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PREFACE
It was hard for the five co-authors to agree on a title for this book. It was 
not so much a disagreement among the members of our research group as it 
was a difficulty in coming up with a succinct title to convey the many aspects 
of the book and the study reported in it.
While this book is indeed an in-depth study of the effectiveness of two job- 
saving strategies used to reverse the shutdown of supermarkets in Philadelphia, 
we believe it is much more, too. It compares worker buyouts and QWL (quality 
of worklife) programs two phenomena of great interest over the 1970s and 
'80s to the public, the mass media, and officials in business, labor, and govern 
ment. It is a study that should prove interesting and useful to researchers in 
economics and other social sciences, to practitioners of management-labor rela 
tions, and to policymakers.
In the book, we attempt to break new ground both theoretically and em 
pirically in the study of employee ownership and worker participation. Chapters 
1 and 2 present a synthesis of previous research on these topics in order to 
develop a theoretical framework. We hypothesize and attempt to demonstrate 
in chapters 5, 6, and 7, in concrete terms, how employee ownership and worker 
participation are linked with economic outcomes for both workers and organiza 
tions. We link workers' attitudes to their firms' economic performance as we 
look at both the individual and organizational effects of innovative structures 
and operational practices.
This study adds to a small but growing body of literature showing the im 
portance of ownership and participation for organizational performance. In 
fact, a very recent study by the United States General Accounting Office, which 
was released after the main text of this book was written, found that: "Those 
ESOP (employee stock ownership plan) firms in which nonmanagerial 
employees have a role in making corporate decisions through work groups 
or committees showed more improvement in our measure of productivity than 
firms without such participation" (USGAO 1987, p. 3).
Though we wanted to reflect the multiple focuses of the study in the title, 
we eventually settled on the primary theme of job-saving strategies. Not only 
was job-saving the initial and overwhelming motivation of the workers, union 
leaders, consultants, and managers who dealt with the shutdown supermarkets 
and the innovative structures, but it is also a significant social, economic, and 
policy issue of our time.
How can our society and economy deal with the pervasive restructuring and 
dislocation which affects so many workers? That question loomed very large 
in the early 1980s when the events recounted and analyzed in this book took
place. In Philadelphia, the scene of the O&O worker buyouts and the creation 
of Super Fresh with its programs of worker involvement in decisions and prof 
its, the late '70s and early '80s brought month after month of shutdowns, 
layoffs, and job loss.
Was it just a short-term crisis? The acuteness of the problem in 1982, when 
the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (A&P) announced the closing of its 
Philadelphia stores, was highlighted by the context of a deep national economic 
recession. Labor force statistics, however, showed a long-term pattern of 
dislocation and change, especially in the manufacturing sector where an average 
net reduction of 1,000 jobs a month had taken place over a 10-year period.
Even now in the late 1980s, with the Philadelphia economy relatively robust 
and the unemployment rate lower, corporate restructuring and interregional 
and international competition continually threaten the jobs of those in former 
ly well-established industries. The question of dislocation and unemployment 
may not get so much mass media attention as it once did, but it has not gone 
away. In 1988 the U.S. Congress passed a bill, which President Reagan op 
posed but did not veto, calling for prenotifiation to workers and communities 
by firms considering shutdowns or large layoffs.
Regardless of which political party is in power, a major issue in coming 
years will be how to prepare for the economy of the future. We hope that a 
major thrust of the emerging debate will be how to better use our human 
resources. We must ask: What kinds of management skills and structures will 
be suited to maintaining prosperity and productivity? What role will workers 
and their union representatives have in maintaining workplace conditions and 
enhancing the fair distribution of income and wealth? How will we ensure that 
basic democratic principles do not get lost in the drive for efficiency and 
profitability?
These questions are not restricted to the context of job-saving, but cover 
a whole range of management, labor, and economic development themes, even 
in the context of economic expansion. In the few years since their initiation, 
both innovations reported in this book have been expanded to other organiza 
tions. Two original O&Os, which were worker buyouts, have now spawned 
experience with four other O&O supermarkets, as described briefly in chapter 
4. The Super Fresh experiment started in Philadelphia has now spread too. 
At the 1987 A&P shareholders meeting, chairman James Woods praised Super 
Fresh as a model for the entire retail grocery chain. The model has been ex 
tended company wide to 243 stores (Palley 1987).
The stories of the O&O and Super Fresh supermarkets, humble and limited 
as they might be, help in the emerging discussion of the issues. Other pieces 
of evidence are being gathered in studies of the results of alternative forms 
of work organization (Rosow 1986), of the role of unions in raising produc-
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tivity and fighting mismanagement (Freeman and Medoff 1984; LeRoy 1987), 
and of the changing global context of American industrial relations and the 
importance of worker participation to industrial change (Kochan 1985). 
Together, these studies share the view that labor-management cooperation is 
indeed required for the future economy, but they warn of the dangers of un 
balanced and nonreciprocated acts of cooperation. Power sharing between labor 
and management is called for, but is much more easily advocated than 
accomplished.
This study was also, significantly, an interdisciplinary one. In the field of 
employee ownership and worker participation, such an approach is often ad 
vocated but rarely put into practice. Dialogue among behavioral scientists and 
economists is often difficult, owing to differing definitions of theoretical 
"modeling," differing methods, differing approaches to statistical methods 
and differing degrees of reliance on them, and differing standards of proof. 
For example, economists often seem to favor systems of equations based on 
variables that can be measured with high degrees of reliability and accuracy. 
On the other hand, behavioral scientists, looking for patterns of behaviors and 
social interactions, often construct models for heuristic as contrasted with 
predictive purposes. Behavioral scientists look at measures of structures and 
behaviors as desirable, but are willing to accept the messiness of human percep 
tions, attitudes, and self-reports, with all of their potential error, bias, and 
unreliability. Even among social scientists, differences in theoretical orienta 
tions and methods between, say, anthropologists and psychologists may in 
hibit cross-fertilization of thinking and research.
These obstacles may have been minimized in this study because, like the 
worker/owners we studied, we can together in this group in part through in 
terpersonal linkages. That is, some of us were drawn in because of mutual 
friendships, acquaintanceships, and prior experience with each other in other 
types of activities. Working together strengthened these bonds and developed 
them in other directions as well. For instance, several of us became more ac 
tive in our faculty union together, partly as a result of informal discussions 
at our research group meetings.
Nevertheless, we still had to struggle to understand each other and to in 
tegrate our perspectives. The reader will have to judge how well we accomplish 
ed a kind of synthesis.
To study a set of workplaces based on democratic principles, we set up a 
democratic research group. That way we experienced both the agonies and 
the ecstasies our research subjects told us about. For us, speed was sacrificed, 
but the multidisciplinary effort we made was profitable and productive. Some 
of the time we had to struggle and fight about our philosophies, our methods, 
and most particularly, our differing abilities to work towards a common 
deadline.
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Most of the time, however, we enjoyed the challenge of working with peo 
ple bringing different perspectives to bear on a complex problem. We had 
researchers trained and practicing as social psychologists, industrial relations 
specialists, urban anthropologists, and labor economists. At the time we began, 
three of us were nontenured (one in a nontenure-track position) and two tenured. 
Our group was composed of four females and one male. Differing personality 
traits and quirks entered into the mixture. It was not possible for us to rely 
on common habits, professional jargons, traditional role relationships, or hierar 
chical ranks for guidance in making decisions.
Though it was a group job throughout, we each took on special areas of 
responsibility. Art Hochner took primary responsibility for writing chapters 
1,2, and 8, and for integating the final product. Cherry Granrose had primary 
responsibility for the analysis of data from the workers' survey and for writing 
chapters 3 and 6. Judy Goode supervised the interviewing of the workers, 
analyzed the interviews and wrote chapter 5. Elaine Simon also worked on 
the interviews, put together the codebook which was invaluable for analyzing 
those interviews, and was primarily responsible for writing chapter 4. Eileen 
Appelbaum took primary responsibility for the analysis of data from the shop 
stewards and store managers, as well as data obtained at the corporate level, 
and for writing chapter 7.
After the initial drafts of chapters were submitted to the group, comments 
and criticisms were forthcoming, and members of the group participated in 
rewriting each other's chapters for later drafts. In the end, the book was the 
product of the entire group, with both the benefits and costs of group work.
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Using Worker Participation and 
Buyouts to Save Jobs
I had been at Food Fair in 1979 when it closed, then 
joined as part-time at A&R I saw the writing on the wall 
as far as chains were concerned. a former A&P worker.
It was a tough period . . . you didn't know what the heck 
was happening before the lay-off, it was a bad time. Peo 
ple were bumping all over the place. Still, it was a big 
shock. January 31 and all of a sudden you're out of a job. 
There's nothing. At the time most everyone was gone 
other than high seniority people over 14 years. I don't 
think it really dawned on them that they were going to 
lose their jobs. We were in a store that was doing well, 
and didn't think it would close. a former A&P worker.
I closed three stores, kept bumping around. It was very, 
very sad, a lot of tears. It had been a very closeknit store, 
like a family. a former A&P worker.
It wouldn't make any difference if I never got the $5,000 
back. Just the experience was worth it. Here, you have a 
chance at possibly making some money, but also to have 
some control over your destiny. a worker/owner.
In late February 1982, during a national recession, the Great At 
lantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P) announced, as required in its 
local union contract, that it was closing its 29 remaining Philadelphia 
supermarkets in 20 days (see table 1.1 for chronology). A&P had 
been closing Philadelphia area supermarkets gradually over the pre 
ceding decade, but closings had accelerated in the last months and 
the announcement of a complete shutdown of A&P's Philadelphia 
operations meant that suddenly 2,000 people would be thrown out of 
work.
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One of the affected unions, local 1357 of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW), was primed to respond. Less than a 
week after A&P announced the final store closings 20 days away, the 
union made a buyout proposal that eventually led to the establish 
ment of the O&O stores. The union originally proposed that A&P 
workers-to-be-laid-off purchase 21 of the closed stores. News got 
around among the A&P workers that there was an alternative to un 
employment or looking for another job, and meetings about the buy 
out plan began at the union hall. About 600 union members showed 
up for the initial meetings. Each potential worker/owner would have 
to contribute $5,000 and a $200 downpayment would hold a place. 
The union's credit union would make arrangements for loans. News 
paper accounts reported that about 600 workers signed pledges 
worth $3 million within the next three weeks.
New Relationships in the Workplace
During the past decade, a great deal of public attention has been 
paid to worker buyouts. To save their jobs, workers have contem 
plated or launched into buyouts of firms threatened with shutdowns. 
These firms range in size from the large 7,000-worker integrated 
National Steel Mill in Wen-ton, West Virginia to the two small A&P 
supermarkets in the Philadelphia area converted to O&O supermar 
kets with about 50 workers each. Worker buyouts have occurred in a 
variety of industries in addition to steel and supermarkets, including 
furniture, machine tools, frozen foods, mining, shoes, trucking, 
printing, meat packing, taxicabs, railroads, garments, and wood 
products. According to the records of the National Center for Em 
ployee Ownership (NCEO), about 60 firms threatened with shut 
down or massive layoffs have been bought by their employees since 
1975. Moreover, it appears that about 90 percent of these bought-out 
firms have survived thus far.
Employee ownership and worker cooperatives have a tradition 
stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century. Workers in recent 
years have rediscovered employee ownership in the midst of crisis
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and found for themselves a new way to work. Furthermore, the cur 
rent rediscovery has been occurring not only in the United States, 
but in most western industrial nations (Jones and Svejnar 1982).
The worker buyout is one path taken in the search for ways to 
change relationships between workers and their workplaces. Cur 
rently, various means of including workers in the ownership and con 
trol of work organizations are being explored. The most widespread 
forms are employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and quality of 
worklife (QWL) programs.
Quality of worklife is a vague term that means many things to 
many people. The kinds of activities it includes often take many 
other names too, such as "employee involvement."
[QWL] is used interchangeably with "humanization of 
work," "work reform," "work redesign," and "work 
improvement." It is too frequently used loosely to charac 
terize almost any joint [labor-management] program that 
requires a committee, but it ought to be confined to joint 
ventures that in the first instance aim at satisfying work 
ers' desires or needs for restructuring of the workplace. 
This restructuring should allow greater participation in 
decisionmaking on the job, constructive interaction with 
one's fellows, and opportunity for personal development 
and self-realization.
. . . All things considered, perhaps a sound enough 
guide to what QWL means is provided in a definition in 
cluded in a news report of an international conference that 
ended in Toronto in early September 1981: "many forms 
of new work organizations . . . involving workers in 
shop-floor decisions through problem-solving commit 
tees" (Siegel and Weinberg 1982, 140-142).
The General Accounting Office estimates that about 4,800 firms 
have ESOPs with various degrees of ownership in each (USGAO 
1986). A New York Stock Exchange study conducted in 1982 found 
that 14 percent of firms employing 500 or more people had quality 
circles, 13 percent had employee suggestion systems, 11 percent had 
employee task forces, 8 percent had profit sharing plans, and 8 per 
cent had labor-management committees. Overall, "one fourth [of
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corporations with 500 or more employees] have at least made a start 
toward the less-adversarial environment associated with QWL" 
(Freund and Epstein 1984, p. 129).
This trend toward experimentation has emerged for a number of 
loosely connected reasons. Structural changes in the economy have 
put pressure on manufacturing industries, on unions, and on the 
Frost Belt. The process of change has been exacerbated by corporate 
strategies that promote deindustrialization, by conglomerate merg 
ers, and by intensified foreign competition. Economic stagnation, 
deep and frequent recessions, and a recovery that left elevated un 
employment rates resulted in severe economic dislocation that is, 
massive layoffs and worsened structural unemployment.
At the same time, there have been institutional and cultural 
changes affecting workplaces. The quality of working life has be 
come a concern, not only of white-collar workers, but also of blue- 
collar employees. Participation by workers in decisionmaking has 
been lauded as a keystone of the Japanese economic achievement, as 
well as a necessary element for reversing declining labor productiv 
ity. Union-management relations have staggered from management 
hostility, union concessions, and union membership decline to union- 
management cooperation. In this confusing context, some workers 
have sought to take their job security into their own hands.
There are smaller numbers of worker buyouts compared to other 
forms of employee ownership and worker participation. Despite this, 
the drama of saving jobs, the mystery of rescuing seemingly failing 
firms, and the paradox of workers taking managerial responsibilities 
in worker buyouts have combined to fascinate both the popular and 
theoretical imagination. Aside from emotional appeal, however, 
worker buyouts seem to be more full-fledged attempts to implement 
employee ownership and worker participation. Observers of ESOPs 
often criticize them for giving workers mere paper ownership with 
out control (Slott, 1985a, 1985b). Meanwhile, critics of QWL pro 
grams distrust so-called participation without a genuine 
redistribution of power (Parker 1985). In theory, worker buyouts 
possess the potential to release workers' energies and to reforge the 
organization on a more effective and more egalitarian basis.
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Creation of Innovative Structures in Philadelphia Supermarkets
The buyout proposal and other union efforts spurred lengthy 
union-management negotiations between A&P and local 1357, which 
continued through the spring of 1982. In May, the UFCW and A&P 
agreed to a landmark contract which would save many jobs through 
the creation of two innovative business structures. First of all, two 
stores would be sold to groups of employees, who would indepen 
dently own and operate them as employee-owned businesses. The 
second innovation was Super Fresh, a new subsidiary of A&P, which 
would reopen many of the remaining stores. Super Fresh would in 
corporate new methods of management, a quality of worklife pro 
gram to provide employee participation in decisionmaking, and a 
revenue-based bonus plan as an incentive for workers. A&P prom 
ised to open 20 Super Fresh stores eventually and to give preference 
to former A&P workers in hiring. In exchange, the UFCW agreed to 
wage cuts of 20 percent and concessions on some benefits.
Even though announcement of plans for the employee-owned 
stores preceded the announcement of the Super Fresh plan, Super 
Fresh stores opened first. The first Super Fresh store opened in July 
1982. Super Fresh engaged consultants from the Busch Center at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania to establish the 
first QWL programs and to conduct the training of "associates" and 
"store directors" (the new terms for workers and store managers, 
respectively). Super Fresh stores were set up with a decentralized 
philosophy, so that the store director would have more autonomy 
than under A&P.
The information meetings on the worker buyout plan were held for 
a time, while union-A&P negotiations dragged on. After May, how 
ever, most workers dropped out of the buyout scheme, expecting to 
be recalled at Super Fresh.
The remaining prospective worker/owners met over the summer 
for planning and research. The first O&O store opened with 24 
worker/owners in Roslyn, Pennsylvania, a northwestern suburb of 
Philadelphia, on October 13, 1982 about seven months after the 
A&P shutdown announcement. The second O&O store, with 17
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(later reduced to 14) worker/owners, opened the following month in 
the far northeast section of Philadelphia, in a neighborhood called 
Parkwood Manor. Each O&O store established bylaws calling for 
substantial worker/owner control over a hired store manager.
This case of worker buyout, in contrast to many that have been 
reported in the news media, occurred in an urban context where a 
shutdown did not threaten the sole employment opportunity in town 
for displaced workers. The A&P workers found themselves out of a 
job at a time when the economy was slumping and employers all 
over the country were calling for union concessions. Even though 
these workers had slim prospects of finding a job with another su 
permarket chain, former A&P employees did have two options they 
could take to keep supermarket jobs. Eventually, 38 became worker/ 
owners in the two O&O supermarkets. Over 1,500 of the displaced 
A&P workers became Super Fresh employees.
As a result of the March 1982 shutdown, 29 A&P stores were 
actually closed. Twenty-six of these eventually became Super Fresh 
stores; two became O&O stores; and one was closed permanently 
because of structural flaws in the foundation.
The Super Fresh chain was later to convert all remaining A&P 
stores in southeastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and north 
ern Delaware to the new subsidiary. Many were changed over by the 
end of 1982, and by mid-1983 there were over 50 Super Fresh stores 
in the region. These stores had been minimally affected by the shut 
down threat in 1982 and were represented by other UFCW union
____________Table 1.1 Chronology_________
Feb. 1982 A&P announcement of closings.
March 1982 UFCW proposes employee buyouts and holds meet 
ings to get pledges from workers.
May 1982 A&P/UFCW agreement to sell two stores to work 
ers, reopen most others as Super Fresh.
July 1982 First Super Fresh openings.
October 1982 First O&O store opens.
November 1982 Second O&O store opens._____________
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locals not actively seeking QWL or employee ownership and not en 
thusiastic about the agreement between local 1357 and A&P, to say 
the least. QWL training was not instituted as early nor was training 
conducted as fully as in the stores in Philadelphia, which had been 
involved in the shutdown. These employees had thus not participated 
in the discussions about employee ownership and QWL conducted by 
UFCW 1357 at the time of the shutdown.
The Study
Despite increasing openness by workers to the idea of buyouts and 
some apparent survivability of bought-out firms, little is actually 
known about the effectiveness of buyouts. That is, though jobs are 
saved, how do worker buyouts compare with other job saving meth 
ods? Do they generate new jobs or merely slow the onset of unem 
ployment? Do they open up new sources of organizational efficiency 
or survive through employee subsidies and painful sacrifices? Do 
they redistribute power in meaningful ways? Do they substitute one 
set of worries for another, financial risk for job insecurity?
This book looks at how worker buyouts function and how success 
fully they meet the goals of saving jobs and increasing worker con 
trol. It studies the two O&O supermarkets created from former A&P 
stores in Philadelphia in 1982 and compares the effectiveness of 
these buyouts to another method of job-saving labor-management 
concessions which included productivity bonuses and a QWL pro 
gram in the Super Fresh stores. Since both of these situations 
emerged from the same labor negotiations between A&P and locals 
56 and 1357 of the UFCW, the setting provides a natural field com 
parison and contrast. It allows for clear and controlled explorations 
of employee ownership and worker participation.
The research began when the shutdown was announced and 
UFCW local 1357 proposed worker buyouts. Members of a study 
group at Temple University investigating plant closings and job loss 
contacted UFCW locals 1357 (retail clerks) and 56 (meatcutters), 
A&P, and the consultants working with them and asked to study this
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experience. The research group conducting the overall study was 
multidisciplinary, drawn from the fields of industrial relations, orga 
nizational behavior, psychology, sociology, anthropology, urban stud 
ies, political science, and economics. The group drew upon many 
perspectives and methodologies in conducting the study. There were 
three major data collection phases, as shown in table 1.2.
This book covers results from Phases II and III. It is divided into 
eight chapters. First, here in chapter 1, we place worker buyouts in 
the context of employee ownership and worker participation, theoret 
ically, historically, and practically. In chapter 2, we present a theo 
retical framework of the organizational processes involved in 
employee-owned firms and the expected outcomes for organizations 
and individual workers. The framework will attempt to explain in 
theory how worker buyouts function and how they affect the organi 
zations' operations and the individuals in them. Chapter 3 presents 
the research design and methods of data collection used, namely 
semistructured interviews and systematic questionnaire surveys. In 
chapter 4, the formal structures of the O&O and Super Fresh stores 
are described. Chapter 5 reports data primarily from interviews con 
cerning the personal experiences of the workers and the informal so 
cial structures of the stores. Chapters 6 and 7 present quantitative 
tests of hypotheses derived from theoretical framework. Worker-level 
perceptions, attitudes, and economic outcomes are included in Chap 
ter 6. Store-level functioning and outcomes are examined in chapter
____________Table 1.2 Research Phases____________
July 1982 Phase I: Worker survey.
Summer 1983 Phase Ha: Interviews with O&O worker owners.
Fall 1983 Phase lib: Interviews with former A&P workers
at two Super Fresh stores in Philadelphia. 
Fall 1984 Phase He: Interviews with former A&P workers
in two Super Fresh stores outside Philadelphia. 
Fall 1984 Phase Ilia: Survey of workers interviewed in
Phase II. 
Winter to Summer 1985 Phase Illb: Shop steward and store manager
surveys.
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7. The final chapter, 8, draws conclusions and translates them into 
policy-relevant recommendations for future research and practice.
Varieties of Participative Firms and Buyouts
To understand the importance of the recent wave of worker buy 
outs, it is necessary to put them in historical, practical, and theoret 
ical focus. Where do these 60 or so firms fit? In particular, why 
study the case of the O&O Supermarkets? These buyouts are less 
well known than larger ones, such as Weirton Steel, South Bend 
Lathe, or Rath Packing. Moreover, the O&O stores are in a retail 
industry as contrasted with the more familiar and "typical" manu 
facturing buyout. However, the O&O case allows for the investiga 
tion of concerns of practitioners and theorists accumulated over the 
past decade which emphasize not only employee ownership but also 
worker control. Furthermore, the unique setting of the O&O case 
provides an unusually rich example of employee ownership and 
worker participation.
There are many types of employee ownership. The generic term, 
employee ownership, is used to refer to most forms of ownership by 
jobholders in a company, both workers and managers. Employee 
ownership is usually associated with the ESOP, only one of the many 
forms and hybrids that employee-owned firms take. The diversity of 
types is often highly confusing.
Two researchers have offered typologies of employee-owned firms 
in attempts to clarify the important similarities and differences 
among them. One typology depends primarily on the three legal 
forms in which employee ownership is found: ESOPs, direct em 
ployee ownership, and worker cooperatives (Toscano 1983b). The 
ESOP is defined in the tax code as a type of employee benefit pro 
gram which invests in its own company's stock and which is eligible 
for certain tax breaks. There are ESOPs with tiny amounts of stock 
in the company, such as at AT&T and Mobil, others with sub 
stantial stock, such as Eastern Airlines, still others with majority 
ownership, such as Rath, and a few with 100 percent ownership,
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such as Weirton Steel. ESOPs are often an indirect form of owner 
ship for workers because stocks are held in trust through an Em 
ployee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT) which may or may not be 
controlled by nonsupervisory employees. Some of these ESOPs re 
sulted from buyouts, but most did not. Worker buyouts number only 
about 1 percent of the estimated number of ESOPs.
Direct ownership is share ownership by workers without the legal 
and tax standing of an ESOP and without the indirect ownership de 
vice of the ESOT. Worker cooperatives, the oldest form of employee 
ownership, tend to involve equal share ownership and equal voice in 
management for all members or owners of the firm. The O&O stores 
were set up as worker cooperatives, but while all owners are work 
ers, not all workers are owners.
Each of the three forms has legal and operational advantages and 
disadvantages. Moreover, they each include so many variations that 
they often may not be operationally distinguishable. For instance, 
there are so-called democratic or cooperative ESOPs, which resem 
ble worker cooperatives in the distribution of ownership and control.
A second typology of employee-owned firms, developed in 
England, distinguishes employee-owned firms on the basis of the 
reasons for their origins (Cornforth 1983): (1) cooperatives 
"endowed" by the original capitalist owners, (2) worker buyouts, 
(3) defensive (job-saving) cooperatives, (4) alternatives (i.e., 
counter-cultural) cooperatives, and (5) job creation cooperatives us 
ing government money to combat high unemployment. Because this 
typology was derived in England, it ignores ESOPs, which form a 
large group here, but were virtually absent in the U.K. in the early 
1980s.
More important, though reasons for establishment may be classi 
fiable, firms in a particular category do not inevitably have similar 
characteristics or objectives. As Blasi and Whyte (1981) have 
pointed out, while job-saving worker buyouts in the 1970s and 1980s 
are similar in origin, they differ in key characteristics and behaviors. 
In the 1970s buyouts, unions were either hostile or passive and 
rarely was management structure changed. In contrast, in 1980s buy-
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outs, unions took initiatives to shape the terms, and workers have 
sought and obtained more say in the firms' day to day operations.
While legal forms and origins are important, they tend to reflect 
historical and legal trends and do not clarify how different organiza 
tions function. A more precise typology is necessary.
For theoretical and practical importance there seem to be two 
main dimensions. These are (1) the amount of employee ownership in 
the firm and (2) the degree of worker participation in decisions 
about policies and day to day management. These dimensions are 
complex and not easily reducible to quantitative scales. Amount of 
employee ownership should take into account not only the percentage 
of equity owned by employees, but also the distribution of shares 
among owners, the dispersion of shares among employees, and the 
percent of equity owned by managers compared to that owned by 
nonsupervisory employees (Conte, Tannenbaum and McCulloch 
1981). Likewise, degree of worker participation is actually multidi 
mensional, involving the degree of worker influence, the range of 
decisions influenced, the extent of participation among workers, 
whether participation is direct or representative, and other aspects 
(Dachler and Wilpert 1978).
Some rough subdivision of these dimensions does allow us to 
make meaningful distinctions among categories of employee-owned 
and worker-participative firms. The following table (1.3) splits 
amount of employee ownership into three segments: no employee 
ownership, minority employee ownership (employees own less than 
50 percent of the shares), and majority employee ownership (more 
than 50 percent of the workers own more than 50 percent of the 
shares). The other main dimension is dichotomized into low worker 
participation and high worker participation. High worker participa 
tion involves such things as (a) restructured hierarchy and control 
systems, changed role of supervisors, worker input to decisions; (b) 
worker representatives on the board of directors and/or on the ESOT, 
worker voting rights on shares; and (c) union involvement in collec 
tively bargaining for the ownership and/or participation plans, pro 
moting the plan, and seeking a changed role for workers and/or the
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union. Low worker participation means workers and unions have not 
been involved in these issues. Table 1.3 illustrates this typology.
Though some of these categories are self-explanatory, others are 
not. The first two categories involve garden-variety capitalist firms 
and are included here for contrast with forms of employee owner 
ship. (1) Conventional firms, probably the largest category, includes 
those with no employee ownership and minimal worker participa 
tion. (2) Firms with QWL or other participatory programs, but with 
no employee ownership belong to an apparently growing group. 
Some well-known examples include Ford Motor with its El (Em 
ployee Involvement) programs developed in cooperation with the 
United Auto Workers (UAW), General Foods with its Topeka pet 
food plant, and, one of the subjects of this study, Super Fresh Food 
Markets.
The remaining four categories comprise the forms usually lumped 
indiscriminately together and called employee ownership. (3) Most 
ESOPs involve a minority of company equity and minimal worker 
participation. According to a survey by Marsh and McAllister (1981) 
of ESOPs of at least three years of age, only 13 percent held greater 
than 50 percent of company stock, the average ESOP holding being 
28 percent. Moreover, the survey found that 69 percent of ESOPs 
granted no voting rights on the stock plan participants, and that 
more than one-half of ESOP companies report no effects of the 
ESOP on worker-management communications, cooperation among 
employees, or employee suggestions. Furthermore, the chief motives
Table 1.3 Typology of Employee Ownership and Worker Participation 
________________Amount of employee ownership______ 
____________None______Minority_____Majority
(2) QWL and (4) Concessionary (6) Worker co-ops 
High participation buy-ins and worker 
Degree of programs buyouts 
worker
participation Low (1) Conventional (3) Most ESOPs (5) Employee/ 
firms manager
buyouts
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for adoption of ESOPs were, in rank order, providing an employee 
benefit, increasing productivity, and taking advantage of available 
tax breaks. (4) Concessionary buy-ins form a relatively small cate 
gory, though an important one, and are particularly a product of the 
1981-83 recession and its aftermath. Companies in which workers 
and unions have given wage concessions in return for company stock 
and, in some cases, seats on the board of directors include Pan 
American Airways (including the Airline Pilots Association, known 
as ALPA), Eastern Airlines (including a number of unions, such as 
International Association of Machinists [IAM], ALPA, and others), 
Chrysler (with UAW), and Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) 
(including a number of railway unions). This category, the subject 
of heated debate in labor circles (e.g., Metzgar 1984; Compa and 
Baicich 1984a, 1984b; Barber and Banks 1984) has never been 
identified as a special subtype of employee ownership, though it is 
neither a typical ESOP nor a full-fledged buyout.
The final two categories, (5) the employee/manager buyout and 
(6) the worker buyout have also not been distinguished before. In 
this study, the term employee/manager buyout implies majority em 
ployee ownership with conventional management control. Such firms 
include those turned over by idealistic owners ("endowed coopera 
tives' ' from Cornforth 1983) and those bought by both managers and 
workers, with stock distribution weighted toward higher-paid man 
agement employees. Often these employee/manager buyouts are 
structured as ESOPs, but almost always control of the stock is in the 
hands of the manager group and/or the financiers of the deal, and the 
typically hierarchical authority structure of the firm is unchanged. 
Employee/manager buyouts tend to conform to what Blasi and 
Whyte (1981) called "1970s buyouts." They include such firms as 
South Bend Lathe (with the cooperation of a United Steelworkers 
local union), Bates Fabrics, and Dan River Textiles.
In contrast is category (6), worker cooperatives and worker buy 
outs. These firms involve both majority employee ownership and 
high levels of participation in decisions by management, workers, 
and/or unions. Older cooperatives include the plywood firms of the 
Pacific northwest (Berman 1967). Relatively new worker coopera-
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tives include numerous countercultural organizations (Rothschild- 
Whitt 1979). The buyouts tend to be of the "1980s variety" (Blasi 
and Whyte 1981) with union involvement and attempts at restructur 
ing the hierarchy. The O&O supermarkets, the main focus of this 
study, fit into this final category.
In sum, the six categories outline different types of firms with 
differing qualities based on the amount of employee ownership and 
worker participation they contain. We expect that the goals they set, 
the methods they use, the problems they face, the solutions they de 
vise, and the effectiveness which results may differ fundamentally 
from one category to the next. For instance, the expectations of 
workers concerning their input to decisions may depend on the de 
gree of employee ownership, such that levels of input adequate in a 
QWL program may be frustrating to those in worker buyouts. Simi 
larly, motivation and productivity gains in ESOPs may be related 
more to stock prices than they would be in worker cooperatives 
where independence from managerial control may be more impor 
tant.
The focus of this study, worker buyouts, has broad significance, 
despite its narrow focus on few firms. Worker buyouts are one of the 
most theoretically interesting forms of participation. Workers and 
unions seem to have noticed limitations of previous cases which in 
cluded less ownership and participation, and recent establishment of 
concessionary buy-ins shows the tendency to mix ownership with 
participation. Future buyouts and buy-ins may continue these pat 
terns. Along with our focus on worker buyouts, we compare the 
O&O stores to Super Fresh Stores, some of which have implemented 
QWL. Thus, we can compare employee ownership with participation 
to participation alone. This enables us to see more clearly the rela 
tive effectiveness of worker buyouts.
Past and Recent History of Employee Ownership
The various forms of employee ownership have had a long history 
in the United States dating back to the 1790s in the case of worker
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cooperatives and to the 1920s in the case of ESOPs. Employee own 
ership did not always enjoy as much notice or as much success as in 
the last few decades. In fact, this history has often been used to 
criticize employee ownership. Lessons can be learned from past ex 
perience on the importance of cooperatives and ESOPs within past 
labor-capital wars, on employee ownership's feasibility and viability 
in the present, and on its likely place in the future. The prevailing 
wisdom, according to critics, claims that:
(1) worker cooperatives failed as an anticapitalist labor 
strategy;
(2) worker cooperatives are doomed to sink as socialist 
islands in the capitalist sea or as anarchic and undis 
ciplined, hence inefficient, businesses;
(3) ESOPs are historic manifestations of management 
hostility to unions;
(4) employee ownership is a sidetrack from either conven 
tional collective bargaining or from "Theory Z" type 
corporate human relations policies;
(5) at best, worker buyouts are moderators of structural 
economic dislocation, and at worst, they are a stick of 
financial burden attached to a paper carrot of stock 
ownership.
Without denying the validity of criticisms of many aspects of past 
performance and practice, it is possible to see recent experience with 
employee ownership as a break from the past. While some motives 
for establishing worker cooperatives and ESOPs have remained con 
stant, the ideological, economic, institutional, and legal environ 
ments have shifted. Thus, employee ownership need not be heavily 
tarred with the brush of past failure and past criticism.
Two separate streams (at times, trickles) of development of 
worker cooperatives and of ESOPs have been joined at the contem 
porary wave of employee ownership. They had quite different ori 
gins: worker cooperatives in the early labor movement of the mid- 
nineteenth century; ESOPs in the antiunion welfare capitalism of the 
1920s.
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Worker Cooperatives
Since the 1830s, workers have formed cooperatives during strikes, 
lockouts, and depressions. Some histories trace them back to the 
1790s (Jones 1984; Curl 1980). Early cooperatives were also part of 
"alternative" or socialist movements, including those stimulated by 
the thoughts of men like Robert Owen and Horace Greeley and by 
Communitarian settlements like Brook Farm. By the 1860s, they had 
become an integral part of the platform of the short-lived National 
Labor Union (NLU) led by William Sylvis. Sylvis and the NLU 
helped found a number of worker cooperatives, but these soon began 
to fail or be dominated by a few worker/shareholders or outsiders. 
Subsequent labor organizations, such as the Knights of Labor 
(KOL), continued to promote cooperatives as the solution to indus 
trial conflict between labor and capital. In fact, Jones (1984) credits 
the KOL with establishing about 200 worker cooperatives in the 
1880s at the height of that union's influence. The next large wave 
took place in the 1930s, when unemployed workers formed "self- 
help" cooperatives during the Great Depression.
As the American Federation of Labor (AFL) gained hegemony 
over the U.S. labor movement in the late nineteenth century, how 
ever, its leaders turned toward collective bargaining through business 
unionism and disdained worker cooperatives as impractical. Worker 
cooperatives became dissociated from the labor movement. Further 
more, as observers and theorists of the labor movement emerged in 
middle-class intellectual circles, critiques of worker cooperatives 
and defense of collective bargaining buttressed the AFL's case. John 
Commons in the U.S. (Derber 1970) and Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
(1920), Fabian Socialists in Great Britain, discredited worker coop 
eratives as inevitably unstable forms of organization, and as inferior 
to collective bargaining in promoting equality of power between la 
bor and capital.
Were the labor officials and intellectuals correct in their pessi 
mism? The verdict on worker cooperatives by subsequent observers 
has frequently been just as negative (Shirom 1972). Generally, 
worker cooperatives have been found to be difficult to organize,
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undercapitalized, concentrated in craft industries and/or those 
threatened by structural and technological changes, handicapped by 
weak management and weak commitment to cooperative ideals, be 
set by hostility from business and labor, and short-lived (Aldrich and 
Stern 1983). However, recent studies by Jones (1984) have shown the 
record of worker cooperatives not to be "as overwhelmingly bleak 
as some critics contend" (p. 51). Worker cooperatives with the most 
cooperative features (i.e., equal share ownership, work requirements 
for members, and participation in decisionmaking) have had the best 
success in viability, longevity, and integrity of democratic gover 
nance structure, Jones finds.
Nevertheless, worker cooperatives have never been more than a 
marginal economic force. Currently, some of them are important in a 
few industries, for example, high grade plywood manufacture in the 
Pacific northwest or refuse collection in the San Francisco Bay area 
(Perry 1978). However, for the largest number of currently existing 
cooperatives, those formed out of the social upheavals of the 1960s 
and 1970s, economic marginality is a fact. Jackall and Grain (1984) 
estimate that in 1980 approximately 1,000 small worker cooperatives 
existed. The origins of these firms seem to be motivated mainly by 
opposition to corporate America and a desire to create alternative 
institutions. Most operate in the service sector, food production, dis 
tribution, and sales, with very few in manufacturing, primarily in 
printing and publishing. These cooperatives are small, with about 10 
members on average and about $200,000 in sales per year. Their 
worker/owners are young, educated, white, and low-paid. Indeed, 
until the recent wave of interest in employee/manager and worker 
buyouts, even sympathetic observers of worker cooperatives deemed 
them anachronistic, idealistic, and/or marginal.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans
At about the same time the labor movement cut its ties with the 
employee ownership movement, capitalists and managers became in 
terested in stock ownership for workers. In the 1870s, Abram
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Hewitt, then congressman and later mayor of New York City, advo 
cated worker stock ownership and profit sharing as the solution to 
industrial evils (Derber 1970). In fact, Patard (1982) traces the roots 
of the idea back to the 1840s. However, it was not until the post- 
World War I period that employee stock ownership flourished, 
through employer-initiated savings plans, stock purchase options, 
profit sharing, and employee benefit plans. Patard describes the em 
ployee stock ownership movement of the 1920s as bigger in propor 
tion to the number of shares outstanding than the contemporary 
ESOP movement in 1980. Employee stock ownership was often pro 
moted by management in connection with employer-dominated com 
pany unions. Unionists and leftists denounced these plans as union- 
busting, co-optation devices, giving workers big financial risks 
without any genuine participation in decisions. The stock market 
crash of 1929 destroyed and discredited this movement. Subsequent 
stock ownership plans tended to be limited to highly-paid executives.
In the 1950s, a visionary investment banker, Louis Kelso, took up 
the banner of employee stock ownership in the Capitalist Manifesto 
(Kelso and Adler 1958) and in his Two Factor Theory (Kelso and 
Hetter 1967). Despite sharp critiques of his theories by eminent 
economists, Kelso was persistent in promoting his views. His efforts 
and those of his students, associates, and converts to his ideas have 
created the contemporary ESOP movement. Kelso's pragmatic thrust 
has been to take advantage of features in the Internal Revenue Code 
that allow qualified employee benefit trusts to borrow money to buy 
the employer's stocks or other securities. Kelso hailed ESOPs as an 
instrument of corporate finance, of hostile takeover prevention, of 
wealth redistribution, of productivity improvement, and a number of 
other boons to capitalists, workers and the economy in general.
ESOPs have been enhanced by virtually every federal tax change 
since the early 1970s. 1 The Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 drew in 
creased attention to the tax benefits to corporations of establishing 
ESOPs. Kelso's chief convert in Congress and the most powerful and 
active proponent of ESOPs has been Senator Russell Long (D., La.),
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son of Louisiana's late populist governor, Huey Long. Sen. Long 
was the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee in the 1970s and 
was the committee's ranking Democrat until his retirement in 1986.
Under ESOPs employers establish ESOTs for their employees to 
give or sell stock in their own company as a benefit, somewhat sim 
ilar to a pension fund. Tax breaks to the employer issue from this 
transaction; for instance, social security tax is not paid on contribu 
tions to the trust, employer contributions are tax deductible, and a 
tax credit might be claimed as well. Employees get a tax-exempt 
benefit and receive vested stock when they leave the firm. The 
ESOT can borrow money to purchase stock and use the employer's 
contribution to pay off the loan. The ESOP particularly attracts 
employers because of its usefulness to: (a) raise investment capital; 
(b) pass a company on to employees; and (c) provide a special type 
of pension plan, exempt from several important ERISA protections. 
However, for workers the ESOP is generally not seen as a suitable 
substitute for a fully protected pension plan.
Business journals emphasize the advantage to management of al 
lowing employee ownership: quick capital formation, tax breaks, 
avoidance of pension fund obligations, union avoidance, improved 
worker motivation and discipline, etc. Fears of management manip 
ulation of ESOPs and of lack of worker control over stock voting 
rights have led many unionists to be very wary of employee owner 
ship.
While then: primary appeal has been to employers, ESOPs have 
sometimes been used to effect employee/manager and worker buy 
outs. The first such employee/manager buyout using an ESOP for job 
saving occurred at South Bend Lathe in 1975. Despite the predomi 
nance of management control, ESOPs have been used by some 
unions to gain a say in management decisions through concessionary 
buy-ins. In fact, the rise of the ESOP seems to have revived the idea 
of spreading stock ownership or making workers into capitalists. 
Ironically, the rise of the ESOP may have helped to resuscitate labor 
movement interest in employee ownership. In addition, the worker 
cooperative movement has been transformed by lessons learned in
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employee/manager buyouts those which granted little control to 
workers or unions.
Current Environment of Employee Ownership
The growth of interest in employee ownership has been stimulated 
by other factors in addition to legislative benevolence to ESOPs. So 
cietal changes over the last few decades also motivate the study and 
practice of employee ownership. These changes reflect popular ide 
ology, the economy, legislative approaches to current problems, and 
institutional rearrangements.
Ideology
Ideological currents in politics, business, and interpersonal rela 
tions in the western industrial nations may be said to have contrib 
uted to a desire for powersharing. Sandwiched in with movements 
such as decentralization and accountability in government and self- 
determination through feminism, since the early 1970s there has 
been a drive for greater worker participation in decisionmaking. The 
Lordstown strike and the book Work in America (1973) led to calls 
for job enrichment and the humanization of work. The rising aware 
ness of foreign competition has given long tenures on the best seller 
list to books advocating forms of corporate powersharing, such as 
Theory Z (Ouchi 1981) and In Search of Excellence (Peters and Wa 
terman 1982). Academic interest in powersharing at work has also 
been stirred by examination of socialist alternatives to Soviet bureau 
cratic centralism, most notably by the Yugoslav system of self- 
managed enterprises. The Solidarity union in Poland renewed this 
interest through placing self-management high on its now-repressed 
agenda of societal change. Although it has been considered quite 
radical at times, the concern for powersharing has pushed into many 
areas of the mainstream and lends legitimacy to forms of worker 
participation and ownership. Even the wave of conservative ideology 
resulting in the Reagan presidency stressed self-help and en- 
trepreneurship, which have been used to justify employee ownership.
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Economics
Economic changes, particularly structural ones, have given the 
greatest impetus to both worker participation and employee owner 
ship. Several forces have combined to shut down many workplaces, 
to force millions to the unemployment lines, and to change the 
power balance between labor and capital. The conglomerate merger 
movement from the late 1960s to the present, together with corpo 
rate disinvestment policies, and deindustrialization closed factories, 
offices, and stores that had become unprofitable or not profitable 
enough for corporate financial analysts (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982). Population migration to the Sun Belt, the shift of employment 
from manufacturing to so-called postindustrial sectors, and a rapid 
series of recessions compounded the economic dislocation. Business 
sought solutions for its decline in competitiveness and productivity, 
taking advantage of unions' political and economic weaknesses. 
Management initiated QWL and participative programs and bar 
gained for labor concessions.
Many workers faced with these pressures and the loss of job secu 
rity had to come up with new coping responses. Some accepted con 
cessionary buy-ins, while some others engaged in employee/manager 
and worker buyouts.
International Developments
Workers in other countries pursued similar paths as well. In West 
ern Europe, interest in employee ownership as an answer to reces 
sion and unemployment grew. Employee-owned companies more 
than doubled in number in both Great Britain and France between 
1975 and 1983. In 1983, the Wales Trade Unions Congress (TUC) 
made employee ownership an integral part of its overall strategy for 
Welsh economic recovery. In Italy, the number of employee-owned 
firms topped 18,000 by 1981, ranging in size from tiny firms to 
those employing thousands of workers. Most of these firms belong to 
cooperative leagues affiliated with the major trade union federations. 
Increasing numbers of worker cooperatives have arisen in Holland,
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Belgium, and Denmark, too. Finally, Spain boasts a rapidly growing 
employee-owned sector, including the famed Mondragon coopera 
tives of the Basque country, employing over 18,000 in more than 85 
employee-owned firms. The Mondragon cooperatives are extremely 
well-integrated, featuring their own central bank, a technical univer 
sity, and the largest manufacturer/exporter of household appliances 
in Spain (EEC 1981).
Employee ownership took on an entirely new meaning in Sweden 
and Denmark during the 1970s and 1980s. The Social Democratic 
parties of those nations proposed a series of plans for "economic 
democracy," in which ownership of private sector firms would, over 
a few decades, pass over to union and/or worker control through ac 
cumulated employer contributions to "wage-earner funds." Al 
though these proposals were stalled and watered down in the 
Scandinavian parliaments, this idea of employee ownership is part of 
a much larger tendency in northern European countries toward 
worker participation and co-determination.
Legislation
The movement towards expanded employee ownership in the U.S. 
has also gained momentum from a variety of legislative initiatives. 
Aside from the various changes in the tax code over the years that 
favor the formation of ESOPs, attempts to aid communities dis 
tressed by unemployment, shutdowns, and poverty have increased 
awareness of the opportunities for employee ownership. For in 
stance, legislation was introduced in a number of states, several cit 
ies (including Philadelphia), and Congress over the past decade to 
mitigate the impact of plant closings. Though these bills primarily 
focused on prenotification of layoffs and shutdowns, most also in 
cluded provisions to encourage employee/manager and worker buy 
outs. Arguments used by advocates of plant closing legislation often 
emphasized that a minimum of six months prenotification was nec 
essary if a buyout was even to be contemplated.
On another front, Congress established in 1979 a National Con 
sumer Cooperative Bank, which can reserve up to 10 percent of its
Using Worker Participation and Buyouts to Save Jobs 23
funds to aid worker cooperatives, employee/manager and worker 
buyouts, and even ESOPs. The Economic Development Administra 
tion (EDA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the 
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), among other agencies, have 
been involved in assisting employee-owned firms, particularly 
through buyouts. Their involvement stems from either broad inter 
pretations of their legal mandates or explicit mandates to work with 
employee-owned firms. Innumerable state and local initiatives and 
agencies have directed attention, money, and other aid to employee 
ownership. Recently, Massachusetts passed a new worker coopera 
tive statute that aids in the formation of democratically-owned and 
operated businesses.
In Pennsylvania, an Employee Ownership Assistance Program was 
established by a state statute in June 1984. The act provided for a 
fund of $15 million to be used over a three-year period: (a) $1 mil 
lion per year was set aside for technical assistance and professional 
services, including the funding of feasibility studies. It was initially 
set up as a "forgivable" loan program, but this later became a grant 
program with the requirement that 10 percent of the grant be 
matched by some other source, (b) $4 million per year was devoted 
to a revolving loan fund for debt financing (or for "gap" equity 
loans while worker/owner investors came up with their own personal 
contributions).2
Support Networks
The establishment of a developing network of support organiza 
tions to advance, encourage, and aid employee ownership demon 
strates an important institutional shift from the past. The legislation 
passed in Massachusetts was drafted by staffers of the Industrial Co 
operative Association (ICA) of Somerville, Massachusetts. The ICA 
is one of a growing number of institutions that have sprung up in the 
past decade to support the employee ownership movement. In the 
past, employee-owned firms often operated in total isolation. Now, 
organizations such as ICA, the Philadelphia Association for Cooper 
ative Enterprise (PACE),3 the O&O Investment Fund, and the North
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Carolina Center for Community Self-Help give several types of tech 
nical and financial assistance to worker cooperatives, buyouts, and 
new start-ups. Educational and advocacy organizations like the Na 
tional Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), the Employee Stock 
Ownership Association, and the Association for Workplace Democ 
racy (AWD) encourage, conduct, and publish research, disseminate 
information, and even lobby the government (in the case of the 
ESOP Association) to promote employee ownership.
Furthermore, in colleges and universities, ongoing research, edu 
cation, and training have led to established centers of expertise on 
employee ownership at such places as Cornell University, Boston 
College, the University of Michigan, Brigham Young University, 
Stanford University, Guilford College, and Temple University, 
among others. While the support network is growing, it is still quite 
loose. Thus far, no superstructure has been able to knit together the 
diverse, disparate, and dispersed set of employee-owned firms.
Considerations in Establishing Worker Buyouts
Despite a few cases that have achieved major media attention, ac 
tual experience with worker buyouts is limited. As stated earlier, 
about 60 firms have undergone employee/manager or worker buy 
outs, and most have survived. Yet no one knows in how many cases 
buyouts were contemplated but never started or were proposed but 
never consummated. Many potentially interested participants may 
have been deterred by lack of knowledge, by fears, by lack of lead 
ership, or by discovering that their dreams could not be transformed 
into workable plans. It may be useful here to briefly outline some 
issues respecting the forms, feasibility, and union-management rela 
tions of worker and employee/manager buyouts in order to under 
stand some of the stumbling blocks.
There are two main legal forms, the worker cooperative and the 
ESOP. In a traditional worker cooperative, each member invests an 
equal amount of money, which forms the basis of the firm's capital.
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In traditional cooperatives, a major problem can be that as the value 
of the company rises, the value of individual shares rises, too. After 
a while, success can be a golden handcuff. If share values rise too 
high for potential new members to afford, this may lead to hiring of 
nonowning workers or selling out to a larger, capitalist firm. These 
problems occurred in the San Francisco Bay scavenger firms and 
also in the plywood cooperatives of the Pacific northwest. However, 
recently ICA and PACE developed a new model of worker coopera 
tives based on the experience of the Mondragon cooperatives in 
Spain. ICA's model of worker cooperatives gets around this problem 
by drastically lowering the cost to be a member (to about $100). 
Members have equal voting rights, and they share in the profits. But 
the members' profit shares are distributed, not in the form of stock, 
but to what are called "internal savings accounts," which operate 
like internal pension funds.
The ESOP form provides a clear model of employee ownership 
that gives substantial incentives to employers for agreeing to a buy 
out. Probably the major advantage of the ESOP, especially when 
compared to the typical cooperative, is its flexibility. This flexibility 
involves several important issues: who buys stock; the distribution of 
ownership; the degree of overall employee ownership; financing; and 
the rights and privileges of ownership. However, the flexibility re 
flects vagueness and also leaves the ESOP form open to manipula 
tion. The popularity of the ESOP in buyouts, particularly in what 
we call employee/manager buyouts, leaves unionists skeptical of its 
advantages.
There has been a trend, as workers and unions gain experience, to 
combine many of the advantages of the two main forms of employee 
ownership into a hybrid form. Olson (1982) calls these cooperative 
ESOPs. These hybrids take the major feature of worker cooperatives, 
commitment to democratic control, and join it to the major feature of 
ESOPs, flexibility in financing and taxation. Creatively structured 
cooperative ESOPs have been initiated at Rath Packing, Hyatt- 
Clark, and Atlas Chain. These worker buyouts provide for worker 
control over management through democratically structured, one- 
member-ohe-vote ESOPs. The cooperative ESOP owes its genesis to
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the active involvement of local unions, which fought to protect 
worker interests and to avoid serious pitfalls of previous efforts, such 
as South Bend Lathe, which the worker/owners struck in 1980, and 
Vermont Asbestos Group, where worker/owners> disgruntled over 
lack of worker input into decisions, sold a controlling interest to a 
businessman. However, it has proven difficult to convert firms to this 
new form because of problems in sustaining cooperative involvement 
by workers and managers in struggling firms.
In general, would we expect employee ownership to be a feasible 
path to save jobs? Or, as some critics claim, are plant closure buy 
outs examples of "lemon capitalism" for workers? If the corporate 
owner cannot make it, why should anyone expect the worker/owners, 
lacking entrepreneurial experience and expertise, to revive dead 
firms? Questions about the viability of employee/owned firms worry 
even those predisposed to favor them.
The "lemon capitalism" argument implies that plant closings are 
caused by the inescapable, invisible hand of market forces. That is, 
competition, technological change, population shifts, educational ex 
pansion, cultural upheaval, and other such seemingly impersonal 
forces cause the closure. And if workers buy it out to save jobs, they 
are just swimming against the tide.
This is the conventional wisdom of yesteryear, which has been 
overturned by observation of companies closing profitable plants 
(Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Whyte 1984). Such was the case of 
the O&O supermarkets in Philadelphia. A&P threatened to shut 
down all its stores in the region (and many others in other regions) to 
satisfy its corporate goals, not because each store was unprofitable. 
Furthermore, there are numerous plants threatened with shutdown 
that could in theory be profitable if some of their operating proce 
dures were changed instead of closing them.
Not every plant closing is an appropriate target for employee own 
ership, however. Successful buyouts have several characteristics: 
good timing, planning, adequate resources, technical assistance, and 
organization, as well as luck (Stern and Hammer 1978). The key 
element is an objective feasibility study, or as Woodworth (1982a) 
puts it, "a cold, hard look at the facts." Virtually all of the success-
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ful employee/manager and worker buyouts involved one or more fea 
sibility studies.
In addition to these elements, successful worker and employee/ 
manager buyouts have good sources of finance, a governance struc 
ture involving workers, competent management, and increasingly, 
union support. Adequate financing is crucial, for many failures of 
employee-owned firms, particularly in the nineteenth century, have 
been traced to undercapitalization. The governance structure may as 
sume greater operational importance only after the buyout is estab 
lished.
Managerial expertise can be a problem, but is not an inevitable 
one. Most researchers agree that managerial expertise is crucial, and 
sometimes it is hard to recruit or keep. However, as Long (1978a) 
reported, managers in one employee/manager buyout were more 
likely to cite advantages than disadvantages for themselves. Advan 
tages included greater worker input in decisions, greater worker in 
terest in doing a good job, and better cooperation between workers 
and managers. Disadvantages for managers included workers overrat 
ing their importance and demanding too much say, loss of manage 
rial authority, and managers needing to work harder and perform 
better under employee ownership. As Bellas (1972) noted in a study 
of worker cooperatives: "The manager must be an educator and a 
motivator, knowing full well that his autonomy will diminish as he 
increases the capability of his employees.''
Unions have been skeptical about employee ownership. Some 
commentators see no role for unions once workers are owners. How 
ever, others believe the role of the union will be preserved and made 
easier through reduced labor-management conflict. In practice, the 
impact on collective bargaining is mixed, but there is still a signifi 
cant and necessary role for the union at employee-owned companies 
(Sockell 1982; Stern and O'Brien 1977; Hochner 1983a, 1983b). 
Where unions take leading roles to facilitate the buyout, they often 
push for participative changes in management and organizational 
culture. This may require them to take on new roles and question 
some traditional values, as well as to learn how to run and finance 
businesses. These new roles require education.
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Employee Ownership's Role in Policy
The potential uses of employee ownership are many, according to 
its advocates. Overall, there is much to be found in employee own 
ership for those of all political stripes. While the implications of our 
particular findings for policy will be elaborated in the final chapter, 
a brief general picture of some potential goals for worker buyouts 
can be given here.
Three overall sets of goals can be identified in increasing order of 
scope (or grandiosity). First, worker buyouts can be used to save 
jobs threatened by structural unemployment and by corporate strate 
gic shifts. As Bradley and Gelb (1983) point out, one of the main 
thrusts of buyouts has been to moderate the velocity of economic 
change and decline of certain industries. Buyouts not only help 
workers avoid the pain of job loss, but also have other ameliorative 
functions. Communities can be spared sudden ruptures in their social 
and economic fabric and can encourage buyouts as a way to preserve 
other local business and the taxbase.
Second, from broader perspective, buyouts and employee owner 
ship may support a strategy of economic decentralization. Employee 
ownership and ESOPs have been perceived as tools for achieving a 
number of political and social goals, such as (1) spreading ownership 
in the face of increased economic concentration of power (e.g., U.S. 
Joint Economic Committee 1975); (2) shifting responsibility for deal 
ing with economic dislocation to private initiatives; (3) providing al 
ternatives to government welfare policies and nationalization 
strategies; (4) opening up options for the development and preserva 
tion of a strong small business sector; and (5) leading to some type 
of radical restructuring and democratizing of the economy, i.e., eco 
nomic democracy.
Finally, buyouts and employee ownership appeal to those inter 
ested in expanding the economy and providing it with new engines 
of growth. As Louis Kelso asserts, opening up ownership may in 
crease the number of sources of capital. Furthermore, if employee 
ownership indeed is a key motivational tool, it may be useful for 
elevating general productivity.
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So far, we have attempted to introduce the issues relevant to job- 
saving through worker buyouts and to discuss even more briefly the 
role of QWL programs. In the following chapters, the story of the 
particular job-saving attempts, the issues in evaluating the success of 
the innovations, the methods we used to conduct our research, and 
our research results are treated much more thoroughly. First, in 
chapter 2 we present a theoretical framework for evaluating em 
ployee ownership and worker participation as job-saving strategies.
NOTES
1. Very recent and up-to-date summaries of this legislative history and references to the actual 
changes in the tax code, including the Tax Reform Act of 1986, can be found in Rosen (1987) 
and BNA (1987).
2. In 1987, the funding for technical assistance and professional services was reduced to 
$1/2 million per year, and the revolving loan fund received no allocation because the larger 
amounts of funding had not been used much in the previous three years. Some observers be 
lieve that the Pennsylvania Employee Ownership Assistance Program was not marketed aggres 
sively by the state government.
3. PACE worked on developing the initial legislation and the guidelines for the Pennsylvania 
Employee Ownership Assistance Program.

Worker Participation, Employee 
Ownership, and Job-Saving Efforts
A Theoretical Framework for 
Gauging Effectiveness
How do we judge the effectiveness of worker buyouts and labor- 
management cooperation to save jobs? On the simplest level, we 
want to know how many jobs were saved and whether or not the 
bought-out firms are viable and profitable. In fact, these concerns 
seem to be the basis for claims that worker buyouts are a proven 
job-saving method. One can point to numbers cited by the U.S. Sen 
ate Select Committee on Small Business (1980) that between 50,000 
and 100,000 jobs were saved through employee ownership during the 
1970s. "As a job creation program alone, employee ownership 
would compare very favorably to government funded public works 
jobs" (p. 18). Similarly, one can point to the fact that of approxi 
mately 60 buyouts during that time period, about 90 percent have 
apparently succeeded (Whyte et al. 1983).
There may have been factors other than employee ownership that 
contributed to the successes, however. The fortunes of the Vermont 
Asbestos Group, for example, rose soon after the buyout by workers 
from the GAP Corporation in the mid-1970s because of sudden 
shifts in the worldwide asbestos market. Similarly, some observers 
point to the failures of some prominent buyouts, such as at Rath 
Packing, as evidence that employee ownership does not work. How 
ever, to what degree did employee ownership contribute to the fail 
ure? Close observers and participants (Redmon, Mueller, and 
Daniels 1985), believe, in fact, that the seeds of Rath's failure were 
planted long before the buyout, and that jobs were saved, though 
only for four or five years.
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To look at effectiveness, we have to ask: how does employee own 
ership work? Specifically, we need to look at the operations of 
worker buyouts, which we defined in the previous chapter's typology 
as combining employee ownership with worker participation. It 
seems that the operations of worker buyouts would work differently 
from the other employee ownership types.
While a number of researchers and observers of employee owner 
ship have theorized about its nature and what makes it effective, 
none have differentiated clearly among the types. Thus, some insist 
that worker participation is a necessary ingredient for success in 
employee-owned firms (Whyte et al. 1983). Some others argue that 
the effectiveness of employe ownership depends much more on the 
value and size of ownership stakes than on worker participation 
(Rosen, Klein, and Young 1985). Still others claim that worker par 
ticipation does not need employee ownership in order to be fully 
effective (Bernstein 1976). Each position has its share of supportive 
evidence. However, the positions may be based on evaluation of dif 
ferent types of employee ownership.
According to our typology, different organizational features may 
contribute to organizational effectiveness in each of the types. In 
conventional employee-owned firms, most ESOPs (category 3), the 
degree of worker participation is minimal and the amount of em 
ployee ownership is minor. In these firms, the value and size of em 
ployee owners' shares may be most relevant in motivating employees 
to effective performance (Rosen, Klein, and Young 1985). In em 
ployee/manager buyouts, those with majority employee ownership 
but minimal worker participation (category 5), ownership stakes may 
lead to high expectations of worker control, which may not be ful 
filled (Whyte et al. 1983). In firms with QWL-type participation 
programs and in those with concessionary buy-ins by workers (cate 
gories 2 and 4) worker participation is predominant over ownership 
stakes. Thus, changes in the social and decisional structure of the 
firm may be necessary for effective performance (Bernstein 1976).
To answer the question of how effective are employee ownership 
and worker participation, we have to look at the features that go into 
a worker buyout or into a participative organization and how they
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function. Based on a review of theoretical and empirical literature on 
employee ownership and worker participation, we have developed a 
theoretical framework to look at the worker buyout. Despite general 
interest in them, there is relatively little written from a systematic 
perspective about what we call worker buyouts, (or even about QWL 
programs), so we have relied on writings about a variety of related 
topics. The literature reviewed is culled from many nooks and cran 
nies in several disciplines. It is hoped that this method will increase 
the relevance of our framework for other combinations of employee 
ownership and worker participation. In fact, the theoretical frame 
work was devised to take into account comparisons of worker buy 
outs, such as the O&O supermarkets, to job-saving through joint 
labor-management concessions, which was the case with Super Fresh 
supermarkets.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework comprises three parts: (1) the ingredi 
ents that led to or existed at the time of the worker buyout, termed 
here Basic Input Features; (2) the functioning of the firm, specifi 
cally aspects having to do with employee ownership and worker par 
ticipation, termed here Organizational Processes; and (3) how 
effective the firm is, termed here Outcomes. With these three parts, 
we can look at the processes and features that contribute to the ef 
fectiveness of the worker buyout as a job-saving strategy.
Basic Input Features of Worker Buyouts
A number of sources seem to agree that for buyouts whether em 
ployee/manager or worker buyouts to take place, several key ingre 
dients are necessary. These ingredients involve characteristics of the 
actual and potential worker/owners, of the organization they work in 
and acquire, and of the environment in which the firm operates. 
These ingredients would also presumably be important for the func 
tioning of organizations in which worker participation takes place.
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Worker Characteristics
Usually in the initial stages of buyouts, the decision to go ahead 
depends on the motivations, willingness, and resources of a group of 
workers. These workers may be motivated by pragmatic job-saving 
desires, by desires for a piece of the "American dream," i.e., entre- 
preneurship, by desires for a more participative workplace, or by a 
combination of some or all of these (Granrose and Hochner 1985; 
Hochner and Granrose 1985). These motivations may color the ex 
pectations workers have for their buyout. Other observers point to 
the importance of workers' willingness and resources (Bradley and 
Gelb 1983; Oliver 1984; Cosyns and Loveridge 1981). That is, a 
self-selection process is at work. Not all workers affected by an im 
pending shutdown, not even all of those interested in the idea of a 
buyout, will participate in a buyout attempt. Those who do partici 
pate need to be not only willing, but also able, because in most 
cases workers either have to pay directly or to sacrifice something, 
such as a portion of future wages or a pension plan, to get ownership 
stakes.
Worker characteristics influence both organizational processes and 
outcomes for workers. For instance, workers inclined toward partic 
ipation may help increase the participativeness of an organization, 
and workers' gains or losses from the buyout will depend partly on 
the degree of hardship the buyout imposes on their resources.
Organization Type
The way the buyout or the participation programs is legally and 
organizationally structured, its organization type, tends to determine 
how decisionmaking will be handled, who will have which legiti 
mate rights, and what opportunities there will be for workers to par 
ticipate. The structure will affect the type of internal processes that 
will be expected and that will occur. As the Industrial Democracy in 
Europe International Research Group (IDE 1981) puts it, legal par 
ticipative structure tends to lead to actual participative practice. If 
laws or by-laws governing the firm's operations mandate equal own 
ership stakes and democratic forms of management, as in worker 
cooperatives, the firm is more likely to be run participatively. If
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those laws or rules tend to mandate distribution of shares to employ 
ees according to then: incomes and say nothing about management 
procedures, as in most ESOPs, the firm is more likely to be run in a 
conventional hierarchical way. With respect to participative struc 
tures, some organizational theorists hold the position that to be ef 
fective, participation has to be a key organizing principle and must 
be thoroughly integrated into the organization at all levels to be truly 
effective (Hochner 1978).
Role of Consultants and Unions
A number of observers (Stern and Hammer 1978; Parzen, Squire, 
and Kieschnick 1982) describe the importance of a number of other 
features and conditions surrounding buyout attempts. Buyouts need 
legal, technical, and financial help, supportive (or nonhostile) union 
attitudes, cooperation from the current owner of the plant, and an 
assessment of the feasibility of profitable operation, based on past 
and projected performance in the firm's markets. Similarly, partici 
pative programs such as QWL need well-rounded support from all 
levels of management and from the union (Zager and Rosow 1982). 
However, Parker (1985) expresses the fear that even strong union 
support for QWL programs can backfire and undermine the union 
itself.
The role of consultants and unions is an important determinant of 
feasibility, of sources of finance, and of actual participativeness. For 
instance, in the Weirton Steel buyout, consultants from Wall Street 
financial firms and conventional ESOP lawyers insisted on a fairly 
conventional ESOP structure with limited worker input to manage 
ment decisions for a number of years. In another case, at Atlas 
Chain, the union and the consultants agreed that a very democratic 
ESOP structure was possible and desirable. In both cases the struc 
tures recommended by the outside experts were adopted.
Even the lack of support by experts and unions, among others, can 
be a strong influence on the success or failure of employee-owned 
firms. Studies by Aldrich and Stern (1983) and Jones (1984) con 
clude that the persistent economic marginality of employee-owned 
firms over the past century-and-a-half in the U.S. is linked to the
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attitudes and actions of potential support institutions. Moral, finan 
cial, political, and institutional opposition from such groups as law 
makers, labor unions, bankers, and educators contributed to a hostile 
environment for employee-owned businesses to grow in. Studies by 
Blasi, Mehrling, and Whyte (1983, 1984) demonstrate the impor 
tance of this environmental opposition by contrasting American ex 
perience with that in other countries, notably Israel's kibbutzim, 
Spain's Mondragon cooperative sector, and Yugoslavia's worker- 
managed economy. In these other countries, worker-owned and 
-managed firms have been supported by a number of popular customs 
and social institutions as well as by government support or neu 
trality.
Business Environment
The business environment involves the context within which the 
job saving effort takes place. Sociological and historical studies have 
identified several factors conditioning the formation and success of 
employee-owned firms. For instance, socioeconomic forces, such as 
business cycles, structural industrial change, and structural unem 
ployment have been said to induce workers to form employee-owned 
firms, through buyouts or formation of new worker cooperatives 
(Jones 1984; Shirom 1972).
The relation of the worker buyout to other firms, such as suppliers 
of essentials and competitors, can also be crucial to its success or 
failure. The degree of competition among firms in the product and 
labor markets in which the bought-out firm will operate determines 
such things as potential market share, pricing policies, and profit 
margins. For instance, Russell (1985) points out that the viability of 
the worker-owned refuse collection companies of the San Francisco 
Bay area is enhanced by the near-total monopoly granted them to 
collect residential refuse by the cities they serve.
Similarly, the availability of debt capital for the buyout will be 
important if the capital requirements of the firm outstrip the re 
sources of the workers contributing. Several observers have pointed 
to the hostility of banks and also of shutting-down employers as a 
key factor in failures of worker-owned business in American history 
(Jones 1984).
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Furthermore, many commentators have pointed to the shortcircuit- 
ing of worker participation in cooperatives and participative experi 
ments by the exigencies of the marketplace (Parker 1985). Worker 
cooperatives are said to "degenerate," i.e., fail outright or fail as 
democratic cooperatives, because they are isolated islands in the 
capitalist sea (Clarke 1984). Even in conventional organizations, cri 
ses brought on by turbulent environments may lead to increased cen 
tralization of power in the hands of managers and elites (Mintzberg 
1979). Thus, the environment may impact internal processes and de 
cisions of the organization. Moreover, the environment including 
such conditions as economic boom or recession, expanding or de 
pressed markets, and relations to external institutions, all of which 
affect firms of any type may directly impact outcomes for job sav 
ing efforts.
Organizational Characteristics
The final basic input feature of worker buyouts and participative 
programs to be taken into consideration is the organization's charac 
teristics. This feature reflects the past history and present capacities 
of the plant to be bought out or restructured. These factors plus pro 
jections of the future, based on assumptions about how the firm will 
operate, comprise important aspects of a market feasibility study. 
Often, consultants play a large role in evaluating this factor. Some 
times they may recommend against a potential buyout. Or they may 
recommend key changes in the firm, such as downsizing the work 
force or even, in one case, moving to a nonunion plant (Hochner 
1983b). In addition, the past fortunes of a firm may partly determine 
the decisions that will be made in the future and how well the firm 
can do. For instance, Hyatt-Clark Industries was troubled during its 
life as a worker buyout by the decline of its basic product market, 
wheel bearings for rear-wheel drive vehicles. In fact, this problem 
led GM to consider a plant shutdown and brought about the worker 
buyout in the first place. Similarly, Rath Packing was forced to do 
something about its declining product quality and declining market 
ing efforts.
Furthermore, cultural practices and customs in firms have been 
said to contribute to or detract from the development of employee
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ownership. Sometimes, successful employee ownership has been fos 
tered by ethnic enclaves, such as at the Norwegian-American ply 
wood cooperatives of Oregon and Washington, the Italian-American 
scavenger firms of San Francisco, and the Russian-American taxi co 
operatives of Los Angeles (Russell 1985). Conversely, the American 
traditions of individualism and mobility may contribute to the small 
number of employee-owned start-up firms (Blasi, Mehrling, and 
Whyte 1983, 1984).
Organizational Processes
The basic input features are essentially "givens" at the time of or 
prior to the job-saving attempt. Once operations begin, organiza 
tional processes start to play a role. In many firms, these would 
include purchasing and marketing efforts, among others. Here, how 
ever, the emphasis is on organizational processes and practices re 
lated to the participative and employee-owned nature of worker 
buyouts. These processes include the governance of organizational 
decisionmaking (participativeness) and specific managerial decisions 
made concerning the deployment of resources (organizational func 
tioning and labor strategy).
Our view of organizational processes distinguishes this theoretical 
framework from those of many other students of employee owner 
ship. We see these processes playing a vital role in translating plans 
into actions. A number of other frameworks that have appeared in 
the literature tend to confuse process with outcome, though it is ad 
mittedly true that sometimes in organizational change strategies the 
institutionalization of the process is a primary desired outcome 
(Kanter 1983). For instance, workplace democratization is the out 
come Bernstein's (1976) theory was established to explain.
On the one hand, to establish what is unique about the worker 
buyout as a job-saving method, it is important to show in which op 
erating aspects worker buyouts differ from conventional firms or 
from labor-management cooperative efforts. However, to convince 
interested parties that worker buyouts are or are not effective ways to 
save jobs, it is necessary to show more than that employee owner-
Worker Participation, Employee Ownership, and Job-Saving Efforts 39
ship and worker participation change attitudes and behavior in the 
firm and that the buyout operates under some different principles 
than the conventional firm. Theory and research must both (a) dem 
onstrate the results for workers and the organization of doing things 
by means of a buyout and (b) account for the sources of these results.
Participativeness
Participativeness and its effects on individual and organizational 
performance have received much attention in the literature on worker 
participation and employee ownership. Social psychologists have 
tended to look at the advantages of participation as a means of im 
proving attitudes, communication, and organizational effectiveness 
(Likert 1961; Tannenbaum 1966).
However, we are also concerned about the impact of participative- 
ness on organizations. Some, but very few, studies have focused on 
the mediatory role of participation on organizational outcomes. A 
report of a study of the economic performance of employee-owned 
firms stated, "Participation is the key" (NCEO 1986).
In our terminology, participation refers to actions of individuals, 
while participativeness is an organizational process reflected by per 
ceptions, structures, and practices. Increased individual participation 
may lead to certain outcomes for the organization as well as for in 
dividuals, such as greater effort and less downtime through absentee 
ism. However, these outcomes may be more properly seen, 
according to our framework, as either additional aspects of organi 
zational processes or by-products of outcomes such as profit, in 
come, and job security. Increased organizational participativeness, 
on the other hand, is related to overall organizational functioning, 
such as decisions concerning the deployment of resources. Both 
types of organizational processes affect individual and organizational 
outcomes which result from organizational effectiveness.
Worker participation is often defined by a variety of terms, such 
as involvement, influence, control, or power, which tend to be am 
biguous. However, Bernstein (1976) identifies three key dimensions 
of participation, which we include in our term participativeness: 
(1) the degree of influence exerted;
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(2) the range of issues over which influence occurs; and
(3) the organizational level at which influence occurs. 
Dachler and Wilpert (1978) add the dimension of form, i.e., whether 
participation is formal or informal and whether it is direct or thor 
ough representatives. In general, the more of each of Bernstein's 
three dimensions an organization has, the more participative it is.
Participativeness is theorized to affect processes and outcomes at 
several organizational levels. At the level of the individual worker, 
theorists hypothesize that participation reduces alienation, while en 
riching job design and increasing effort, productivity, commitment to 
organizational goals, self-esteem, and mental health (Argyris 1957; 
Blumberg 1968; Conte 1982; Long 1978b; Nightingale 1982; Rhodes 
and Steers 1981; Tannenbaum et al. 1974). Moreover, labor costs re 
lated to absenteeism and turnover are hypothesized to decrease.
Furthermore, participativeness affects the group and overall orga 
nizational levels. Participation is linked to greater teamwork, group 
cohesion, self-policing behavior, information flow between hierar 
chical levels, less need of direct supervision, reduction of hierarchi 
cal power distinctions (while expanding the total amount of power 
and influence available), fewer adversarial conflicts, and more adap- 
tiveness and flexibility (Bradley 1980; Lammers 1967; Tannenbaum 
1968, 1983).
These hypotheses about the positive effects of participation are not 
accepted by all. Perrow, for one, likens the participative model to a 
"boy scout creed for organizations" (1982, p. 125). A number of 
conditions, contingencies, and contradictions are said to diminish 
the effectiveness of participation. For individual workers, participa 
tion may require increased education as well as a need for influence 
(Singer 1974; Vroom 1959). Strauss (1963) questions the impact that 
unattainably high expectations for participation have on its effective 
ness. The type of technology used and the design of jobs also may be 
seen as a limit on the ability to spread participation. Furthermore, 
some argue that democratic decisionmaking is slower and less effi 
cient by increasing "transaction costs" (Williamson 1975). Finally, 
some commentators point out that the effects of participation (and, 
we extrapolate, participativeness) are tempered by the nature of the 
organization's external environment (Mintzberg 1979).
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Whether employee-owned firms are indeed participative is a mat 
ter of some debate and cannot be taken for granted. However, studies 
of long-established employee-owned firms, such as the plywood co 
operatives and the San Francisco Scavengers, find high levels of par- 
ticipativeness. Relative to managers, line workers in these firms tend 
to have high degrees of influence in both informal and formal ways 
over both shop floor and strategic decisions (Greenberg 1980, 1984; 
Russell, Hochner, and Perry 1979). In some recent buyouts, rela 
tively high levels of participativeness were found i.e., voting rights 
on stock or high worker influence relative to managers (Conte, Tan- 
nenbaum, and McCulloch 1981; Long 1978b). However, in some 
other buyouts, which we would call employee/manager buyouts (see 
chapter 1), workers' influence had either not increased or had actu 
ally diminished since the takeover (Long 1982; Hammer and Stern 
1980).
The evidence on the impact of participation on workers and orga 
nizations fills volumes and defies clear summary. However, general 
reviews (e.g., Locke and Schweiger 1979) conclude that participa 
tion tends to have positive effects on job attitudes and mildly posi 
tive or neutral impacts on performance. A comprehensive review by 
Strauss (1982) of worker participation studies in a variety of coun 
tries and organizational forms concludes its success depends on the 
criteria chosen by the observer. Nevertheless, Strauss notes that the 
evidence on economic impacts is "somewhat spotty" (p. 244).
Organizational Functioning and Labor Strategy
Our theoretical framework posits that participativeness is impor 
tant primarily to the degree that it has effects on Organizational 
Functioning and Labor Strategy, That is, to have an impact on most 
organizational and worker outcomes (e.g., profits, income), organi 
zational democracy must have an effect on management decisions on 
deployment of resources.
However, the role of resource deployment and ways of allocating 
labor has hardly received much explicit attention in prior literature. 
In this framework, we hope to help correct this deficiency. Most of 
the attention paid to the types of decisions made in employee-owned 
and -managed firms has been by economists. Sometimes social psy-
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chological issues have been looked at concerning the relation of par 
ticipation to organizational functioning. A few researchers (e.g., 
Conte 1982) try to bridge the gaps among the potential links of em 
ployee ownership and worker participation to performance. Often, 
the literature has the following deficiencies.
(1) Worker attitudes, such as job satisfaction or commitment, be 
come a dead end. That is, they either are the outcome to be derived 
or are merely assumed to be related to other, ultimate outcomes, 
such as job security, income, productivity, and profit.
For instance, Long (1978) developed a framework for looking at 
the effects of employee ownership in a buyout. However, both the 
framework and the empirical research he reports devote most atten 
tion to worker attitudes and tend to neglect the link even to behav 
iors like absenteeism. Rosen, Klein, and Young (1985) similarly 
analyzed the causes of job attitudes in employee-owned firms, with 
little analysis of their link to performance.
(2) Worker attitudes are related to weak measures of organizational 
performance such as absenteeism, rather than directly to productivity 
and profit.
Both the models presented by Conte (1982) and by Rhodes and 
Steers (1981) tie in worker ownership and participation to individual 
worker behaviors, but do not go much further to discuss the relation 
ship of these and other features of employee-owned firms to overall 
performance. Even when researchers try to establish the notion that 
worker ownership indirectly affects performance through the social 
system of the firm (Tannenbaum 1983), they focus on individual per 
formance, rather than that of the overall organization.
(3) Organizational features special to employee-owned and -man 
aged firms, such as increased participativeness, nonhierarchical 
authority structures, and reduced job specializations, are identified 
but are not connected to comparative organizational performance. 
Rothschild-Whitt (1979) does a fine job of dissecting the differing 
arrangements of organizational structures and practices between 
collective-democratic firms and bureaucratic ones. But her theoreti-
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cal framework does not explain what difference the different struc 
tures make in comparative performance, save on what goals are 
important to each. Similarly, Nightingale (1982) presents a theoreti 
cal model emphasizing that the congruence of organizational values, 
structures, processes, and outcomes in participative firms makes 
them a qualitatively different type of organization from conventional 
bureaucracy. However, the outcomes he discusses never get beyond 
worker attitudes.
(4) Assumptions are made about how participation affects entrepre 
neurial and managerial decisions in the firm without a clear under 
standing of the true costs and benefits of democratic, participative 
management practice. This problem occurs most often in the eco 
nomics literature on employee-owned and -managed firms.
For instance, economic theory assumes a model of motivation in 
which individuals maximize their individual gains. Thus, worker/ 
owners are assumed to be maximizing their own individual gains, 
rather than the gains of the entire group based on majority rule.
(5) In fact, the focus of most literature on employee ownership and 
worker participation, whether from an economic or a social psycho 
logical perspective tends to be the individual, rather than the group 
or the organization, where attention should more often be directed. 
However, recently a few studies have been directed toward the issue 
of organizational processes and organizational outcomes (Katz 1985; 
NCEO 1986).
Many positions exist on the issue of what kind of managerial de 
cisions are made in employee-owned firms. In fact, early observers, 
such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1920) believed that the quality of 
managerial decisionmaking in employee-owned firms was seriously 
handicapped by an inability to recruit competent managers and by 
the impossibility of managing a group of owners.
The economics literature on labor-managed firms originates with 
the assumption that employee-owned and participative firms, in con 
trast to their "capitalist twins" whose main goal is profit maximiza 
tion, tend to maximize income per worker (Ward 1958; Meade 1972; 
Vanek 1970). Economists then derive a number of characteristic en-
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trepreneurial and managerial decisions that would seem to flow from 
the initial assumption. For instance, worker/owners would be ex 
pected to pay themselves high wages now, rather than invest for the 
future. Similarly, they would tend to try to reduce the number of 
worker/owners when profits were being made rather than to increase 
the number as one might expect. That is, they would rather increase 
their own relative shares than to have more worker/owners with 
whom to share the profits.
Other economists challenge this pessimism (Ellerman 1982; 
McCain 1982, Sertel 1982). Some argue that employee-owned and 
participative firms have operational advantages over conventional 
ones, such as: (a) an ability to tap human resources, i.e., teamwork, 
consensus, commitment, involvement, and communication; (b) less 
need for supervision; and (c) reduced labor costs and increased pro 
ductivity (Conte 1982; Levin 1984). Pryor (1983), in a review of 
theoretical literature, concludes that the original assumption of in 
come maximization per worker as the firm's objective function is 
easily modified, which changes all subsequent derivations and pre 
dictions of behavior.
As Batstone (1982) asserts, such a starting point assumes that 
employee-owned firms are democracies of small capitalists, rather 
than collectives of solidaristic workers with other objectives, such as 
collective income maximization, worker satisfaction, group mainte 
nance, or even "the reduction, if not the eradication, of the role of 
the conventional capitalist or shareholder" (p. 100). Moreover, the 
objectives of potential and actual worker/owners may be a complex 
mixture of pragmatism (saving jobs), entrepreneurial values (for 
ownership and profits), as well as collective values (worker partici 
pation in decisions), as pointed out in our earlier studies of the 
workers involved in the Philadelphia-area A&P shutdown of 1982. 
(Granrose and Hochner 1985; Hochner and Granrose 1985). Such 
mixed motives may have great effects on managerial decisions.
Our theoretical framework emphasizes that participative processes 
should make worker buyouts do things differently from conventional 
firms and the other types identified in chapter 1 (Batstone 1982; 
Jones 1984; Levin 1984; Nightingale 1982; Rothschild-Whitt 1979;
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Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann 1984). Organizations with more 
participative forms of employee ownership are hypothesized to:
  use less supervision,
  give more responsibility to workers,
  increase communication of information to all levels,
  reduce internal wage differentials,
  employ job rotation and job redesign,
  invest less in capital and more in workers through wages and 
training,
  hire higher quality labor, i.e., be less inclined to save on labor 
costs by hiring low-paid, part-time, unskilled workers,
  get higher effort levels and less downtime from their workforces,
  rely more on work method innovations, though less on techno 
logical modernization, and
  have a lower level of adversarial conflict, e.g., strikes and griev 
ances.
The evidence for these hypotheses comes from a variety of sources 
concerning employee-owned and -managed firms. What evidence 
there is tends to support the hypotheses, though there are some con 
tradictory findings. In studying the plywood cooperatives, Greenberg 
(1984) found considerably less use of supervision than in conven 
tional firms. In fact, he reported that when an employee-owned firm 
was bought out by a conventional firm, one of the first things the 
new owners did "was to quadruple the number of line managers and 
foremen" (p. 193). Similarly, Nightingale (1982), who compared 10 
participative firms some of which were employee-owned with 10 
conventional firms, found that workers perceived significantly fewer 
bureaucratic rules, less supervision, more opportunities to take ini 
tiative, and less hierarchy in the participative firms. On the other 
hand, neither studies by Hochner (1978) on the scavenger coopera 
tives nor by Long (1978a, 1978b) on an employer/manager buyout at 
a trucking company found that work groups were more cohesive. Yet 
international studies by Tannenbaum et al. (1974) had found that the 
opinions of the work group tended to be more important to workers 
than the opinions of supervisors in organizations with greater worker 
participation, such as the Israeli kibbutzim.
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Nightingale also reports increased communication at the rank-and- 
file level in his sample of participative firms. However, again neither 
Hochner (1978) nor Long (1978a, 1978b) found more communica 
tion between management and workers or greater information flow. 
Perhaps these findings on communication reflect the already simple 
and flat hierarchies of refuse collection and trucking firms. This may 
have implications for the current study of supermarkets, which have 
similarly simple and flat hierarchies.
Concerning wage differentials there is little direct evidence for 
American firms with worker ownership and participation. The scav 
enger cooperatives historically had a policy of equal wages for all 
worker owners, but began to abandon that policy in the 1960s to 
keep and attract managerial talent (Perry 1978; Russell 1985). We 
are not aware of other reports of wage policies in employee and 
worker buyouts. However, the example of the Mondragon system in 
Spain's Basque region, where a ratio of 4.5:1 from the highest-paid 
to the lowest-paid has been established, has received wide attention. 
In the U.S., where wages are a matter of union-management negoti 
ation in unionized firms, wage policies in employee-owned firms 
may vary more widely. If employee-owned and -managed firms do 
hire more skilled labor, than wages for worker/owners may be at the 
top of the pay scale. Considering that researchers on employee own 
ership often tend to be concerned about such benefits to workers as 
job satisfaction, it is somewhat odd that wages have been relatively 
neglected.
There is also evidence that organizational resource deployment in 
worker-owned and -managed firms is more flexible than in conven 
tional firms. For instance, Nightingale (1982) reports that in partic 
ipative firms, a number of job design features have been altered, 
such as the amount of task variety, of autonomy, of required interac 
tion with others, and the number of conflicting demands. It may be 
that job design itself is not altered outright by participativeness, but 
that a reduction of the kind of detailed job specialization that is of 
ten found in conventional bureaucracies takes place by more workers 
being aware of the requirements of other workers' jobs, either 
through cross-training or job rotation. Moreover, it is possible that
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the participative process itself, while changing nothing directly about 
a worker's job tasks, adds new tasks associated with discussions at 
meetings, for instance. The degree of actual job redesign may be a 
function of organizational characteristics, such as the prior amount 
of specialization and hierarchy.
A recent study by Tannenbaum et al. (1984) found that while 
employee-owned firms were less technologically adaptive than con 
ventional firms (in their adoption of new technology), they tended to 
have a higher rate of survival during the recession of the early 
1980s, probably because of greater flexibility and adaptiveness in 
their use of human resources. In fact, Berman (1967) reports that the 
plywood cooperatives adjusted worker/owners' wages downward to 
cope with business downturns, rather than lay off workers as is typ 
ical in conventional plywood mills.
Concerning effort and downtime, the evidence is mixed. On the 
one hand, most studies find that commitment of workers to organi 
zational goals is more positive in employee-owned and/or participa 
tive firms. Worker participation, in fact, seems more strongly related 
to commitment than does ownership in the scavenger companies and 
in the employee/manager buyout of a trucking company (Hochner 
1978; Long 1978b). The importance of participation seems to ex 
plain the findings of Kruse (1984), who measured employee job at 
titudes in two employee/manager buyouts that had little provision for 
worker participation and found few improvements after the buyouts.
It is hypothesized that increased commitment would be related to 
lowered absenteeism and turnover. However, a study by Rhodes and 
Steers (1981) of the plywood cooperatives found that, though per 
ceived commitment was higher than in conventional plywood mills, 
absenteeism did not differ significantly. Hammer, Landau, and Stern 
(1981) studied patterns of absenteeism following an employee/man 
ager buyout. They found that while overall absenteeism did not de 
cline, the reasons for absenteeism shifted. This is, voluntary 
absenteeism (not legitimately excusable for illness, death in family, 
etc.) increased. Perhaps, the commitment of workers to this firm led 
to a felt need to follow its rules. A more straightforward link of 
worker participation and absenteeism was found by Katz, Kochan,
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and Weber (1985). They found that absenteeism was significantly 
negatively related to worker participation in suggestion programs 
and to worker involvement in QWL programs.
Nevertheless, the mixed relationships of commitment to perfor 
mance measures such as absenteeism suggest that performance in 
employee-owned and -managed firms may be only slightly affected 
by changes in worker attitudes. Our framework suggests that absen 
teeism rates are only one part of organizational functioning that is 
affected by participation and ownership. Organizational performance 
may be more generally related to larger changes in resource deploy 
ment.
The final aspect of organizational functioning and labor strategy 
to be considered here involves adversarial conflict. Again, the evi 
dence is mixed. Much was made in the media about the irony of 
worker/owners striking their own company when in 1980 there was a 
strike at South Bend Lathe, which had undergone an employee/man 
ager buyout in 1973. Furthermore, labor-management conflict at 
Rath Packing (a worker buyout in 1980 which filed for bankruptcy in 
1984) and at Hyatt-Clark Industries (a worker buyout in 1981 which 
has been reported to be seeking an external buyer) seems to have 
been a continual problem. Even some empirical studies, as opposed 
to media accounts, give little apparent support for our hypothesis. 
Sockell (1981) studied aspects of labor-management relations at sev 
eral employee/manager buyouts. She found that labor relations nei 
ther worsened nor improved based on incidence of strikes and 
grievances.
All of the cases cited in the media, however, were cases in which 
what conflict did occur was about the withholding of decision in 
volvement from workers by management. Furthermore, the cases 
studied by Sockell tended to be ones in which there was little worker 
participation, i.e., the union did not get involved with the buyout, 
preferring to be a passive observer, and there were few if any provi 
sions for worker input into everyday managerial decisions.
In fact, evidence from organizations with substantial amounts of 
worker participation indicates the positive side of participation for 
labor-management relations and conflict. In a historical study of
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worker cooperatives and employee-owned firms from the 1840s to 
the 1970s, Jones (1984) reports that strikes have tended to occur in- 
firms with high numbers of nonowning workers, i.e., in which not 
all workers participate in ownership and, presumably, in decision- 
making. Katz (1985) reports that in QWL programs at General Mo 
tors from 1977-80, even limited worker involvement can be causally 
linked by statistical methods to lower grievance and discipline rates 
and smoother collective bargaining. Moreover, worker participation 
has been successful in Europe, particularly West Germany and Yu 
goslavia, in toning down adversarial labor relations (Strauss 1982). 
It may be that worker participation and employee ownership do 
not merely reduce conflict, but actually change its nature. That is, 
some types of conflict, such as those concerning strategic direction 
of the firm and allocation of resources, may be brought to the sur 
face more readily in employee-owned and -managed firms. Accord 
ing to the 12-nation study of industrial democracy in Europe (IDE 
1981), frequency of conflicts is positively correlated with the power 
of participatory bodies representing workers directly or indirectly. 
This should not be surprising, for increased information flow and 
the involvement of more people in decisionmaking, such as in ma 
trix organizational structures adopted by many conventional firms 
over the past 20 or so years, tends to surface conflicts and to require 
that employees have greater tolerance for ambiguity and learn to 
practice diplomacy (Mintzberg 1979). However, as Strauss (1982) 
points out in his review of literature on worker participation, while 
participation may slow down the decisionmaking process, it seems to 
make implementation smoother.
Outcomes for Organizations and Workers
The final part of our theoretical framework involves the outcomes 
of worker ownership and participation in a worker buyout. We posit 
that the performance of the firm (organizational outcomes), such as 
viability, productivity, and profitability, are influenced by organi 
zational functioning and labor strategy, as well as by the business 
environment and organizational characteristics. Furthermore, the
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performance of the organization will directly influence what the 
workers get out of the buyout experience (worker outcomes). That 
is, worker income, job security, job and life satisfaction, and family 
well-being are all results which are evaluated based on how well the 
firm does. However, worker outcomes may also be independently af 
fected by organizational resource deployment, i.e., by what wage 
rates are set, by aspects of job design, and by other conditions of 
work. Similarly, the degree of participativeness may affect workers' 
evaluation of tradeoffs, if any, between job satisfaction and eco 
nomic outcomes. Finally, workers' outcomes are influenced by their 
motivations, their resources, and the expectations they have about 
what their results should be. This part of our theoretical framework 
is perhaps the most difficult to support, because so little direct evi 
dence on worker buyouts has been collected.
Organizational Outcomes
Prior evidence for these hypotheses, particularly concerning eco 
nomic results, which is a major concern in our study of the effective 
ness of worker buyouts, is mixed and scarce. For instance, Jones 
(1984) has studied the historical record of over 750 American worker 
cooperatives and employee-owned firms from the 1840s to the 1970s 
to examine their viability and efficiency. He found that worker coop 
eratives were often viable (i.e., able to survive more than 10 years), 
that they tended to do more poorly as they aged, and that efficiency 
was highly variable. Viability and performance were better in firms 
with "the most cooperative features" (1984 p: 52). These are firms 
adhering most closely with the following features: (a) restriction of 
ownership to those working in the firm; (b) control and management 
on a one-owner, one-vote basis; and (c) distribution of profits based 
on labor contributed, rather than on capital.
Tannenbaum and his colleagues have done two broad studies of 
large samples of employee-owned firms in business in the 1970s and 
1980s to look at aspects of economic functioning (Conte, Tannen 
baum, and McCulloch 1981; Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann 
1984). However, the two studies came up with contradictory results, 
even though then" samples of firms overlapped considerably. The
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first study looked at 98 employee-owned firms including ESOPs, 
employee/manager and worker buyouts, and long-established worker 
cooperatives. The second study expanded the sample of employee- 
owned firms to 200. Neither sample appears to be representative of 
the population of such firms, but at this time they are the only data 
bases containing significant amounts of information about economic 
results. Conte, Tannenbaum, and McCulloch (1981) found the 98 
employee-owned firms to be more profitable than a matched set of 
conventional firms. Moreover, the percent of equity owned by work 
ers was the highest and only significant predictor of profitability in a 
regression analysis. However, Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann 
(1984) did not replicate the earlier study's findings. The 200 
employee-owned firms studied did not score higher either on a ratio 
of profit-to-sales or on growth over a five-year period. Moreover, 
this time there was a small negative correlation of percent of equity 
owned by workers to growth. Despite these neutral findings, 
employee-owned firms did have a higher rate of survival between 
1976 and 1982, a turbulent period in the overall economy. From 
these studies, the effect of employee ownership on economic results 
is unclear. Nevertheless, employee ownership appears to have at 
least neutral if not positive effects, and may give added strength to a 
firm in adverse times.
Another study of growth in employee-owned firms concerned the 
number of jobs created (Rosen and Klein 1983), finding that em 
ployee-owned firms created three times as many jobs as the typical 
firms in their industries. However, employee-owned firms that pass 
on stock voting rights to employees (rather than exercising these 
rights through trustees) did not show quite the superiority over con 
ventional firms in employment growth. Rosen and Klein imply that 
this means that democracy in the firm leads to slower growth. Stock 
voting rights are a very small part of worker participation, however. 
Moreover, alternative explanations are possible, e.g., that fast- 
growing firms are more likely to adopt ESOPs as an employee ben 
efit program and that those firms passing on voting rights may have 
tended to be in trouble even before employee ownership.
In fact, the research findings of Rosen and Klein, which came out
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of a study for the National Center for Employee Ownership, were 
contradicted by a subsequent study by NCEO (1986). As mentioned 
earlier, this study found that worker participation in employee- 
owned companies "is the key." Compared to a matched sample of 
164 conventional companies, a sample of 30 employee-owned firms 
not only performed better, but job-level worker participation was the 
explanatory factor most consistently significant in predicting eco 
nomic success i.e., job growth, sales growth, and growth in the 
ratio of sales-per-employee.
Few in-depth studies of the economic results of particular 
employee-owned firms have been conducted. Long (1977) found ev 
idence of increased quality after an employee/manager buyout at a 
trucking company in Canada. A few studies looked at results in the 
plywood cooperatives. Berman (1967) found productivity 30 percent 
higher than in conventional plywood mills. Bellas (1972) confirmed 
Berman's findings and extended them. Taking a complex measure of 
worker participativeness in the firm, Bellas found it to be the highest 
and only significant correlate of performance, defined by change in 
the value of an ownership share.
The relationship of participativeness to economic results, which 
was raised in Bellas' study, has rarely been looked at in employee 
ownership studies. However, a few studies of QWL and labor- 
management cooperative programs show positive impacts of the 
programs on performance. Macy (1979) conducted a longitudinal as 
sessment of the Bolivar QWL project in Tennessee. He found worker 
participation associated with increased job security, job safety, and 
productivity. Schuster (1984) conducted a study of several forms of 
labor-management cooperation at a variety of firms. He found that 
both employment and productivity either increased or remained the 
same for the majority of cases in his sample. More recently, Katz 
(1985) analyzed the impact of QWL programs at GM between 1977 
and 1980 and reported that they had a slight positive impact on mea 
sures of quality and labor productivity, with an even larger indirect 
effect on these outcomes through their effect on industrial conflict.
Worker Outcomes
Economic outcomes for workers involved in worker buyouts have
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been rarely if ever studied. Some evidence from other employee- 
owned and -managed firms does exist, however. Jones (1984) con 
cludes that over the 140-odd years of experience with worker 
ownership in the U.S., workers in firms with the most cooperative 
features (equal ownership, democratic management, and profit shar 
ing based on labor contribution) tended to make higher incomes than 
workers in other employee-owned firms. Similarly, Berman (1967) 
found that worker/owners' wages at the plywood cooperatives were 
21 percent higher than the industry average. Similarly, Russell, 
Hochner, and Perry (1979) found that the income of worker/owners 
at the San Francisco scavenger companies in 1976 was approximately 
50 percent higher than income of refuse collectors at comparable pri 
vate firms or municipal departments in the same region. Both the 
plywood cooperatives and the scavenger firms tend also to conform 
to Jones' definition of firms having cooperative features.
The potential for diminished economic well-being for workers in 
buyouts does exist, nevertheless. For instance, the workers at South 
Bend Lathe gave up their pension plan to gain ownership through an 
ESOP. Similarly, workers at Weirton Steel, Rath Packing, and Hyatt- 
Clark Industries took wage concessions, agreed to or had imposed 
on them dismantlement of their pension plan, and/or waived sever 
ance benefits. The workers at the O&O stores examined in this study 
took a pay cut to achieve their buyouts, as did their fellow former 
A&P co-workers as part of the deal to create Super Fresh with its 
QWL program.
In some of these cases, however, the initial cuts or concessions 
may have been a kind of investment which may or may not pay a 
return. The present study is an evaluation of such costs and benefits 
to workers of the O&O buyouts compared to workers taking the Su 
per Fresh route to save their jobs.
Other types of worker outcomes, such as job satisfaction and men 
tal health, have received some attention in the literature on employee 
ownership and worker buyouts. Tannenbaum (1983) sums up the re 
search results as being reasonably consistent with the hypothesis that 
ownership is a source of satisfaction at work. However, the studies 
he cites sometimes found a negative effect on the job satisfaction of 
managers.
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Studies measuring mental health are about as close as anyone has 
gotten to looking at life satisfaction for worker/owners. The findings 
do not indicate a simple positive effect of employee ownership and 
worker participation. Nightingale (1982), for instance, found a sig 
nificantly higher level of overall mental health and a lower level of 
alienation at the rank-and-file level in his sample of participative 
firms. However, in studying the San Francisco scavenger firms, 
Hochner (1978) found lower levels of perceived powerlessness 
among worker/owners, while Russell, Hochner, and Perry (1979) re 
ported them complaining of a greater incidence of nervous tension, 
worry, and anxiety compared to other refuse collectors. In retro 
spect, such mixed findings are not surprising, since increased power 
also leads to increased responsibility.
Summary of the Theoretical Framework
Organizational and worker outcomes in worker buyouts are highly 
variable. To understand the sources of this variation, it is necessary 
to look at several factors at once. Assuming that the outcomes result 
directly from employee ownership and worker participation misses 
the real story behind the ways that worker buyouts and labor- 
management cooperative efforts are put together and function over 
time. Our framework emphasizes that outcomes result from organi 
zational processes, which in turn result from basic input features.
This framework does not imply that employee ownership and 
worker participation are either the cure-all for ailing firms or the 
villains if and when the firm fails, just as managerial practice is not 
necessarily the cause of good or bad performance in organizations. 
For instance, the worker buyout at Rath Packing led to a substantial 
effort to change the organizational culture from management autoc 
racy and labor adverarialism to participative labor-management co 
operation at several levels (Whyte et al. 1983). Nevertheless, the 
firm is in bankruptcy today. Such a case serves as a reminder that 
employee ownership and worker participation may not be as effec 
tive as theory would have it, or more likely, that they are not always
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potent enough to overcome the effects of the business environment 
and organizational characteristics.
The following set of equations sums up the diagram shown as fig 
ure 2-1:
Participativeness = f (worker characteristics, organization type, 
role of consultants and unions);
Organizational functioning and labor strategy = f (participative- 
ness, business environment, organizational characteristics);
Organizational outcomes = f (organizational functioning and labor 
strategy, business environment, organizational characteristics); 
and
Worker outcomes = f (organizational outcomes, worker character 
istics, participativeness, organizational functioning and labor 
strategy).
In the case under examination here, as we shall see in chapter 3, 
several aspects of this framework will require modification. For in 
stance, because the business environment facing the O&O buyouts 
and the Super Fresh stores at the time of the A&P shutdown was 
basically the same, and because the stores being studied still operate 
under very much the same regional and local market conditions, this 
basic input feature is considered as a constant. Furthermore, some 
aspects of the business environment, such as the availability of cap 
ital, may indeed differ for the O&O buyouts compared to Super 
Fresh (still wholly owned by A&P). Yet these differences may be too 
difficult to measure, and thus, impossible to factor in.
Similarly, many of the constructs, as indicated by the contents of 
the boxes in figure 2-1, are complex and multidimensional. Thus, 
this framework and the quasi-equations above do not match the pre 
cise equations used in analyzing the data we collected. While we 
quantify as many relationships as possible, a great deal of qualitative 
data is needed for clarification. In the next chapter, the actual meth 
ods used to test the theoretical framework are described. The chapter 
following that describes the complexities of the A&P shutdown and 
the circumstances and actions leading to the O&O buyouts and the 
creation of Super Fresh.
Figure 2.1 
Theoretical Framework of Employee Ownership and Worker Participation
Basic Input Features
Worker characteristics
—Demographics
—Skills
—Resources
—Motivation
Organization type
—Worker ownership
—Participative mgt.
—Traditional mgt.
Role of consultants and unions
—Supportiveness
—Extent of training
—Degree of conflict
Business environment
—Competitiveness
—Creditor favorableness
—Customer favorableness
Org. characteristics
—Size
—Product market
—Sales Volume (pre-buyout)
Org. Processes
Org. Participativeness
—Worker attitudes to involvement
—Degree of control
—Range of issues
—Extent of participation
Org. functioning & labor strategy
—Supervision
—Capital investment
—Wage differentials
—Skill mix
—Job function changes
—Effort by workers
—Training costs
—Innovation
Outcomes
Worker economic outcomes
—Wage rates
—Adequacy of income
—Profit/bonus share
—Job security
—Family sacrifices
Org. economic outcomes
—Productivity
—Profit
—Labor costs
Research Design and Methods
In previous chapters we introduced the 1982 Philadelphia A&P 
shutdown and subsequent job-saving efforts through worker buyouts 
and labor-management cooperation (see chapter 4 for further detail), 
and presented a theoretical framework for looking at their compara 
tive effectiveness. This chapter deals with research issues emerging 
from the theoretical framework set forth in chapter 2. The issues 
include finding a situation to study, selecting a sample, operational- 
izing constructs, conducting measurements, and testing hypotheses. 
We describe the research strategy followed and the methods by 
which we gathered our data. We also present an overview of the 
research project, discuss the objectives of our research design, re 
view general methodological issues, and report our procedures in 
collecting data.
We begin with a description of the three major phases of the lon 
gitudinal research project:
Phase I: First Worker Survey
With financial support from the unions, the A&P, Super Fresh, 
and Temple University, the research group sent a mail survey ques 
tionnaire during the summer of 1982 to members of locals 56 and 
1357 employed by A&P. This survey focused on perceptions of the 
workers' former and current situation as well as opinions about the 
opportunity to become worker/owners or to have a QWL program. 
The findings of this phase are not reported here. For details, see 
Hochner & Granrose (1985) and Granrose & Hochner (1985). This 
survey was important because it began a long research relationship 
and yielded information about worker expectations for the new situ-
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ations. The data were helpful in formulating subsequent research in 
struments and interpreting data collected after the new stores had 
opened.
Phase II: Semistructured Interviews
During the summer of 1983, one year after the initial survey, em 
ployee/owners in two O&O stores agreed to participate in individual 
interviews. This phase of the project was guided by a developing 
theoretical framework, which eventually evolved into the one pre 
sented in chapter 2. The primary focus, however, was on organiza 
tional processes and individual motivations. The interviews asked 
employees their reasons for becoming owners, their views on how it 
was working out, and the utility of their training. The interviews 
were partially supported by a grant from Temple University. Also, 
one member of the team, Cindy Coker, was supported by the Ford 
Foundation to evaluate the training the owners had received from 
PACE and Grey Areas, two consulting groups (see chapter 4). She 
helped coordinate the two research efforts into a single interview 
format and gained cooperation from the worker/owners.
By the fall of 1983, further support from the Samuel S. Pels Fund 
enabled us to conduct a similar set of interviews with former A&P 
workers from two Super Fresh stores in Philadelphia. In these stores, 
workers and managers had undergone extensive formal training in 
operation of a QWL program to increase employee participation in 
decisionmaking. The aim of these interviews was to provide a data 
set for comparison with the O&O workers and stores. They focused 
on worker experiences in the new setting and the new QWL system 
of worker participation in the organizations. This group of workers 
was asked why they had not chosen to become worker owners and 
what conditions were like in Super Fresh after training in QWL.
In the fall of 1984, support from the Upjohn Institute enabled us 
to conduct similar interviews with former A&P workers in two Su 
per Fresh stores outside Philadelphia. These stores had been mini 
mally affected by the shutdown threat in 1982 and were represented
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by union locals (UFCW 27 and 56) not actively seeking QWL or 
employee ownership. QWL training was not instituted as early in 
these stores as it had been in the other stores in which interviews 
took place. These employees had not participated in the discussion 
about employee ownership and QWL conducted by UFCW 1357 at 
the time of the shutdown.
Phase III: Structured Questionnaire Surveys of Workers, 
Shop Stewards and Store Managers
The Upjohn Institute funding also enabled the focus of the project 
to be extended more explicitly to economic issues for individuals and 
stores. During the fall of 1984, a written questionnaire asking about 
current conditions in the stores and personal financial welfare was 
given to every Super Fresh employee and O&O worker/owner who 
had been interviewed. Similar questionnaires were sent to shop stew 
ards representing these six stores and the other 19 Super Fresh stores 
in Super Fresh's Philadelphia zone.
Managers from every O&O and Super Fresh store whose workers 
or shop stewards had contributed data, also filled out a written ques 
tionnaire about the store as a whole. Data on the stores' financial 
condition were obtained from the Super Fresh corporate headquar 
ters, from the O&O store boards, and from available published 
sources.
Study Objectives
The research design was guided by two major objectives: to doc 
ument an important and unique case in which worker buyouts and 
labor-management concessions were used to save jobs; and to exam 
ine and test the proposed theoretical framework in order to compare 
the effectiveness of the two innovations for workers and their stores 
(see chapter 2).
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Longitudinal Documentation
The first major goal was to document longitudinally the conse 
quences and the remedies established in this particular plant shut 
down situation. By following this experience from the initial 
announcement, valuable new information on the process of adjusting 
to a shutdown could be gained. Another related goal was to explore 
in depth employee ownership in retail stores rather than in the man 
ufacturing setting typical of past cases reported in the literature. 
Since buyouts in the trade and service sectors may occur more often 
in the future if employee ownership becomes more popular, this in 
formation could prove valuable. Furthermore, this worker buyout 
occurred in an urban context where a shutdown did not threaten the 
sole employment opportunity for displaced workers, in contrast to 
the typically studied buyout. Given these conditions, we believed it 
would be desirable for social policy to clarify whether and under 
what circumstances worker buyouts might be a beneficial alternative 
to job loss.
Theory Testing
A second, equally important objective was to study the linkages 
suggested by the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. We 
aimed primarily to evaluate the influence of the basic input features 
on internal organizational processes and the influence of organi 
zational processes on outcomes for individuals and organizations. 
Specifically, we wanted to compare (1) the efficacy of saving 
jobs through worker buyouts and labor-management concessions, 
and (2) how different organizational processes, namely employee 
ownership and worker participation, affect outcomes.
Comparative Efficacy of Saving Jobs Through Different Methods 
As stated at the outset of chapter 2, to many observers the efficacy 
of job-saving may be judged only by the number of jobs saved. How 
ever, in this study the research design aimed to determine the type
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and level of economic outcomes occurring for both individuals and 
organizations. Economic objectives were broadly defined to include 
job and life satisfaction, as well as income and employment goals, 
i.e., both subjective and objective welfare. Economic outcomes were 
singled out because financial benefits are often advocated as the pri 
mary reason for undertaking a buyout. A broad definition of "eco 
nomic" was adopted because there was concern not only for whether 
or not jobs were saved, but also what kinds of jobs and at what cost 
to other aspects of an employee's life.
This study addresses another issue not usually considered in pre 
vious research, namely, the issue of relative effectiveness. Unless re 
sults are compared to other alternatives these workers might have 
had, it would be difficult to interpret the economic consequences of 
an employee buyout. The comparison of the O&O stores to the Su 
per Fresh stores enables us to determine the comparative ability of 
worker buyouts and QWL to provide jobs, income, well-being, and 
store profits.
Processes and Outcomes of Employee Ownership
and Worker Participation
The theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 differentiates 
employee ownership from employee participation. First of all, em 
ployee ownership and labor-management cooperation, as organiza 
tional types, operate within contexts that involve many factors: 
worker characteristics, consultants and unions, business environment 
and particular organizational characteristics. Second, the framework 
specifies that it is necessary to establish that worker buyouts and 
joint labor-management programs do indeed involve worker partici 
pation operationally. Third, the framework posits organizational 
functioning and labor strategy as a theoretical construct separate 
from participativeness and as a key input into organizational 
outcomes. Operationalizing organizational functioning and labor 
strategy is a key task in studies of worker participation in decision- 
making. Fourth, the framework hypothesizes that organizational and 
individual outcomes are influenced by a number of factors and re 
quire consideration of several sources of variation.
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General Methodological Issues
Three major difficulties, which were considerations in the design 
and execution of this study, are inherent in studying employee own 
ership and worker participation. The first is the problem of defining 
and operationalizing important theoretical constructs. The second is 
taking into account the influence of contextual factors on the key 
variables in comparing employee-owned and participatory firms 
with more conventional ones. A third problem concerns who is a 
better source of information about the key variables in the theoretical 
framework: workers, managers, or union representatives?
Definition and Operationalization of Key Theoretical Constructs
Several of the boxes in our theoretical framework (chapter 2) in 
volve difficult-to-define, multidimensional concepts having to do 
with ownership, participation, organizational functioning and labor 
strategy, worker motivations, effectiveness, and productivity.
Of particular importance are the nature and distribution of owner 
ship and participation, which are covered in our constructs of orga 
nizational type and participativeness. Because we restricted our 
study to the worker buyout, which is a particular form of employee 
ownership, and to Super Fresh, which involves a particular form of 
cooperative labor-management agreement, the issue of organizational 
type is clearly defined here.
However, there are some major controversies in the study of 
worker participation, influence, power, and control, all of which 
contribute to the construct of participativeness (IDE 1981). First, 
there is a lack of agreement among researchers about definitions of 
the various terms. Similarly, there are inherent problems quantifying 
"soft" concepts such as participativeness. Second are potential 
problems of methodological errors and bias, such as the possible 
qualitative difference in participativeness between worker buyouts 
and forms of labor-management cooperation (e.g., through QWL 
programs). Another potential methodological problem occurs in the 
variety of approaches to the study of power and dimensions of par-
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ticipativeness. Walton (1970), in surveying the research on commu 
nity power structures, found that choice of methods was significantly 
related to consequent results. For instance, the reputational method 
(asking respondents who has power) tends to find pyramidal struc 
tures, while the decisional method (analyzing the decision process) 
tends to find factional or coalitional structures.
To deal with the definition of participativeness, we follow the 
multidimensional definition given by Bernstein (1976), which in 
cludes (a) the degree of influence, (b) the range of issues involved, 
and (c) the organizational level where influence occurs. Measure 
ment of these dimensions, using operationalizations developed by 
Hochner (1978), IDE (1981), and Tannenbaum et al. (1974), also 
gives us the ability to compare our results with those of other related 
studies.
To deal with method problems, our research strategy involved 
what Jick (1979) calls "triangulation," i.e., using different method 
ologies to study the same phenomenon. Both qualitative, semistruc- 
tured interviews and quantitative structured surveys were conducted 
with workers in the various stores chosen for intensive study. This 
enabled us to get a better handle on measuring and evaluating inter 
nal processes in the organizations. The qualitative worker interview 
results are reported in chapter 5, while the quantitative worker sur 
vey results are reported in chapter 7. Integrating and reconciling 
these results, where different, is one of the tasks of the concluding 
chapter (8).
Other theoretical constructs, such as worker motivation (part of 
worker characteristics), organizational functioning and labor strat 
egy, and worker outcomes, involve some of the same difficulties as 
participativeness. They are all hard to define, operationalize, and 
measure. Where possible, we chose measures derived from previous 
literature. Also, the use of triangulation permitted us to get two per 
spectives on the impact of these variables.
Effectiveness and other aspects of outcomes were also difficult to 
define. As noted above, a broad definition of worker economic out 
comes was adopted because of our concern not only with the number 
of jobs saved, but also with what kinds of jobs and at what cost to
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other aspects of an employee's life. Thus, we looked at objective 
outcomes—whether the jobs are full time or part time and the 
amount of job income received—and at subjective outcomes—the 
degree of sacrifice imposed on workers by the shutdown and subse 
quent events and their satisfaction with their jobs, lives, and eco 
nomic results.
Effectiveness at the organizational level is another important mat 
ter. A number of researchers on employee ownership and worker par 
ticipation comment that conventional measures of profits may have 
limited applicability because cooperatives do not always keep their 
books and account for profits the same way conventional firms do. 
For instance, Thomas and Logan (1982), in their study of the Span 
ish Mondragon cooperatives, advocate measures of performance such 
as value added. According to Berman (1967), ownership leads to 
stability of employment, a primary outcome for both individuals 
and firms. (In this study, we were able to use comparable mea 
sures of profits from both worker-owned and conventional firms. See 
chapter 7.)
In theory, the objectives of employee-owned and participatory 
firms may differ from those of conventional firms. Instead of single- 
minded pursuit of profit, the objectives of employee-owned and par 
ticipatory firms may be multiple: profit, employment security, high 
and steady worker income, and desirable work hours. In this study, 
we took a multidimensional approach to organizational outcomes. 
More detail on this approach will be forthcoming in chapter 7.
The Influence of Contextual Factors
In addition to employee ownership and worker participation, the 
literature discussed in chapter 2 strongly suggests the importance of 
certain contextual variables and organizational characteristics in de 
termining worker and store outcomes. Control of the context is im 
portant for determination of the extent to which results can be 
generalized. That is, it will enable us to incorporate or rule out the 
particular context (depending on the degree to which contextual and 
organizational factors interact), suggest the circumstances under
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which other worker buyouts might have similar effects, and help in 
dicate what can or cannot be done to enhance or promote successful 
buyouts. Levin (1982) favors an experimental analogy of control: 
"cooperative or labor-managed and traditional capitalist forms of 
organization would represent experimental treatments applied to 
productive enterprises to see which provides higher productivity" 
(p. 53). To approximate such experimental conditions, a study of 
employee-owned and participatory firms would be expected to find a 
sample which would hold constant the companies' resources, nature 
of the products, market prices, and external environments, including 
geographical area. Furthermore, it would be necessary to randomly 
assign employees to experimental treatments.
In reality, the experimental analogy is a false one. Firms are not 
created by some invisible experimental hand, allowing comparisons 
on only one key variable at a time, say employee ownership versus 
conventional ownership, while holding all other sources of variation 
constant. Instead, firms are formed for a variety of reasons at a va 
riety of times. Historical forces and personal preferences predomi 
nate in determining which firms get developed, when they get 
started, what stages they go through, and who gets in what firms. 
There is no random assignment for either workers or firms.
Levin considers this may be a serious problem "if LMFs [labor- 
managed firms] are found predominantly among enterprises that are 
purchased by their workers as a last resort to maintain employment, 
after the capitalist owners have decided to terminate production and 
close the firms. That is, if LMFs are typically a product of worker 
takeovers of failing capitalist firms, a comparison of productivity 
will hardly be valid" (p. 54).
However, instead of bemoaning the imperfect actual conditions un 
der which tests of hypotheses must take place, it is more useful to 
identify ways in which fair tests of employee ownership and worker 
participation can take place. Hochner (1978) provides a few key cri 
teria for these fair tests: (1) comprehensive and multidimensional 
theories of participation and (2) selection of appropriate cases to 
study, which involve meaningful motivations for worker partici 
pation.
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First, it is possible to use a comprehensive theoretical model of 
employee ownership and participation and a measurement model that 
is inclusive of background factors. Then at least contextual factors 
will be taken into account. This is part of the approach in this study.
Second, various sampling strategies can be adopted. Many previ 
ous studies have tried to control contextual variations through sam 
pling. Some studies tried to maximize control over contextual 
variables, including business environment and organizational charac 
teristics, by matching a sample of employee-owned firms in a vari 
ety of industries with a sample of conventional firms in the same 
industries, sometimes also using such criteria as size of workforce 
and type of technology (Nightingale 1982; Conte, Tannenbaum, and 
McCulloch 1981; Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann 1984; Rosen 
and Klein 1983). Other researchers have tried to control for industry 
by sampling firms with employee ownership and conventional firms 
within one industry, one region, and with similar work methods 
(Rhodes and Steers 1981; Greenberg 1980; Berman 1967; Bellas 
1972; Russell, Hochner, and Perry 1979). Neither of these strategies, 
however, can rule out variations in worker characteristics. Even 
when workers in employee-owned and conventional firms do similar 
jobs and have the same basic qualifications, there may be self- 
selection at work. Though it is not possible to rule out self-selection 
through an experimental design, this factor needs to be incorporated 
in research designs.
The establishment of the worker buyout O&Os and the Super 
Fresh stores simultaneously makes this situation seem to be a type of 
naturally occurring field quasi-experiment (Campbell and Stanley 
1963). A&P workers and stores were threatened with shutdown. The 
workers were reemployed and stores reopened through two organiza 
tional innovations. Therefore, this situation seems to control for 
many industry and background factors.
Even here, however, a precise experimental control analogy is 
faulty. While industry is held constant, plant differences may be sig 
nificant. For instance, the actual openings of the different stores did 
not occur at the same time, but rather took place over a period of 
time stretching from mid-1982 to late 1983. Some A&P stores that
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received the Super Fresh treatment either had not actually been 
threatened in the original shutdown announcement or were only 
closed briefly to allow for conversion. Moreover, the potential 
worker/owners had to choose sites for buyouts from a list presented 
to them by A&P corporate staff, so it is likely that A&P kept the best 
sites for itself; and not all A&P stores were reopened as Super Fresh. 
Furthermore, the worker/owners do not have many of the resources 
of the big chain, though they have affiliated their stores with a 
quasi-chain, IGA (Independent Grocers' Association), which pro 
vides them with some coordinated advertising, short-term financ 
ing, purchasing, and warehousing.
Similarly, worker background in this situation may not be well- 
controlled either. As reported in chapter 4, though the workers in the 
different settings do have a common previous employer, they se 
lected which option they would go to. In chapters 5 and 6, the im 
portance of self-selection becomes clear when we discuss the 
differences between the O&O and Super Fresh workers. Some A&P 
workers were never explicitly threatened with job loss and lost only a 
few weeks work during the conversion process. In addition, not all 
former A&P workers were called back to work at Super Fresh. Nor 
did they all have a chance to participate in the planning of the 
worker buyouts, particularly if they were members of union locals 
either unreceptive or hostile to the idea.
In the unique setting of the current study, we were able to adopt a 
variation of the single-industry sampling strategy. We concentrated 
on one industry, but in addition, the workers in both the O&O and 
Super Fresh stores originally came from the same pool of A&P 
workers and got sorted into the new structures at approximately the 
same time. Furthermore, most of the firms in the sample were 
threatened with shutdown at the same time, and then reopened. 
Thus, this sample provided unique opportunities for comparisons of 
workers and of firms. In this context, we could control for industry, 
geographical area, and to some degree, the length of time the inno 
vation has been established. To control or take into account other 
sources of contextual variation, where possible, we examined some 
worker self-selection factors (such as worker motivations to choose
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either O&O or Super Fresh), and some differences in organizational 
characteristics, such as preshutdown profitability, resources, and lo 
cal external environment.
Whose Perspective in Data Collection?
Complex and controversial topics such as employee ownership and 
worker participation, tend to entail disagreement among theorists 
about how to operationalize theoretical constructs (IDE 1981). In 
particular, with respect to participativeness, various arguments are 
made that the perceptions of either workers, managers, or objective 
observers are more valid representations of reality. Contrarily, par 
ticipativeness is sometimes defined by legal or constitutional ar 
rangements in the firms (IDE 1981; Jones 1984). In this study, 
similar contentions could be made over organizational functioning 
and labor strategy. How do we validly measure difficult constructs?
To some extent, it is possible to hedge this question in research 
design by using multiple methods and multiple measures of each 
construct. For instance, in this study, by using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, we were able to compare workers' 
spontaneously-expressed cognitive categories with a priori theoreti 
cal constructs and measurements.
However, there is a larger question here. Are organizational pro 
cesses best seen from the workers' perspective, or that of managers, 
or through some other means? In theory, this may be unresolvable. 
Nevertheless, we had to come up with an answer in this study, be 
cause we focused on both workers and their stores. Where possible, 
we measured perceptions of organizational processes from three 
sources—workers, store managers, and union shop stewards. Be 
cause we asked workers about their experiences and their outcomes 
in the stores, we decided to ask them about processes. Likewise, 
because we asked store managers about store outcomes, we decided 
to ask about processes as well. However, because we were limited in 
our budget and because we were unsure that store managers and 
workers would see things similarly, we asked shop stewards, as pos 
sible proxies for workers' perceptions. In part, we were interested in
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differences in perceptions among organizational levels. However, to 
strengthen our confidence in our measures, it was necessary not only 
to test these differences, but to construct measurement scales using 
items that all organizational levels agreed hung together.
Nevertheless, the major reason we were concerned about differing 
perspectives had to do with the limits of our sample. Only two 
employee-owned stores were established through worker buyouts. 
That fact limited the sample that could be used for comparison with 
the new worker/owners, despite the fact that the Super Fresh stores, 
with their QWL programs, eventually numbered over 55 and em 
ployed several thousand workers.
The small number of cases necessitated modifications in the the 
oretical framework, to apply this framework to the actual setting. 
This test was split into two levels of analysis: one for individual 
worker perceptions of processes and outcomes and one for store-level 
processes and outcomes. At each level, a specific research design 
was selected that would compare workers for stores in three situa 
tions: (1) employee ownership with worker participation (the O&O 
stores), (2) conventional ownership in which QWL had been fully 
implemented (QWL Super Fresh stores), and (3) conventional own 
ership in which QWL had been less fully implemented (non-QWL 
Super Fresh stores).
Sampling Procedures 
The Worker Sample
To study worker outcomes, attitudes, and perceptions in depth, a 
sample of workers from six stores was chosen. Perceptions of orga 
nizational processes and reports of individual worker economic out 
comes could be studied intensively in the six stores selected for 
comparison. We chose this approach because (a) we wanted to fol 
low up former A&P workers in the new setting; (b) we wanted to 
know how QWL worked; and (c) most important, we wanted to 
know how these workers and their situations compared with the
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O&Os. Because only two O&O stores had been started, two stores 
of each type were selected for the in-depth look at workers. Limited 
resources led us to limit the number of comparison cases and of 
workers. Consequently, we tried to match the Super Fresh stores 
with the O&Os, but as explained below, the matching was rather 
imperfect.
In the O&Os, every available worker/owner was included in the 
sample. Within each Super Fresh store, subjects were selected from 
a list of all former A&P employees provided by management. After 
stratification for department, department head status, and sex, selec 
tion was randomly made by the research team. In the two Super 
Fresh stores outside Philadelphia, the number of former A&P work 
ers was sufficiently small that almost all of them were interviewed.
The sample of workers was chosen to be representative of former 
A&P workers, not of all workers in the stores, because the major 
focus of this study was on job-saving. Not all of the workers in the 
O&O stores are worker/owners; several are hired workers. But these 
hired workers tend not to be former A&P workers, whereas the 
worker/owners are. Similarly, in the Super Fresh stores, there are 
workers who we ruled out of eligibility for selection to the sample 
because they had not been former A&P workers.
The Store Sample
For testing hypotheses concerning store-level processes and out 
comes, a six-store sample would be inadequate. It would be impos 
sible to answer questions about the economic consequences to stores 
on the basis of such a small sample. It was necessary, therefore, to 
gather store-level data from a larger number—to put the six stores 
studied intensively into a broader context and to enable some infer 
ences concerning the relationship of store organizational processes to 
store economic outcomes. Store-level data were collected from 19 
other Super Fresh stores in Philadelphia itself, as well as from the 
six stores at which worker interviews took place. For store-level 
measurement of the role of consultants and unions, organizational 
environment, store functioning and labor strategy, operational char-
Table 3.1 Data Collection Summary
Personal Interviews
Number Contacted
Number Responding
Number of Stores
Date Data Collected
Survey Questionnaire
Number Contacted
Numbej Responding
Number of Stores
Date Data Collected
Store 
managers
—
—
—
25
25
25
1/85
Shop 
stewards
—
—
—
48
47
25
1/85
O&O 
worker/ 
owners
39
31
2
9/83-3/84
39
27
2
2/85
QWL Super 
Fresh 
workers
41
41
2
3/84-1/85
41
36
2
2/85
Non-QWL 
Super Fresh 
workers
59
58
2
3/84-1/85
59
53
2
10/84-1/85
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acteristics, and organizational economic outcomes, a survey of store 
managers was conducted.
Shop stewards as proxies for workers.
Though we needed to measure the worker perspective on the key 
variables of participativeness and store functioning, financial limita 
tions prohibited contacting every worker in these stores. Instead, two 
shop stewards for each of the additional 19 stores as well as the six 
original ones—one representing retail clerks from local 1357 or 
from local 27 and the other representing meatcutters from local 
56—completed a structured written questionnaire about their store, 
including information on the extent of QWL implementation and on 
participation in decisionmaking. Shop stewards were chosen as prox 
ies to represent the perceptions of workers in their stores of overall 
store participation and functioning.
How good a proxy were the shop stewards' responses for workers' 
responses in the larger sample of stores? (See appendix for table.) 
After we categorized Super Fresh stores as being either QWL or 
non-QWL stores (see below), we compared the mean levels of shop 
steward characteristics, participativeness, and perceived store func 
tioning variables reported by workers in the two stores in that cate 
gory studied in depth.
Overall, the shop stewards' responses showed few if any signifi 
cant differences from workers in their category. First, shop stewards 
were no different from workers in worker characteristics. Second, 
combining both categories, shop stewards' responses tended to fall 
roughly intermediate between the responses of full-time and part- 
time workers on all measures, though on some variables they dif 
fered from either full-time or part-time workers. Third, for the QWL 
Super Fresh stores, shop stewards seemed to be quite representative 
of both full-time and part-time workers. Fourth, for the larger 
sample of non-QWL Super Fresh stores (n = 8), shop stewards did 
perceive less worker influence in daily and intermediate decision- 
making, and less learning from their training session compared to 
workers in the two non-QWL stores studied in depth. This last find 
ing, however, may be a function of the special nature of the
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stores selected for in-depth study, as discussed below.
It would have been desirable to interview and survey workers in a 
larger number of stores, but given financial and time constraints, it 
was not possible. It may have been possible to survey a larger group 
of workers in a larger number of stores by skipping the intensive 
interviewing, but that would have eliminated the triangulation of 
methods so desirable and so necessary for studying worker motiva 
tions and structures of participation and decisionmaking, as noted 
above.
Selection of stores for in-depth study
The Super Fresh stores studied in depth were selected jointly by 
the research team and Super Fresh corporate management. In select 
ing the initial two stores to study (expected to fit the label "QWL 
Super Fresh"), the research team requested that they be matched 
with the O&Os on the basis of size, location, and business volume. 
However, Super Fresh management strongly recommended two par 
ticular stores, which turned out to be larger than the O&Os and lo 
cated in urban neighborhoods with higher density. This did not 
match the less urban setting of the O&Os. These two Super Fresh 
stores were part of the initial group of stores receiving QWL train 
ing. They were accepted by the research team because they were 
expected to be representative of stores in which QWL had been im 
plemented and because they were stores represented by UFCW local 
1357, which had been the original party to the innovative Super 
Fresh labor agreement.
The other two Super Fresh stores in this sample (expected to fit 
the label "non-QWL Super Fresh") were also selected jointly by the 
research team and Super Fresh management. We wanted stores most 
closely resembling, operationally, A&Ps before the shutdown and 
conversion. In addition to similar matching criteria, a particular con 
cern was to select stores outside the jurisdiction of local 1357, which 
had initiated the worker buyouts, negotiated the QWL program and 
worker bonuses with Super Fresh, and was involved in extensive 
training programs likely to change workers' opinions to be less rep 
resentative of the old A&P. Though the agreement between Super
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Fresh and local 1357 became a pattern for contracts between the 
company and other UFCW locals in the area, the other locals were 
not enthusiastic about the agreement. The two Super Fresh stores 
chosen for the sample were south of Philadelphia, and the workers 
were represented by UFCW locals 27 and 56. They were supposed to 
have implemented a QWL program, but this had been initiated later 
than in Philadelphia, involved less extensive training, less union sup 
port, and the workers in these two stores had not faced a permanent 
shutdown in 1982. For these reasons we expected a low level of 
QWL implementation in these stores.
As a check on the degree to which stores had really implemented 
QWL, we also gathered data on the extent to which QWL was 
known and practiced in these stores. We had expected that our orig 
inal sampling categories of QWL and non-QWL would be filled 
through taking two stores in Super Fresh's Philadelphia zone (where 
QWL was originally proposed and implemented) and two stores out 
side that zone (where QWL was formally implemented later, if at 
all). More details on the establishment of both the O&O worker- 
owned stores and the Super Fresh chain and its QWL program will 
be found in chapter 4.
Reclassification of stores to sampling categories
Data from our interviews, as reported in chapter 5, and the an 
swers to some questions on the worker surveys, concerning the de 
gree of QWL implementation in the stores led us to question our 
original assumptions. One store in the Philadelphia zone and one 
store outside had actually fully implemented QWL and the two other 
Super Fresh stores (one in Philadelphia and one outside) had either 
done an incomplete implementation or had not followed up the ini 
tial training. Thus, we reclassified the Super Fresh stores in the sam 
ple used in our in-depth study on the basis of the degree of actual 
implementation. Moreover, the stores in the larger sample were clas 
sified according to these new criteria, too.
Sampling biases in store samples.
A number of sampling biases need to be discussed to help inter 
pret our findings. As mentioned above, despite our efforts to select 
four Super Fresh stores for the in-depth part of the study that would
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be matched with the O&O stores on the basis of size, location, and 
business volume, Super Fresh management recommended four par 
ticular stores.
To check on how representative these stores were, we compared 
the store-level data collected from managers and shop stewards at (a) 
the two QWL stores from the sample studied in depth with stores in 
the larger sample of 19 which we classified as QWL stores (n= 11) 
and (b) the two non-QWL stores from the in-depth study with non- 
QWL stores from the larger sample (n = 8). Specific findings of this 
analysis (see table in appendix for detail) revealed the two QWL 
stores studied in depth were larger in square footage, sales revenue, 
and payroll; had been more profitable in the year before the A&P 
shutdown; had significantly more worker influence, overall and in 
certain decisions; and had instituted more training programs for 
workers. There were fewer differences between the two non-QWL 
stores studied in depth and the others. For instance, the non-QWL 
stores did not differ in participativeness. Nevertheless, they did have 
significantly higher payroll costs, sales, current (1983) profits, more 
worker training programs, and higher worker bonuses than the non- 
QWL stores in the larger sample. In addition, it appears that the 
non-QWL stores in the larger sample have about the same levels of 
participativeness on many variables as do the QWL stores.
Overall, it seems that Super Fresh management chose "star" 
stores for us in the in-depth part of the study for comparison with 
the O&O stores. This may significantly bias the comparisons we 
make. However, if we find that workers in the O&O stores differ 
from those in the Super Fresh stores in ways predicted by the theo 
retical framework, we can be rather certain about confirmation of 
our hypotheses.
Procedures Used in the Collection of Data 
Worker Interviews
This method asked respondents to describe current and recollected 
situations in depth, providing an insider's view of personal motives,
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informal social networks, informal systems of communication, and 
store operations. The semistructured worker interviews consisted of 
approximately one-and-one-half hours of conversation focused on:
Reasons for their choice of this work situation; 
The nature of their former and current jobs; 
Decisionmaking and supervisory practices in the store; 
Social networks at the stores; 
Career history and aspirations; and 
Household circumstances.
The interviews were usually conducted in a back office at the 
store or in a nearby restaurant. The setting was reasonably private, 
but sometimes hot, cold, or noisy because of the loading and unload 
ing of food going on in other parts of the back of the store. Most 
Super Fresh employees were given time off from work to be inter 
viewed. The O&O employee/owners were paid $10 from Ford Foun 
dation funds for coming in early or staying late in order to be 
interviewed. Interviews were conducted by the research team or by 
graduate anthropology students trained in the collection of ethno 
graphic material.
Interviewers took notes in space provided on the interview ques 
tionnaires, and taped the conversation. 1 After the interview was 
completed, the interviewers refined their notes based on the tapes. 
Each completed interview protocol was then coded by three anthro 
pologists. In coding the O&O interviews, the primary objective was 
to develop categories which fit the cognitive categories of the em 
ployees. If information in response to one question was elicited as an 
aside in a later question, the information was coded in both places.
Construction of the Super Fresh interviews benefited from the ex 
perience gained interviewing O&O employee/owners. Some ques 
tions were simplified and others made more specific or more 
structured, using the coding categories developed after the O&O in 
terviews. Coding of the Super Fresh interviews conformed as much 
as possible to that of the O&O employees, but if different ideas were 
being expressed, preference was given to capturing the ideas of the 
employees rather than forcing responses into O&O-determined cate 
gories. A copy of the questionnaire used for each group is located in
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the appendix. The coding scheme will be discussed in conjunction 
with the explanation of the interview findings in chapter 5.
Worker Survey
Whereas the interviews occurred over a long time span in different 
stores, the survey gathered data from all employees concerning ap 
proximately the same time period. The questionnaires, which could 
be filled out in about a half hour, contained precoded questions on:
Job experience;
Training, particularly in the new setting;
Perceptions of the amount and type of participation in
decisionmaking; 
Perceptions of store functioning under QWL or worker
ownership; 
Personal values;
Aspects of job and life satisfaction; 
Household situation; and (for Super Fresh workers) the 
QWL system and worker's knowledge of it.
Some questions were selected or adapted from prior instruments, 
such as the survey administered in Phase I of the research project, 
Tannenbaum (1968), IDE (1981), and the Michigan Quality of Work 
Survey (Quinn and Staines 1977). Others were written specifically 
for this study using ideas gained from the completed interviews or 
from the theoretical constructs needed for model testing. All ques 
tions were structured or provided with precoded categories for re 
sponse except the group of questions on the Super Fresh 
questionnaire that asked employees to define QWL and to describe 
its implementation in the store. A copy of this questionnaire is lo 
cated in the appendix.
The questionnaires were distributed directly by interviewers in the 
last two stores studied. In other stores, questionnaires were delivered 
to workers at the stores by members of the research team or our 
assistants. A cover letter assured the employees of confidentiality 
and reinforced the message that the data were being returned to the
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Temple research team, not to their store or union. They returned 
completed questionnaires by sealing them in provided envelopes and 
dropping them in a box in the store. Those employees who did not 
return their questionnaires immediately were contacted by phone if 
needed and personal follow-up was continued until a response or a 
refusal was received. After the completed questionnaires were re 
ceived, a research team member assigned code numbers, checked 
them for completeness, and coded the QWL questions. Data was 
then keypunched directly from the questionnaire.
Shop Steward Survey
Since all stores but the O&Os were represented by two unions, 
one for retail clerks and one for meatcutters, both shop stewards in 
each store were surveyed, partly to make sure there would be at least 
one response from each store. 2 The survey of shop stewards was 
distributed and returned by mail, since these stores were widely dis 
persed geographically. Names and addresses were provided by Super 
Fresh management. The questions on the shop steward survey were 
identical to those in the employees' written questionnaire except that 
in some questions the steward was directed to respond based on her 
or his perception of the workers' general situation in their store 
rather than her or his own particular situation or belief. Specifically, 
the shop steward was asked about:
Personal background (similar to worker survey job ex 
perience);
Participation (questions similar to worker survey but 
asking about all workers, not just this individual); and
Training (again, concerning the whole store not just this 
individual).
A copy of this questionnaire is located in the appendix.
If responses to this survey were not received immediately, a 
follow-up postcard was sent. Telephone reminders were then used to 
encourage stragglers to return their questionnaires. Because the sam 
ple size was small, a response was needed from virtually all in the
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sample. If the data were not returned by mail after several phone 
calls, the responses were collected by telephone interview. All ques 
tions were preceded and were punched directly from the question 
naire.
Shop stewards from both the retail clerks local and the meatcutters 
local in the store were surveyed. However, we actually used the re 
sponses of the retail clerks steward, unless we were not able to ob 
tain his or her response from a particular store. In those cases 
(n = 4), we used the responses of the meatcutters steward. These 
meatcutters stewards' responses did not differ significantly from 
those of the retail clerk stewards used. Retail clerks rather than 
meatcutters stewards were our first choice because of the greater 
support of the new Super Fresh arrangements by the main retail 
clerks local (1357).
Store Manager Survey
Similar to the shop stewards survey, store managers' (called store 
directors at Super Fresh) questionnaires were sent and returned by 
mail. The questionnaire covered:
Characteristics of the store;
Participation in decisionmaking (similar to shop steward 
questions, but covering all levels in the store—man 
ager, department heads, and workers;
Methods being used in the organizational innovations;
Store financial information, including strategy for tough 
times; and
Amount of consulting and training programs received, 
plus what workers have learned.
In all cases, we had to collect store financial data which (1) were 
available from the stores and corporate management and (2) were 
comparable to the data we were getting from the other sources. In 
most cases, store managers were reluctant to provide the detailed 
economic data requested. For the Super Fresh stores, financial infor 
mation was then obtained from Super Fresh corporate headquarters.
At one of the O&O stores, the manager filled out most of the 
questionnaire, but wouldn't divulge financial information. The board
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of directors and the worker/owners as a whole also refused to release 
the information, though they had been cooperative up to then. For 
that one store, we had to use information from key informants cross 
checked with published data about the industry and about the stores. 
We have every reason to believe that it reliably represents figures 
comparable to those obtained for the other stores.
Table 3.2 
______Sources of Measures of Theoretical Constructs______
Variable or construct_______Sources of data__________
I. Basic input features
Worker characteristics Worker interviews and survey. 
Store type Sampling (also shop steward and
manager survey).
Role of consultants & unions Store manager survey. 
Business environment Sampling or manager survey. 
Store characteristics Store manager, corporate archives,
and published sources.
II. Organizational processes
Participativeness Worker, shop steward, and manager
survey, and worker interviews.
Store functioning and Worker, shop steward, and manager 
labor strategy survey, and worker interviews.
III. Outcomes
Worker level Worker survey and interviews. 
Store Level Manager survey and corporate
archives.
Limitations of the Study Design
There were several possible limitations which need to be taken 
into account when results of this study are interpreted. The small 
number of stores and workers increases the probability that particu 
lar cases are not representative of stores in general. Of course, it 
would also have been better to have had more than two employee- 
owned stores, but having at least two alerted the research team to 
possible store idiosyncracies.
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Concerning individual data, self-report data were used, although 
several sources were used for many of the key variables. Self-report 
data always are subject to bias due to the difficulty people have in 
objectively perceiving their world and reporting it honestly to others. 
It also would have been desirable to obtain data from all of the 
workers involved, instead of using the proxy measurement of key 
informant shop stewards used for testing the store-level analysis. 
However, the shop steward data, as reported above, appear to be 
representative, based on the six stores studied in depth.
Conducting the store-level analysis on a sample of just 25 stores 
means that few variables can be used in quantitative tests. Thus, less 
detail is available than can be used in the analysis of the individual 
level. However, the qualitative information collected in semistruc- 
tured interviews should help in interpreting both the worker-level and 
the store-level analyses.
Controlling for industry, region, and organizational type meant 
that some generalizability was sacrificed. By carefully documenting 
the circumstances of this buyout, the nature of jobs, and the defini 
tion of constructs in ways comparable to other studies, however, it is 
possible to determine when the findings of this research project can 
realistically be applied to other settings.
Despite the uniqueness of the setting, our sample may be repre 
sentative of employee buyouts, even if not representative of the su 
permarket industry. The O&O worker buyouts tend to share several 
characteristics of previous employee buyouts (Whyte et al. 1983). 
(1) Profitable units were closed by the parent company, so economic 
viability was possible. (2) Management delayed notification of a 
shutdown, though the union had anticipated it. (3) Plant management 
practices could be improved and several strategies for improvement 
were available. (4) Financial, managerial, and organizing leadership 
were available to the potential worker/owners through the union and 
consultants. (5) Complex financial arrangements, including both se 
cured bank notes and individual capital investment, were needed to 
fund the buyout. (6) The degree of participation in decisionmaking 
to accompany ownership was identified as a crucial issue affecting 
economic viability of the firm.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed the overall research project, our ob 
jectives in the current phase, and our strategy and procedures in col 
lecting data. Overall, the setting provided a unique opportunity to 
compare job saving in worker buyouts to labor-management cooper 
ation and to test theoretically meaningful hypotheses. Our research 
design was developed to focus on both worker- and store-level pro 
cesses and outcomes.
In the next chapter (4), we go into detail on the context which 
led to the establishment of the O&O and Super Fresh stores and the 
formal implementation of the worker buyouts and the labor- 
management cooperative programs. The following chapters present 
the findings of our qualitative and quantitative explorations of the 
hypotheses suggested by our theoretical framework.
NOTES
1. The employees were assured that the tapes would only be heard by the interviewers or 
senior researchers. They were also assured that identification of their individual responses 
would not be revealed to anyone at the store, the company, or the union. If someone objected 
to being taped, their wishes were honored.
2. The meatcutters local did not want to get involved in the worker buyout, so the meat work 
ers in the O&Os were made part of the retail clerks local.
Context of the Closings and 
Implementation of Alternatives
A&P took down its last few red and white logos in the Philadel 
phia area in 1982. In their place, two new logos appeared on the 
fronts of some former A&P stores. O&O stores had a crisp blue and 
white logo with the name in classic lettering. Super Fresh raised a 
green and white sign to convey freshness. About all the general pub 
lic saw was the exchange of signs. The public held (and still holds) 
many misconceptions about what happened to A&P and what kind of 
business structures characterize the new Super Fresh and O&O 
stores. This chapter describes what lay behind the series of events 
leading up to the establishment of the stores bearing those new 
logos. The first half of the chapter explores the national, industrial, 
and corporate context of the 1982 A&P closings in Philadelphia and 
the response of the local union. The rest of the chapter explains each 
of the two alternatives that emerged in the attempt to save supermar 
ket workers' jobs: the O&O and Super Fresh stores. The second part 
of the chapter focuses on the formal labor agreement, training pro 
grams, and organizational structures that were planned and on the 
actual developments (planned and unplanned) occurring in the imple 
mentation of the two alternatives.
Using the terms of our theoretical framework, this chapter con 
tains primarily descriptive information about most of the basic input 
features. The contextual description of the economy and the com 
pany is important background information on the business environ 
ment in which both job-saving attempts occurred. Similarly, the 
description of A&P corporate decisions and actions provides a gen 
eral understanding of the organizational characteristics and past his 
tory that those creating new organizational forms had to contend
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with. The details of the actual store types are thoroughly rendered, 
including some sense of the differences between plan and realization. 
The roles played by consultant and union support are at the heart of 
the story of the establishment of the job-saving alternatives told in 
this chapter. The story of the implementation of the types gives some 
basic indications of how the organizational processes are expected to 
work, but that part of our framework will be examined in depth in 
chapters 5-7. Likewise, there is no discussion of the characteristics 
of the workers, which will be dealt with in those later chapters.
In a more basic sense, this chapter should enable the reader to 
understand events from the point of view of the various categories of 
insiders. What contributed to A&P management's decision to close 
its Philadelphia stores, gradually over a number of years, and then 
all at once in 1982? What did the A&P workers experience in the 
years and especially the months before the final announcement of 
store closings? Why did the union offer to buy and operate a number 
of stores as worker-owned? What were the motivations of A&P and 
workers' to go the route of Super Fresh? What were former A&P 
workers' expectations of each setting and what preparation did they 
have? The next chapter takes up the reality of implementation of the 
new businesses.
As stated earlier, a strength of this study is that the structure of 
the situation we describe has some of the qualities of an experimen 
tal research design. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind 
that the development of the businesses was not exactly parallel. This 
chapter also discusses the circumstances of development that account 
for these differences. For example, the amount and timing of training 
for working out the store structures differed for the two store types 
and training occurred not only before the stores opened but after 
stores started up. These differences in training affected how the 
stores evolved and led to a redefinition in this study of store types 
among Super Fresh stores based on amount and quality of on-the-job 
experience with QWL.
The Economy
Early 1982 was a period of deep recession in the economy as a
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whole. The national unemployment rate reached 8.8 percent in Feb 
ruary, the month A&P announced the impending shutdown of its 
Philadelphia stores. Unemployment climbed steadily through the 
year, going up to 10.8 percent in November, when both O&O stores 
had opened. In this context, unions were negotiating relatively un 
precedented contracts, agreeing to wage cuts and other concessions. 
Major contracts (covering at least 1,000 workers) negotiated in the 
first quarter of 1982 provided for first-year wage increases of 3.0 
percent on average, compared to 9.0 percent for contracts negotiated 
in the fourth quarter of 1981 (Ruben 1983). The situation faced by 
the Philadelphia A&P workforce was in many respects duplicated 
throughout the country.
The Food Retailing Industry
The cyclical problem of plant closings and unemployment brought 
on in the recession exacerbated economic dislocation that structural 
shifts had been causing for several years. That is, industries under 
going profound changes in consumer demand, in technology, in plant 
location, and in competitive pressures, such as automobiles and 
steel, were among the hardest hit and accounted for much of the 
increase in unemployment.
Structural and strategic changes were occurring in other industries 
as well, however, even in relatively stable ones such as food retail 
ing. Increasing suburbanization, sophisticated marketing strategies, 
and changes in cash register and warehouse technologies led food 
retailers to sharpen their competitive edges. A key management cop 
ing strategy in this environment has been to cut costs, particularly 
labor costs.
For workers in food retailing, this effort, by the late 1970s,
had yielded mixed results. The automated check-out 
counter, with its scanners and pre-coded inventories, had 
reduced the need for labor. Product specialists in meats, 
vegetables, fruits and dairy had already been deskilled. 
Only meatcutters, as Braverman (1974, p. 371) notes,
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"retain any semblance of skill, and none requires any gen 
eral knowledge of retail trade." (Blim 1985).
The deskilling process also led to the bifurcation of the food retail 
ing labor force (Doeringer and Piore 1971).
. . . [E]ach supermarket giant developed, in effect, its 
own internal labor market, through which the maintenance 
of the full-time, labor core of the organization was subsi 
dized by a segment of the firm's labor force that best was 
characterized as less-well-paid, part-time, young and sub 
ject to high turnover (Blim 1985).
This trend was to be a key reason for problems A&P encountered as 
it shut down stores around the country in an attempt to remain com 
petitive. Ironically, shutdowns led to the retention of a unionized, 
"full-time labor core" who bumped less senior workers. This meant 
higher, rather than lower, labor costs. However, the Philadelphia 
shutdown enabled A&P to leapfrog over its competitors, to introduce 
an even more fully developed version of the bifurcated internal labor 
market, as we shall see below.
A&P Corporate Context
There has been much speculation on the reasons for A&P's de 
cline from the largest and most successful supermarket chain to one 
of the most troubled (Hartley 1983; Steiner 1982; "A&Ps Busy 
Boss"; Barmash 1982). Partly, massive store closings can be attrib 
uted to general trends in the industry toward fewer, bigger stores and 
increased competition. Yet, there is no shortage of internal reasons 
cited for A&P's long slide into financial difficulties. The history of 
A&P provides a key to understanding the decision to close the Phil 
adelphia region.
A&P's biggest enemy may have been its history of success. By 
1930, A&P had been in business for over 70 years, having pioneered 
the retail cash and carry food market chain structure (Dirlam 1971).
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A&P was the biggest chain, with 19,422 stores in 1930 and sales of 
a billion dollars (Hartley 1983).
Although A&P had established stores across the country, manage 
ment remained centralized until the 1920s when the company insti 
tuted a regional management structure. Even then, real power 
remained centralized. Founded by George Huntington Hartford in 
1859, management remained in the family until George Jr. died in 
1957. Until 1974, leadership of the company was elected from in 
side.
By the 1930s, A&P was a smug and complacent company, making 
it slow to respond to changes in the industry, in the geographical 
distribution of the population, and in the public's food buying pref 
erences. The first challenge A&P failed to meet was the supermar 
ket. The average size of a 1930 food market was only about 500- 
600 square feet and weekly sales about $500-$600. Michael 
Cullen's "King Kullen" chain, started in 1930, initially had stores 
of at least 6,400 square feet, with a weekly sales volume of $12,500 
(Dirlam 1977). These stores could offer lower prices during the de 
pression and offered free parking at a time when the car was becom 
ing increasingly important. A&P was slow to follow the trend. The 
average A&P store in the 1960s was 14,000 square feet, compared 
with an average of 20,000 square feet in the other major chains 
(Hartley 1983).
After World War II, when the flight to suburbia was at its height, 
A&P failed to make adjustments. By the time A&P began moving 
out to the suburbs, the best locations were already taken by other 
chains. Further, A&P did not modernize its remaining stores, leaving 
them dimly lit, shabby, and small.
A&P was slow to pick up on new merchandising trends also, such 
as carrying nonfood items and trading stamps. Furthermore, A&P 
held on to the idea of selling its own brands, made in expensive 
food-processing plants, and failed to engage in mergers during the 
two periods of intense merger activity in the industry—between 1920 
and 1930 and between 1949 and 1964. By the late 1960s, A&P found 
it had an image problem (Hartley 1983; Steiner 1982; Barmash 1982). 
A&P had become known for its dingy, poorly maintained stores,
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poor customer service and stodgy, old-fashioned management styles.
A&P Corporate Strategy: 1970s
In 1974, for the first time since the depression, A&P had a net 
loss—of $157 million. Although profits had been declining for sev 
eral years, this devastating loss led the company to recruit Jonathan 
Scott as chairman and chief executive, the first outsider to head the 
company. He made strategic cuts in A&P's operations, eliminating 
unprofitable stores and food-processing units.
Reductions in the number of stores a chain operated was a general 
trend in the industry, and had accelerated during the last decade as 
companies moved toward bigger and bigger stores. When Scott en 
tered the scene in 1974, there were 3,680 A&P stores and 125,000 
employees. By 1980, there were only 1,542 stores and 63,000 em 
ployees. Scott also discontinued 36 food-processing plants (Steiner 
1982; Barmash 1982).
After the devastating 1974 losses, the company made a slight 
comeback and actually had a modest profit of $18.7 million in 1976. 
Even though A&P continued to cut back stores and employees, the 
losses started again. In 1978, despite a record high in sales, A&P 
suffered a net loss of $52.2 million, and fell to the number three spot 
behind Kroger. Losses for 1979 matched the earlier high of $157 
million. That same year, Tenglemann, a family-controlled German- 
based retail group with extensive food market holdings bought a con 
trolling share of A&P stock of 42 percent ("A&P Looks Like 
Tenglemann's Vietnam"; Steiner 1982). Scott resigned in 1980.
Several analysts see the critical flaw as Scott's decision to close 
individual stores rather than entire regions ("A&P Looks Like Ten 
glemann's Vietnam" Barmash 1982; Hartley 1983). Savings realized 
by closing an unprofitable store were cancelled out by maintaining 
the overhead costs of distribution within a region (Hartley 1983, p. 
137). This strategy not only failed to reduce costs, but also "drove 
up overhead and turned profitable stores into losers" ("A&P Looks 
Like Tenglemann's Vietnam"). Even with fewer stores, A&P be 
came weaker (Steiner 1982).
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Most merchandising decisions still were not sensitive to regional 
tastes and preferences. Scott left the highly centralized and top-heavy 
corporate structure unchanged, again failing to reduce overhead 
costs. Continued high overhead costs prevented investments in mod 
ernizing and building stores.
The cutbacks had caused labor problems as well. First of all, the 
drastic reduction in the number of employees meant that the remain 
ing employees tended to be the oldest, highest-seniority, and highest- 
paid workers. Wage costs and workers' length of service were twice 
as high at A&P as at any of its competitors (Barmash 1982; Ackoff, 
Broholm, and Snow 1984; "Local Unions ..."). Job histories of 
former A&P workers document a high frequency of transferring 
from store to store in the last few years, as senior workers 
"bumped" (i.e., displaced through contractual seniority provisions) 
less senior employees as stores were shut and positions cut. These 
transfers often entailed a loss of job status, loss of hours, or concern 
that it was only a matter of time before the job would be lost alto 
gether. In addition, each time stores were closed A&P was forced to 
engage in local labor contract renegotiations, further weakening em 
ployee morale (Hartley 1983).
A&P Corporate Strategy: 1980s
Very few of the early observers of Tengelmann's purchase saw the 
wisdom in it, as exemplified by the title of one article, "A&P looks 
like Tengelmann's Vietnam." Hoping to restore A&P's health, 
Tengelmann replaced Scott with James Wood, who had been CEO at 
Grand Union, the country's second oldest chain. Wood, unlike his 
predecessor, consciously followed a strategy to reduce overhead 
costs, calling it a "revitalization" program (Barmash 1982), by clos 
ing entire regions rather than individual stores. When Wood came 
on, there were only 1,542 stores still open. He continued to cut the 
number of stores, but at a slower rate. However, during one six- 
month period in 1982, A&P announced 400 store closings (Ruben 
1983). In addition, on April 1, 1982, A&P closed its huge food- 
processing plant at Horseheads, New York "Local Unions ...").
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Wood also made significant cuts in central management. In his 
first year, he eliminated 100 of the 550 jobs at A&P headquarters in 
Montvale, New Jersey (Steiner 1982). He began a program to re 
structure procedures that would give store managers more responsi 
bility, thereby reducing the need for central management. In 1982, 
the company reported a quarterly profit for the first time in two 
years.
To reduce labor costs, Wood began a campaign to get union con 
cessions in various regions. Wood also intended to reopen or pur 
chase new stores after the earlier round of closings in order to 
"dilute the number of senior employees" ("Local Unions ..."). 
In New York City, A&P halted store closures after union locals 
agreed to introduce an early-retirement program. At this point, the 
Super Fresh model had not yet been proposed and analysts were not 
sanguine about the possibility of A&P being able to extract other 
union concessions in New York after years of A&P layoffs ("Local 
Unions ..."). However, during 1982, wage concessions were given 
by a 300-member UFCW local to A&P in Norfolk, Virginia and by a 
1,700-member UFCW local in Baltimore. Also, 13,000 UFCW 
workers took a wage freeze at A&P and two other grocery chains in 
Detroit (Ruben 1983).
To counteract A&P's image problems, Wood hoped to re-establish 
a competitive identity. For one thing, he wanted to focus on service, 
widening the range of products and emphasizing fresh produce and 
meats. Wood also intended to modernize existing stores and begin a 
building campaign, but the company did not bounce back quickly 
enough for him to direct resources to such a program. Although 
Wood was able to cut losses drastically, he continued the policy of 
shutdowns in his first years as chairman.
The 1982 Philadelphia A&P Shutdown
The phase-out of 79 stores in the Philadelphia region clearly re 
flects the implementation of Wood's regional strategy. From 1979 to 
1981, A&P's share of supermarket sales in the Philadelphia metro 
politan area dropped from 17 percent to 6 percent, while the number
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of stores was more than cut in half (Supermarket News 1981, 1983).
From employees' and customers' points of view, the rationale for 
closing the entire Philadelphia region was not clear. Although A&P 
had been closing stores in Philadelphia for years, the stores that had 
been disappearing during the 1970s were generally among the oldest 
and least profitable. In this new round of regional cutting, however, 
employees and customers saw that store profitability and a good 
competitive edge made no difference. A&P was vague about its mo 
tives, insisting that the decision was based on the profitability of 
stores and the competitive nature of the Philadelphia market. The 
behavior of A&P corporate decisionmakers made little sense to em 
ployees, who had a difficult time believing A&P would really close 
stores they knew to be viable.
Many employees attributed the moves to management incompe 
tence. In a study comparing management practices at A&P and other 
food retailers in the Philadelphia area, Nicholson (1985) came to the 
conclusion that "A&P was a poorly managed corporation ... at ev 
ery level." Its chief competitors, both large national chains and in 
dependent, locally-owned, "had never experienced many of these 
problems [that A&P had]" (Nicholson 1985, pp. 147-148). Other 
companies were found to be more flexible and modern than A&P.
In late February 1982, when A&P announced they would close the 
remaining Philadelphia stores by March 20, there were only 11 stores 
still open in the city and 8 in the near suburbs. These were among 
the 29 to go. Warehouses in the area were also slated for closure. 
About one week later, in an inexplicable reversal, A&P announced 
that it would keep 6 of the 29 stores open, 3 of which were in Phil 
adelphia and the remaining 3 in the surrounding Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey suburbs. Wendell Young, President of UFCW local 
1357, immediately accused A&P of closing some of its better stores 
and keeping open some with a particularly low overhead and lower 
payroll costs: "Everyone that they're closing is a good store" 
(Schaffer 1982a). According to one chronicler of this event, James 
Wood actually admitted that high wages were a factor in closing 
stores, but the strategy also was clearly in line with his idea that it 
was important to save overhead costs by closing an entire region. 
Young suspected that A&P decided to keep a few stores open to save
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itself from having to meet pension obligations to employees (Lin 
1982).
The Local Economic Situation
This shutdown of a major retail food chain in the Philadelphia area 
was just one in a long line of business closings that had been occur 
ring at a high rate over the previous decade. In the national context 
of three recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s and a structural eco 
nomic shift from basic manufacturing towards service industries, 
Philadelphia fared poorly. During the 1970s, Philadelphia lost em 
ployment in every sector but services, and its gain in services was 
not as strong as the rest of the nation's. The biggest losses were in 
manufacturing jobs, about 150,000 jobs lost from 1970-80, and that 
sector lost another 30,000 jobs during the 1982-83 recession (BLS 
1982). Even finance and insurance jobs were lost in the Philadelphia 
metropolitan area during the early 1980s recession. Both the city and 
the suburbs lost about 20 percent of the jobs in wholesale and retail 
trade over the decade from 1970 to 1980. Two department stores, 
two large discount department store chains, and two major food 
chains closed their operations in Philadelphia. Altogether, 10 major 
retailers left Philadelphia, accounting for a loss of 10,000 retail jobs 
(Steiner 1982; Moberg 1982).
Several recent shutdowns weighed on workers in the Philadelphia 
area in early 1982. For instance, the venerable Bulletin newspaper, 
once the nation's largest daily in circulation, shut its doors in Janu 
ary 1982, despite its unions having agreed to concessions in negoti 
ations the previous fall. Similarly, the Philadelphia Journal, a fairly 
new paper concentrating on sports, stopped publishing early in the 
year.
The Union Context
The Philadelphia area's weak economy and A&P's continuing de 
cline confronted the leadership of UFCW local 1357 when they
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learned of A&P's 1982 closing announcement. By various calcula 
tions, this closing would mean a loss of membership of at least 
2,000 to a local union that had undergone other recent losses and 
threats of losses.
According to some sources, the union had lost 5,000 members 
since 1976, but through aggressive organization of new employers 
the membership had been kept fairly stable at 12,000 for the four or 
five years prior to A&P's closing announcement in March 1982 
(Steiner 1982; "Local Unions . . . "). Local 1357 had been strug 
gling to keep up its membership over the years, and the loss of more 
than 2,000 jobs from A&P was significant, not only in numbers, but 
also in the nature of the members being lost. The A&P loss "repre 
sents a severe blow to the union. . . . Food-store members have the 
highest salaries in the local and contribute the highest member dues" 
(Hochner and Bennett 1982). About a year before, the governor of 
Pennsylvania had proposed privatization of the state liquor store sys 
tem, which would have meant the loss of another major portion of 
local 1357's membership.
The current president of local 1357, Wendell Young, was first 
elected in 1963 at the age of 22. As a student at St. Joseph's College 
working part time in supermarkets, he saw the way companies ex 
ploited the lowest-paid, unorganized clerks. He sought the presi 
dency and immediately led a strike against Food Fair, a now-defunct 
Philadelphia grocery chain that was opening new stores with non 
union workers (Clark and Guben 1983).
Young characterizes his tenure in office as filled with examples of 
last minute announcements of store or chain closings. He notes that 
the usual few hours or even few days notice was insufficient for him 
to mount a meaningful response in light of the length of time regular 
negotiations took. He had been feeling frustrated and helpless to re 
ally do anything (Young 1984).
Young had begun working on the closing long before A&P made 
their February 1982 announcement. Although the threatened state li 
quor store closing never materialized, the continuing A&P store 
closings prompted Young to keep up his exploration for ways that 
the union could save jobs, and to consult with individuals from var-
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ious points of view. These included Jay Guben, a successful entre 
preneur in the restaurant business who had recently been working as 
a consultant to business for start-ups, and PACE (Philadelphia Asso 
ciation for Cooperative Enterprise), a local group with expertise in 
worker-owned business headed by Sherman Kreiner and Andrew La 
mas. When the November 1981 round of A&P store closings began, 
information was leaked to Young that A&P's ultimate intention was 
to shut down all the Philadelphia area stores (Clark and Guben 
1983). The union hired a food industry consultant to do preliminary 
feasibility studies on A&P stores. In January 1982, Guben contracted 
with PACE to enter into partnership to assist worker buyouts of sev 
eral former A&P markets. l
During this period of consultation, Young was exploring other op 
tions, as well. He consulted the Busch Center of the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, which advocated a quality 
of worklife program that restructured management. In the interest of 
saving jobs, he also went to other food store chains trying to interest 
them in buying some of the stores (Schaffer 1982b).
The Negotiation
On March 2, a few days after A&P gave the 20-day notice re 
quired in the union contract that it was closing its remaining Phila 
delphia stores, the union made a bid to purchase 21 of the to-be- 
abandoned stores. Immediately, local 1357 president Young held a 
meeting to explain to A&P-employed union members the idea of sav 
ing jobs through worker ownership. He announced that to buy in, 
each potential worker/owner would have to contribute $5,000, and 
asked for pledges of $200 to hold a place. Young told attendees that 
they would be able to make arrangements with the union's credit 
union to borrow the $5,000. By mid-March, orientation sessions be 
gan for the 500-600 workers who were interested in pledging. Jay 
and Merry Guben and Sherman Kreiner and Andrew Lamas of 
PACE jointly developed these planning and information sessions, 
with PACE concentrating on the cooperative structure and the Gu- 
bens focusing on business management topics.
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By the time the stores actually shut down on March 20, A&P had 
still not responded to the buyout bid. Nevertheless, meeting and 
planning for the worker-owned stores proceeded. The reason for the 
delay was that Tengelmann, the West German parent company, had 
raised questions about the wisdom of moving out of the Philadelphia 
region (Kreiner and Lamas 1983). Perhaps domestic A&P manage 
ment saw an opportunity to extract wage concessions as well. During 
March and April, A&P and UFCW locals 1357 (representing clerks) 
and 56 (representing meatcutters) began a round of talks. The 
unions, particularly local 1357, wanted to obtain options for workers 
to buy some stores and to get the right of first refusal to buy other 
stores A&P might decide to close in the future. A&P wanted wage 
and benefit concessions in exchange for restructured management 
and a reopened form of A&P.
At the end of April, slightly more than a month after 500-600 had 
pledged to become worker/owners and begun attending training ses 
sions, the union announced an agreement with A&P, which provided 
for reopening stores as Super Fresh and granting options to former 
A&P workers to purchase up to four of the stores. A&P took the 
lead in establishing the Super Fresh identity, rehiring managers and 
workers, and beginning to design the quality of worklife program in 
cooperation with the Busch Center. The first Super Fresh stores ac 
tually opened in July 1982. Some former A&P workers were called 
back to begin working at Super Fresh, even while still attending 
worker/owner training meetings. Two stores were bought later that 
year by those still interested in worker ownership, and were opened 
under the O&O name in October and November.
Union-Management Concessions
In both O&O and Super Fresh, workers made concessions to save 
jobs. First, total compensation was cut in a number of ways. Both 
sets of workers lost about 20 percent of their hourly wage, although 
the meatcutters lost somewhat less. A clerk, for example, went from 
about $10 to $8 an hour (Whyte 1983). The starting wage for new 
hires, particularly in the unskilled "utility clerk" category, dropped
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to the federal minimum wage, $3.35 per hour. Overtime pay would 
begin after 10 hours per day instead of after eight as it had at A&R 
The Sunday overtime rate was reduced from double to time-and-a- 
half, and the Saturday night overtime rate went from time-and-a-half 
to straight time. Workers in both settings gave up vacation time; 
senior employees entitled to four weeks of vacation lost three weeks 
for the first year of the contract. They also lost personal days and 
one holiday (Steiner 1982). 
In many ways, these changes added up to
a permanent two-tiered wage system, whereby new hires 
receive lower wages and fewer benefits for work equiva 
lent to that performed by higher-paid existing employees- 
. . . (Bureau of National Affairs 1985a; 1985b). New 
hires, depending on the job title, at one-half to three- 
quarters of the already reduced hourly rate of old A&P 
employees. In a word, new hires could never catch up 
with old hands, despite the fact that old A&P employees 
would only catch up to their prior hourly wage in the third 
year of the contract. (Blim 1985)
Third, the old A&P internal labor market was dismantled and re 
assembled. Concessions on seniority and staffing were sold as paths 
to flexibility and competitive efficiency. Super Fresh workers got 
single-store seniority, i.e., they could no longer transfer their senior 
ity across stores. Essentially, this reduced A&P's high wage problem 
caused by senior workers bumping into other Super Fresh stores. Se 
niority was also lost in long-term layoffs. Moreover, because A&P 
chose to reopen fewer stores than it had closed, it effectively won the 
right to selectively call back old A&P employees (Blim 1985).
Fourth, work rule changes to save on labor costs, particularly on 
the assignment of hours, were instituted. Night crew workers were 
no longer promised two consecutive nights off. To workers, the most 
important changes may have been those with respect to the assign 
ment of full-time jobs. The contract limited full-time jobs to 60 per 
cent of the total number of jobs, determined on a store-by-store 
basis. In practice, most of the senior former A&P workers have had 
to settle for part-time jobs. Further, minimum hours of part-timers
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were cut in the interest of maintaining a low labor rate, i.e., the ratio 
of labor costs-to-revenues.
Together, these changes reinforce the tendency in service indus 
tries in general and in the grocery industry in particular toward bi 
furcation of the labor force into a small higher-paid, established, and 
protected senior component and a larger lower-paid, newer, and in 
secure junior component (Blim 1985). In 1984, for instance, two- 
tiered wage settlements were included in 35 percent of all airline 
contracts, 32 percent of contracts in the wholesale/retail sector, and 
17 percent of agreements in both nonmanufacturing industries and 
motorized transportation (Salpukis 1985). In the food industry in 
1984, three-fourths of the 400,000 members of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers were employed under two-tiered contracts 
(Ross 1985).
Two further contract provisions were presented as management 
concessions: a revenue-based bonus fund and a quality of worklife 
program. The bonus was envisioned as both a way for workers to 
gain back some of what they had given up in wages and as an incen 
tive to keep labor costs low. It was to work as follows: Each store 
that kept its yearly labor costs below 10 percent of gross sales would 
receive at least 1 percent of the store's gross sales to be put into a 
fund. For every fraction of a percent store labor costs exceed 10 per 
cent, the 1 percent bonus would be reduced by a fraction. For every 
fraction of a percent under 10 percent, the 1 percent bonus would be 
increased by a fraction. Part of the fund was to be an investment 
pool for workers to draw from in case they wanted to buy out any 
Super Fresh stores to close in the future. The other part was to be 
apportioned among employees within the particular stores according 
to the number of hours each worked in the course of the year and 
awarded annually.
The QWL program was to "provide a mutual basis for problem- 
solving." It was to be a joint labor-management set of arrangements 
to cooperate on methods and financial issues. Management was to be 
more flexible than in the past, with more autonomy given to store 
managers than under the traditionally centralized A&P system. Pro 
vision was made for involvement of managers, employees, and union
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representatives at the store and corporate levels. More information 
on the QWL arrangements will come later in this chapter.
How did these contract provisions compare with conditions at 
other markets? First, if Super Fresh kept wage costs below 10 per 
cent of sales, they would be reducing by one-third the 15 percent 
labor cost A&P had before the shutdown. This would bring them 
below the industry average of 12 percent (Steiner 1982; "Worker 
Ownership . . . "). Competitors have complained that the conces 
sions gave Super Fresh an unfair advantage—a 20 percent lower 
wage than most of their competitors (Diamond 1983).
The lowered wage rate for Super Fresh has prompted other super 
markets in the area to try to extract similar concessions, although 
without restructuring management and increasing worker participa 
tion in decisionmaking as at Super Fresh. However, Nicholson 
(1985) makes a point that reinforces the conclusion reached earlier, 
namely, that A&P has been slow in adapting to change,
[M]any of the changes in management attributed to the 
Super Fresh QWL Program had been implemented at 
Acme [a major rival chain, also organized by UFCW Lo 
cal 1357] through more traditional methods (p. 147).
[The effects of earlier Acme corporate decisions] are sim 
ilar to those created by Super Fresh's redesign. These 
were reductions in the number of managers and manage 
ment levels, decision making was pushed to lower levels 
of management, and an emphasis is placed on increased 
training and exchange of information between manage 
ment levels (p. 149).
Continuing Efforts on the O&O Buyouts
Those A&P workers who wanted to stay in the O&O process after 
the establishment of Super Fresh had to come up with their $200 
cash by the end of June and demonstrate that they could produce the 
remaining $4,800 by the first week in July. Local 1357 offered to 
lend them the money from the local's credit union. By this point, 
after Super Fresh stores opened, the number of prospective owners 
had dwindled to about 40.
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Based on the feasibility studies done early in 1982, the Roslyn 
and Parkwood stores were highly rated among those the consultants 
recommended for bids. Recognizing the Roslyn store as having been 
very successful in the past, A&P offered two other stores at no cost 
in exchange for retaining the Roslyn store. The worker/owners-to-be 
at the Roslyn store rejected the offer.
The Parkwood store was, in fact, a second choice for the worker/ 
owners-to-be. Another store had been chosen, but physical problems 
with the foundation were discovered at the site. The group then de 
cided to bid on the Parkwood store, which slowed their progress in 
starting up and actually opening their venture.
In the meantime, the union and consultants had been investigating 
various avenues for financing. They approached two national level 
financing sources required by law to consider worker cooperatives, 
the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the National Cooper 
ative Bank (NCB). The NCB did not even go as far as to entertain a 
proposal. The SBA turned down an initial proposal for a 90 percent 
loan guarantee, but allowed submission of a revised proposal at the 
urging of Senator John Heinz (R) of Pennsylvania. The SBA's ap 
proval enabled the stores to get loans from Continental Bank in Phil 
adelphia (Whyte 1983). The bank loans were not fully approved until 
after both stores actually began operating. The stores opened in the 
fall of 1982, Roslyn in mid-October and Parkwood a month later.
How did the owners match themselves up with stores? According 
to our interviews with them, the selection process was not complex. 
Their choice was primarily a matter of two factors—residential 
proximity and a judgment about what type of "personality" was best 
suited to each of the stores. Each of the owners had moved from one 
A&P store to another during A&P's last years, so they knew how 
stores differed, and they developed preferences for particular ones.
Though both stores are about the same distance from the center of 
the city in driving time, Parkwood is in the more urban Far North 
east section of Philadelphia, whereas the Roslyn store is located well 
outside the city limits. Immediately surrounding both stores are 
working class communities, but there are key differences in their 
locations. Roslyn itself is circled by several more affluent suburbs.
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Parkwood draws mainly on the low-to-moderate income areas 
around it, including some public low-income housing, and local resi 
dents employed in nearby manufacturing industries. Residential 
structures near Parkwood are dominated by attached rows or apart 
ment complexes of high density. The more uniformly single-family 
residential area surrounding Roslyn is dotted with commercial strips 
and malls. Chapter 5 will further discuss the ways in which social 
ties and former co-worker relations influenced recruiting for each 
store.
The Formal O&O Model
The banner across the front of the Roslyn O&O store reads, "We 
own it, We operate it, We care." This slogan describes the structure 
of the O&O supermarkets. As worker-owned cooperative businesses, 
the O&O markets are set up on the principle that each owner who 
has made the $5,000 investment has one share and one vote. Each 
member has equal participation in decisionmaking for the corpora 
tion. Profits are distributed based on "labor participation," that is, 
hours worked as a percentage of the total hours worked during a 
given period of time. Thus, when owners leave the cooperative for 
any reason, they are entitled to the return of their initial membership 
fee plus interest, and any profits allocated, minus losses (Kreiner and 
Lamas 1983). Their ownership share, however, would revert back to 
the cooperative, since the share is linked to the role of worker and 
not considered transferable or saleable (Clark and Guben 1983).
Participants in the O&O training program developed the by-laws 
jointly (so they were the same for both stores initially). The by-laws 
cover five areas of operations—corporate structure, membership, 
roles and responsibilities, profit allocation and distribution, and by 
law amendments or changes. Membership essentially is defined as 
those who hold shares and work for the corporation. The store man 
ager is not supposed to be a member of the cooperative, but is sup 
posed to be hired from outside by the Board of Directors.
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The entire membership is obligated to elect the Board of Direc 
tors annually. Reelection and rotation of board members has oc 
curred in both stores more than once and more often than at annual 
intervals. The by-laws originally called for nine board members, al 
though the Parkwood store lowered this number to five. (Parkwood 
dropped four slots because, with only 14 members, a nine-member 
board was considered too unwieldy).
The by-laws lay out the policies for authority and decisionmaking 
that define the roles of the manager, Board of Directors, and general 
membership. The scheme, referred to as the "Time Line, Money 
Line, and Member Line," provides criteria for evaluating decisions 
that determine what level in the organization—manager, Board or 
membership—has authority for any decision. The criteria include 
the immediacy of the decision, amount of money the decision would 
commit, and how many people would be affected by the decision 
(Whyte 1984). Those decisions involving amounts of money under 
$3,000, affecting fewer than seven members, or a daily time frame 
can be made by the store manager alone. Decisions concerning ex 
penditures ranging from $3,000 to $10,000, affecting up to half of 
the members, or having a time frame of one to three years rest with 
the Board of Directors. Decisions involving over $10,000, affecting 
more than half the membership, or having a time frame of over three 
years are decided by the entire membership.
Members conduct business through meetings that occur regularly. 
The Board of Directors meets at least once a month or more fre 
quently for specific issues as needed. In general, the board is respon 
sible for setting goals and determining policies, overseeing the 
manager, and controlling finances. General meetings of the entire 
membership occur approximately once a month, although the by 
laws require only one annual meeting. A member other than the 
Board president presides over the general membership meetings. 
Since the entire membership must vote on issues of wide impact, 
such as changing the Board of Directors or hiring and firing poli 
cies, these meetings are also called on an as-needed basis. Members 
can refer to an agenda posted before the store meetings and suggest
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additional agenda items for discussions. The membership has called 
for emergency or single-issue meetings on several occasions.
The by-laws detail the method of profit allocation to members and 
the corporation, policies for carrying out meetings and other proce 
dures, and rules for changing the corporate structure. Changes in the 
by-laws have not been extensive and general operating procedures 
have evolved as the members gained experience in actually running 
the stores. The most significant change is that both stores currently 
have managers from within the ranks of the membership, for reasons 
which will be discussed later.
Implementation of the O&O Structure and Philosophy
The developers of training had no ready-made models or materials 
from which to prepare former A&P workers for operating worker- 
owned supermarkets. Devising the approach as they went along, the 
planners used three kinds of training settings. First, large orientation/ 
news/announcement sessions were held periodically during the first 
two months, when the O&O idea was presented. Second, a series of 
substantive introductory sessions took place. Finally, the group 
formed into functional committees which met for the remainder of 
the training sessions. Union president Wendell Young convened the 
large meetings, but Sherman Kreiner and Andrew Lamas of PACE, 
with Jay and Merry Guben, created the training content, sometimes 
incrementally and disjointedly.
Training began as soon as the bid on the 21 stores was made. First, 
local 1357 called a large meeting. The consultants and union staffers 
explained the idea of O&O and recruited participants. PACE and the 
Gubens ran introductory sessions, repeated and scheduled at conve 
nient times for interested former A&P employees, starting in the 
first week after the initial bid was made. These sessions were de 
voted to two topics, cooperative business structure and general busi 
ness planning.
In the weeks that followed, Kreiner and the Gubens invited other 
consultants to involve the group in actively solving hypothetical co 
operative business problems. At the introductory sessions, consult-
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ants from the Wharton School's Management and Behavioral Sci 
ences Center encouraged participants to analyze problems 
encountered in their old jobs and to devise new systems.
Finally, the trainers divided the large group into functional com 
mittees for the remainder of the training period. The committees in 
cluded the following: 
By-laws and legal structure—to address self-management and
worker co-operative law;
Governance—to allocate decisionmaking authority among the 
management, board of directors, and general assembly of 
worker/owners;
Union role and personnel policies—to discuss work rules, define 
the workers' relationship with the union, and outline the griev 
ance procedure; 
Worker selection and part-timers—to define the workers' roles
and store staffing needs; 
Umbrella association—to determine the feasibility of linking the
stores in an association and to consider supplier affiliation; 
Management selection—concerning store management, e.g., re 
cruitment, selection criteria, training;
Financing and business planning—to acquire funding for start-up 
and to develop specific business plans for individual stores; and 
Worker education—to put out a workers' newsletter, and to as 
sume administrative duties such as public relations, organizing 
and scheduling meetings, etc.
In addition, one member from each committee was elected to a 
steering committee, which met weekly to coordinate information 
across committees. Participants gave the steering committee author 
ity to make decisions for the group prior to the stores' start-up 
(PACE News 1982).
Although 500 people had originally expressed interest in the 
worker-ownership scheme in March 1982, as meetings progressed 
through April there were about 125 regular meeting attendees 
(Kreiner personal communication). A&P had still not responded to 
the bid so Kreiner's expectation was that there could be as many as 
17 stores (the number was reduced from the original 21).
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To accommodate the prospective worker/owners, meeting sched 
ules were flexible, and most trainees came to the union hall for 
meetings two or three times a week. Individuals selected which com 
mittees they wanted to work on. They could participate in more than 
one committee and several switched committees during the training 
period. In later months, each store group formed a start-up commit 
tee for tasks necessary for getting the stores open (PACE News 1982). 
The functional committee meetings began in late April and contin 
ued for seven to eight months until the stores opened in the fall.
The attrition in the O&O group requires some further comment. 
The situation for the laid-off A&P workers in the spring and summer 
of 1982 was one of uncertainty and exploring possibilities. By the 
time the stores were identified and bids made, there were only 38 
still involved.
Interviews with O&O owners revealed that few had made a com 
mitment to worker-ownership right in the beginning. Many of them 
saw O&O as only one strategy to find work. A few continued to 
attend the meetings because of basic interest and time on their 
hands. Despite pledging in March, no cash changed hands until the 
end of June when the $200 pledge came due. The 500 early 
"pledgers" had not been financially committed. It seems plausible 
that many saw O&O as an "iron in the fire," but were attracted to 
Super Fresh, which suddenly materialized in late April. Further 
more, fewer worker/owner slots than originally anticipated were 
available. A&P's decision to reopen stores meant that no more than 
four stores would open as worker cooperatives. Many continued to 
attend O&O meetings anyway. They had no way of knowing whether 
they would actually be called to work at Super Fresh.
The fact that Super Fresh became a reality before O&O likely in 
fluenced workers' decisionmaking. The first Super Fresh store 
opened in July 1982, while the first O&O opening was not until fall. 
With job security foremost in their minds, and despite their negative 
view of A&P, dropouts probably doubted the O&O stores would ever 
open. Nevertheless, 38 met the $5,000 financial commitment and 
divided themselves up among the two stores, which were slated for 
bids by early June.
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Differences Between the O&O Stores
Despite their legal and structural similarities, the development of 
the two O&O stores differed. As mentioned earlier, the Parkwood 
store had delays in opening. First, Parkwood became an alternative 
only when problems were found with another choice. Second, this 
switch affected the momentum of the group. Third, the delay in get 
ting loan approval left members in a vulnerable financial position for 
the several months. The process went more smoothly at the Roslyn 
O&O store.
The stores also differed in basic physical characteristics. There is a 
significant size difference: 23,000 square feet and 24 owners for the 
Roslyn store compared to 13,500 square feet and 14 owners for Park- 
wood. Roslyn is a free-standing store on a heavily travelled suburban 
road. Two other supermarkets, each about two miles away, compete 
with the Roslyn O&O, since customers tend to shop within a three- 
to four-mile radius of home (Dirlam 1977). Parkwood, on the other 
hand, shares space with a variety of stores and a movie theater in an 
urban shopping center at a busy intersection. When it originally 
opened, there were no other supermarkets close by, but four stores 
later opened. Parkwood's location within the shopping center attracts 
shoppers who make small quantity purchases. Both stores changed 
then- hours several times in adapting to the competition.
The two stores also had different experiences with their managers. 
The by-laws required experienced nonowner managers. One of the 
functional committees set up the hiring criteria, recruited, and nar 
rowed the field of candidates. The committee members interviewed 
two finalists and tape recorded the interviews for the other owners. 
Both stores hired experienced former supermarket managers.
Only a few weeks after he started, the Roslyn manager had a 
heart attack. Once he returned, he and the Roslyn owners worked 
well together. He remained in the position until 1985 when he 
bought a food store of his own. The former assistant-manager, an 
owner, took over as manager. Seeing him as too much a product of 
the supermarket chains and not in tune with what they wanted for
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the store, the owner/workers came to believe they could run the store 
better themselves. After almost a year of operation, they let him go 
and appointed the president of their board as manager. He has held 
both positions since then.
A Third O&O Store
The Parkwood owners purchased an additional store (not a former 
A&P), located nearby in the small New Jersey town of Lambertville, 
near Trenton. The purchase came because of uncertainty whether the 
Parkwood O&O store would prove successful. Ironically, after the 
Lambertville purchase, Parkwood's performance improved. The 14 
Parkwood owners are divided between the two stores, so fewer own 
ers work in each of these stores than at the Roslyn O&O store.
Relationship Between the O&O Stores
No formal relationship exists between the Roslyn and Parkwood 
O&O stores; the proposed umbrella association to link the stores for 
mutual benefit was never formed. Both use IGA as their supplier. 
Occasionally, events and obligations bring owners together to repre 
sent the first worker-owned and -operated supermarkets.
The Formal Super Fresh Model
Super Fresh is a wholly-owned subsidiary of A&P. Major differ 
ences from its parent company, include: (1) a participatory manage 
ment program(QWL); (2) a sales-based bonus plan; (3) an obligation 
to give workers the right of first refusal on buying any store to be 
closed; and (4) a single-store seniority system which restricts work 
ers' mobility to a single store and eliminates the store-to-store 
"bumping."
Another unique structure established by the union at the time of 
the Super Fresh agreement was a fund for providing seed money for 
future worker-owned businesses. This fund, called the O&O Invest 
ment Fund, was to be financed by a percentage of the bonuses of
Context of the Closings and Implementation of Alternatives 107
Super Fresh employees, and was intended to support the right-of- 
first-refusal clause in the Super Fresh agreement.
The new management structure adopted by Super Fresh was in 
tended to increase worker participation in corporate decisionmaking, 
thereby increasing job satisfaction and productivity. Busch Center of 
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania served as con 
sultants in the design of their QWL program.
The consultants worked with a 30-member design team represent 
ing A&P/Super Fresh management, union staff, and full-time and 
part-time hourly employees (Steiner 1982; Ackoff 1984). Using the 
Busch Center's "Interactive Planning" method, the work of the 
team resulted in a design for the participation structure as described 
in the booklet, "Quality of Work Life for United Food and Commer 
cial Workers Local 56 and Local 1357 with Super Fresh Food 
Markets."
Essentially, the approach sets up entities called "planning 
boards" for all levels or units of the corporation. The lowest level or 
smallest unit is the department, and the next levels are the store, 
region, and corporation. The exact content of decisions and concerns 
was not specified, although general guidelines for organizational 
strategies, policies and procedures were provided. The booklet de 
scribes planning boards as policy making bodies, rather than "merely 
advisory committees," and it includes the proviso that "executive 
decisions will be left to respective managers." The booklet states 
that planning boards should meet regularly, but does not specify a 
schedule or minimum number of meetings.
Department planning boards include associates2 within a depart 
ment and the department manager. The store-level planning board 
consists of the store director, assistant directors, department man 
agers, representatives of the Super Fresh president, two union repre 
sentatives, and employees elected from each store department.
The corporate planning board consists of the Super Fresh presi 
dent, the store directors, a representative associate from each super 
market selected by the store planning board, Super Fresh marketing 
directors, representatives from corporate support services units, the 
presidents of the union locals, representatives from A&P, and possi-
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bly outside shareholders. The regional planning boards are subunits 
of the corporate planning board for particular geographical units. 
The original design called for regional boards when enough stores 
began operating. Each regional board includes only those assigned to 
a particular region in addition to someone from Super Fresh corpo 
rate headquarters.
As the QWL handbook states, "Decision-making will be made at 
the lowest possible level where participation will be reflected by au 
thority and responsibility." Participants at each level, then, set pol 
icy only for concerns that can be handled at that level or below, 
although they are encouraged to have input or make suggestions to 
higher levels.
The autonomy of each Super Fresh store is encouraged through a 
system of financing which incorporates sales incentives. The Super 
Fresh corporation receives all store sales minus direct costs. Super 
Fresh pays all indirect costs of corporate level services. Funds for 
business development at each store, however, are set aside as a per 
centage of each store's financial contribution to the Super Fresh cor 
poration. All profits go to A&P, although Super Fresh can negotiate 
with A&P for reinvestment funds to use for expansion and renova 
tion. Each store director has flexibility in pricing and product mix 
according to a four-category system, and although most inventory 
comes from A&P warehouses, individual store directors are allowed 
to use local vendors as well. In this way they are encouraged to try 
to tailor merchandise to customer tastes. Management also has an 
incentive fund, based on sales, employee satisfaction and the amount 
of financial contribution to Super Fresh.
As explained earlier, employee bonuses are tied to the stores' sales 
and labor costs. Employees get an annual bonus based on the hours 
they work, how well the store does, and the labor costs at that store. 
Each store has its own sales and labor cost incentives, and the bo 
nuses vary across stores.
The O&O Investment Fund
UFCW local 1357 president Wendell Young conceived of the O&O 
Investment Fund as a mechanism to supplement financing of addi-
Context of the Closings and Implementation of Alternatives 109
tional worker-owned businesses. The Fund was incorporated, had a 
director and Board of Directors. Young, who is generally recognized 
as the "architect" of the fund idea, sat on the 18-member board 
(Lin 1983). The Board included academics, business people, elected 
officials, and representatives from the two O&O supermarkets. Jay 
Guben, also president of a consulting firm called Grey Areas, served 
as acting director of the Fund until the spring of 1985, when PACE 
assumed the management role. The Investment Fund also established 
working committees which brought in others from the community to 
address specific issues related to business development and research.
Support for the Investment Fund was originally to come from a 
portion of Super Fresh employee bonuses. Under the Super Fresh 
agreement, the corporation was to contribute the amount employees 
pledged from their bonuses to a union-controlled "incentive and in 
vestment fund." The union would transfer the money to the O&O 
Investment Fund (Lin 1983). Initially, the employees were expected 
to pledge 60 percent of their bonus amounts to the Fund. The Fund 
directors assumed that the potential for becoming worker/owners 
would serve as the incentive for employees to pledge a portion of 
their bonus money. The first contributions to the fund would be 
made in the summer of 1983 after the first Super Fresh stores had 
been open for one year. The Fund's directors expected that the fund 
could receive as much as $750,000 in its first year, which they be 
lieved could leverage as much as $2.5 million through grants, invest 
ments or loan guarantees (Schaffer 1983).
These assumptions soon proved mistaken. First, UFCW local 56, 
the meatcutters, and Super Fresh employees represented by other 
union locals also opted out. In a May 1983 referendum, local 1357 
workers voted to contribute 35 percent of their bonuses to the fund. 
However, a few months later when the bonuses came due, the retail 
clerks of local 1357 began to reconsider. Eventually, the contribu 
tions to the O&O Investment Fund were made voluntary and limited 
to 15 percent of any individual's bonus. Almost no one ended up 
contributing. (Schaffer 1983; Lin 1983).
Without the anticipated revenue, the O&O Investment Fund found 
itself with a large deficit. The Fund's director had already hired staff 
and committed money to such projects as an inner-city neighborhood
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convenience store, also to be called O&O, to be staffed by laid-off 
former A&P workers and community residents. Some months later, 
when the Fund's management was taken over by PACE, it was trans 
formed from "a job-security insurance policy" for Super Fresh 
workers, as local 1357 President Young had termed it, into a conduit 
for royalties on the O&O logo which were to be paid by any new 
stores or business operating under employee ownership and con 
nected to the O&O concept. As of mid-1987, three local supermar 
kets (none previously owned by A&P) had been converted to O&O 
stores and were paying a sort of franchise fee into the O&O Fund.
How does one interpret the workers' vote of no confidence in the 
Fund? When Super Fresh opened, the attrition from the original 
group of 500 interested in O&O suggested that most had seen O&O 
merely as one possible alternative. This view is even borne out in 
interviews with O&O workers, where half indicated that they had not 
initially been committed to O&O, or had seen it as a hedge against 
no job at all. Those offered positions with Super Fresh faced a 
choice between a familiar, low-risk option and a novel, high-risk op 
tion. Most chose the former. For the same reasons, Super Fresh 
workers had little incentive to give up the bonus that could help 
make up for lost income for an O&O Investment Fund set up to give 
them a buy-out option at a future time. The current success of the 
Super Fresh stores had reduced their concern about needing such an 
option in the future.
Furthermore, workers' negative view of the union transferred to 
the Fund, which was perceived as a creation of the union. Despite 
the fact that the union was instrumental in saving their jobs, many 
workers distrusted it and did not see it as concentrating on their best 
interests.
The Right of First Refusal
One feature of the Super Fresh agreement of which the union and 
PACE were particularly proud was the right-of-first-refusal clause. 
The clause gave employees 90 days to purchase a store slated for 
closing. PACE and the union saw the right-of-first-refusal agreement
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as a way to afford workers a degree of job security. As Steiner points 
out, "even if Super Fresh employees decide not to operate a store, 
they have the right to buy it and immediately re-sell it to the owner 
of their choice" (Steiner 1982, p. 23).
Expansion of the Super Fresh Corporation
The Super Fresh corporation has opened new stores at a very fast 
rate—well beyond its original promise to reopen 20 stores. By the 
end of 1982, Super Fresh had opened 30 markets employing 1500 
workers (Kreiner & Lamas 1983). By the beginning of July 1983, 
there were 51 stores reopened or converted from A&P in the Phila 
delphia, South Jersey, and Delaware areas. Super Fresh was in fifth 
place among food retailers in sales and market share in the region. 
UFCW local 1357 represents the workers in 27 of these stores 
(Schaffer 1983) with the remainder represented by locals in New Jer 
sey, Southern Pennsylvania, and Delaware. By mid-1985, there were 
59 Super Fresh stores open in the three states, and Super Fresh had 
climbed to third place among the five giants in Philadelphia food 
retailing in market share and sales.
QWL Training and Implementation
To implement QWL in a particular store, Super Fresh employees 
were urged to undergo some training. The initial training, under the 
Busch Center, was done with two stores with an eye to refining the 
approach there. Then Busch would work with half of the store direc 
tors, followed by the workers in their stores, and the upper ranks of 
management. However, since A&P hurried to open stores in the 
summer of 1982, most of the stores were opened without staff re 
ceiving QWL training.
Training consisted of an orientation to the QWL structure. The 
Busch Center did not actually conduct training sessions until Novem 
ber 1982, four months after the first stores opened (Steiner 1982). 
Most stores opened and operated as conventionally-managed super 
markets for some period of time.
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The Busch Center's contract expired in January 1983. Several 
months later, consultants established an in-house training capability. 
According to Nicholson (1985), "half the employees in a store were 
brought together for training in among other things, problem solving 
and team building" (p. 80). They were also encouraged to develop a 
plan for how QWL would work in their store. Super Fresh's QWL 
program was designed to adapt to situations in specific stores. Train 
ing focused on the process of QWL rather than on the content of 
meetings or even what, beyond a few basics, constituted a good 
quality of worklife. After a store underwent training, the trainers (ei 
ther the consultants or later Super Fresh's in-house staff) encouraged 
planning boards to meet. Meeting frequency and content were not 
specified and varied widely across the stores, as we will see in chap 
ter 5. Training in QWL, however, continued to lag behind the store 
openings. The A&P stores converted later in the region waited the 
longest time before receiving it.
Implications of the Super Fresh Labor Agreement
As Nicholson (1985) and Blim (1985) have shown, several features 
of the Super Fresh arrangements have potentially greatest signifi 
cance for the operation of the stores. These conditions, which are in 
line with A&P chairman James Wood's goals of reducing labor costs 
while providing more service include: (1) the wage and benefit re 
ductions, (2) the two-tiered wage structure, (3) the elimination of 
almost all full-time employment, (only department head or assistant 
manager positions are full time), (4) the use of high-turnover, low- 
wage, part-time employees, (5) selectivity in rehiring former A&P 
employees, and (6) the bonus plan.
The bonus plan, in many ways, can have unintended conse 
quences, in combination with other elements of the cost reduction 
strategy. For one thing, "the responsibility for the major source of 
conflict between the corporation and its employees, that is, keeping 
the labor-rate low, has been transferred to the hourly employees 
themselves" (Nicholson 1985, p. 177). Similar to a piece-rate pay 
plan, the bonus could pit worker against worker, although with a
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different twist. It would seem to be in the interest of workers to 
reduce the hours of highly-paid workers, in order to keep the labor 
rate low, insofar as they can influence that. For the union, that may 
mean that the traditional source of strength, the senior workers, are 
in disfavor with other workers. For the senior workers, it is a catch- 
22, in that the more work they do, the lower the bonus to be shared 
among workers in the store. Nicholson (1985) notes, "some [assis 
tant directors and department managers] recognize that instead of 
fostering cooperation, as it may have been intended, the [bonus] sets 
employees against each other" (p. 182). The further discussion in 
chapter 5 indicates that the workers themselves are well aware of 
these implications.
Conclusions
The O&O and Super Fresh attempts at job-saving occurred in an 
extremely turbulent economic environment. The immediate backdrop 
was the recession, but there were structural changes taking place in 
Philadelphia's economy and in the grocery industry, and radical 
changes in A&P corporate strategy. A&P had once been the proud 
leader, but had fallen behind the other firms in the industry and was 
trying to revamp itself through downsizing and a tough negotiating 
stance with labor.
In this setting, UFCW local 1357 had prepared for a fight and 
developed an unusual strategy promoting ownership and management 
by workers. A&P returned to the bargaining table with an innovative 
extension of its developing marketing and labor strategies. A land 
mark agreement was fashioned through the creation of Super Fresh. 
Two worker buyouts did take place, while the bulk of the stores and 
jobs threatened with closure were converted to Super Fresh.
The labor agreement, particularly at Super Fresh, involved signif 
icant labor concessions—a wage cut, two-tiered wages, and revised 
seniority rules—together with management restructuring through 
QWL and productivity sharing through a bonus plan. It was a bitter 
pill for workers, but 2,000 jobs were saved, and management prac 
tices would be reformed.
114 Context of the Closings and Implementation of Alternatives
Worker/owners at O&O stores seemed to be getting several things 
in return for their sacrifices that Super Fresh workers were not: cap 
ital investments, autonomy on the job, self-determined training, and 
democratic decisionmaking at all levels. Super Fresh workers, by 
contrast, received externally-designed and-run training (if they re 
ceived training at all), and the contradictory implications of the com 
bination of QWL and bonus programs with A&P's part-timer labor 
strategy.
At least formally, then, the implementation of the store types 
manifested the advantages and disadvantages of each. Worker/owners 
had risks to face and had to learn quickly how to succeed in busi 
ness, but they had complete involvement in the processes and out 
comes of work. Super Fresh workers had saved their jobs and 
received some involvement in decisions and profits, but their in 
volvement was constrained and limited, chiefly owing to formal im 
pediments.
NOTES
1. Around this time, Wendell Young attended a conference at the National Center for Em 
ployee Ownership that included Russell Long on ESOPs and Sherman Kreiner giving an ori 
entation about co-ops. According to Kreiner, Young concluded that the cooperative structure 
was definitely the way he wanted to go.
2. Store managers at Super Fresh are directors; employees are associates.
The Implementation Process
Chapter 4 described the setting in which two workplace innova 
tions were conceived and implemented from the top down. The the 
ory of both innovations was that the exchange of wage and benefit 
cuts—on the one hand for economic incentives (bonus or profit- 
shares) and more worker influence on how work is done on the other 
hand—would lead to effective workplaces. Those who designed the 
changes expected that, through increased participation, the workers 
would achieve more autonomy over their working conditions, the hi 
erarchy of power would decrease, all levels would be brought closer 
together, and everyone would be provided with a role in decision- 
making. The range of issues subject to worker control varied con 
siderably between the two store-types; it was all-inclusive in the 
worker-owned stores and limited in Super Fresh.
In the initial process of formal change, consultants for the union 
undertook the training of future O&O workers, while others helped 
A&P to train workers for QWL. This chapter will look at the major 
facets of the actual process of implementation of the innovations in 
each of six intensively studied stores, as described by the workers. 
First, neither in the O&O stores nor in the individual Super Fresh 
stores was there random selection of workers. The very ways in 
which workers were recruited affected store social processes. Sec 
ond, the implementation of the new forms of participation was af 
fected by variations in the commitment of leaders and consistency of 
follow-through. Third, our analysis involves the unanticipated and 
unintended informal social processes which significantly influenced 
the establishment of worker ownership and QWL. Some of these in 
formal processes can be traced to the continuation of former chain- 
wide patterns of power relationships. Others can be related to the 
continuity of specific ties of loyalty to former bosses and co-workers
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in each store. Still others can be tied to the morale problems in 
stores, which were affected by contradictions in the contract, by the 
social composition of the stores and by crisis events that occurred.
Iii-Person Interviews
The information on which this analysis is based comes from the 
intensive, face-to-face interviews with workers in the six stores most 
thoroughly investigated. These included two worker-owned O&O 
stores and four Super Fresh stores with different degrees of partici 
pation. The interview schedule included both open-ended questions 
and rating scales. The interviews took one to two hours and con 
sisted of five topical areas: (1) career histories; (2) responses to the 
threatened store closing (perceptions of options and actions); (3) in 
formation about families (composition, economic situation, leisure 
and lifestyle); (4) descriptions and evaluations of participation in the 
stores; and (5) hopes and expectation for the future.
We tape-recorded the interviews, transcribed them, and prepared a 
codebook to best reflect differences in responses. Interviews were 
coded and then analyzed for frequencies and correlations.
We used the material from the personal interviews in three impor 
tant ways. First, knowledge gleaned from the interviews led to the 
ultimate grouping of the four Super Fresh stores closely studied as 
QWL and non-QWL. Our initial assumption that earlier establish 
ment of the program and greater local union support would increase 
the degree of QWL implementation was not accurate. After we 
looked directly at the informal process of implementation in the 
stores, we regrouped the stores as QWL and non-QWL according to 
the degree of active QWL which had been actually implemented. 
These regroupings agreed with each shop steward's assessment of 
the strength of QWL in each store.
Second, to develop the self-administered survey, we used the ways 
in which workers described the innovation and characterized the 
workplace, their life goals, etc. Our new, in-depth understanding of 
the way workers thought about their jobs, careers and life goals 
helped us construct the shorter, more structured instrument used to 
test the worker outcomes model (chapter 6).
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In this chapter, we describe how informal social processes affected 
the implementation of the innovation. Of particular importance is 
the role played by the persistence of old roles, expectations and 
power relationships and their influence on the way each of the new 
stores was assembled. This provides insight about the way "worker 
characteristics" (gender, age, skills, and experience) relate to each 
other. Chainwide patterns of social organization reveal that access to 
power, knowledge and opportunity is not randomly distributed to all 
departments and positions.
In addition to chainwide patterns, critical store-specific social pro 
cesses affected the development of participativeness and, in turn, 
store and worker outcomes. The process of store formation (the way 
new store members were recruited) differed between Super Fresh and 
O&O stores. The degree to which former co-workers were kept to 
gether, and the degree to which recruitment brought in workers from 
key or marginal sectors of former stores, experienced and inexperi 
enced people, and those who were better off or worse off in the new 
store all affected the store's social process. Managerial experience 
and style affected each store as well. Finally, each store underwent a 
unique series of special events and crises which helped to solidify or 
rupture the experiments with participation. These social patterns 
help to explain some of the outcomes more formally measured in 
chapters 6 and 7. One finding relevant to the model-testing in those 
chapters was that in Super Fresh stores, having a full-time job was 
almost always identical with department head status. Moreover, these 
full-time elites were the major "winners" in the innovation, those 
who did not lose position or hours in the transition.
Chainwide Patterns
Informal Social Organization of Supermarkets: 
Differential Power and Knowledge
To understand how the former social system has persisted, it is 
important to look at customary practices developed over the years 
in the supermarket industry. In spite of formal administrative rules,
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supermarkets, like all workplaces, have developed informal social 
structures of roles, opportunities, and power which are shared 
throughout the industry, and in which supermarket employees have 
spent their work lives. These real but informal systems were not con 
sidered by the innovators, who concentrated on changing the official, 
formal structures of work. The informal patterns provide crucial in 
sights about what happened.
Supermarkets are, in general, organized into several different so 
cial units which vary in opportunities for learning skills, for moving 
up, for working in teams and for acquiring knowledge about the 
store as a whole. Formally, the store consists of departments based 
on the specific product handled, (e.g., meat, produce, etc.). Each 
department has a "head" or manager who reports to the local chain 
of command: the assistant managers and the manager. 1 While the 
formal organization chart treats all departments as equal, there are 
significant informal differences between them in power and access to 
information.
The core of the store is the grocery department, whose head is the 
grocery manager. The grocery manager controls all products but 
meat, deli and produce. Within groceries, one person—called a 
manager but with no other employees—is responsible for frozen 
food and one is responsible for dairy. These two junior managers and 
the "receiver" who deals with vendors and handles incoming orders 
are not equal to department heads. However, their guaranteed full- 
time work and their opportunities for learning business skills (re 
ferred to as "paper-work," such as inventory, ordering, etc.) make 
them important positions in the industry's vertical career ladders. 
These positions are held by men, who, along with the grocery man 
ager and top store hierarchy, spend time together in the office and 
are in constant communication about store business. The grocery de 
partment is also the administrative home of the night crew, the so 
cially isolated stock clerks who work the night shift when shelves 
are stocked.
The "back of the store"—the second major component—consists 
of the meat room and deli, which are physically contiguous and so 
cially intertwined. The job of a meat cutter is skilled, and access is
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controlled through an apprentice system. Meat cutters—most of 
whom work full time—tend to belong to a different union local than 
the retail clerks. The meat wrappers and deli clerks are females, who 
also belong to this local. Although meat wrapping is a dead-end job, 
it provides better wages and hours than other "women's" jobs. Con 
sequently, access to meat wrapping positions is also controlled, not 
by formal apprenticeships, but through informal social connections. 
Because of their physical separation from the rest of the store, and 
because meat is a major source of store profit, meat room workers 
think of themselves as the elites of the store and develop extreme 
internal solidarity. Joking relationships and close camaraderie— 
"one big happy family"—prevail. Trust and loyalty are evident in 
meat room/deli relationships.
The third component, the produce department, is small and simi 
lar to the meat department in being physically separate within the 
store, in requiring very specialized skills, in having a unique set of 
vendors and specialists, in having problems related to display, fresh 
ness and spoilage. However, produce has less "clout" than the meat 
room. Produce further suffers from being a department with high 
inventory "shrinkage" due to perishability and customer foraging.
The fourth major component of the store is the "front end" or 
cashier stations. The front end is a female world of dead-end jobs 
characterized by part-time hours, competition for favored schedules 
and fragmented worktime with no opportunity for peer interactions 
(e.g., cashiers work few hours a week, rarely the same from week to 
week and take breaks individually). Their interaction is with custom 
ers and not with each other.
Women comprise more than half of the store personnel, but be 
cause they are primarily part-time workers, they comprise much less 
than half the payroll. The only routes upward for front-end women 
are opportunities as front-end manager and in the office (book 
keeping, head cashier, etc.). Like the female meat wrappers, women 
in the office become loyal and trusted sidekicks to the store manage 
ment and inner circle of grocery leaders. Women in the office repri 
mand cashiers about till shortages, which can lead to suspension and 
other penalties. They are also involved in scheduling cashiers, a task
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with a lot of pressure due to the competition for "gravy" hours, as 
good schedules are called. Several women talked with our interview 
ers about turning down positions in the office. Some said that they 
would "miss the customers." Others talked about "the pressure" 
and several said they would have accepted these tasks if office jobs 
provided opportunity for advancement. However, the most a woman 
can achieve in the office is the role of loyal assistant to the male 
workers.
In summary, the store consists of four major parts: groceries, the 
back (meat/deli), produce, and the front end. One informant talked 
about his store as "three separate stores." The grocery department 
contains vertical career opportunities for men, meat is limited in re 
cruitment by an apprentice system, and the front end is a dead-end 
for women in the workforce. The only positions for women outside 
the front end are in subordinate positions in the meat room, deli and 
office.
Worker Characteristics: Type of Workers and Types of Careers
Traditional career patterns in the former A&P supermarkets ex 
hibit a strong internal labor market. Except for meat cutters, almost 
everyone enters the job at the same level with no skills or experi 
ence. Subsequent career trajectories are very different, however. The 
following patterns are drawn from the 140 career histories collected. 
All of the workers came from working-class backgrounds, with 60 
percent of their parents in blue-collar work, 30 percent in low-level 
white-collar jobs, 5 percent in farming/mining and 5 percent in small 
business.
Sixty percent of the current workers were brought into their 
present jobs by relatives, friends or neighbors who worked in the 
local store. Of the 40 percent remaining, half got their jobs by walk 
ing into their local store. Only 20 percent were hired through a more 
formal process (application to central office, response to advertise 
ment).
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Sixty-seven percent began their supermarket careers at age 14-20 
(high school or college years). Almost all of the remaining third are 
women who entered their jobs upon returning to work after child- 
bearing or childrearing. Most men had no other work experience 
except for the military, while women did have experience in other 
kinds of work. For everyone who entered before the last decade, the 
supermarket industry was seen as very secure. This was the period 
of rapid post-war expansion. Over and over, workers stated that gro 
ceries was a good industry since "people had to eat," and one 
worker said "it was steady, like a government job." Sixty-six per 
cent of the workers did not initially plan to make a career in the 
market.
It is likely that many who entered this workforce to earn money 
during school years eventually left. Our workers are those who re 
mained because of perceived advantages. Many spoke of the advan 
tages of the hourly wage rate in the industry and the security 
advantages compared to other comparable jobs; but for men, the op 
portunities to move through vertical career ladders were also appar 
ent. While women remained part time, men tended to move to full 
time within one or two years. Women in the front end frequently told 
of watching 16-year-olds move into the grocery department after sev 
eral months, when they would have gladly taken the vacancy. One 
male explanation for this is that grocery clerks need to move large 
heavy cartons of stock. Young men are quickly put "on the floor" 
(groceries) where they begin to learn "the business." One woman 
told of feeling humiliated when a 16-year-old with several months 
experience was given the keys (the right to open and close the store) 
when several women with over 10 years experience were present.
Knowledge about vendors and "paperwork" (inventory, ordering, 
etc.) was available through a variety of both formal and informal 
positions. Because stores are open more than 40 hours a week, there 
was an elaborate system of "back-up" personnel needed for times 
when an incumbent was not there. The managers and assistant man 
agers were backed by a "third man," not formally recognized in title 
or pay, but able to learn how to run the store and gain the trust of
122 The Implementation Process
the leadership. The dairy and frozen food managers, the receiver, 
and the night crew boss were in similar positions for acquiring both 
knowledge and trust. Moreover, someone has to back-up the dairy 
and frozen food managers when they are not present.
People used to position themselves in these strategic spots to learn 
about the business and to develop ties with managers and external 
chain supervisors (itinerant regional supervisors specialized in gro 
ceries, meat, deli, produce, etc.). They used these ties to scout op 
portunities for moving up in other stores. When the chain was ex 
panding to the suburbs in the 1960s and early 1970s, many positions 
became available with each new store. More recently, opportunities 
have only come about as a result of retirement, resignation and sick 
leave. The strategy has been to engineer a transfer to a store where 
such a vacancy is expected to open, and then back-up the departing 
person. Currying favor with managers or external supervisors has 
been important because such ties could help to locate an opportunity 
and accomplish the transfer. One way to curry favor has been 
through working a stint on the night crew, which is hard to staff 
with reliable people, or to be willing to come in on short notice to 
fill in for absentees or to work weekends. The careers of successful 
men used to depend on a vertical series of planned transfers. These 
led to well-dispersed positive reputations within the corporation and 
the union. It was important to be identified as an up-and-coming 
worker. While these patterns based on interstore mobility can help to 
explain how the new stores recruited their workers (see below), they 
are no longer relevant in either the O&O or Super Fresh stores.
Movement from store to store did not always mean upward mobil 
ity. In recent years, movement was triggered by the frequent closings 
and the "bumping" rights of more senior workers. Several patterns 
of rapid demotion developed as senior department heads displaced 
regular full-time meat wrappers and so on. Those at the bottom were 
laid off.
In this section, we focus on career patterns before the major chain 
problems began. Even in better times, there were patterns of down 
ward movement. Male employees who entered the industry at 18 or 
20 were rapidly moved up in the first decade. When they became
The Implementator! Process 123
department managers, they could either choose to move to corporate 
management (product supervisors, warehouse jobs, etc.) or stay in 
the union and become assistant managers. Another common goal 
was to use the business knowledge acquired in the chain to buy their 
own store. This was most frequent among butchers and those with 
high-level grocery positions.
Store managers were out of the collective bargaining unit and had 
constrained discretionary power. Product supervisors from the re 
gional office dealt directly with department heads. Decisions on or 
dering and displays came directly from headquarters. Managers 
handled predominantly personnel matters: schedules, transfers, etc. 
As a result, managing was not always desirable as a career choice.
Since there was no room for all male workers at the top, many 
were stabilized at lower level while others experienced patterns of 
demotion. While transfers to achieve better positions were voluntary 
and often initiated by the worker himself, other transfers were chain- 
initiated. They often involved inconvenient locations, tough manag 
ers and were intended to encourage workers to leave.
Transfers were thus used to punish male workers who had "bad 
reputations." Men who had risen to department head but were 
strong-willed and often in conflict with managers, were subject to 
demotions, loss of hours and frequent transfers. Some report being 
transferred to "punishment" stores with autocratic managers who 
would "bring them down." Women who ran into trouble were also 
transferred to inconvenient stores as punishment. Several of our in 
terviewees had protected themselves through the union, however. 
They had frequently grieved transfers and were soon left alone.
In addition, there were many older workers nearing age 50 and 
their 30-year retirement option. Those whose careers had leveled off 
during their prime years when competition was strong were often 
seen as "dead wood." They were moved around in order to 
"protect" jobs for the manager's preferred workers.
Except for some office jobs, only female department heads (deli, 
front end) were full time. Even these jobs were not frequently given 
to women. Meat wrappers, while given more hours than cashiers, 
were rarely full time. A very few women with specific skills as
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bookkeepers or meat wrappers had made some vertical moves as 
new stores opened with positions available, but most moves for 
women were horizontal. Their moves were made to accommodate 
domestic needs, such as residential moves or new hours to fit with 
children's activities. 2
Other A&P workers had extremely stable careers, spending years 
and sometimes decades in the same job and store. This pattern was 
more common for women, but also characterized the careers of sev 
eral men. Individuals who had spent over 20 years in the industry 
but had stayed at the same level in hours and position at one or two 
stores were common. These steady jobs required a manager's protec 
tion, especially during the troubles of the past decade when workers 
were bumped from store to store on the basis of seniority. A man 
ager could protect a job by transferring less favored workers with 
more seniority to a reasonably high-level position at an inconvenient 
store where they were likely to resign, or by securing a bumping for 
a favored worker to a "good" store with a paternalistic manager. 
People with this kind of career used family metaphors to describe 
their workplace. When asked to describe their ambitions in the 
former store, they overwhelmingly reported that they just wanted to 
do the best job they could and to make their store the best store. 
Women were especially likely to state this as their ambition. These 
workers strongly valued the stability and regularity of their former 
jobs. They missed their former stores and were less satisfied with 
their new situation.
In the new setting, they continued to look to their store leaders as 
patrons, thus ignoring the new potential for active self- 
determination. They also continued to state a desire to work hard 
and promote the store welfare as their major ambition. While this 
view could be interpreted as a result of the new emphasis on team 
work, it is really a continuation of their former goals.
One career pattern we expected to find more frequently than we 
did involves using the supermarket job as a part-time supplement to 
a full-time job. This is clearly what the Super Fresh corporation 
wants most workers to do today. Corporate leaders talk about their 
jobs as not being intended as primary sources of household incomes.
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The first Super Fresh president, Gerry Good, stated several times 
that, "This is not a welfare system. Workers should not expect to 
support a family with a supermarket job." However, such a supple 
mental income strategy only occurred for 12 percent of the male 
workforce interviewed. In these cases, primary jobs included teach 
ing, firefighting, the construction trades and working in family- 
owned businesses.
In summary, there are several career patterns, to which gender and 
age are very significant, which formerly predominated in the indus 
try: (1) The vertical career, which is only available to men and is 
pursued by those who place themselves in positions to acquire busi 
ness skills and important patrons as sources of power in order to 
move up the informal and formal ladders. (2) Horizontal "pun 
ishment" transfers, used before the chain's economic decline of the 
last decade, for "mavericks" who argued with managers or for older 
workers perceived as "dead wood." (3) Convenience moves, partic 
ularly by women, after a change of residence or family schedule. (4) 
Little movement between stores, a pattern more common for women, 
who developed strategies of loyalty to assure the protection of a 
manager, but which applies to men as well. (5) Part-time careers to 
supplement another full-time job. While today the industry managers 
see this as the preferred pattern, it rarely occurred in the past.
The union, managers and chain supervisors shared significant in 
formation about workers. The chain was and continues to be a rela 
tively closed system. Workers brought spouses and children in. 
Union staff and current Super Fresh leaders often came up the ranks 
together. The former A&P workforce of 2,000 was a small commu 
nity where people knew each other personally, by face or by name. It 
was easy to get information about most people through one's per 
sonal network of contacts in the chain. Reputations outside the store 
were very important in explaining decisions about participation in 
the O&O stores. They also help to explain the "call-back" process 
used by Super Fresh. The order of recall, the quality of store, the 
position level and the hours for individuals depended on their repu 
tation and clout in the A&P community.
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Household Economic Vulnerability: The Importance of 
Age Cohorts
The interviews also revealed differences between the experiences 
of different age and gender cohorts. Not only were gender and age 
significantly related to career trajectory (skills, knowledge, power), 
but also to economic vulnerability (the degree to which one's house 
hold was dependent on the supermarket income). These factors af 
fected the responses of workers to the A&P shutdown, to recall at 
Super Fresh, and to new opportunities at O&O.
Most of those entering the supermarket during the difficult past 10 
years were 20-30 years old. Most of those younger workers who 
were successful in keeping jobs were related to old-time supermarket 
workers. Many were not married, lived at home and considered their 
income as mostly disposable—for hobbies and recreational ac 
tivities.
Men aged 30-50 tended to be family men with children at home; 
they had often achieved vertical careers before the decline. This 
group had been given the leadership roles in all the new stores. They 
can be categorized in terms of economic vulnerability: those with 
working wives and those with homemaker wives. Of those with 
working wives, a small number had spouses with full-time, middle- 
level jobs (owning small shops, selling real estate, teaching, nurs 
ing); the others had wives with pink-collar, clerical jobs. The most 
common spouse's job was as a fellow supermarket worker. These 
secondary sources of income made a difference in the adjustments 
workers made to the changes in O&O and Super Fresh stores. The 
men with working spouses were less concerned about the risks of 
O&O or part-time hours at Super Fresh, since their income was not 
as vital to the household.
The men over 50 with fewer dependents at home were all thinking 
of retirement and perhaps second careers. With a pension plan which 
took effect after 30 years, many were counting the years to this tran 
sition. They were less interested in their current work situation than 
in the future.
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Women's age cohorts had different economic needs than men's. 
While women from 18-22 were, like young men, unmarried and liv 
ing at home, women in their later 20s were likely to have children. 
Women aged 23-50 were in the family-rearing stage of the life cy 
cle; many were divorced single mothers. Another large group of 
women had husbands who were disabled or laid off. Their incomes 
were also more than supplementary to the household. For both these 
groups, full-time hours and career mobility were seen as necessary 
but unattainable. Many of these women wanted full-time jobs and 
some expressed interest in vertical careers. Thus, while chain policy 
was based on the assumption that women were willing part-time 
workers providing supplemental income, this was not true for almost 
half of the women interviewed.
Women over 50 needed to work to a later age to be eligible for 
pensions, since they had entered the workforce later or had inter 
rupted their careers. While they had no child dependents, many of 
these women were widowed, single, or had husbands who were dis- 
advantageously retired, laid off or disabled.
In sum, young entrants to this workforce (women under 22 and 
men under 30) had experienced hard times but were economically 
independent. Men from 30-50 had family responsibilities, but many 
had working wives to supplement income. They were often in a 
much better position than the large number of women (23-50) whose 
income was central to their household. Women over 50 were also in 
less advantageous positions regarding the achievement of timely and 
adequate retirement income.
Store-Specific Social Processes
For both the O&O and Super Fresh stores, each local workplace 
underwent a unique process of social formation. The transitions to 
worker ownership and to QWL were molded and somewhat trans 
formed in each store through differences in recruitment of new work 
ers and in the perpetuation of old relationships, roles and power. 
These informal social processes greatly affected the degree to which 
change occurred in each of the six store settings. Important factors
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included the degree to which former co-workers were recruited to a 
store, the social composition (in terms of gender, age cohorts, de 
partment of origin and career trajectory and economic vulnerability), 
the manager or leader's style and the critical turning points and 
events. These in turn seem to have affected the degree to which par 
ticipative structures were used and the degree to which they were 
effective.
Choosing Worker Ownership or QWL
As we saw in chapter 4, more than 600 workers signed pledges for 
worker-owned stores, but less than one-tenth remained after the Su 
per Fresh openings were announced. This group eventually was re 
duced to 40 as individuals dropped out. How were those who stayed 
with the O&O different from the rest?
When we asked people to state their reasons for choosing O&O, 
their responses fell into the following patterns. Most workers chose 
O&O stores because they did not like or trust A&P. Some waited to 
be called back to Super Fresh and then examined both concrete op 
tions. Others decided right away to avoid A&P. Many voiced the 
view that they had watched the chain make contradictory and capri 
cious decisions over the years as a result of centralized decisionmak- 
ing. They felt they could do a better job.
Job security was the most frequently expressed concern. O&O 
workers did not trust A&P to stick with the Super Fresh innovation 
or to succeed. Full-time hours and control over one's schedule and 
position were also an area of concern. Workers knew their reputa 
tions and could evaluate whether their chances for full-time hours or 
a "living wage" were good at Super Fresh and acted accordingly. 
This was especially important to women and to the "mavericks" 
who had lost their influence and position at A&P and had blemished 
reputations. People who saw the system of patronage as capricious 
and distasteful wanted to avoid it.
While avoiding A&P was more frequently stated as a reason, a 
few expressed positive reasons for choosing O&O. The most fre 
quently stated specific reason was a desire to be an entrepreneur, to
The Implementator! Process 129
own one's own business. This is not surprising since it had long been 
a career goal for many in the industry. Others talked less specifically 
about a desire for a life change, a "challenge," "something new," 
indicating the willingness for risk or adventure. Almost no one spe 
cifically mentioned worker ownership or democratic worker partici 
pation as a motive, but two workers did mention being attracted to 
the "O&O concept." Changes were mostly discussed in personal 
terms—"I would be working for myself," "I might make more 
money," etc. Goals emphasized were higher income, the purchase of 
more stores and fewer owners sharing the profits.
The dominant reason expressed by Super Fresh workers for not 
choosing worker ownership was the social complexity of collective 
decisionmaking: "getting stuck with people you don't know or 
like." Several said they had thought about going into business for 
themselves, "but if I did it I would do it right—buy my own store." 
Others talked about going in with former co-workers on their own as 
better than having this change controlled by outsiders.
Turning from what workers said about their reasons to questions 
of demographic/career differences between the two groups, we see 
clear patterns which underscore the stated explanations:
(1) People who chose O&O stores formed their stores in such a way 
as to minimize the risks of "too many bosses" and "getting 
stuck" with undesirables. In one store, more than half of the 
workers were experienced males aged 30-50 who had worked 
with each other before as elites in former stores. This mutually 
known or vouched-for group became the core of the store. In the 
other store, several dyads or triads of friends/former co-work 
ers, and even pairs of relatives (parent-child, brothers-in-law, 
uncle-nephew) opted for the new experiment together. Thus 
former ties and loyalties mitigated against the concern about col 
laborating with strangers of unknown capability.
(2) The O&O stores, compared to Super Fresh, contained a signifi 
cant proportion of "mavericks" with histories of conflict with 
former managers or union grieving. They also contained the 
most outspoken women, several of whom were primary bread 
winners. Both of these groups needed full-time work and as-
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sessed their opportunities at Super Fresh negatively. The women 
achieved full-time hours at O&O, but the opportunities for new 
leadership for women have still been limited.
(3) Each O&O store contained a majority of those who had been in 
dominant grocery and meat positions where they had acquired 
significant business knowledge. None of the Super Fresh stores 
contained as large a proportion of such experienced, knowledge 
able and confident workers.
(4) Several workers chose O&O to spread the risk in households that 
had had two A&P pay checks. While the spouse or parent with 
the greatest opportunity at Super Fresh stayed with the chain, 
the other family member chose O&O.
Formation of the O&O Stores
The following section will describe similarities and differences 
between the two O&O stores (A and B) in the process of formation 
and their resulting social composition. This will be followed by dis 
cussion of the formation of Super Fresh stores (C,D,E,F). Discus 
sion of implementation and resulting practice of participation in the 
stores will also follow.
Store A
One cannot overemphasize the importance of both social ties and 
the particular store selected in the process of formulation of the 
O&O store. In the smaller store, Store A, the role played by a 
closely knit group of nine former co-workers was critical to the 
workers' decisions to participate. Here, the store involved in the 
buyout changed over the course of the summer when the desired 
store was found to have a weak foundation and another store was 
substituted. The commitment within the group was very strong, 
however. Although a few people left the group (four left in the sum 
mer and one right after the store opened), this turned out to be an
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advantage since the substitute store did not have the volume to carry 
as many members as the first one.
In Store A, half of the members (seven) were males ages 32-45. 
All of them had known each other before, most having worked to 
gether in one recent store. All these men had occupied key positions 
before as department heads, or other positions which provided oper 
ational knowledge. They all considered one man as the primary 
leader. He had taken the lead in recruiting them and keeping them 
together. While all of these men had families, they also all had wives 
who worked. None of them was extremely vulnerable economically. 
They had also all had another option, having been called back to 
Super Fresh. The core group recruited one woman and one young 
male from their former store to join them.
The remaining five members were women and older males who 
were not former co-workers. Four of these five workers chose O&O 
because it was their only chance for full-time work. Older workers 
and women were less likely to be given full-time work by Super 
Fresh. The fifth had been offered full-time work, but was one of the 
few whose primary motivation was the concept of worker ownership.
The store was thus constructed around a core of former co- 
workers. As one member of the group said, the leader "wanted a 
stacked deck." Only one individual in the store was economically 
vulnerable as the sole support of a family. All of the other workers 
either had no dependents or had working spouses.
Members of the core group in this store often referred to each 
other as "my partners." There were several negative remarks made 
about the idea of a cooperative. One person said, "I don't like the 
co-op idea. Everyone is not equal. Some are satisfied with less." 
Other comments were, "I'm not into the concept; I had friends 
here" and "This is not the wave of the future; there are too many 
personalities."
Store A workers distanced themselves from the O&O consultants 
early in the experience. First, they shunned media attention and the 
talk-show obligations which the other store accepted. They tended to 
use their supplier, IGA, as the primary source of information about 
planning (ordering, inventory control, scheduling labor efficiently,
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etc.) and development. Several people said they would rather be 
called IGA than O&O. This was in contrast to Store B, which had a 
major confrontation with IGA over the lack of prominence given to 
the O&O logo in their newspaper advertisements.
The purchase of a second store by the Store A corporation (ac 
complished in 1984) was planned from the beginning. The men in 
the core group often talked about buying more stores to be run by 
part-time labor (as opposed to the goal of having all workers be 
owners).
All of this underscores the view that this store was formed by a 
group of successful, former co-workers who had acquired business 
skills through their vertical careers. They were more attracted to the 
entrepreneurial possibilities of the new stores than to the cooperative 
movement. While three members (including the leader) specifically 
spoke about the idea of worker ownership at length, this was un 
usual.
Store B
The larger O&O store has been more committed to the "concept" 
from the beginning. For this store, location was extremely important 
for three-fourths of those interviewed. Over and over, people said 
that this was a first-rate store (potentially) and that they would have 
dropped out if other stores had been assigned. Social ties also made 
a difference. Only 3 out of the 25 did not know any new co-workers. 
There were three pairs of very close friendships, and three pairs of 
relatives: a mother and son, an uncle and nephew and two brothers- 
in-law, as well as several people who had worked together or with 
close friends or relatives of each other in the past. Several workers 
had been co-workers of as many as five to six others before. Some 
workers reported being specifically recruited by former co-workers 
as stores were forming and specific skills were needed. Some re 
ported being close friends of the fathers of two of the younger male 
owners and of the husband of one of the female owners. There was
The Implementaton Process 133
much testimony to the importance of these ties in terms of continu 
ing attendance at meetings and participation in committees during 
the summer prior to opening. New friendships were based on mutual 
acquaintance.
This store contained 13 core males (34-46), with 9 experienced in 
jobs which provided skills and knowledge, 4 young men (20-30), 6 
women and two men in their late 50s. Almost all of these workers 
had been called back to Super Fresh, but not necessarily for full- 
time positions. Only two workers had not had the Super Fresh 
option.
Of the young men, all had parents in the business. None were 
economically vulnerable. Most were single, one a newly wed with a 
working wife. Of the women, three were single parents. The other 
three had income-earning husbands. For all the younger men and the 
women, positions had improved in the new store because of their 
full-time hours.
Two owners in this store were part-timers for whom this was a 
moonlighting job. One had always been an active board member. 
The other was an older male worker who expected to work at the 
store full-time when he retired from his other job.
Most of the core males were doing the same job in the new store 
that they had done before: assistant manager, grocery manager, fro 
zen food manager, night crew boss, receiver, etc. A few had to learn 
new jobs because of duplication (a former night crew boss became a 
bookkeeper). We had expected that assignments to positrons would 
have been a major source of conflict in the formation of these stores. 
In Store B, there had been one problematic placement which was 
later resolved, but after some initial reorganizations, everyone 
seemed pleased with his or her role. (In Store A, only a few noncore 
members expressed dissatisfaction.) They were pleased because jobs 
were defined flexibly and could be redesigned if necessary. There 
were possibilities of cross-training and job shifts. Once-coveted de 
partment headships were less in demand because of the decrease in 
hierarchy, the tendency to share work across job categories, and the 
flattened wage hierarchy.
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While all the core males in Store A had working wives, three- 
quarters of the men in Store B had wives who did not work at all. 
Adding the three single-parent women, a substantial number of own 
ers in this store were completely dependent on this one income. This 
group of males had tended to work more than one job before, and 
many had been forced to give up or cut back on their moonlighting 
because of the time involved in the new store.
Several owners were concerned about a lack of "chain of com 
mand" or lax supervision in the stores. They were concerned that 
there was too much equality and no clear authority. This theme came 
out in the discussion of a decision made by the manager to extend 
store hours on two nights/week. Members were evenly divided be 
tween those who felt the manager needed to have authority over such 
issues and those who thought it should have been brought to the 
membership for a vote.
Store B was more complex than Store A in size, composition and 
ideology. It was more tied to the worker ownership movement and 
the consultants representing the movement. The tie between this 
store and the movement can be seen in the conflict over IGA adver 
tisement policy. The store "faced down IGA" in a conflict between 
the O&O and IGA logos in the newspaper ads. This decision was 
seen by many to be a turning point in the store's independence and 
ability to control its own situation. It also signified the importance 
given to the O&O concept. The fight was led by those who identi 
fied with the movement. At other times, however, the leaders have 
been unable to secure sufficient votes to commit store resources to 
the movement (to help in training for new O&O stores, to open up 
membership roles, to make the logo accessible to new stores).
Summary
Several common features obtain for both stores. First, as one in 
formant stated, "The stores are a combination of both the most se 
cure [people who were experienced and confident in their ability to 
do better than A&P] and the most insecure [those not called back]."
The "most secure" were the core-age males who comprised half
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of each store's membership. They had substantial former experience 
with key positions in the stores. They also had substantial direct ties 
of loyalty to each other or indirect ties through relatives and mutual 
friends.
The least secure were those who, because of age and gender, were 
less likely to get full-time work or even call-backs to Super Fresh. 
These included five young men who were only offered part-time 
work, four older workers (only one of whom was called back) and 
ten women.
For many of the women, the new structure offered not only a rare 
opportunity for full-time work, but a chance to break down barriers 
to leadership roles in the store. Of all the women in O&O stores, 60 
percent cited new and expanded roles for women as a major attrac 
tion of the innovation. One stated, "I wanted a career, not a job." 
One of these women left her store shortly after the interviews be 
cause of perceived male dominance and inadequate opportunities for 
women. Two significantly changed roles: one became a major mem 
ber of the board, and the other broke a gender barrier to become a 
member of the night crew with a 10 percent increase in pay and 
hours compatible with parental roles. The old barrier was based on 
the assumption that women could not manage heavy stock boxes. 
Three others also experienced cross-training to broaden their skills in 
other departments and overall store operations.
Forty percent of the women wanted to continue their traditional 
roles. Several had turned down opportunities for promotion. One 
woman said, "Let the fellows be department heads. ... I have other 
work at home." Most of these women cited full-time hours as their 
reason for choosing O&O. One was strongly recruited by former co- 
workers and said that she "couldn't let the guys down."
There was an unusual number of "mavericks" in both stores. 
These are people who describe themselves as "outspoken," as al 
ways knowing they had more ability and ingenuity than the people 
they worked for. Of the 14 people in one store, 5 described them 
selves in this way. Of the 25 in the second store 9 described them 
selves in this way. There was little, if any, such self-description 
among those who worked in Super Fresh.
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When asked about recommending an O&O store to a friend, over 
and over people stressed the contingent importance of looking at 
who the co-participants are and the potential of the location. While 
everyone recognizes that not all people are superworkers, it is im 
portant to make sure of the ratio of those who work hard and carry 
their burden to those who "just bought a job."
Participation in the O&O Stores
The major differences in informal organization between the O&O 
stores are related to the size of the group, the social processes of 
formation and the external forces which influenced success (see 
chapter 4 for a discussion of the differences in experiences with bank 
loans, store selection, local competition, type of community, etc.).
The stores seemed more concerned about how they were perceived 
by external institutions—banks, vendors and customers—than about 
their role in the worker ownership movement. This was true of both 
stores, but especially of Store A. Many comments made by infor 
mants indicated that they wanted to appear like competent, knowl 
edgeable businessmen to the outside groups which exerted so much 
influence on their success. They talked about behaving appropriately 
and fitting in with the "business world" as being very important. 
This led to situations which required minimizing their ties to the 
consultants and the movement. It is possible that more of the work 
ers will become interested in the worker ownership movement again 
in the future if a critical mass of worker-owned stores and support 
ing institutions develop.
For the O&O stores, unlike Super Fresh, there is no question 
about whether a system of worker participation in decisionmaking 
was developed, because such a system must develop if the stores are 
to operate. Chapter 4 outlines the specifics of governance in the 
stores contained in the corporate by-laws. Briefly, workers as owners 
each have equal votes as store members. Monthly store meetings ex 
ist to inform members of lower level decisions allowed to managers 
or board discretion. At these meetings, higher level decisions re-
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served for maximum participation are also made. A board, elected 
periodically by the owners, meets bi-weekly and a manager, hired by 
the owners, oversees day-to-day operations and is responsible to the 
board and membership.
Formal training occurred only during the summer before the stores 
opened. There was no formal, follow-up training after the stores 
opened except that Store B briefly hired a consultant on its own (see 
below). The summer training described in chapter 4 involved several 
special task committees which reported to a steering committee. 
Committees concentrated on both operational start-up issues (work 
assignment, business skills) and on governance issues (e.g. by-laws, 
rights, hiring a manager, the role of the board, etc.). Very few 
worker/owners remembered much about their own committee assign 
ment, the range of committees and the work of other committees. 
Most stated that they learned almost everything on their own after 
the stores opened.
Knowing about the former power and authority structures in A&P 
workplaces, there are several ways of evaluating the degree to which 
the O&O stores have followed the innovative blueprints. First, re 
garding the formal structures: To what degree are the formal gover 
nance systems in place and operating? To what degree have informal 
systems of communication replaced them? What is the relationship 
between the hired manager and his worker bosses?
Second, regarding cooperative management practices: Where does 
the store fall on a continuum from totally shared decisionmaking to 
centralized authority? Is power being gradually distributed through 
rotation of board membership or gradually centralized through a 
strong leader or a stable board which does not change? Is there an 
increasing gap between the board and the members? To what degree 
are all members participating and knowledgeable about issues facing 
the stores?
Finally, regarding informal social systems: To what degree does 
the role played by former co-worker ties affect the structure of the 
decisionmaking in the store? Do former ties of friendship and loyalty 
lead to cliques and factions and preferential behavior?
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The Issues
Both stores have been faced with a considerable number of impor 
tant issues, many of them externally controlled. Store A was faced 
with an initially poor profit margin, several crises involving new 
stores opening within their market area leading to the readjusting of 
operating hours, a major decision to buy a new store, a decision to 
terminate the manager's contract, as well as continuous capital in 
vestment and personnel decisions. Store B also adjusted its hours to 
changing local competition, dealt with the illness of its manager and 
president and eventually the resignation of both. Moreover, this 
store, the legal owner of the O&O logo, was involved in many votes 
about the sale of the logo and participation in the training of a work 
force for new O&O stores, in addition to on-going capital investment 
and personnel decisions. While the Super Fresh stores can operate 
without QWL, the worker-owned stores require a structure for par 
ticipation.
The small size of Store A has led to a tendency for informal pro 
cesses to operate more than formal structures. In describing the for 
mation of Store A, the presence of a strong leader with a loyal 
following from a former store was indicated. Conflict with the hired 
manager resulted in his departure, and the store leader, who was al 
ready board president, took over the manager's position as well. He 
has been described fondly by one colleague as "an emperor" who 
rules with "tough love." In spite of this, he expressed commitment 
to the concept of a worker-owned cooperative in his interview and 
subsequent talks.
Regular board meetings occurred, although store meetings were 
less regular and often replaced by informal one-on-one consultation 
with every member. The store has maintained an elected board, al 
though its membership has been relatively static from the first and 
has been almost all male. The manager/board president has struggled 
to tone down his style and to produce consensus decisions. He has 
made an effort to restrict the tendency of some of his close friends to 
by-pass democratic decisionmaking.
The purchase of a second store by the worker/owners of Store B
The Implementaton Process 139
probably contributed to the persistence of shared power. The logis 
tics of staffing and operating two geographically dispersed stores 
was difficult enough to require cooperation, teamwork and flexibil 
ity in the division of labor. There have been many role conflicts 
among the personnel in the home store and between the two stores, 
but with every resolution of conflict the team has survived another 
crisis. The size of this store also makes a difference. With slightly 
more than half the membership of Store B, and with two stores to 
run, there are few workers who have not taken a turn at a position of 
responsibility. The majority of store members are board members or 
department heads.
Store B has taken great pains to implement the formal structure of 
worker ownership. The elected board has convened frequently and 
storewide members (owners) meetings held monthly. Board elections 
take place at specified intervals and there have also been special 
elections. (Shortly after the stores opened, special elections were 
held to reduce the unwieldy size of the board initially designated in 
the by-laws.) The composition of the board has tended to narrow 
over time to include the traditional inner circle.
In the beginning, Store B members were disappointed by the way 
storewide meetings were run. People talked about unimportant is 
sues. Conflicts arose in the meetings. The meetings were seen as 
endless and without closure on issues. A consultant was hired to 
train the group in collective decisionmaking. He taught them how to 
construct an agenda, limit discussion and other procedures to enable 
them to deal with issues effectively. Most of the workers considered 
this to be a major turning point in store governance.
The manager in Store B was viewed as having developed a satis 
factory relationship in a complex situation. He handled role conflicts 
with good grace and a sense of humor. He left in the third year to 
buy a store of his own, however, and was replaced by an experienced 
grocery department leader.
Store B has also seen power consolidate into the hands of a few. 
Starting out with a hired manager, an assistant manager (who was 
president of the board) and a meat manager (who was vice-president 
of the board), the store went through a period when the manager was
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hospitalized and the president of the board took over. Then, the pres 
ident left the corporation in the second year (after the interviewing) 
and was succeeded as president by the vice-president (meat man 
ager).
To the leaders of the store (the former and current board presi 
dents), the concepts of participation and consensus were very impor 
tant. One said, "it is harder to be l/2s owner than a solo owner 
because you have to use reason and effort to make a decision—but 
it's a better decision." Another said, "I think 25 people have more 
collective knowledge than one person. If I didn't think so, I would 
quit." (He, like the leader in the other store, sees himself as chang 
ing from a self-centered, impatient person to a tolerant, patient 
leader.)
The potential for a gap between active and less active members 
exists in Store B because of its larger size in relation to the limited 
number of headships and board positions. That such a division exists 
is reflected in comments by both leaders (who complain about non- 
participation) and some members (who complain about board cliqu- 
ishness). Part of this problem has been addressed by deliberate 
rotation of board positions. As in Store A, however, there are several 
people who have been on the board continuously and there is a ten 
dency for department head status and board membership to con 
verge. In this store, women have served on the board, but except for 
one woman who has been on the board from the beginning, women 
seem to rotate on and off more frequently.
Summary
The two stores differ in both size and in the significance of former 
co-worker ties in the store's composition. Size and former friendship 
ties affected the degree to which formal structures of communication 
were replaced by informal social processes. Size also affected the 
degree to which people had access to information and leadership po 
sitions. The larger store had the greatest gap between the board and 
less active members as time went on. In both stores, former ties 
declined in importance to participation and governance as time 
elapsed and major problems needed to be solved.
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Leaders and workers in both stores continue to be concerned about 
participation, either in attendance at meetings or in awareness and 
knowledge of issues. About one-third of the workers are seen as non- 
participating by their colleagues. They are said to have "just bought 
their jobs," to "put time in and walk away" leaving decisions to the 
others. Many workers report that they only go to meetings when the 
issues "affect my pocketbook."
Participation and leadership follow an expected pattern if one con 
siders department head status and department membership. The 
presidents of both boards are meat room managers. In both stores, 
the meat room and deli workers are supportive and loyal to the lead 
ership. They evoke the "team" and "family" metaphors so often 
used in talking about the meat room. The front end and produce 
departments and the night crew are significantly distanced from the 
leadership core in both knowledge and attitude.
There has been little role change in the O&O stores, since the 
leadership has come directly from those who had vertical careers at 
A&P and who had worked in departments with the greatest access to 
business skills. With few exceptions women's roles remain quite tra 
ditional. Women are under represented on the boards and still serve 
as "loyal side-kicks" in the meat room, or on the front end. They 
have also lost their former office bookkeeping jobs to young males 
in the new stores, since the bookkeeping functions are seen as more 
critical in the autonomous store corporation. However, the ability to 
flexibly redesign jobs and provide a storewide view of issues through 
meetings and cross-training have allowed women access to new skills 
and information.
Formation of the Super Fresh Stores 
Contradictions in the Contract
The formal features of the Super Fresh contract led to several pol 
icies which discouraged active participation in QWL. These features 
have been described in chapter 4. In the following discussion we 
describe how each feature acted as an impediment to QWL.
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First, tying the bonus to labor costs created an incentive for man 
agers to hire few full-time workers, decrease the hours of part-timers 
whenever there was a wage rate increase, and replace former A&P 
workers with newcomers paid at a lower rate. Many workers were 
well aware of the direct relationship between the bonus and their 
continuing loss of income and, thus, were hostile to QWL. They saw 
it as a meaningless feature in comparison to their declining wages.
A schism between part-time and full-time workers developed as a 
result. Full-time workers felt secure while part-timers worried about 
further erosion of the number of hours worked. Several workers in 
one store believed there was a formal policy to reduce everyone to 
12 hours per week. Conflicts over hours and schedules prevented the 
emergence of feelings of equality between department heads (most of 
the full-timers) and other workers.
Part-time workers have not been kept informed. While meetings 
were part of clock-time (paid for) in the earliest days of QWL in 
stores C and E, they are no longer part of compensated work-time at 
these stores and were never paid for at stores D and F. Part-timers 
have not been willing to attend meetings scheduled on their time off.
Second, the contract also generated a developing hostility between 
former A&P workers and new workers. New workers were to be 
paid less than former A&P workers during the first years of the con 
tract. By the end of the contract this gap would be closed. Thus 
there was initially an incentive to give more hours to new, lower- 
wage workers. Where this occurred, it was deeply resented. In addi 
tion, former A&P workers felt entitled to some "reparations" for 
the concessions they made after years of loyalty. They resented the 
fact that newcomers also received the bonus and that wage-rates 
were to be equalized. One worker said, "Why should they get the 
hours when I gave the company 14 good years." Another said, "I 
thought the bonus was only for us, to make up what we lost."
Third, the contract encouraged high turnover, i.e., replacing 
former A&P workers with newcomers and replacing experienced 
newcomers with novice newcomers entering at minimum wage. In 
one store with an older, more female workforce of former A&P 
workers, many informants felt that there was a conscious attempt to
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encourage resignations. The better-off workers sometimes revealed 
their awareness of their competition with other long-term workers 
for the bonus and their vested interest in turnover. One worker com 
mented favorably on the resignation of another: "There goes another 
one-percenter."
Fourth, morale problems developed around the loss of former ben 
efits. The single most resented "give-back" among the workers was 
the vacation time. Many of them had developed lifestyles (camping, 
trailers at the beach, etc.) which were based on their former vacations 
of four-five weeks accumulated after many years. Of all the conces 
sions, this one will probably continue to dampen morale for the 
longest time.
A fifth feature of the new contract which has led to dissatisfaction 
and lowered morale was the single-store seniority system. Seniority 
is now based on the individual stores rather than on service in the 
chain. Transfers are no longer part of the game. This is good for 
those who preferred the "store as family" model, but it impedes the 
upward mobility allowed for by the transfer system. Single-store se 
niority was based on the assumption that teamwork would best be 
fostered by stability within the stores. It also enabled Super Fresh to 
surmount the barriers to profitability engendered by a high-seniority 
labor force with layoff/transfer protection. Some of the young, am 
bitious men saw this as a loss of opportunity; women who had 
wanted more hours or full-time jobs also realized that without trans 
fers they would be limited. However, those who thought the 
new chain's success would lead to new store openings retained the 
hope of moving up in the system.
Staffing the QWL Super Fresh Stores
On the surface, there appeared to be a chainwide policy for staff 
ing. While stores were to be staffed by a 3:1 ratio of former A&P 
workers to new hires, this appears to have been only a chainwide 
average. In fact, there was considerable latitude in the staffing strat 
egies used in different stores. The four stores in our sample varied 
considerably.
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Variables which made a difference in staffing policy were the 
knowledge and clout of the manager, the position of the store in the 
chronological sequencing of openings, and how the process of call 
backs was managed. Some callbacks were formal, based on a list of 
former workers and their positions. Others were informal (managers 
and union leaders responded to pressure by relatives, workers, pa 
trons and calls by former workers themselves). It was possible for a 
manager to reconstruct a store largely with former loyal co-workers. 
While many workers actively worked at being called back, others 
were totally passive and waited for calls and letters.
The strategy for staffing led to the perpetuation of an already co 
hesive and mutually-known workforce or to the creation of a new 
social group. Such differences could affect the social process in de 
veloping QWL.
In addition, the following dimensions of store composition are 
important because of their implications for store functioning and 
morale:
(1) ratio of former A&P workers to new hires;
(2) inequality among former A&P workers in terms of hours;
(3) inequality between former A&P or new workers in terms of 
hours;
(4) number of former A&P workers doing better, the same or 
worse in the new stores in terms of hours and position.
Initially, Stores C & E were grouped together as experiencing 
early QWL training in an enthusiastic union context while D & F 
were grouped as experiencing late QWL training in a less supportive 
union context. However, preliminary qualitative analysis revealed 
that Stores C & D had more in common in consistent implementa 
tion of QWL. C & D had actively practiced QWL while E & F had 
been less consistent. Thus, in all further analysis, C & D will be 
treated as QWL stores while E & F will be grouped as non-QWL 
stores.
Store C
Store C did unusually well in calling back former workers. Sev 
enty percent of the recalled workers had experience in the same store
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with the same manager. Former workers the manager preferred to 
exclude or who were unavailable were replaced by workers with 
good reputations in the chain. Since this was one of the first stores, 
he had "first pick" and was able to assure most of his former work 
ers of good positions. His workers reported little anxiety over the 
transition. Not one worker interviewed had considered the O&O op 
tion. The store was dominated by 52 former A&P workers who out 
numbered the 32 new hires. In each department, oldtimers 
outnumbered the new.
This manager provided more full-time jobs for former workers 
than any other. In most stores, only department heads are full time, 
amounting to about 12 full-time slots. Here, several other jobs in 
each department were full time so that there were 20 full-time jobs. 
The manager also made certain that all former workers had more 
hours than new hires. Under the new system, this kind of staffing 
was discouraged by the need to keep wage costs down. However, the 
sales volume and profit in this store permitted the manager to use his 
formerly successful paternalistic strategy of taking care of "his 
workers'' in return for loyalty and productivity.
Unlike any other store, there were no disgruntled women in the 
front end at Store C. The manager had called back mostly elite 
males and staffed the problematic front end largely with new hires. 
He thus avoided a typical source of disaffection. The women who 
were called back trusted the manager to take care of them. Only a 
few people made negative comments or indicated a desire to leave. 
These included some men, new to the store, who worked in the more 
socially isolated departments. They simply did not like the neighbor 
hood. The others had common reasons to leave—the need for full- 
time work or the desire to retire.
Most of the former workers in this store had been called back to 
positions which were the same (in hours and level) or better than 
before. Very few had lost anything. Three of the 20-year-old males 
had achieved rapid advancement to better positions and were very 
optimistic about the future. Those on the store planning board had a 
wealth of experience in leadership roles. Store C had the largest 
number of college degrees in any one store. Moreover, most workers 
in this store were not economically vulnerable. All the leadership
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males had wives with good jobs and several had one or more busi 
ness investments on the side. None of the women were primary 
breadwinners. This was also a young store. The leadership group 
was 35-45 years old. There were more workers 20-30 years old 
than in other stores and fewer workers over 45. In many ways, this 
store resembled the O&O stores in composition. Skilled elite males 
dominated and there were few unhappy women and older workers. 
Most workers were "winners," with new positions equal to or better 
than before. The men were not interested in worker ownership 
because many of them were already involved in entrepreneurial ac 
tivities outside of the industry.
Store D
Store D resembled Store C in that the manager was strongly com 
mitted to assembling a team when he called back workers. Sixty per 
cent had worked for him before but, in contrast to Store C, many had 
not worked together or in this particular store. The others were se 
lected by reputation. His "inner circle" or grocery management 
team consisted of several people for whom this was a significant and 
rapid promotion. They were enthusiastic and loyal. Many workers, 
even those in the front end, reported high morale.
Unlike Store C, Store D was opened late in the process and relied 
on a workforce of mostly new hires (31 former A&P to 86 new). The 
staff was dominated by newcomers, but newcomers did not have 
more hours than former A&P workers. The meat department had 
more former A&P workers and the grocery department was evenly 
split reflecting the benefits of experience for both departments. Un 
like Store C, there were few full-time workers except for department 
heads. Several men in the 30-45 age group had achieved significant 
improvement in position, however. There were also a few who lost 
hours and position (mostly women), but the majority of workers had 
stayed at the same level in terms of position and hours.
Workers in this store had greater economic vulnerability than 
those in C, especially the women. Store D was divided into a group 
of successful men and a group of vulnerable women. Thirty-three
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percent of the former A&P workers were women supporting fami 
lies. Half of them had been forced to work second jobs since their 
Super Fresh callback. Like Store C, there were few older workers 
(10 percent). All of them had lost position or hours and talked about 
the chain's age discrimination.
In this store, the idea of QWL and the manager's consistent prac 
tice of it created strong feelings of optimism for the future, but, of 
course, less chance for mobility due to single-store seniority. Four 
workers (two men and two women) who were already full time 
wanted management posts. All of them saw their possibilities limited 
in the new system without transfers. They hoped that the expansion 
of the chain would lead to new stores and new opportunities.
While there was less actual loss of full-time status and decrease in 
part-time hours than in stores E and F, the 17 percent who com 
plained about lowered income link the loss of their work hours to the 
"new system" which they saw encouraging shrinking hours and 
high turnover.
Both Stores C & D called back workers with an eye to picking 
those with good reputations and assembling teams of former co- 
workers. They tended to place people in positions which were better 
or at least even with their former ones. They maximized callbacks 
from high-skill departments and former store leaders and minimized 
callbacks of those likely to be disaffected: front-end women and 
older workers. Finally, they avoided any appearance of preferential 
treatment to new workers in regard to the quantity of hours or qual 
ity of schedules. These processes of formation in turn led to differ 
ences in the informal political and social organization of the store 
and the morale of the workers which indirectly affected the imple 
mentation and success of QWL.
Implementation of QWL in QWL Stores
In looking at the QWL process, there are questions about the de 
gree of implementation which must be investigated. First, regarding 
the formal structure: have there been QWL meetings? If so, at which 
levels—store planning board and/or departmental? Second, regard-
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ing the centralization or dispersion of decisionmaking: If there have 
been meetings, how widely disseminated has been the knowledge of 
them? How broad has been the attendance? How much exposure has 
there been to QWL meetings outside the store (regional and corpo 
rate planning boards)? Third, regarding the substance of QWL: 
What has been covered at QWL meetings? Have they been viewed 
as serving all the intended functions or just a few?
Store C
Store C had a strong commitment to QWL on all counts. First, the 
planning board participants (inner circle) were enthusiastic. Second, 
everyone in the store knew what QWL was and meetings did take 
place regularly. Moreover, many of the workers had worked "on this 
team" before and several stated, that, with this manager, "we al 
ways had QWL."
In addition to QWL, this store held formal social events outside 
the store to maintain solidarity and morale, including holiday par 
ties, softball games and trips.
Store C was open for two months before QWL training began. It 
was one of the first three stores to be trained by the original consult 
ants. Each department received separate training in a workshop. In 
addition, the store planning board was also trained together as a 
group.
All the workers were aware of a functioning QWL program with 
monthly department meetings. Those not on the store board were 
vague about the frequency of store meetings, but they knew they 
occurred. They talked about QWL as promoting teamwork and co 
operation, getting along better, allowing input and suggestions, plac 
ing job security in their own hands, sharing knowledge and 
decisions.
In spite of this positive reporting, half the workers reported not 
going to meetings. One reason for this was that meetings were no 
longer counted as paid worktime, and many workers chose not to 
attend on their own time. Overall, 65 percent of the workers in this
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store viewed QWL positively. Of these, 25 percent thought that 
QWL made a difference to their jobs, while 40 percent were positive 
but vague about the contribution of QWL. The other 35 percent were 
disappointed or hostile. For the most part, QWL was an unimportant 
feature to those workers who described themselves as ambitious 
(looking for advancement) or those few who were disgruntled about 
their hours and position.
Store D
Store D was trained late through a union local which was less 
supportive of the innovation. This store also has other mechanisms 
to maintain solidarity, such as an active "sunshine committee" to 
organize trips and parties and a projected newsletter.
The store planning board met every other week while department 
heads met every Thursday for a sales meeting. Thus, there are two 
store-level meetings clearly dividing QWL from operations. There 
was very little confusion or vagueness among the workers who knew 
about QWL. (This store had the highest uniformity of knowledge 
about how QWL operated.) The planning board was also making a 
strong attempt to involve regular workers in their meetings by invit 
ing four different store members (not regular board members) to each 
meeting. As a result, more regular clerks and cashiers had actually 
been involved. On the other hand, there were no individual depart 
ment meetings.
Forty-five percent of the workers, including the leadership, were 
quite enthusiastic about QWL, emphasizing teamwork and commu 
nication aspects. Several wanted to work harder to involve more 
workers, however. Twenty percent of the regular workers were not 
clear or certain about what QWL was or how it worked. Another 35 
percent were knowledgeable but disappointed in it, just as in Store 
C. They saw no increased control, no difference, and complained 
about "all talk and no action," and the need to pay workers to at 
tend. One worker was very hostile, calling QWL "a joke." This 
worker had been initially very enthusiastic about workers gaining
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equality and control. The more satisfied workers were those who had 
been invited to meetings.
Staffing the Non-QWL Super Fresh Stores
Store E
Like Store C, Store E was also a high volume store staffed early 
when a large pool of workers was available, but this store was com 
posed of fewer former co-workers who had worked with the manager 
in the past (only four or 20 percent). More workers were passive 
callbacks to this store. There was a less desirable ratio of former 
A&P workers to new hires (36 former to 47 new) than in Store C but 
a better ratio than in the later-opening Stores D & F. There were also 
fewer full-time slots than in C. The front end was dominated by new 
hires, but there was parity in all other departments except meat 
(which, because of the .skill/union factor, was always dominated by 
former A&P workers).
This less-experienced manager had not been in the position to call 
back proteges, but had staffed his store predominantly with young 
workers (20-30 years old) from families with ties to and clout in 
the chain. His staffing seems to have been influenced by input from 
workers' relatives and from corporate and union leaders. Half of the 
workers came from families having parents, siblings or spouses who 
brought them in and pressured for their recall. Unlike QWL Stores C 
& D, few workers bettered their position in the new store. Fifty per 
cent reported a loss in hours and position. For some, the new posi 
tion presented significant demotion from former elite posts. Workers 
viewed this as age discrimination. The new position represented a 
promotion for only 25 percent of the former workers. The remaining 
25 percent of the workers reported continuity and stability in posi 
tion and hours. This group included those for whom the supermarket 
job was a second job or provided supplementary income.
Former A&P workers did receive preference in hours. All of the 
new cashiers worked 18 hours or less, while all former A&P workers 
had at least 18 hours and half had more. This favored treatment was
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true for all other departments as well. Many were still extremely 
disgruntled, however, by a steady pattern of loss in hours. Most have 
had their hours cut since they began to work at this store, some by 
half. Several have seen a pattern of cutbacks with every contractual 
hourly rate rise, while others believed there was a chain goal of cut 
ting all part-timers to 12 hours.
Even those who were well-connected in the chain or who knew 
the manager before became disgruntled and fatalistic. The cutbacks 
had the effect of leading to turnover of one-seventh of our initial 
group of interviewees in Store E in one year. Although the former 
A&P component of this store was composed of young workers with 
few dependents, one young man in his 20s reported the cancellation 
of his marriage plans. Moreover, for the eight workers over 32 with 
dependents, the cutbacks have had a severe impact.
Store F
Store F was also managed by a relatively new manager. Most of 
his recalls were formal (from a list) and passive (workers did not 
actively seek placement). There were 33 former A&P workers and 
50 new hires. Former workers were in the majority in the office, the 
meat room and the grocery department. Cashiers, deli clerks and 
produce clerks were predominantly newcomers. Moreover, unlike any 
of the other stores, all newcomers in the front end had more hours of 
work than former A&P workers, creating a serious morale problem. 
This store reflected most strongly the results of a system that re 
wards hiring more new workers at lower rates of pay.
Store F was also skewed in sex and age. We saw that morale prob 
lems heavily involve women and older workers. Almost two-thirds of 
the former A&P workers in Store F were women and almost all of 
them were 55 or older. Like Store E, 50 percent of the workers in 
Store F had lost significantly in the changeover. Losses included 
movement from full to part time, loss of part-time hours, moves 
back to night work and loss of managerial positions. For 35 percent, 
there was no loss or gain, however many of these individuals had 
been in one store for over 10 years and reported a sense of loss in 
terms of the family-like atmosphere of the former store.
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All of the 15 percent who gained in the new store moved into 
managerial positions. This store had more inexperienced department 
heads than the others and lacked the core of former achievers found 
in leadership positions in the other stores.
While many of those who lost in Store E were single young per 
sons without dependents, here many of the "losers" depended on the 
job for most of their income. Thus, many of the problems in this 
store can be related to its social composition, which was in turn con 
strained by the nature of the remaining pool of former A&P workers 
available.
The process of composing stores E & F involved less control over 
the callback process. This could be related to a lack of managerial 
experience which led to less knowledge about the pool of former 
workers, vulnerability to pressure from the chain, a greater depen 
dence on the formal list of names, and in the case of F, a reduced 
pool of laid off workers from which to choose. Stores were com 
posed of workers with fewer skills and less experience. For the most 
part, the former A&P workers in these stores experienced lowered 
status and salaries and were disadvantaged in relation to new work 
ers. These characteristics in turn affected both morale and the ability 
to implement QWL successfully.
Failure of QWL Implementation in the Non-QWL Stores
Store E, like Store C, was one of the first to receive lengthy train 
ing in QWL involving every worker. However, the store planning 
board went through retraining again a year later under the new con 
sultant team since they were regarded as not having implemented the 
plan. The store then reported weekly meetings of the planning 
board, but fewer regular department meetings. The front end and of 
fice did meet as a department, however, to air gripes about schedul 
ing and pressure on cashiers. This was the only store to deal with the 
front-end problem in this way. It was unusual to see the front end 
participating to this degree. Produce, meat and deli met infrequently 
and the isolated night crew rarely attended their meetings.
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Since the store was beginning to reimplement QWL, members of 
its planning board were the most enthusiastic workers. They talked 
of increased involvement and motivation, more departmental auton 
omy, etc. One, who took the corporate point of view, blamed the 
failure of QWL on the workers' failure to distinguish between QWL 
issues and contract issues (hours, wage rates). Others in leadership 
positions could identify with the workers and noted that QWL would 
never work until workers were paid to attend meetings or given more 
hours and better schedules.
Of the workers, 20 percent (mostly those on the store planning 
board) reported positive results from QWL ("we are equal to man 
agement," atmosphere is "open," attitudes are better); 50 percent 
liked the idea but felt it was not operating (no follow-through); 30 
percent were disappointed (no change at all, all talk no action, petty 
beefs dealt with but nothing important).
Store F was least satisfied with QWL. Here, even the department 
heads recognized that QWL had broken down. There were no plan 
ning board meetings in four months prior to our interviews and, as 
one commented, "the team concept is going under." The leaders 
saw that one reason for this was the cleavage between former work 
ers with few hours and new hires with more hours. Another reason 
given was the understaffing resulting from the new system of tying 
bonuses to labor costs. One department head reported that there were 
also conflicts between departments and, thus, the store had split into 
three parts. He wondered why the chain had bothered with all the 
QWL training.
Thirty-three percent of the regular workers in Store F had never 
heard of QWL or the meetings. Another third knew that meetings 
took place, but did not know about QWL or the purpose of meet 
ings. One-third knew what QWL was, but reported it to be broken 
down. Several said that QWL was for the bosses. Very few could 
describe the goals of QWL specifically. The clearest statement was 
that QWL meant "not putting people down."
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Summary
It is obvious that QWL has not completely achieved the goals of 
the formal training in any of the stores. The most that can be said is 
that members of the planning boards feel they have more "rights" or 
"say" in how the store works. In one store, (F), few workers have 
heard of QWL. In Store D, there has been the greatest attempt to 
implement the formal process of QWL and to reach out to incorpo 
rate all the workers. Difficulties with contract issues (hours, sched 
ules, etc.) interfere with a totally positive view of QWL, and 
workers recognize that these issues are more important to them than 
the potential rewards of QWL. In Store C, we find both formal im 
plementation of QWL and a long history of "informal QWL" (con 
sultation, discussion, etc.) while in Store E we find less 
implementation and a real interference due to hour cuts and schedul 
ing difficulties. Whether QWL "works" is clearly a result of two 
factors: (1) leadership's consistency in running meetings and practic 
ing QWL as they were trained to do; and (2) the degree to which 
workers' losses of income, position, etc. interfere with their percep 
tion of QWL as meaningful. In all these aspects, Stores C & D are 
similar to each other and unlike Stores E & F.
Understanding QWL in Super Fresh
The most successful aspect of QWL is not its functioning within 
each store but the automony the stores have gained from centralized 
chain decisionmaking. No longer do all stocking decisions, display 
decisions and the like come from the top down. Store leadership has 
gained latitude to stock for local neighborhood needs, to buy pro 
duce from small, individual vendors, and to develop innovations in 
procedures, which later may be approved as chainwide policy. No 
longer do specialized product supervisors from the central office 
control the business operations of each department. Stores are ex 
pected to work as teams and their successful work innovations are 
reported and discussed at regional and corporate planning board
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meetings. It is at these above-store levels that there has been the most 
success.
Elite members of store planning boards (department heads and 
shop stewards) have been able to participate and to see the change 
most clearly. If they had been to a regional or corporate planning 
board meeting, they felt the change even more. Even at the top, 
however, there has been a persistence of old structure. Female de 
partment heads were few and they were not always part of the inner 
circle. For example, in one store, the front-end manager was the 
only department head not asked to consider promotion when an as 
sistant directorship became vacant. When she approached the direc 
tor, he seemed surprised at her interest.
In addition to the participative successes at levels above the store, 
QWL has involved some symbolic changes which are supposed to 
reinforce the idea of equality, democracy and participation. Status 
names have been changed so that workers are called "associates" 
and managers are called "directors," but the new nomenclature has 
not actually been adopted thoroughly in any store. Workers are still 
called workers, and in one store all nondepartment heads reported 
that the term "associate" refers only to members of the store plan 
ning board (department heads).
The flattened hierarchy at corporate headquarters is also a mani 
festation of the notion that there is less distance between the top and 
bottom and that access to the top is open. Both the first and second 
corporate presidents have made themselves accessible at training ses 
sions and planning board meetings. They have also been visiting the 
stores. Many workers commented on the fact that the president is 
"down at our level," and accessible. They have been impressed by 
such store visits.
One of the problems is that QWL has overlapped two other broad 
domains—store operations and contractual issues. Much time and at 
tention have been given to trying to separate QWL from these other 
domains. "Operations" refers to business details of running a store: 
keeping records of inventory, payroll costs and, most important, 
sales volume and profits. In addition, stores must deal with general 
promotional issues—new products, displays, advertising, etc. Con-
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tractual issues include the formal aspects of the contract: how the 
bonus is calculated, how labor costs are targeted, etc. Even those 
questions left up to store directors' discretion, such as how to dis 
tribute hours among workers, as well as the qualitative issues of who 
gets good hours, who gets weekends and evenings, are defined as 
contract issues because there is an awareness that these are manage 
ment rights, not subject to worker input.
In some stores, store-level meetings have been divided into two 
parts. The operations part has involved providing information on 
how the departments have been doing and how the store as a whole 
has been doing. Innovative suggestions about policies (promotions, 
customer relations) and work procedures have also been sought. 
Thus, this has incorporated two aspects of QWL—information shar 
ing and worker input on policy and procedures. Unfortunately, many 
stores have not defined information sharing and innovation as part of 
QWL and have excluded these elements from formal meetings.
The QWL part of the meeting largely has involved reducing social 
conflict and increasing team solidarity. At the very least, QWL has 
been seen as an opportunity to gripe and be listened to. At best, 
these sessions have been seen as problemsolving sessions, attempt 
ing to deal with such issues as how to train the steady influx of 
newcomers, how to control absenteeism and turnover, how to de 
crease the suspensions and grievances related to cash shortages on 
the front end, etc. Thus, QWL has been focused on increasing morale 
and team spirit as opposed to increasing worker input to the labor 
process and control over conditions of work.
What has interferred with morale most are the issues of work as 
signment, hours and schedules. Since these are management rights, 
they have been defined as inappropriate for QWL discussions. There 
is increasing awareness that QWL has been impeded by the inability 
to deal with the issues which are most important to the workers.
Conclusions
Certain chainwide patterns affected the relationships between 
workers' characteristics (age, gender) and the workers' experience. 
Departments varied in their power, opportunity for acquiring knowl-
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edge and opportunities for teamwork. The power, knowledge, skills, 
expectations, success, and career patterns of workers were the result 
of both their gender and their hiring dates (in the company cycle of 
rise and decline). Their personal household economic vulnerability 
was closely related to age (stage in family cycle). The A&P chain 
had developed patterns of recruiting through families, paternalistic 
protection of women and the sponsorship of mobility for males iden 
tified as worthy, all patterns which are difficult to change. More 
over, assumptions made by A&P that women were less interested in 
careers and were mostly supplementing income are contradicted by 
the large number of self-supporting single women, single parents 
and women with husbands who were laid off, disabled and unem 
ployed.
When A&P shut down and the stores reopened as Super Fresh or 
as O&O, the traditional patterns of employment and careers did not 
go back to what they had been. Many jobs were saved, but many 
workers had hard adjustments to make in the new settings. Not only 
did the workers take wage and benefit cuts, they also lost many of 
the sources of security and mobility they had had. First, while we 
did not focus on them in this study, a number of former A&P work 
ers did not find jobs in the new setting and went elsewhere. Second, 
only a small, select group were able and willing to risk becoming 
worker/owners. Third, while some full-time elites retained status in 
Super Fresh, many more former A&P workers had their hours re 
duced, as the chain adopted more flexible schedulings and staffing. 
Rapidly, four of the major career patterns we identified became al 
most extinct, while a previously uncommon pattern—the part-time 
supplement to a different full-time job—became preferred by man 
agers. A strong internal labor market was broken up in favor of a 
more external, unstable labor market.
The old patterns left a legacy that influences the innovations in 
the O&O and Super Fresh stores. In both the O&O and the Super 
Fresh stores, the traditional social organization of the store (the sta 
tus, power and potential for knowledge of different departments and 
positions) still underlies social process in the new stores and inter 
feres with the implementation of change. Moreover, traditional views 
of age and gender still create stereotypes.
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The process of recruiting differed for all stores, influencing the 
number of people with pre-existing ties and experience working to 
gether. This is true not only among the four Super Fresh stores, but 
also between the two worker-owned stores. The proportion of expe 
rienced, knowledgeable core workers (former department heads, as 
sistant managers, and the like from the grocery or meat department) 
to less knowledgeable, less integrated workers (front end, night 
crew, produce) also varied from store to store. Finally, stores dif 
fered according to their manager's style and the unique events and 
crises they experienced.
It is important to note that both O&O stores are formed around a 
core of self-selected, experienced, and knowledgeable supermarket 
workers and had very small numbers of former part-timers or front- 
end women. It is questionable whether the stores could have suc 
ceeded without the experience of former meat and grocery managers. 
This is of great interest to the future of worker ownership in this 
industry.
In both types of stores, the innovators' goals of involving workers 
in decisionmaking of extending equality of influence and of changing 
workers' views of their rights and roles has not been fully realized. 
In the Super Fresh stores, this can be directly traced to dissatisfac 
tion with hours as well as positions, and to perceived possibilities of 
advancement. Although formal mobility was limited in the O&O 
stores too, there was greater flexibility in the design of jobs. In the 
worker-owned stores in contrast to Super Fresh, hours were not a 
problem, but department status remained an obstacle to some extent. 
For all stores, the relative status and social centrality of one's depart 
ment played a big role in predicting involvement and knowledge. 
However, in contrast to the Super Fresh stores, there was no problem 
of perpetual part-time status or hour cutbacks among owners in the 
worker-owned stores, since any owner who wished full-time work 
could have it. Moreover, those outside the leadership circle learned 
much more about storewide operations and diverse departments and 
functions than their counterparts in Super Fresh.
One major consequence of worker ownership has been the devel 
opment of a storewide perspective and the dissemination of cross-
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training, skills and knowledge across department lines. This level of 
understanding of "the business' in Super Fresh existed only among 
the store leaders, who are the rare full-time department heads or 
shop stewards who serve on the store planning boards.
The two innovations are extremely different in their organizational 
functioning and labor strategy, and this difference affects participa- 
tiveness. In Super Fresh, the primary problems in implementing 
QWL stem from the elimination of decisions about labor strategy 
and deployment of resources from the QWL process. In the worker- 
owned stores, these decisions are made by the worker/owners. The 
differences between the QWL and non-QWL stores are clearly the 
result of differences in previous social ties, leadership styles, worker 
characteristics and whether workers were winners or losers in the 
new store. These differences affect the degree to which worker par 
ticipation is successful. Success can be viewed in terms of whether 
meetings are held at all, the degree to which workers know about 
and attend them, and whether they are limited to store elites. Other 
issues include whether meetings are limited to airing complaints and 
resolving disputes or whether they provide workers with information 
about store operations and encourage innovations from below.
In the months following our interviews, we continued to maintain 
communication with the stores. While the four Super Fresh stores 
continued to be very different from each other, the two O&O stores 
seemed to be becoming more alike. In spite of their differences in 
size, process of formation, patterns of board and store meetings, 
leadership styles, experiences with hired managers and other crises 
and events, they have developed similarities in functioning. Both 
have been led by former meat managers and have centralized power 
in their boards of directors.
Compared to the Super Fresh stores, the dispersion of knowledge 
and the frequency of participation is much greater in both O&O 
stores, and the range of issues continues to be broad. Even the non- 
owners (mostly part-timers) in the O&O stores who have previously 
worked in chains report that these are improved workplaces. They 
see a flattened hierarchy, a less sharply defined division of labor, and 
feel that they are trusted and given more responsibility. 3
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We must remember that the O&O owners were not drawn by the 
ideology of worker ownership. They were would-be entrepreneurs, 
people who needed full-time jobs, and those strongly disaffected by 
A&R In cooperating to make the stores work, they have established 
the necessary mechanisms for collective decisionmaking.
As a result of their experiences, they are now poised between be 
ing a group which is clearly committed to the ideology of worker 
ownership and democratic workplaces and a group of dominant store 
elites who are partners in small business. The important factors in 
their transition are not limited to previous experience with formal 
decisionmaking. The ability to cross-train those in low status posi 
tions, to impart a store-wide perspective on operations, and to make 
the division of labor more flexible and the hierarchy flatter has prob 
ably played a major role. The diversification of day-to-day work has, 
in turn, had a major impact on participation. This process has been 
absent in the Super Fresh stores, where daily work, access to knowl 
edge, and autonomy have improved for the elite but deteriorated for 
the rest of the former A&P workforce.
NOTES
1. In the Super Fresh stores, these are called assistant director and director while workers are 
referred to as associates. The new nomenclature is intended to reduce the perception of hier 
archy.
2. Recently A&P lost an EEOC suit regarding discrimination of women and is obligated to 
pay significant compensation. We note that in all new Super Fresh stores (56 as of 1986) there 
is only one woman store director.
3. Preliminary reports from interviews with non-owners conducted by Simon and Granrose 
(unpublished document).
_________ 6 _________
Outcomes for Workers in
Worker-Owned, QWL, and Non-QWL
Supermarkets
In the previous chapter, the social processes involved in changing 
from A&P to new types of organizations were discussed. This chap 
ter will answer questions such as: "How did the workers themselves 
make out in the job-saving efforts at the O&O and Super Fresh 
stores?" "What happened to the former A&P workers who became 
worker/owners through a buyout and those who became Super Fresh 
employees?" "How were they doing financially?" "What degree of 
sacrifice was imposed on them by the shutdown and subsequent 
events?" "Did their job security and working conditions improve?" 
"Was power redistributed to them in meaningful ways through 
worker ownership and the effective implementation of QWL?" 
"Which was better for workers: getting some influence in decision- 
making through QWL or accepting the responsibility of ownership?" 
"What happened to their satisfaction with their jobs, lives, and eco 
nomic status?" While these are not easy questions to answer, they 
are among the most important questions of all for present and future 
worker/owners.
To identify what happened to the workers, we surveyed former 
A&P workers at the six stores described in chapter 5: the two 
worker-owned stores (O&Os), the two Super Fresh stores that effec 
tively implemented QWL, and the two Super Fresh stores that had 
not fully implemented QWL. The distinction between QWL and 
non-QWL stores was based on shop stewards' responses, as well as 
the in-person interviews discussed in chapter 5.
This survey information differs in method of data collection from 
that of chapter 5, which used open-ended interviews to examine the
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actual social processes in each store. The worker outcomes in this 
chapter are drawn from outcome measures derived from a precoded 
instrument. The information elicited independently by each method 
strongly corroborates the other.
To clarify the dynamics which can answer the questions posed for 
this chapter, we use the framework developed in chapter 2. First, we 
describe mean differences in characteristics, attitudes, perceptions, 
and results between workers in the three work settings. Then we use 
statistical modeling to identify the relative importance of factors that 
played a role in bringing about workers' outcomes.
The Worker Model
Figure 6.1 illustrates the parts of the larger model examined in 
this chapter. The primary difference between this model and the one 
presented in chapter 2 is that we omitted some factors—the role of 
unions, the business environment, and store characteristics—because 
theoretically these factors have their primary impact on store out 
comes, not on individuals. Since the performance of the organization 
should directly influence worker outcomes, however, we included 
store economic outcomes.
We hypothesized that store participativeness would be a function 
of the skills, characteristics, and resources of its workers, of the for 
mal structure of the store (QWL or worker ownership) and of con 
sultant advice and help. We also proposed that participativeness 
would influence store functioning, including the labor strategy the 
store adopts, the extent to which it trains workers, the informal ways 
that workers interact, and worker motivation and effort. Finally, we 
expected that store functioning, store economic success, and worker 
characteristics would determine workers' financial outcomes. In ad 
dition, we expected these factors plus participativeness to influence 
workers' satisfaction with their jobs and lives.
The next sections describe the sample, how we measured and op- 
erationalized these theoretical constructs, and the similarities and 
mean differences among the three groups. Tests of statistically sig-
Inputs
Figure 6.1. Research Model
Organizational Processes Outcomes
Worker characteristics 
demographics 
ed./experience 
extent of layoff
Store type 
worker-owned 
QWL 
non-QWL
Participativeness 
range of issues: 
long/short term 
overall participation
Store functions 
use of part-timers 
effort/effectiveness 
training 
absenteeism/turnover
Worker outcomes 
income/hours 
bonus/profit share 
satisfaction
Store outcomes 
productivity 
profit 
labor costs
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nificant differences involved analyses of variance (ANOVA) and 
least significant difference (LSD) multiple range tests for comparing 
mean scores of groups of unequal size, p=.05. These mean differ 
ences may be due to many factors, not just store type, however, so 
caution should be used in interpreting the results. A clear explana 
tion of causal relationships will appear in the subsequent section on 
model testing.
The Sample
As indicated in chapter 3, two years after the A&P shutdown, we 
asked former A&P workers in six stores—two O&Os, two QWL Su 
per Fresh, and two non-QWL Super Fresh—to fill out questionnaires 
about their experience, training, perceptions, attitudes, satisfaction, 
household situations, and economic outcomes. Workers sampled 
were those interviewed for chapter 5. Table 6.1 shows the distribu 
tion of responses.
Table 6.1 
______Questionnaire Survey Responses by Store Type______
Store type______________N sampled_______N respondedO&O—————————————————25——————————————
QWL Super Fresh 48 46 
Non-QWL Super Fresh 49 43
TOTALS 122 111
Because our focus was on job-saving strategies in response to the 
Philadelphia A&P shutdown, our sample was representative of 
former A&P workers now employed in O&O and Super Fresh stores. 
The sample does not represent all workers in these stores. In partic 
ular, it does not include the following: (1) part-time workers at the 
worker-owned stores who were not owners, though very few of these 
were former A&P workers; (2) those Super Fresh workers who had 
never worked for A&P—about half of the workers in these stores— 
working mostly part time. Because part-time workers played a big
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part in Super Fresh and responded in different ways, we report the 
results of full-time and part-time workers, separately.
Mean Differences Among the Groups 
Worker Characteristics
We expected that the simultaneous establishment of the O&O and 
Super Fresh stores in the wake of the A&P shutdown would result in 
little variation in worker characteristics, because all of the workers 
in our sample were long-term A&P employees. Even so, self- 
selection was operating in O&O stores and selective recruitment oc 
curred in Super Fresh. As we have already seen in chapter 5, there is 
reason to believe that the worker/owners were a special group, and 
that recruitment differed between QWL stores and non-QWL stores. 
To explore variations in motivations, resources, and expectations 
that might occur because of these selection processes, we looked at 
demographic characteristics, job experience, and personal values.
Demographic Characteristics and Job Experience 
O&O and Super Fresh workers were fairly similar in cultural 
background, family situation, and job experience (see table 6.2). 
They were primarily high school-educated, married, white, middle- 
aged and mid-career, with many years of supermarket experience be 
hind them. In Super Fresh stores, however, part-time workers said 
they knew how to do fewer jobs and generally had fewer years of 
experience than full-timers.
One apparent difference was that fewer women were worker/own 
ers. Previous research indicates that while women whose pay pro 
vided a substantial part of family income were very interested in 
becoming worker/owners, they sometimes did not have the financial 
resources to do so. Women contributing less than one-third of house 
hold support were less likely to choose worker ownership in the 
A&P shutdown and were more likely to be part-time workers (Gran- 
rose and Hochner 1985). But, among full-time workers, O&Os had 
a higher proportion of women than did Super Fresh stores. Many
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Table 6.2 
Mean Differences in Worker Characteristics
Worker characteristics
Full time
Part time
Age
% Female
FT
PT
%Married
%Catholic
%White
# of dependents
FT
PT
Years of education
FT
PT
Yrs. seniority in markets
FT
PT
# Jobs know how to do
FT
PT
Months of layoff
FT
PT
Values 1
Accomplishment
Growth
Co-worker relations
Pay and fringe benefits
Worker ownership or QWL
Job security
Independence
Promotions
Relations with boss
O&O
(N=20)
(N=2)
41.52
27.3b'c
30.0
00.0
77.3
57. lc
100.0b
2.48
2.35d
5.00b'c 'd
12.86
12.55d
16.00b'c 'd
18.59
18.75
17.00
8.73C
8.55
10.50C
5.68
5.83d
3.00b'°'d
4.82
4.59
4.45
4.04C
4.14
4.82
4.50
3.14
4.00b>c
Store type
QWL
(N=24)
(N = 22)
41.84
47.8a
20.8
77.3
64.4
45.5C
91.1a'c
1.98
2.37d
1.50a'd
12.98
12.96d
11.95a'd
17.30
20.92d
13.36d
7.24C
9.29d
5.00d
3.89
2.44
5.75a
4.65
4.39
4.67
4.50
3.89
4.74
4.15
3.87
4.76a
Non-QWL
(N=14)
(N = 29)
43.36
60.5a
21.4
79.3
76.2
71.4a'b
100.0b
1.76
2.46d
1.43a'd
12.28
12.28
11.96a
18.67
24.07d
16.07d
5.39a'b
9.28d
3.52a'd
5.90
2.54d
7.46a'd
4.63
4.52
4.61
4.56a
3.62
4.78
4.22
3.57
4.51a
1.5 = Extremely Important, 1 = Moderately Important.
a. Sig. dif. from O&O;
b. Sig. dif. from QWL;
c. Sig. dif. from non-QWL;
d. Sig. dif. between PT/FT in same store type;
p=.05.
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Super Fresh employees were part-time cashiers, a heavily female- 
dominated job. As discussed in chapter 5, this gender-based internal 
labor market kept women in dead-end jobs and resulted in a larger 
overall proportion of females in Super Fresh stores.
The most striking difference among the three types of stores was 
that 90 percent of the O&O worker/owners had full-time jobs com 
pared to half of the QWL workers and less than a third of the non- 
QWL workers. This is not surprising, since the desire for full-time 
work was one of the primary reasons for choosing O&O reported in 
the interviews.
Personal Values
Values may be important in determining worker results because of 
their role in forming expectations. Several significant differences 
emerged among the groups in their evaluation of their relationship to 
the bosses and of their economic rewards.
Worker/owners placed lower importance on good relations with 
their bosses than did Super Fresh workers. As predicted by many 
theorists (e.g., Webb and Webb 1920), worker/owners were some 
times unclear about how to resolve the relationship duality of being 
owners who hire the store manager and workers subordinate to the 
manager. The new roles in a hierarchy subject to democratic deci- 
sionmaking may have reduced the usual emphasis on getting along 
with the supervisor. Eliminating the need for protection from bump 
ing and for sponsorship by supervisors, which used to occur in A&P, 
also has changed this relationship.
Workers in non-QWL stores were more likely to value economic 
rewards than worker/owners. Participativeness, or the lack of it, may 
affect workers' evaluation of tradeoffs between job satisfaction and 
economic outcomes. Or part-time workers with low incomes could 
now be placing a particularly high value on economic rewards. All 
workers in both stores took a $2/hour cut in wages compared to their 
former A&P jobs, so some concern about financial welfare was ex 
pected for all workers. Because many part-time workers formerly 
worked full time, this double loss created financial difficulties for 
many of these workers.
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Store Participativeness
In accordance with our multidimensional definition of participa- 
tiveness, we looked at a number of measures of this construct:
(1) the perceived degree of overall worker control in the store;
(2) the perceived distribution of influence within the store hierarchy;
(3) the perceived involvement of workers in decisionmaking on a 
range of issues; and (4) the perceived extent of participation, that is, 
how many workers frequently participate.
Perceived Degree of Overall Worker Control
We asked two general questions, "How much are workers' opin 
ions taken into account in the store?" "How much say or influence 
do workers have on what goes on in the store?" Worker/owners' av 
erage responses were equal to the average responses of QWL Super 
Fresh workers. However, part-time Super Fresh workers, particularly 
in non-QWL stores, perceived less overall worker control compared 
to full-timers. (See table 6.3)
Perceived Hierarchical Influence Distribution
We asked workers a set of questions derived from those Tannen- 
baum (1968) made popular: "How much say or influence 'did' and 
'should' each level of the store hierarchy have in what goes on in the 
store?" (See figure 6.2.) There was no difference between QWL and 
O&O workers' perceptions of the actual influence hierarchy, but 
non-QWL workers, especially part-timers again, reported less influ 
ence for every level except for managers.
With respect to the desired distribution of influence, it appeared 
that QWL was especially effective in raising workers' desires for 
control of work at all levels of the supermarket hierarchy. These as 
pirations may have colored their perceptions of what was actually 
happening in these stores and how satisfied it made them feel.
Perceived Worker Involvement in a Variety of Issues 
We asked workers about the degree of worker involvement in nine 
decision areas. Three were decisions regularly made on a daily basis: 
task assignments, work schedule, and working conditions. Four were
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Table 6.3 
Mean Differences in Participativeness
Store type
Participativeness
Full time
Part time
Degree of worker control1
FT
PT
Range of issues
In daily decisions2
FT
PT
O&O
(N = 20)
(N = 2)
7.14
7.05
8.00
14.09b'c
14.10
14.00b'c
QWL
(N = 24)
(N = 22)
7.44C
7.96d
6.86c 'd
10.73a'c
13.30d
8.04a'c>d
Non-QWL
(N=14)
(N = 29)
6.37b
7.23d
5.96b'd
8.07a'b
13.00d
5.69a'b 'd
In intermediate decisions 
Hiring workers 
FT 
PT
Selecting department heads 
FT 
PT
Beginning training 
FT 
PT
Changing vendors 
FT 
PT
In long-term decisions3 
FT 
PT
Extent of participation 
% who often participate
3.77b'c
3.85
4.00
3.91b'c
4.45b>c
5.00
3.86b-c
4.25C
4.00
3.59C
3.50
4.50 
827b,c
8.40b>c 
7.00b>c
55.00C
2.04a
3.50d
2.04d
2.02a
3.42a
2.86
2.59a'c
4.17c'd
3.14d
2.85
3.54d
2.09d
2.91a
3.21a
2.59C
35.00C
1.84a
3.00d
2.11d
1.58a
3.36a'd
2.25d
1.67a'b
3.14a'b
2.78
2.09a
3.71d
2.67a
3.64a'd
2.21a'd
5.00a-b
a. Sig. different from O&O;
b. Sig. different from QWL;
c. Sig. different from non-QWL;
d. Sig. difference between FT/PT workers in same store type:
p=.05.
Multi item scales were:
1. Sum of 2 items, How much worker's opinions are taken into account 
when decisions are made in the store, 1 = none, 5 = a great deal; How 
much say workers have in what goes on in the store, 1 = very little say, 
5 = very much say.
2. Sum of 3 six point items for influence in tasks, choice of hours, and 
working conditions, 1 = 1 am not involved, 6 = 1 can decide on my own.
3. Sum of 2 six point items (as in 2 above) for influence in capital invest 
ments and shutting the store.
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Figure 6.2 (continued)
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Figure 6.2 (continued)
Amount of Influence
Store Mgrs. Depart Heads
Hierarchial Level
Perceived Influence Gradients
for Non-QWL, QWL amd O&O Stores
Worker Survey
Non QWL 
QWL 
O&O
Amount of Influence
6 Non QWL 
QWL
O&O....A--
Store Mgrs Depart. Heads
Hierarchial Level
Ideal Influence Gradients
for Non-QWL,QWL and O&O Stores
Worker Survey
Outcomes for Workers 173
decisions with an intermediate time focus: hiring and firing workers, 
selecting department heads, initiating training programs, and chang 
ing vendors. Two were strategic or long-term decisions: making cap 
ital investments and shutting down the store.
One of the biggest differences one would expect, based on formal 
store type, was the range of issues in which workers could be in 
volved. As anticipated, worker/owners experienced the most involve 
ment and non-QWL workers, especially part-timers, experienced the 
least involvement in every kind of decision. Super Fresh part-time 
workers felt disenfranchised from all decisions, whether they worked 
in a QWL store or not. In fact, the longer the time period covered by 
the implications of the decision, the more involvement O&O worker 
owners reported, compared to others.
In issues surrounding daily work, among full-timers, Super Fresh 
workers' perceptions equaled the worker/owners'. In long-term deci 
sions, however, worker/owners reported and desired considerably 
more influence. This occurred because long-term decisions, particu 
larly important for workers who had experienced a series of retail 
shutdowns in their city, were outside the jurisdiction of labor- 
management committees in the Super Fresh QWL program.
Percent Participating Often
According to the shop stewards, the O&Os had the largest per 
centage of workers who often participated in decisionmaking in their 
stores, QWL stores had slightly fewer, with a third participating of 
ten, and non-QWL stores trailed far behind, with about 5 percent 
participating often. The assessment agrees with the picture of partic 
ipation developed in chapter 5.
In summary, while many people participated in the worker-owned 
stores, full-time Super Fresh and full-time O&O workers perceived 
equal levels of worker control over daily store life. The major differ 
ence was that worker/owners also controlled long-term decisionmak 
ing.
Store Functioning
Our theoretical framework implies that participativeness should 
affect how stores function and, in turn, influence worker outcomes.
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We examined several aspects of store operational practices, includ 
ing the labor strategy adopted (full time vs. part time), the number 
of innovations in work methods, how many new skills workers 
learned formally or informally, and perceived worker motivation and 
effectiveness, as well as perceived results of the new forms of deci- 
sionmaking. We took the assessments of labor strategy and innova 
tions from the store manager survey; all other measures came from 
the worker survey.
Labor Strategy, Training, and Motivation
We expected that worker-owned and worker-controlled stores 
would deploy human resources in ways more favorable to workers 
and would make more effective use of those resources. This point 
will be further elaborated in chapter 7. The O&O stores adopted the 
labor strategy of providing full-time jobs for owners who desire them 
and for some nonowners as well. This strategy, in contrast to the 
Super Fresh part-time strategy, was accompanied by low turnover 
and absenteeism rates (see table 6.4).
For our measure of training, we combined workers' responses 
about how many training programs they had attended, and how many 
new jobs and new skills they had learned in the new setting. Not 
only did the O&O worker/owners make greater use of consultants for 
training workers in business practices, but they learned more jobs 
and skills than Super Fresh workers. This confirms the interview 
data about cross-training and job flexibility discussed in chapter 5. 
Specifically, they reported having learned significantly more inter 
personal and group skills, more willingness to speak up at meetings, 
greater confidence, more knowledge about teamwork, and a greater 
ability to listen to others' opinions. They also reported feeling signif 
icantly more responsible for their work. Ironically, despite greater 
opportunities for full-time jobs and for learning new skills, worker/ 
owners did not feel more motivated, effective, or innovative.
QWL Super Fresh workers reported greater gains than O&O 
worker/owners in confidence and in learning about supervising and 
influencing others. One interpretation of this may be that while 
QWL store planning board members, who had limited responsibility 
and authority over store survival, had time to think about and discuss
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Table 6.4 
Mean Differences in Store Functioning
Store Functioning
Labor strategies
Av. hrs./week part time
Absenteeism (Weekly)
Turnover (Annual)
Operations
Innovations 1
Training2
FT
PT
Individual effort & effectiveness3
FT
PT
Perceived consequences of
decisionmaking
New effort & effectiveness4
FT
PT
Improved interactions5
FT
PT
Slower decisionmaking6
FT
PT
O&O
20.00b'c
2.00b
8.00b
10.00C
9.50b>c
968b,c,d
6.00b>c 'd
7.27
7.50
5.00
7.24
7.47
5.00
16.73
17.20b
12.00
3.36
3.40
3.00
Store type
QWL
23.00a>c
6.50a'c
176.50a'c
10.50C
6.07a
6.09a
6.05a
6.43
7.39d
5.38d
6.49
7.36d
5.40d
17.36C
21.26a'c 'd
12.39d
2.76
3.09
2.33
Non-QWL
16.50a'b
2.50b
25.50b
11.50a'b
4.12a
5.00a
3.68a
6.02
8.08d
5.10d
6.12
7.86d
5.24d
13.88b
15.33b
13.09
2.97
3.17
2.86
a. Sig. dif. from O&O;
b. Sig. dif. from QWL;
c. Sig. dif. from non-QWL;
d. Sig. dif. between FT/PT in same store type;
p=.05.
1. Sum of 3 items; innovations in jobs, procedures and equipment.
2. Sum of 3 items; How much job-related training received since began 
working there, 1 = none, 5 = a great deal; plus count of # new jobs and 
# new skills learned since shutdown.
3. Sum of 2 items; How often it is true that working hard leads to high 
productivity and doing the job well, 1= never, 5 = almost always.
4. Sum of 2 items; Extent opportunity to contribute to decisionmaking in 
fluences extra effort and effectiveness on the job, l=none at all, 5 = a 
great deal.
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5. Sum of 5 items; Consequences which occurred because of system of 
DM: greater acceptance and quality of decisions, higher trust of man 
ager, more open disagreement, disagreement more easily resolved; 
1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely yes.
6. Takes longer to make decisions because of system of decisionmaking. 
1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely yes.
store process, the daily pressures at the O&O stores led to a situation 
where events required decisions so rapidly, the same level of consid 
eration could not be given.
Perceived Influence of Participation on Store Functions 
We asked workers whether worker ownership or QWL 
(1) improved aspects of informal interactions in their stores, such as 
the acceptance or quality of decisionmaking, trust between manager 
and workers, open communication of differences, and conflict reso 
lution; (2) slowed down decisionmaking; and (3) improved overall 
motivation and effectiveness. Surprisingly, there were almost no dif 
ferences among worker/owners, QWL, and, non-QWL workers in 
these perceptions. However, full-time QWL Super Fresh workers re 
ported more improvement in interactions than any other group of 
full- or part-timers. And compared to full-timers in their stores, part- 
time Super Fresh workers perceived the least improvement in moti 
vation and effectiveness as a result of the new decisionmaking 
systems.
In summary, O&O worker/owners got more training, while QWL 
Super Fresh workers got less training, and had higher turnover and 
absenteeism. Full-time Super Fresh workers believed interpersonal 
interactions had improved as a consequence of QWL, but most other 
worker perceptions of store functioning did not differ among the 
store types.
Store Outcomes
Both theoretically and practically, one would expect that workers' 
welfare would be influenced by the success or failure of the stores in
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which they worked (see table 6.5). The Super Fresh stores in which 
we interviewed and surveyed former A&P workers were slightly 
larger and had been more profitable in 1981 than the O&O stores. 
Even so, 1983 O&O labor costs were lower and profits higher than 
these Super Fresh stores.
Table 6.5 
Mean Differences in Store Characteristics and Store Outcomes
Store characteristics
# Square feet
# Employees
% Full-time workers
Union and consultants1
Store economic outcomes
Profit 19812
Profit 1983
Unit labor costs 198 1 2
Unit labor costs 1983
O&O
(N=2)
18500b>c
42b,c
44.6b'c
7.50b'c
.05b'c
.10b)C
.16
.09b'c
Store type
QWL
(N=2)
28000a'c
115a>c
16.9a
2.50a
.09a
.08a
.14
.ll a
Non-QWL
(N = 2)
5000a'b
117a,b
14. l a
1.00a
.08a
.08a
.14
.ll a
a. Sig. dif. from O&O; 
b. Sig. dif. from QWL; 
c. Sig. dif. from non QWL; 
p=.05.
1. Sum of number of times 6 possible kinds of help were received from 7 
possible sources.
2. Per $ of sales.
These store outcomes will be more completely considered in the fol 
lowing chapter.
Worker Outcomes
What were the effects of the job-saving efforts through worker 
ownership and participation in decisions? We focused on four areas 
of impact on individuals: (1) financial benefits from job income and 
bonuses; (2) perceived economic well-being, including comparisons 
with their pre-shutdown situations; (3) job satisfaction; and (4) life 
satisfaction.
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Financial Outcomes
Although the worker-owned stores reported greater profitability, 
success or failure of an individual store does not insure the same 
result for workers. Because union contracts fix wage rates for each 
position, differences in job income correspond either to differences 
in position or to differences in number of hours worked.
As can be seen in table 6.6, O&O worker/owners clearly came out 
ahead of non-QWL Super Fresh workers in average job income, pri 
marily because all but two worker/owners were full-time, compared 
to less than a third of the non-QWL workers. But compared to full- 
time Super Fresh workers, full-time worker/owners received slightly 
lower job incomes, even though they worked more hours. Why this 
discrepancy? First, the worker/owners contributed "sweat equity"— 
several unpaid hours of work per week. Second, at the O&Os, there 
were more full-time women working in lower paid positions and 
there were fewer highly paid meatcutters. While meatcutter wages 
were the highest of any position in the O&O stores, Super Fresh 
meatcutter wages were higher still. Third, our sample may not ade 
quately represent the true average job income of O&O worker/own 
ers because fewer of them responded to questions about their 
income.
Though wages might be the total job income in conventional su 
permarket jobs, the innovations at O&O and Super Fresh added a 
bonus form of gainsharing to the pay package. With respect to bo 
nuses, however, comparing O&O worker/owners and Super Fresh 
workers was difficult because different distribution rules existed and 
because worker/owners were more reluctant to report incomes and 
bonuses.
At Super Fresh, bonuses represented a portion of store revenues, 
but they were tied to store labor costs. As labor costs went down, 
bonuses went up; the exact formula was determined by the union 
contract. Full-time workers in QWL stores obtained higher bonuses 
than their counterparts in non-QWL stores, and of course part-timers 
got smaller bonuses than full-time workers in both types of stores.
Not only was the O&O bonus formula different, tied to profits 
rather than costs, but according to their loan agreements, O&O 
worker/owners were not supposed to vote themselves a dividend until
Table 6.6 
Mean Differences in Outcomes for Workers
Worker outcomes
Full time
Part time
Financial
Job income
FT
PT
Hours/Week
FT
PT
Bonus
FT
PT
Economic well-being
Satisfaction with pay1
Satisfaction with economic 1
situation
Postshutdown changes in budget2
FT
PT
Satisfaction
Job satisfaction, overall 1
with supervision
with co-workers
with job security
with system of decisionmaking
with promotions
with growth
with accomplishment
with independence
Life satisfaction, overall 1
with leisure
with family
with health
with career
with self
O&O
(N = 20)
(N = 2)
$19,183a
$19,513b'c 'd
$13,572b'c 'd
44.86b>c
46.65b'c 'd
27.00c>d
$309.37b'c
$309.37b'c
3.32
3.59
18.95C
18.84
21.00b'c
4.27
3.28b 'c
3.14b'c
3.91C
3.73C
2.91
3.50
3.82
3.45
4.04
3.04b 'c
4.14C
4.04b 'c
4.09
4.36
Store type
QWL
(N = 24)
(N = 22)
17,039
22,687a'd
9,822a'd
30.78a
40.46a'd
20.23a'd
2,010.05a'c
2,599. 14a'd
1,247. 7 l d
3.13
3.40
17.74
20.13d
14.84a'd
4.22
4.32a
4.17a
3.26
3.39C
3.49C
3.58
4.19
3.75
4.44
4.27a
4.53
4.53a
3.81
4.44
Non-QWL
(N=14)
(N = 29)
14,413C
24,560a'd
9,514a'd
26.81a
42.28a'd
19.34a'd
l,144.90a>b
l,514.61 a'd
966.89d
3.19
3.62
14.95a
16.14
14.28a
3.95
3.95a
3.90a
3.00a
2.68a'b
2.72b
3.25
3.83
3.52
4.40
4.47a
4.80a
4.50a
3.93
4.48
1. l = Very dissatisfied, 5 = very satisfied.
2. Sum of 7 items, how savings compare with preshutdown. l=much 
	worse, 5 = much better; how much owed compared to preshutdown, 
a. Sig. dif. from O&O; 
b. Sig. dif. from QWL; 
c. Sig. dif. from non-QWL; 
d. Sig. dif. between PT/FT in same store type; p = .05.
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l=much more, 5 = much less; how food, clothing, transportation, lei 
sure, and housing budget were affected, l = less in budget, 5 = more in 
budget.
after their start-up debt was retired. However, both O&Os apparently 
voted year-end bonuses anyway, since a few workers from each store 
reported receiving one. The reported bonuses were within the range 
of Super Fresh bonuses, but many workers simply reported a zero or 
left this question blank. The figures for mean bonuses among 
worker/owners thus do not accurately reflect the actual bonuses re 
ceived, since some workers reporting "0" or a blank probably re 
ceived a bonus but were aware of the legal prohibitions so did not 
answer the question accurately.
The O&O worker/owners did have another economic benefit, not 
captured by these data, in the growth of equity accumulating through 
the $5,000 share each contributed to become an owner. A percent of 
profits was distributed to each shareholder's account, based on the 
number of hours worked, but the owner was not free to withdraw 
this money until he or she left the store or until the debt was retired. 
With the information we had available, we could not calculate the 
dollar value of this equity growth. Nevertheless, in future studies of 
other organizations, the equity growth value ought not be ignored 
when considering the comprehensive financial benefits to worker/ 
owners.
Perceived Economic Welfare
Although we were unable to capture the dollar total of pay, bonus, 
and equity for worker/owners, we could compare perceptions of eco 
nomic well-being. First, we asked workers how satisfied they were 
with their pay and fringe benefits, and with their overall economic 
situation. On both measures, all three groups of workers were 
equally satisfied. This satisfaction was associated with higher per 
sonal cost, however, since many Super Fresh workers were managing 
to maintain their standard of living only by holding down second 
jobs or by relying on other family members' incomes. Household 
incomes ranged from $2,000 to $90,000, but the average annual
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household incomes did not differ between full-time and part-time 
workers.
Second, we used a series of questions asking workers to compare 
their current situation to their situation before the A&P shutdown. 
When we asked workers whether they had more or less savings, 
debt, or money in their budget for food, clothing, transportation, 
leisure, or housing since the shutdown, O&O workers believed they 
were significantly better off compared to before the shutdown than 
did the non-QWL workers. Part-time Super Fresh workers reported 
the greatest loss. Worker/owners also reported a greater ability to 
engage in discretionary purchases, such as buying a car, paying for a 
wedding, going on vacation, retiring, and paying for leisure activi 
ties. Though Super Fresh workers generally felt able to get by over 
all, they recognized that they pinched more pennies now than before 
the shutdown.
Job Satisfaction
We asked workers to rate how satisfied they were with their jobs 
overall and with each of eight aspects of their jobs, in addition to 
their pay satisfaction mentioned above. Overall job satisfaction and a 
sum of the nine separate satisfaction questions (overall job satisfac 
tion plus the other eight aspects) showed no significant differences.
Considering each nonfinancial aspect of satisfaction separately, 
however, differences did emerge. Worker/owners were much more 
satisfied with their job security and worker ownership system than 
non-QWL Super Fresh workers were with their job security and with 
QWL. On no aspect, however, were worker/owners more satisfied 
than QWL workers. In fact, worker/owners were much less satisfied 
with supervision and co-workers than Super Fresh workers. Com 
ments made during the interviews suggested that the dissatisfaction 
with supervision arose from unclear expectations of the boss's power 
and identity resulting from role conflict between the manager, board 
members, and members at large and from perceiving supervision as 
too lax. Some worker/owners reported wanting a clearer chain of 
command. Dissatisfaction with co-workers came from unresolved
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differences of opinion over store decisions and also from some work 
ers feeling excluded from decisionmaking cliques in the stores.
Full-time QWL workers were more satisfied than other workers 
with promotions and job opportunities. This is curious because these 
workers actually lost their long-held, interstore transfer right, which 
was the primary route for promotion to the top in the old A&P. 
However, particular store managers singled out many of the older, 
male elite workers and called them back to work at Super Fresh, 
frequently as department heads. In our interviews, Super Fresh 
workers expressed the hope that the retail chain would succeed, and 
that new stores would be opened to which they would be transferred 
because they were known as good workers. In Spring 1986, Super 
Fresh did announce openings of several new Philadelphia-area stores. 
Perhaps a few workers will achieve their dream, but some later dis 
illusionment among workers not chosen for new stores would not be 
surprising.
Part-time QWL workers were not as satisfied with their promotion 
opportunities as other workers. They were also less satisfied with 
their pay, with QWL, and with their job security. In sum, they had a 
fairly realistic assessment of their situation. Why then did they re 
port a high level of overall satisfaction? It may be due to the high 
proportion of part-time workers who were females and to the famil 
iar finding that women report higher job satisfaction than men, even 
under poorer working conditions. Also, as the interviews show, 
some of these women were satisfied to simply provide supplemen 
tary household income and wanted to have part-time jobs to fit their 
homemaking schedules.
Life Satisfaction
We also asked workers several questions about satisfaction with 
their lives. In addition to general life satisfaction, they rated satisfac 
tion with their families, leisure, career, health, and self-esteem. 
They responded as they had when we asked about their jobs: in over 
all life satisfaction there were no differences, but in particular as 
pects of their lives, differences appeared. Worker/owners expressed 
the heavy toll of working extra hours, learning how to run a super-
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market, and being responsible for the business through lower ratings 
of satisfaction with leisure, family, and health.
Both innovations had affected workers' lives away from the work 
place. There is much worker testimony from the interview data 
about the time demands of worker-ownership. One older worker 
said, "The store owns me." He had hoped for a more relaxed prere 
tirement period. For workers with dependent children or sick family 
members, the time demands were most difficult. Several casual re 
marks were made about spousal pressure to become less involved 
with the store. Those worker/owners who had second jobs, serious 
hobbies or were active in voluntary organizations found these activ 
ities incompatible with the demands of worker-ownership.
Some might believe that those who became worker/owners were 
more critical, less satisfied people in general—less satisfied with 
A&P and with most aspects of their lives. Worker/owners were not 
dissatisfied with everything, however. Their economic situations and 
their careers pleased them, but their concern was the heavy price 
paid in other parts of their lives—a complaint expressed by many 
entrepreneurs in the early years after opening a new business.
The new work structure affected Super Fresh workers very differ 
ently. Formerly, elite A&P workers tended to work overtime; those 
same workers, now in new Super Fresh, full-time leadership posi 
tions, were not working any more than in the past. Since few part- 
time workers participated in QWL, they felt no excessive time 
demands. Many spoke of the extra time they had with nothing to do 
as a result of cutbacks in hours. The major noneconomic effect of 
working in Super Fresh was clearly the loss of vacation time. The 
reduction to a single week vacation was severely felt by workers who 
had had up to a month's vacation in the past and who owned homes 
and businesses in vacation areas.
Theoretical Model Testing
The previous sections of this chapter described mean differences 
in worker characteristics, perceived organizational processes, and
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worker outcomes among the three groups—O&O worker/owners, 
QWL, and non-QWL Super Fresh workers. Such descriptive results 
cannot tell us much about which factors were most important or in 
fluential in contributing to these differences, however, and they do 
not tell us whether these differences arose from working in a partic 
ular store type or from some other factor.
To determine how much support we had for our hypotheses, we 
tested them through simultaneous equation modeling, using a Three- 
Stage Least Squares (3SLS) technique. Our theoretical model posited 
one-way causal relationships, i.e., it was recursive. However, to al 
low for the possibility of unspecified interactions among the depen 
dent variables or feedback loops, we chose the 3SLS technique. The 
remaining statistical tables of this chapter report, for each set of de 
pendent variables in the model, the unstandardized model coeffi 
cients for each independent variable. The magnitude or absolute 
value of these coefficients is not meaningful because of the arbitrary 
scale values they represent. The direction of effect (positive or neg 
ative) and the significance of the coefficient are of key importance. 
They express the direction and existence of a relationship between 
independent and dependent variables as specified in the model. Un 
like single equation regression models, summary statistics such as 
R2 are not relevant in simultaneous equation models. The simulta 
neous equations for the model are as follows:
(Eq. 6.1) store participativeness = f(Worker Characteristics, Store
Type, Consultants). 
In (Eq. 6. la), store participativeness is measured by the degree of
worker control. 
In (Eq. 6.1b), store participativeness is measured by the degree of
worker participation in daily decisions. 
In (Eq. 6.1c), store participativeness is measured by the degree of
worker participation in long-term decisions.
(Eq. 6.2) worker outcomes = f(Worker Characteristics, Store Partic 
ipativeness, Store Functioning, Store Economic Outcomes).
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For each worker outcome, we estimated a model comprising four 
simultaneous equations. 1 The first three equations, of the form of 
equations (6. la), (6.1b), and (6.1c) estimated three measures of per 
ceived participativeness. The fourth equation, of the form of equa 
tion (6.2), included the three estimations of perceived 
participativeness derived from equations 6.1, as well as nonesti- 
mated variables which measured aspects of worker characteristics, 
store functioning, and store outcomes.
Analysis of each worker outcome included essentially the same set 
of model variables:
A. Worker Characteristics. We used education, total su 
permarket seniority, number of jobs known, depart 
ment head status and months of layoff in all equations 
of the form (6.1). Education, sex, number of depen 
dents and years of seniority were included in equa 
tions of the form (6.2).
Worker Attitudes and Beliefs. For all analyses except 
the two concerning job income and weekly hours, we 
also included in equation (6.2) three worker attitudes 
and perceptions characteristics: satisfaction with su 
pervision, satisfaction with co-workers, and a measure 
of perceived economic gain since the A&P shutdown. 2 
We included the satisfaction measures to represent 
some aspects of manager selection and self-selection 
processes in recruitment to particular stores, which 
loomed as so important in the worker interviews (see 
chapter 5). In addition, we expected that worker atti 
tudes about their outcomes would be affected by the 
degree of sacrifice endured or gains accrued since the 
A&P shutdown.
B. Store Type. 3 Two dummy variables, ownership and 
QWL, were used in all forms of equation (6.1).
C. Consultants. The sum of the number of times several 
kinds of consulting was received was included in all 
equations of the form (6.1).
D. Participativeness. We used the three measures: the 
degree of worker involvement in daily decisions, the
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degree of worker involvement in long-term decisions, 
and the perceived degree of overall worker control.4
E. Store Functioning. We used average weekly part-timer 
hours in the store,5 weekly store absenteeism,6 and 
measures of training, motivation, and informal pro 
cesses in all forms of equations (6.2).7 We could not 
use another apparently important measure of labor 
strategy, namely, the percentage of full-time workers 
in the store, because it was too highly correlated with 
store type, as well as with worker involvement in 
long-term decisions.
We estimated the model with and without two addi 
tional measures of informal store functioning included 
in equation 6.2. The first was a sum of five perceived 
interpersonal consequences of the system of store de- 
cisionmaking (worker ownership or QWL). These con 
sequences included greater acceptance and better 
quality of decisions, higher trust of managers, more 
open disagreement, and disagreements more easily re 
solved. The second, a single-item measure from the 
same set of questions which did not load on the same 
factor as the others, is the perceived slowness of deci- 
sionmaking. Using these variables reduced the sample 
size by about six or seven people, and reduced the de 
grees of freedom. In a few cases these variables had a 
significant effect.
F. Store Economic Outcomes. Though both unit labor 
costs and profits for the current year were considered, 
the small sample size dictated that only one store fi 
nancial measure be used. Profit was our choice. We 
expected that workers in more profitable stores might 
benefit, financially or otherwise.
The worker outcomes examined included the economic outcomes 
of job income, hours worked per week, satisfaction with pay and 
fringe benefits, and satisfaction with overall economic situation. Job 
satisfaction measures included satisfaction with job overall, with job 
security, and with the system of decisionmaking. Life satisfaction 
aspects examined were satisfaction with life overall, and with family, 
leisure, and health. We decided to use the two satisfaction items as
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separate dependent measures rather than summing them into multi- 
item scales for two reasons. First, mean differences were found be 
tween worker/owners, QWL, and non-QWL workers for individual 
satisfaction items. Second, variables in which we were interested 
might have had opposite effects on different aspects of satisfaction 
and cancel each other out, resulting in no significant effect on over 
all measures, if a summed scale was used.
Participativeness
We used three multiple-item measures of participativeness as de 
pendent variables for equation (6.1): degree of worker involvement 
in daily decisions, degree of worker involvement in long-term deci 
sions, and perceived degree of overall worker control. This means 
that every time the model was calculated, four equations were in 
cluded, three estimating participativeness and one for a worker out 
come. Because we earlier noted differences within the stores 
between full- and part-time workers, we tested our model separately 
for the sample as a whole and for full-time workers.
Worker Characteristics
Our theoretical model and our interview data (see chapter 5) sug 
gested that individual workers with different backgrounds and previ 
ous experience might have different perceptions of store 
participativeness. Therefore, we examined the effect on perceived 
participativeness of a series of background variables. Differences 
that arose from selection processes or self-selection, are captured 
by including these demographic data. Differences due to experience 
on the planning boards or boards of directors are also captured by 
the inclusion of seniority and department head status, since board 
membership in all store types tended to reflect these leadership char 
acteristics.
Being male, married, and older predicted perceptions of greater 
participativeness in preliminary regression analyses, but all of these 
characteristics were highly correlated with the number of jobs 
known, which we chose for inclusion in the simultaneous equation 
model.
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Worker values also were related to perceptions of participative- 
ness. While the small sample size precluded use of all of these vari 
ables in the final model, initial single equation regression analyses 
found that those who valued good relations with their co-workers 
and boss, who liked job security, and who valued independence were 
likely to perceive more participativeness, regardless of where they 
were working.
Several worker characteristics had a significant effect on partici 
pativeness. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 only illustrate results for equations of 
the form (6.1) for the model run which had the largest N. They are 
representative of the effects found regardless of the worker outcome 
used in equation (6.2). The first table presents results for all work 
ers, the second for full-time workers only.
Table 6.7
Representative Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for
Predictors of Perceived Participativeness Among All Workers
(Equation 6.1)
Perceived participativeness
Input
Worker characteristics:
Yrs. of education
Yrs. seniority
# of jobs known
Department head1
Mo. of layoff
Store type
Worker-owned2
QWL2
Unions & consultants
Consulting3
Daily
decisions
(N=89)
Coefficients
0.606***
0.016
0.276***
3.813***
-0.155**
3.269**
-0.595
0.045
Long-term
decisions
(N=89)
Coefficients
0.156***
0.006
0.052
0.926**
0.037
4.655***
-0.321
0.040
Degree of
worker control
(N = 89)
Coefficients
1.408***
0.047**
0.114***
0.165
0.045
0.261
0.548
-0.043
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
1. Dummy coded, l=dept. head, 0 = nondepartment head.
2. Dummy coded against non-QWL.
3. Sum of the # of times 6 kinds of assistance were received from 7
sources.
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Generally, workers' perceptions of power in the store reflect their 
experience, skills, and status. Within each store type, those with 
more education perceived more participativeness. In addition, those 
with more seniority and knowledge of more jobs perceived more 
overall worker control. In daily decisions, those workers who knew 
more jobs or were department heads perceived more participative- 
ness while those with longer layoffs perceived less. Department 
heads also had stronger perceptions of involvement in long-term de 
cisions.
Table 6.8
Representative Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for 
Predictors of Perceived Participativeness Among Full-Time Workers
(Equation 6.1)
Perceived participativeness
Input
Worker characteristics:
Yrs. of education
Yrs. seniority
# of jobs known
Department head1
Mo. of layoff
Store type
Worker-owned2
QWL2
Unions & consultants
Consulting3
Daily decisions
(N=46)
Coefficients
0.760***
-0.002
0.239***
2.356***
0.171
0.467
-1.101
-0.003
Long-term
decisions
(N=46)
Coefficients
-0.027
0.063
0.090
1.499**
0.255***
3.261***
-0.296
0.112
Degree of
worker control
(N=46)
Coefficients
0.438***
0.057
0.065
0.266
0.083
-0.131
0.336
-0.057
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
1. Dummy coded, l=dept. head, 0 = nondepartment head.
2. Dummy coded against non-QWL.
3. Sum of the # of times 6 kinds of assistance were received from
sources.
Store Type
As we expected, the formal worker ownership structure did influ 
ence participativeness (see tables 6.7 and 6.8). Controlling for- 
worker characteristics and consulting received, worker/owners per-
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ceived greater participativeness in daily and long-term decisions (for 
full-time workers, worker ownership increased perceptions of in 
volvement in long-term decisions only).
Surprisingly, perceived overall worker control was not higher 
among worker/owners, other things being equal. Comments made in 
the interviews suggested that before the shutdown, A&P corporate 
activities had limited what workers could do in the stores. After 
workers became owners, however, they still saw their choices as con 
strained, but the constraints were more general: "That's how things 
are in business."
Compared to working in a non-QWL store, working in a QWL 
store had no influence on perceptions of any dimension of participa 
tiveness. Since worker characteristics did have an influence, this 
suggests that store staffing patterns, not QWL, truly differentiated 
QWL and non-QWL stores from each other.
Consultants
Consultant help, which was measured by store managers' reports 
of the number of different kinds of help received from each of a 
variety of sources, did not predict worker perceptions of participa 
tiveness.
In summary, our model found incomplete confirmation of the ef 
fect of input factors on participativeness. The formal structure of 
worker ownership, as set up in the O&Os, has been translated into 
organizational participative processes, particularly on long-term is 
sues. Super Fresh's QWL program seems not to have such an effect, 
though it may seem effective (i.e., when one only looks at mean 
differences) because staffing and self-selection processes recruited 
senior workers into the stores we studied, and having more experi 
ence and education consistently had a positive effect on workers' 
perceptions of participativeness.
Worker Outcomes
According to our model, worker characteristics, participativeness, 
store functioning, and store outcomes should either directly or indi 
rectly influence worker outcomes. In the following sections we re-
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port the results for each group of outcome variables [equation 6.2]— 
economic outcomes, job satisfaction and life satisfaction. When 
these results were computed, three equations of the form (6.1) were 
included in the system of simultaneous equations, but a description 
of these parameters will not be repeated for every outcome reported 
here.
Economic Outcomes
We looked at four measures of individual economic outcomes: su 
permarket job income for the year preceding the survey; usual 
weekly hours of work; satisfaction with pay and benefits; and satis 
faction with one's overall economic situation. The results of equa 
tion 6.2 model analyses for economic outcomes are shown in tables 
6.9 and 6.10.
Few of the variables significantly predicted workers' 1984 job in 
come and hours. Worker involvement in daily decisions had a posi 
tive effect on income and hours worked, whereas involvement in 
long-term decisions increased only hours worked. Among full-time 
workers, perceptions of more overall worker control were related to 
higher individual income. Seniority, as one would expect, led to in 
creased weekly hours. For full-time workers, however, women 
earned less than men, presumably because of the sex-based internal 
labor market which usually gave men the higher paying positions.
Surprisingly, store functioning variables tended to be poor predic 
tors of income and hours. Store profit similarly had no significant 
impact. The only effect of store functioning on worker job income 
was that workers believing themselves harder working and more ef 
fective were among the lowest paid. Although conventional wisdom 
suggests that effective workers should be reaping the benefits of their 
work, the opposite was true in this case if the workers' perceptions 
are accurate. Our worker interviews suggested that women, particu 
larly deli clerks and meat wrappers, were highly motivated and be 
lieved they were effective in their jobs, yet were in relatively low- 
paying positions.
We found a number of unexpected relationships for workers' sat 
isfaction with economic outcomes. Those who were satisfied with
Table 6.9
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of Economic Outcomes Among All Workers
(Equation 6.2)
Worker characteristics
Demographics
Yrs. of education
Sex
# of dependents
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with supervision
Satisfaction with co-workers
f^nmrmmtive* /»r*r»nr»mir» rtaine ctru
1984 personal
income from
supermarket
job
(N=85)
Coefficients
384.70
-896.45
132.12
138.21
->Q r.liii*«-l/-»iir»i
Weekly
hours
(N = 89)
Coefficients
0.825
-1.440
0.575
0.282***
Satisfaction
with
pay &
benefits
(N = 82)
Coefficients
0.121
0.703
0.045
0.022
0.219
O O I Asfc:fc .339**
n rm
Satisfaction
with
overall
economic
situation
(N = 82)
Coefficients
-0.014
1.007***
-0.136
0.011
0.283*
0 244**\j   **  nr
n HAH*
Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker control
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and effectiveness
Training
Increased effort
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
1065.89***
-264.69
1279.66
10.55
-134.29
-825.55*
-22.14
169.98
-33.387
1.374***
1.565***
0.259
-0.103
-0.641
0.271
-0.013
-10.503
-0.021
0.087
0.119
0.105
-0.220***
-0.150
0.034
-0.021
-29.969*
0.120
-0.196
0.195
-0.008
-0.054
0.065
0.034
-0.103
8.843
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes on tables 6.1 to 6.6 and in the text. 
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
194 Outcomes for Workers
Table 6.10
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of
Economic Outcomes Among Full-Time Workers
(Equation 6.2)
Worker characteristics
Demographics
Yrs. of education
Sex
# of dependents
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with 
supervision 
Satisfaction with 
co-workers 
Comparative economic 
gains since shutdown 
Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker
control
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of
part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and
effectiveness
Training
Increased effort
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
1984 personal 
income from 
supermarket 
job
(N=46) 
Coefficients
698.06
-2554.12*
167.30
25.81
186.92
-520.34
2999.55***
-457.24
269.40
-513.29
26.72
267.43
65.859
Satisfaction 
with pay 
and benefits
(N=45) 
Coefficients
0.181
0.690
0.206
0.022
-0.115 
0.518** 
0.003
0.243
0.081
-0.229
0.129
-0.078
-0.376**
0.000
0.124
-38.122
Satisfaction 
with overall 
economic 
situation
(N=45) 
Coefficients
-0.091
0.580
-0.144
0.028
-0.073 
0.047 
0.042
0.224
-0.205*
0.147
-0.035
0.071
-0.004
0.017
-0.132*
19.854
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes to tables 6.1 to 6.6. 
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
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their co-workers were satisfied with their pay and benefits; those 
who worked in stores with lower profitability and higher absentee 
ism, and those full-timers who perceived they were less effective, 
were also more satisfied with their pay. Not surprisingly, since pay 
and benefits were regulated by the union contract and not affected by 
either form of participation, participativeness had no effect.
Workers' satisfaction with overall economic situation is somewhat 
different. Women, those satisfied with their supervisor, and those 
who made postshutdown gains were more satisfied; those who per 
ceived more participation in long-term decisionmaking, who were 
less satisfied with their co-workers, and who were working harder— 
that is, primarily the O&O workers—were less satisfied with their 
overall economic situation.
With respect to the low impact of participativeness and store func 
tioning on economic outcomes, these findings are surprising. First, 
we expected any effect of participativeness, especially in long-term 
decisionmaking which is highest for worker/owners, to be positive. 
Second, we expected participativeness to positively influence work 
ers' satisfaction with economic outcomes, but to influence worker 
financial outcomes only indirectly through store functioning and 
store profits. However, participativeness seems to affect worker out 
comes directly in our tests, and we shall see more of this effect be 
low when we discuss other worker outcome measures.
How can we explain these apparent anomalies? First, perhaps 
worker/owners had very high expectations of prosperity; they may 
have wanted to be in an even better position than they found them 
selves. Second, the actual causality may run opposite to that pictured 
in our model; that is, those with higher incomes and more hours 
perceive higher worker participativeness, perhaps because they gen 
eralize from their own power in the stores. After all, full-time work 
ers had higher mean levels of perceived participativeness and, 
because of their schedules if nothing else, were more available to 
participate. Also meatcutters, who were very powerful, received 
higher wages.
Third, some stores with high levels of participativeness may have 
maintained a labor strategy of high wages and high average weekly
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hours for former A&P workers. While this would be expected to 
show up in store functioning, we could not use percent of full-time 
workers as a measure of this strategy in the worker model because it 
was too highly correlated with store type. The measure of labor 
strategy we used, average weekly part-timer hours in the store, nei 
ther affirms nor rules out this third alternative. Our interview find 
ings (see chapter 5), support this third explanation by showing that 
some very participative Super Fresh managers hand picked former 
employees and made certain they received good positions. Thus, la 
bor strategy is probably quite important even if measures included in 
the worker model had few significant effects. The high correlation of 
store type with percent of full-timers indicates store type may indeed 
be identical to labor strategy.
Job Satisfaction
We looked at overall job satisfaction and two other specific as 
pects of job satisfaction, job security, and decisionmaking. A com 
prehensive set of predictors of job satisfaction was not included in 
this analysis because, unlike many other studies, our purpose was 
not to predict as much of the variance in job satisfaction as possible. 
Rather, we were trying to find out whether the specific innovations 
in formal structure—worker ownership or QWL—led to store pro 
cesses which affected job satisfaction. Predictors of job satisfaction 
not differing by store type were assumed to be distributed similarly 
in each store and assumed not to have significant interaction effects 
with store type that would necessitate their inclusion in this system 
of equations. This assumption remains to be tested in future studies. 
Results of the analyses for equation (6.2) for these outcomes are 
shown in tables 6.11 and 6.12.
It is often claimed that if people participate in decisions which 
affect them, they will be more satisfied with the results. This expec 
tation was modestly confirmed. The degree of worker control had a 
barely significant effect on overall job satisfaction among full- 
timers, but not when their results were combined with those of the 
part-timers. Worker involvement in long-term decisions also posi-
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lively affected individual satisfaction with decisionmaking and job 
security.
Table 6.11
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of 
_____Job Satisfaction Among All Workers (Equation 6.2)_____
Satisfaction 
with
Worker characteristics
Demographics
Yrs. of education
Sex
# of dependents
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with
supervision
Satisfaction with
co-workers
Comparative economic
gains since shutdown
Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker control
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of
part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and
effectiveness
Training
Increased effort
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
NOTE: Variables are defined
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01;
Satisfaction
with job
overall
(N=82)
Coefficients
0.090
0.423
-0.127
0.014
0.109
0.227**
0.033*
0.011
0.047
0.151
0.022
-0.032
-0.063
0.013
0.067
3.410
in footnotes
Satisfaction
with job
security
(N = 82)
Coefficients
0.019
0.053
0.057
0.042**
0.260
0.415***
0.026
-0.010
0.266**
0.011
0.061
-0.045
-0.041
0.038
-0.108
-24.294*
of tables 6. 1 to
system
of
decisionmaking
(N=74)
Coefficients
0.041
-0.480
0.015
0.014
0.275
0.480***
0.013
-0.019
0.272**
-0.104
0.217*
-0.087
-0.049
0.014
-0.027
-25.151*
6.6.
two-tailed t-test.
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Table 6.12
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of Job 
Satisfaction Among Full-Time Workers (Equation 6.2)
Worker characteristics
Demographics
Yrs. of education
Sex
# of dependents
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with
supervision
Satisfaction with
co-workers
Comparative economic
gains since shutdown
Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker control
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of
part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and
effectiveness
Training
Increased effort
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
NOTE: Variables are defined
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01;
Satisfaction
with job
overall
(N=45)
Coefficients
0.067
0.381
-0.049
0.012
0.013
0.023
0.026
0.113
0.008
0.297*
-0.002
-0.062
-0.143
0.004
0.027
-6.949
in footnotes
Satisfaction
with job
security
(N=45)
Coefficients
0.160
-0.027
-0.019
0.010
0.422
0.304
-0.005
-0.023
0.404***
-0.006
0.153*
-0.079
-0.264
-0.015
0.043
-38.627
of table 6.1 to
Satisfaction
with
system
of
decisionmaking
(N = 43)
Coefficients
0.262**
-0.471
0.038
-0.055**
0.294
0.445*
-0.005
-0.158
0.433***
0.121
0.201**
-0.145
-0.139
-0.040
0.059
-50.017**
6.6.
two-tailed t-test.
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Contrary to our hypotheses, few store functioning variables had 
any effect on overall job satisfaction. Those who reported them 
selves to be more hard-working and more effective full-time workers 
were less satisfied with their job security. These same workers were 
also less satisfied with their pay and fringe benefits. This may indi 
cate some complacency on the part of more senior workers, or some 
particularly motivated workers may be in positions of low pay and 
low job security.
When differences in worker characteristics and levels of participa- 
tiveness and store functioning are controlled, the most profitable 
stores had workers least satisfied with decisionmaking and job secu 
rity. Were workers unaware of how well or how poorly their stores 
were doing in comparison with others and thus using some unrealis 
tic standard for comparison? Or were the most profitable stores 
somehow dissatisfying to work in? We do not have the data to 
choose between these alternative explanations.
Participativeness had some interesting effects on life satisfaction 
(see tables 6.13 and 6.14). In contrast to the negative effects worker 
control had on some aspects of job satisfaction, we found that the 
degree of overall worker control had a positive effect on overall life 
satisfaction and on satisfaction with family and health. For full-time 
workers, worker involvement in daily decisions positively affected 
their overall life satisfaction and satisfaction with health. More 
worker involvement in long-term decisions meant less satisfaction 
with leisure, however. Most likely, worker/owners have been too 
busy to enjoy themselves outside of work.
Store functioning variables affected life satisfaction in some odd 
ways. Those believing themselves more effective and seeing im 
proved interpersonal interactions in the new work setting were less 
likely to be satisfied with their lives overall, and with their family 
life. Perhaps these were also the people who invested more of their 
time trying to make their stores successful, and they suffered from it. 
Also, those working in stores with higher absenteeism were more 
satisfied with their lives. When coupled with the negative impact of 
worker involvement in long-term decisions, these findings indicate 
that work interfered with nonwork aspects of worker/owners' lives.
Table 6.13
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of Life Satisfaction Among All Workers
(Equation 6.2)
Worker characteristics
Demographics 
Yrs. of education
Sex
# of dependents 
Yrs. of seniority 
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with supervision 
Satisfaction with co-workers
Comparative economic gains since shutdown
Satisfaction
with life
overall
(N=82) 
Coefficients
-0.141**
0.573*
-0.227*** 
-0.024
0.070 
0.124
0.011
Satisfaction
with
family 
(N = 82) 
Coefficients
-0.047
0.573*
-0.060 
-0.032
0.028 
0.135
-0.005
Satisfaction
with
leisure 
(N = 81) 
Coefficients
0.046
0.534
-0.082 
-0.007
-0.033 
0.214*
0.008
Satisfaction
with
health 
(N = 82) 
Coefficients
-0.179**
0.615*
-0.170* 
-0.030*
0.107 
0.195*
0.023
Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker control 
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and effectiveness
Training
Increased effort 
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
0.049
-0.154 
0.699***
-0.057
23.953**
0.009
-0.172 
0.748***
-0.093*
24.269*
0.040
-0.348** 
0.331
-0.059
18.499
-0.001
-0.104 
0.701***
-0.060
0.027
0.046
0.011
-0.106*
0.000
0.068*
0.012
-0.117*
0.055
0.124
-0.032
-0.060
0.048
-0.002
0.002
-0.058
27.478**
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes of table 6.1 to 6.6. 
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
Table 6.14 
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters of Life Satisfaction Among FulI-Time Workers (Equation 6.2)
Worker characteristics
Demographics 
Yrs. of education
Sex
# of dependents 
Yrs. of seniority 
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with supervision 
Satisfaction with co-workers
Comparative economic gains since shutdown
Satisfaction
with life
overall
(N=45) 
Coefficients
-0.157
0.009
-0.182* 
-0.006
0.098 
0.074
-0.016
Satisfaction
with
family
(N=45) 
Coefficients
-0.114
0.223
0.005 
0.006
0.243 
-0.016
-0.016
Satisfaction
with
leisure
(N=45) 
Coefficients
-0.079
-0.127
-0.059 
0.020
-0.070 
0.251
-0.017
Satisfaction
with
health
(N = 45) 
Coefficients
-0.235*
0.201
-0.095 
0.008
0.165 
0.101
-0.000
Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker control 
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and effectiveness
Training
Increased effort 
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
0.275**
0.064
0.429**
0.064
0.154*
0.068
0.019
0.075
0.213
-0.109
0.432*
-0.123
0.070
0.084
0.002
-0.153
0.234
-0.318**
0.158
-0.114
0.177
0.164
-0.052
-0.104
0.321*
-0.034
0.263
-0.051
0.164
-0.101
-0.034
-0.018
19.495 20.152 27.096 18.075
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes of table 6.1 to 6.6. 
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test
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Conclusion
Contrary to extreme claims that worker ownership is a failure or 
that it is a panacea, the findings of our analyses suggest that the men 
and women who bought out their stores managed to devise a well- 
run decisionmaking system that pleased them and managed to be 
satisfied with their job security. They also paid a substantial price, 
however: they reported more conflict with co-workers and supervi 
sors, longer work hours, less leisure time, and poorer health.
As we expected, the formal structure of worker ownership worked 
to increase worker involvement in long-term decisions. Worker/own 
ers have used this power to adopt store labor strategies preserving 
full-time jobs for all owners, including cashiers and others in low- 
paying jobs. They also used cross-training of workers to increase 
then- flexibility and provide growth and career opportunities.
Worker ownership, through the cooperative system of decision- 
making, has had a more modest impact on other aspects of store 
functioning. While some worker/owners claimed to be working 
harder and more effectively, others did not. The worker/owners' av 
erage estimates of motivation did not differ from workers in Super 
Fresh. We found a similar lack of difference in levels of trust, con 
flict, and acceptance of decisions.
The Super Fresh alternative, which also saved many workers' 
jobs, promised increased worker involvement in decisions, though 
these were limited to daily matters, and a bonus share of profits if 
workers helped keep labor costs low. Super Fresh adopted a dual 
labor force strategy with a small core of full-time workers and a 
larger group of lower-paid part-time workers, however; thus most of 
the jobs saved were part time.
This strategy had a different impact on full-time and part-time Su 
per Fresh workers. Full-time Super Fresh workers felt workers had 
as much control overall and in daily matters as did worker/owners, 
they earned larger job incomes than worker/owners, and they were as 
satisfied as worker/owners with their economic situations, jobs, and 
lives outside of the job. They did not have a say in intermediate and
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long-term decisions in their stores, however. The QWL program it 
self was not crucial in obtaining benefits for Super Fresh workers. 
The full-time workers got their influence in store decisions through 
their own human capital attributes—seniority, education, job knowl 
edge, and department head status.
The large group of part-timers (85 percent) at Super Fresh bore 
the primary costs of the Super Fresh method of job-saving. Com 
pared to full-time Super Fresh workers and all worker/owners, these 
part-timers made less than half the income and reported a postshut- 
down loss of economic welfare and lower satisfaction with QWL, 
pay, promotions, and job security. A small number of women gained 
family satisfaction from their part-time schedules, but they were not 
so many or so satisfied that they could raise the average satisfaction 
levels of their stores.
In theoretical terms, the results supported many of our hypothe 
ses, but a few results were surprising. Worker ownership and worker 
experience did increase perceived participation, but QWL had few 
effects on worker outcomes. Differences in store functioning had a 
limited impact on worker outcomes. The full-time labor strategy 
adopted by the O&Os positively affected workers' hours and income, 
but other changes in informal interactions in the stores were modest 
and had little impact on worker outcomes.
Participativeness, which we expected to have an indirect effect 
through store functioning, had instead repeated substantial direct ef 
fects on worker outcomes. While limitations of our measurement of 
store functioning may be a partial explanation, this is unlikely to 
account for every effect. We did expect participativeness to affect 
worker satisfaction. More worker participation increased some per 
ceptions of job quality and earning power, but was costly to workers 
in diminishing some aspects of job and life satisfaction.
Curiously, these results give some indication that the supermarkets 
did not always reward workers for their efforts and effectiveness. 
Workers who perceived themselves to be hard-working and effective 
were less satisfied with their pay, benefits, and job security. Workers 
in more profitable stores had less satisfaction with their job security,
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and their form of decisionmaking. Either there are inequalities, in 
which effective workers are not well-rewarded, or else high expecta 
tions of effective workers have led to dissatisfaction with rewards 
given.
Chapters 5 & 6 have presented outcomes from the workers' point 
of view. The next chapter will look at the differential economic out 
comes for the stores themselves among the three types of organiza 
tions.
NOTES
1. We had many possible measures for each of the constructs in these equations. Therefore, 
we had to reduce the data considerably through preliminary analyses before we could precisely 
define the actual equation model to test. We used two primary techniques for this task. First, 
we factor analyzed all attitudinal and perceptual measures of each construct. If we could iden 
tify clear, meaningful factors, we used summary scales of the measures comprising the factors. 
Our general rule was to look for measures which had loadings on one factor over .4 and less 
than .2 on all other factors. Items to be summed had to have a similar factor structure for 
workers, managers, and shop stewards before we would consider them as summed scales. 
These factor analyses are available from the authors.
Second, we used correlation and multiple regression techniques to identify suitable measures 
of the constructs, (a) We eliminated from further analyses variables reported in the descriptive 
results above which neither significantly related to other model variables nor were clearly 
important in theory, (b) We selected variables representing our theoretical constructs but 
which were not highly correlated with each other. However, even potential multicollinearity 
problems did not eliminate some variables, because we used them in separate alternative ver 
sions of the model.
2. Because these variables were measured in the same way and were physically located near 
the other satisfaction questions in the questionnaire, any significant effects on satisfaction out 
comes may be the result of measurement bias. In spite of this, it seemed important to include 
them so that the influence of other variables in the model could be determined, net of these 
worker characteristics.
3. Store type is represented by two dummy-coded variables, O&O and QWL. Non-QWL is 
the omitted category with which comparisons are made.
4. The simultaneous equation model estimates each of the three participativeness measures 
described earlier (equation 6.1) and then enters these estimated values variables in the worker 
outcomes equation (equation 6.2).
5. This measure came from the store managers' survey.
6. Employee turnover in the store was too highly correlated with average weekly part-timer 
hours in the store to be used in the same equation. However, absenteeism could be included. 
The measure of absenteeism also came from the store managers' survey.
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7. Training was a sum of the number of new jobs and new skills learned since the shutdown, 
plus a five-point rating of how much training workers said they received in their new stores. 
Perceived worker effort and effectiveness (motivation) was measured through a sum of two 
items asking for workers' estimates on a five-point scale of the degree to which they believed 
that working hard leads to high productivity and to doing one's job well.

Economic Performance of
Worker-Owned, QWL and Non-QWL
Supermarkets
The O&O buyout of two A&P stores, and the conversion of most 
of the Philadelphia-region A&P stores to Super Fresh stores with 
varying degrees of worker participation, presented a unique oppor 
tunity to examine and compare the economic performance of worker- 
owned firms with that of conventionally-owned firms with and 
without QWL. The common history of these stores as part of the 
failing A&P chain, their common location within the Philadelphia 
metropolitan area, the common experiences of most of the full-time 
and many of the part-time workers as former A&P employees, and 
the coverage of workers in all of the stores by similar union contracts 
means that the major dimensions along which these stores vary are 
type of ownership and extent of worker participation. Differences in 
industry, geographic location, general economic climate, experience 
of workers and unionization, which ordinarily confound the interpre 
tation of the effects of worker ownership and worker participation on 
economic performance, are absent in this case study. Thus, this 
study of the O&O and Super Fresh stores two years after the A&P 
shutdown is an exceptional opportunity to test the model, developed 
in chapter 2, of the way economic outcomes for individual stores are 
affected by the type of store (worker-owned, Super Fresh with QWL 
or Super Fresh without QWL), the extent of store participativeness, 
and the effect of participativeness on store functioning.
This chapter analyzes the economic performance, measured in 
terms of profitability, productivity, and unit labor costs, of each of 
the three types of stores in our sample. In the next section we ana 
lyze the theoretical issues involved in comparing the economic per-
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formance of worker-owned and traditional firms. This is followed by 
a descriptive section detailing important differences and similarities 
among the three store types. This section also compares the percep 
tions of shop stewards and store directors or managers regarding how 
the store is functioning and how participative it is. Finally, the 
model described in chapter 2 is tested. The empirical work reported 
here provides considerable support for that model.
Theoretical Issues
One of the persistent questions concerning such workplace inno 
vations as worker participation is their effect on the economic per 
formance of the enterprises in which they are introduced. Proponents 
of worker participation in managerial decisionmaking through 
worker ownership or quality of worklife programs argue that these 
practices increase productivity and profit. Giving workers scope to 
utilize the knowledge they have acquired about the firm's production 
process, customer requirements, regulatory environment or business 
climate, according to this view, increases sales, reduces waste and 
inefficiency and increases the flexibility with which workers can be 
assigned to jobs. The resulting productivity gains support increases 
in wages as well as profits while holding unit labor costs down 
(Levin 1984). In contrast, critics of worker participation support the 
traditional hierarchical organization of the firm in which decision- 
making and authority are centralized at higher levels of the bureau 
cracy. They argue that close supervision and control of the work 
process as well as the ability to lay off workers or reduce their hours 
of work are essential to achieving productivity targets and to holding 
down costs.
Differences in Objectives
Discussion of the contribution of worker participation to the fi 
nancial success of an enterprise is further complicated when firms 
owned by their workforce are considered. The objective of a tradi-
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tional firm is to maximize profit, so profitability is an appropriate 
measure of its financial success. Worker-owned firms, however, have 
multiple goals. Like their more traditionally-managed competitors, 
they must operate successfully in the market if they are to continue 
to exist. Whether profit maximizing or not, they must nevertheless 
be profitable if they are to generate internal funds for investment and 
expansion. Moreover, profit is the standard which suppliers and 
banks, themselves organized as traditional firms, apply in determin 
ing the credit-worthiness of worker-owned firms. Profitability, there 
fore, remains an important goal even in cooperative enterprises.
At the same time, worker-owned firms do not single-mindedly 
pursue the objective of maximum profits. Such firms also have a 
strong commitment to providing employment security, full-time 
wages and the hours of work desired (usually full time) to worker/ 
owners. High and steady worker income ranks with profits as a goal 
of such enterprises (Berman 1967).
Furthermore, the distinction made in traditional firms between 
"variable labor"—ordinary workers whose numbers and/or hours 
are increased during periods of high demand and reduced during pe 
riods of slack—and "overhead labor"—managerial and professional 
employees who are viewed by the firm as a quasi-fixed cost of doing 
business—is not a meaningful distinction in the case of worker- 
owned firms. Here, the entire worker/owner labor force must be 
viewed as a quasi-fixed cost to the firm, to be spread over as large a 
sales volume as possible. Thus, sales volume looms as a much more 
important variable for worker-owned firms, than for comparable tra 
ditional enterprises.
While worker-owned firms may be less likely, except under ex 
treme circumstances, to reduce the hours of work of worker/owners, 
they do have greater control over employee compensation than is the 
case for conventional firms. Even where wage rates are bargained 
uniformly by a union representing both worker/owners and employ 
ees in traditional firms, worker-owned firms have some flexibility 
with respect to compensation. Worker/owners can vote themselves 
small or zero bonuses, and they can vote to provide "sweat equity" 
in the form of unpaid hours of work above their scheduled full-time
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paid hours. In contrast to traditional firms, worker-owned firms are 
more likely to vary compensation rather than hours of work to 
achieve higher profits and productivity, should this prove necessary. 
They are reluctant to do this, however, since full-time wages and 
high income for worker/owners is an important objective of these 
firms.
Both conventional firms and worker-owned firms have strong in 
centives to increase productivity and reduce unit labor costs. Rising 
productivity leads, in general, to higher profits. It also makes possi 
ble wage increases without increases in unit labor costs. Of course, 
the distribution between wages and profits of the gains from making 
the enterprise more productive are likely to differ in traditional and 
in worker-owned firms. Traditional firms are responsible to share 
holders, and have an incentive to hold down wages while capturing 
increases in productivity in the form of higher profits. In contrast, 
worker-owned firms, whose shareholders are also their workforce, 
desire to raise worker incomes, subject to the need to sustain a sat 
isfactory level of profits.
These differences have important implications for the kinds of 
strategies which worker-owned and conventional firms adopt to hold 
down unit labor costs. The concept of unit labor costs refers to pay 
roll costs per unit of output. It can easily be shown that payroll costs 
per unit of output are equivalent to the average wage paid to workers 
divided by the average product (or output per employee hour) of 
labor. 1 Traditional firms may find reducing the average wage an at 
tractive strategy for holding down unit labor costs. They can pursue 
this strategy by hiring large numbers of part-time workers for dead 
end jobs at lower wages, saving on training and fringe benefit costs 
as well. Or they can encourage high turnover so that a large propor 
tion of the labor force is employed at entry level wages. Reducing 
average wages may appear less costly or less risky than pursuing the 
alternative strategy of making workers more productive. This alter 
native strategy might include instituting training programs to in 
crease skill levels and allow greater flexibility in the assignment of 
tasks, providing opportunities to increase product knowledge and 
better meet customer desires, or encouraging and rewarding effort
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and hard work. Other productivity-enhancing alternatives might in 
clude valuing the knowledge of experienced workers and providing 
ways in which this knowledge can be heard and acted upon, under 
taking investment in modern technology and implementing technol 
ogy and work processes so as to enhance rather than reduce worker 
skills. In general, productivity can be increased by encouraging con 
tinuous on-the-job learning experiences for the firm's workforce.
Worker-owned firms, with their commitment to full-time hours 
and wages for worker/owners, have little leeway for reducing average 
wages. Like those Japanese firms with a commitment to lifetime em 
ployment, they must concentrate on raising productivity if they are 
to remain competitive. With a high wage, high seniority, mostly full- 
time labor force, the impetus for achieving productivity gains is es 
pecially high in worker-owned businesses.
Important differences in the behavior of worker-owned and tradi 
tional firms are suggested by this analysis. They can be expected to 
differ in their use of full-time employees, in the hours of work of 
part-time employees, in the amount of turnover, in the number of 
training programs and the opportunities for learning new jobs and 
new skills that they provide, in the rewards they provide for hard 
work and effort, and in the extent to which they encourage worker 
participation in a wide range of decisions. These differences, which 
may be quite acute in comparisons between worker-owned and con 
ventionally managed firms, may be ameliorated when traditional 
firms adopt quality of worklife (QWL) programs which provide 
workers with training and with some opportunities to participate in 
decisions. Traditionally-managed firms that implement QWL do so 
in order to achieve the productivity gains made possible by increas 
ing the knowledge and skills of workers and by utilizing the knowl 
edge of workers through worker participation in decisions. In this 
respect, they resemble worker-owned firms. QWL firms differ from 
worker-owned firms, however, in that they continue to be owned by 
shareholders and to pursue the objective of profit maximization.
In light of the emphasis on productivity growth through skill de 
velopment and participation in worker-owned stores, it is possible 
that such firms have increased productivity and achieved lower costs
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despite higher worker hours and wages. As a result, the "high" 
profits of worker-owned firms need not fall below the "maximum" 
profits of traditional firms.
Similarities and Differences Among Worker-Owned, QWL and
Non-QWL Stores
Unlike the previous two chapters, this one is not limited to six 
intensively studied stores. It is based on a sample of 25 stores—2 
O&O stores and 23 Super Fresh stores. Questionnaires were distrib 
uted to each store manager as well as to the UFCW local 1357 
(clerks) shop steward and the UFCW local 56 (meatcutters) shop 
steward at each Philadelphia store and the UFCW local 27 shop 
stewards (clerks) in the two stores outside of Philadelphia. The anal 
ysis in this chapter is based on data obtained from these question 
naires. In addition, 1981 financial data for all of the stores prior to 
the A&P shutdown, and for the Super Fresh stores in 1982 and 1983, 
were obtained from A&P corporate headquarters. Financial data for 
the O&O stores came from the manager's questionnaire and from 
published sources.
We characterized the 23 Super Fresh stores as QWL or non-QWL 
on the basis of the assessment by the shop steward of the extent to 
which a formal QWL program was in place in his or her store.
For the four Super Fresh stores studied in depth, the judgment of 
the researchers coincided squarely with the evaluation of the shop 
stewards regarding implementation of QWL (see chapter 5). This in 
creases our confidence in the shop stewards' evaluation of QWL in 
the larger sample of stores. Shop stewards were asked to rate, on a 
scale of 1 to 5, both the extent to which a formal QWL program had 
been implemented in their stores and the extent to which workers 
were encouraged to attend store QWL meetings. Stores which scored 
3 or better on both of these scales were classified as having a QWL 
program in operation; all others were classified as non-QWL stores. 
Based on this classification scheme, our sample consists of 13 QWL 
stores and 10 non-QWL stores, in addition to the two O&O stores.
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Note that this refers only to whether a formal QWL program was 
implemented and not to the effectiveness of the program in involving 
workers in decisionmaking.
Table 7.1 reports mean values by store type for the variables 
which the model (see chapter 2) hypothesizes will affect the eco 
nomic performance of the stores—worker characteristics, use of 
consultants, union support, store participativeness, store functioning 
and store characteristics. Questions about participativeness, as well 
as those concerned with such aspects of store functioning as inter 
personal processes, slowness of decisionmaking, number of training 
programs and amount of peer training, were asked of both store man 
agers and shop stewards. Many of these same questions were also 
asked of the workers in the six stores where workers were inter 
viewed. In all, the shop steward and manager questionnaires had 57 
questions in common while the manager, shop steward and worker 
questionnaires had 54 questions in common.
The UFCW local 1357 and 27 shop stewards, who represent ev 
eryone in the store except the meatcutters, are generally more knowl 
edgeable about store conditions and returned more complete 
questionnaires than the UFCW local 56 shop stewards. We have, 
therefore, used the responses of the UFCW local 1357 or 27 shop 
stewards in this analysis except for the four stores where only the 
UFCW local 56 shop steward responded. An analysis of the re 
sponses of the shop stewards by union local indicates that there are 
no significant differences between them in their assessments of par 
ticipativeness and store functioning.
Analysis of the responses of the shop stewards and workers to 
questions about participation and store functioning in the six stores 
in which workers were interviewed indicates that the shop stewards' 
views are largely representative of those of the workers in their 
stores. Their views of participation are slightly less enthusiastic than 
those of other full-time workers, but more positive than those of 
part-time workers who had less opportunity to participate.
Moreover, in the 13 QWL stores, analysis of the responses of 
managers and shop stewards indicates that the two groups share very 
similar perceptions of participation and its effects. Only in the
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Table 7.1 
Comparison of Mean Values By Store Type
Variable
Worker characteristics
Percent female
Percent nonwhite
Percent high school graduate
Consultants and union
Consultants 1
Union support
Store participativeness
Manager's perceptions
Decisions about daily tasks2
Long-term decisions3
Perceived overall degree
of worker control4
Frequency of participation
Amount of say mangers have
Amount of say dept. heads have
Shop steward's perceptions
Decisions about daily tasks
Long-term decisions
Perceived overall degree
of worker control
Frequency of participation
Amount of say managers have
Amount of say dept. heads have
Store functioning
Number of employees
Pet. full time
Turnover (per year)
Absenteeism (per week)
Avg. weekly hours part time
Pet. at top pay
Pet. at bottom pay
Pet. can do more than 1 job
Innovations5
Manager's perceptions
Interpersonal interactions6
Slowness of decisionmaking7
O&O
(N=2)
42.41
5.47
94.12
13.00b'c
2.50b
7.00b'c
2.00b>c
8.50
65.00b>c
—
5.00
9.50
10.00b'c
7.00
30.00
4.50
3.50
42.00b*c
44.59b'c
8.00
2.00
20.00
44.00
13.00
49.71
10.00
22.00b>c
2.00b'c
QWL
(N=13)
39.03
21.19
77.12
2.75a
4.77a
8.15a
3.23a
6.69
23.00a
4.61
4.15
8.15C
3.00a
6.69
22.78
4.69
4.00C
96.61 a
16.45a
58.38
6.31
18.46
32.62
20.77
45.06
8.00C
19.31 a
3.08a
Non-QWL
(N = 10)
38.95
5.50
82.88
2.71 a
4.00
9.40a
2.30a
8.40
23.33a
4.60
4.60
5.30b
2.60a
4.67
12.86
4.30
2.89b
93.00a
17.17a
22.56
4.40
17.30
40.25
25.11
61.20
11.10b
21.67a
3.10a
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Table 7.1 (con't)
Variable
# of training programs since
reopening
Amt. of peer training
Manager's say over hiring
Shop steward's perceptions
Interpersonal interactions
Slowness of decisionmaking
# of training programs since
reopening
Amt. of peer training
Increased effort8
Perceived effort and
effectiveness9
Implementation of participation
Workers encouraged to attend
meetings
Worker satisfaction with
participation
Store characteristics
Size in square feet (000)
Number of competitors
1981 sales volume (000)
1981 profit (cents per $ of sales)
1981 labor productivity
1981 unit labor costs (cents
per $ of sales)
Ease of obtaining credit
Store economic outcomes
1983 sales volume (000)
Pet. sales growth 1981-83
1983 value added (cents per
$ of sales)
1983 profit (cents per $ of sales)
1983 labor productivity
1983 unit labor costs (cents
per $ of sales)
a. Significantly different from O&O;
O&O
0.00
5.00b
6.00
18.00b'c
4.50C
1.50
1.50b 'c
6.50
8.00
4.50C
4.50C
3.00b>c
18.50
6.00
4337.80b
5.31
1.45
15.67
5.00
6731.40
53.18b' c
21.18
10.39
2.32C
9.15b'c
QWL
5.85
3.62a
5.54
19.92a'c
3.15C
3.00
3.33a
6.77
7.46
3.58C
4.54C
2.66a
22.08
3.46
8293.603
5.88
1.64
14.51
4.09
9687.20
17.65a
19.61
6.92
1.78
11.16a
Non-QWL
6.22
4.30a
5.80
11.44a'b
1.75a'b
2.20
2.90a
6.00
6.89
140a,b
2.60a'b
3.50a
23.67
3.90
7556.18
6.44
1.55
14.96
4.75
9050.60
19.41 a
18.42
5.11
1.59
11.673
b. Significantly different from QWL;
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c. Significantly different from non-QWL;
p=.05.
Multi-item scales:
1. Sum of the number of times 6 kinds of assistance were received from 7 
sources.
2. Sum of 3 six-point items for influence in tasks, choice of hours, work 
ing conditions (1 =1 am not involved, 6 = 1 can decide on my own).
3. Sum of 2 six-point items for influence in capital investment and shutting 
the store (1 =1 am not involved, 6 = 1 can decide on my own).
4. Sum of 2 items, How much worker's opinions are taken into account 
when decisions are made in the store (l=none, 5 = a great deal) and 
How much say workers have in what goes on in the store (1 = very little 
say, 5 = very much say).
5. Sum of 3 items, innovations in jobs, procedures and equipment.
6. Sum of 5 items, consequences which occurred because of new system of 
decisionmaking: greater acceptance and better quality of decisions, 
higher trust of manager, more open disagreement, disagreements more 
easily resolved (1= definitely not, 5 = definitely yes).
7. Takes longer to make decisions because of the new system of decision- 
making (1= definitely not, 5 = definitely yes).
8. Sum of 2 items, How often it is true that working hard leads to high 
productivity, to doing the job well (1 = never, 5 = almost always).
9. Sum of 2 items, Extent to which the opportunity to contribute to deci 
sionmaking influences extra effort, extra effectiveness on the job 
(1 = none at all, 5 = a great deal).
non-QWL stores did we find that managers and shop stewards dif 
fered widely in their perceptions of virtually every aspect of partic 
ipation and store functioning about which both were asked. 
Compared to the shop stewards, managers of the non-QWL stores 
reported extremely optimistic views of the percentage of workers 
who participate often in store QWL meetings, of the participation of 
workers in decisions about daily tasks, of the overall degree of 
worker control, of the number of training programs in the store and 
the amount of peer training, and of improvements in interpersonal 
processes within the store as a result of the QWL program.
In non-QWL stores, managers, but not shop stewards, reported 
values for these measures as high as, or even higher than, values 
reported by managers in the QWL stores. Our interpretation of this
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discrepancy is that managers in non-QWL stores exaggerated when 
answering questions concerning participation and the effects of 
QWL on store functioning in order to impress Super Fresh corporate 
management which favors QWL and has encouraged store managers 
to implement it. For this reason, and in light of the close correspon 
dence between the views of shop stewards and managers in the QWL 
stores as well as between the responses of shop stewards and work 
ers in the six stores where both were interviewed, we have elected to 
use the shop stewards' perceptions rather than store managers' re 
sponses regarding store participativeness and its effects on store 
functioning in testing our model. Factual data from the managers' 
survey has been utilized in the analysis.
Store Economic Outcomes
Average values, by store type, for the measures of economic per 
formance are reported in table 7.1. Significant differences (p=.05) 
were identified using ANOVAs and LSD multiple range tests for 
comparison of means of groups of different size. As predicted by our 
theoretical analysis, the O&O stores with their much larger propor 
tion of full-time workers and with more workers at the top of the pay 
scale appear to have pursued sales growth more aggressively than the 
Super Fresh stores in order to spread these high, quasi-fixed labor 
costs over a larger volume of sales. Our results show that sales 
growth at the O&O stores was significantly higher than at either type 
of Super Fresh store. Sales revenues at the O&O stores increased on 
average by 53 percent between 1981 and 1983, while sales at the 
Super Fresh stores increased by 18 percent for the QWL and 19 per 
cent for the non-QWL stores.
All three types of stores actively attempted to increase productiv 
ity, reduce unit labor costs and increase profit in order to reverse the 
poor performance of the former A&P stores, become economically 
viable and protect the jobs of workers. Productivity, in this analysis, 
is defined as value added per dollar of payroll, where value added is 
the gross margin or difference between sales revenue and the cost of 
goods sold. The productivity measure preferred by economists is
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value added per employee hour, but 7 store managers failed to report 
total employee hours for their stores. A comparison of value added 
per dollar of payroll with value added per employee hour for the 18 
stores for which both measures of productivity are available shows 
that the two measures are highly correlated, with a correlation coef 
ficient of .824. Thus value added per dollar of payroll, which is 
available for all 25 stores, is a good alternative measure of produc 
tivity.
Unit labor costs are, conceptually, very closely related to produc 
tivity, especially as we have defined it above. Unit labor costs are 
defined in the usual manner as payroll costs per dollar of sales, and 
are inversely correlated with profit. For this sample, the correlation 
between profit and unit labor costs is —.752.
A comparison of 1983 average values for labor productivity and 
unit labor costs with 1981 average values indicates improvement for 
the O&O stores as well as for both QWL and non-QWL Super Fresh 
stores in comparison with the performance of the former A&P stores 
at these locations. However, the improvements were most marked for 
the O&O stores. These worker-owned stores, which had been among 
the poorest performing A&P stores, had significantly lower unit la 
bor costs in 1983 than either the QWL or non-QWL Super Fresh 
stores, despite the fact that they employ a larger proportion of full- 
time, highly paid workers. In 1983, unit labor costs in the worker- 
owned stores averaged a little more than 9 cents per dollar of sales, 
which compared favorably with the Super Fresh stores, whose unit 
labor costs averaged between 11 and 12 cents per dollar of sales. 
This was achieved despite the fact that more than 44 percent of O&O 
workers were full-time employees, compared with only 16 to 17 per 
cent full-time employees at Super Fresh. Moreover, the O&O stores 
had 44 percent of workers at the top of the pay scale, compared with 
33 percent at the QWL stores and 40 percent at the non-QWL 
stores—and fewer workers at the bottom of the pay scale—13 per 
cent compared with 21 percent at the QWL stores and 25 percent at 
the non-QWL stores. Part of the explanation for this may lie in the 
improvement in labor productivity achieved by the O&O stores, in-
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creasing from 1.45 to 2.32 between 1981 and 1983. Smaller im 
provements were achieved by the Super Fresh stores, from 1.64 to 
1.78 for the QWL stores and from 1.55 to 1.59 for the non-QWL 
stores.
Value added per dollar of sales is another interesting indicator of 
economic performance. It shows the gross margin, or difference, be 
tween sales revenue and cost of goods sold as a percent of sales. 
Higher values on this measure indicate either a higher profit margin, 
perhaps as a result of improvements in dealing with wholesalers, or a 
reduction in wastage due to spoilage, stocking inappropriate mer 
chandise, shoplifting or employee pilfering. Higher value added is 
generally associated with higher profit independent of the effect of 
unit labor costs on profit. In this sample, the correlation between 
value added per dollar of sales and the rate of profit is .973. Value 
added averaged 21 cents per dollar of sales for the O&O stores, 20 
cents per dollar of sales for the QWL stores and 18 cents per dollar 
of sales for the non-QWL stores. These differences, however, are not 
statistically significant.
The rate of profit in the retail food industry is reported per dollar 
of sales rather than as a return on assets. We were unable to obtain 
data on either the assets or fixed costs of the stores in our sample. 
Accordingly, the rate of profit in this analysis was computed by tak 
ing sales revenue less cost of goods less operating expenses less pay 
roll and then dividing by sales revenue. Multiplying by 100, we ob 
tained a rate of profit expressed in cents per dollar of sales. It should 
be understood that this is a gross profit measure which includes 
some fixed costs such as rent that would have to be subtracted in 
order to obtain a purer measure of net profit. The rate of profit for 
the O&O stores averaged over 10 cents per dollar of sales in 1983. 
This was double the rate of profit in the non-QWL stores, which 
averaged just over 5 cents per dollar of sales, and was above the 
average profit rate of 7 cents per dollar of sales for the QWL stores. 
Despite these large differences by store type in the average rate of 
profit, however, the differences were not statistically significant. 
This was due to the very large variation in the rate of profit among
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individual Super Fresh stores, both QWL and non-QWL. Differences 
in store functioning that contributed to these variations in the profit 
rate are examined below as part of the model testing.
Thus, the multiple objectives pursued by the O&O stores— 
providing full-time employment at high wages to a large proportion 
of the labor force as well as earning an acceptable rate of profit— 
did not cause profitability to suffer in comparison to Super Fresh 
stores, where the emphasis was on profit maximization.
The model developed in chapter 2 hypothesizes that worker char 
acteristics, store type, help from consultants, formal organization of 
the store and union support will influence a store's participativeness. 
Store participativeness, hi turn, is expected to affect store function 
ing—both the kind of labor strategy the firm adopts and the infor 
mal processes that go on within the store. Finally, store functioning 
and store characteristics are expected to influence the store's eco 
nomic performance—its profit, productivity and unit labor costs. 
Mean values for variables in each of these categories are also re 
ported in table 7.1.
Mean values are reported by store type, however the role of store 
type in affecting store economic outcomes cannot be inferred from 
the mean values. Caution must be exercised in interpreting these 
mean values. They are merely descriptive and neither confirm nor 
disconfirm hypothesized causal relationships. Those are tested be 
low, in a later section of this chapter.
Worker Characteristics
The O&O stores employed a higher proportion of female workers 
and a higher proportion of high school graduates while the QWL 
stores had the highest proportion of nonwhite employees. None of 
these differences is significant, however, because of the wide varia 
tion among individual stores in each category.
Consultants and Union
The O&O stores received significantly more different kinds of 
consultant help from a variety of sources than either QWL or non-
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QWL Super Fresh stores. Help from consultants is measured by a 
variable that reports the number of different types and sources of 
consulting the store received. Union support for participation was 
measured by a single five-point item on the shop steward's question 
naire that asked how much the union supported worker ownership 
(for the O&O stores) or QWL (for the Super Fresh stores). The 
O&O stores reported significantly lower union support. This surpris 
ing outcome results from the reduced role of the union in the O&O 
stores, where grievances and other differences are more likely to be 
resolved through informal processes established through participa 
tion in decisionmaking by worker/owners. In contrast, the union has 
an important, formally designated, and time-consuming role to play 
in the QWL program.
Store Participativeness
Shop stewards and store managers were asked to evaluate worker 
participation in their stores. The extent to which workers participate 
in decisionmaking within the stores can be measured along several 
dimensions, including the overall extent of worker control, the range 
of decisions in which workers participate, and the intensity of the 
participation. The overall influence of workers on decisionmaking, 
which we have termed "degree of overall worker control," combines 
the responses to the questions, "How much are workers' opinions 
taken into account?" and "How much 'say' or influence do workers 
have on what goes on in the store?" It is measured on a scale of 2 to 
10. Both managers and shop stewards rated the degree of overall 
worker control higher on average at the O&O stores, but the differ 
ence was not statistically significant.
The range of decisions over which workers have control is another 
important aspect of participation. Shop stewards at the O&O and 
QWL stores rated workers as having significantly more control over 
decisions relating to daily work—schedule, working conditions and 
tasks—in comparison with the rating by shop stewards at non-QWL 
stores. Shop stewards rated workers at O&O stores as having signif 
icantly more control over such long-term decisions as capital invest-
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ments or shutdowns than workers at either QWL or non-QWL Super 
Fresh stores. Managers at the non-QWL stores, however, rated their 
workers significantly higher than other workers were rated in control 
over decisions about daily work; and managers at O&O stores rated 
their workers significantly lower than managers at Super Fresh stores 
in control over long-term decisions. The shop stewards' perceptions 
of the range of issues over which workers have control in each type 
of store closely parallel those of the workers themselves (compare 
table 7.1 and table 6.2 in chapter 6).
Workers at O&O stores were more likely than other workers to 
participate often in decisionmaking. When asked to give the percent 
distribution of workers who participate often, sometimes, rarely or 
never, managers at O&O stores reported that 65 percent of workers 
participate "often," compared with 23 percent at both QWL and 
non-QWL Super Fresh stores. Shop stewards estimate the proportion 
who participate "often" more conservatively. According to the shop 
stewards, 30 percent of O&O workers, 23 percent of QWL workers 
and 13 percent of non-QWL workers participate "often."
The distribution of power in the hierarchy, measured by how much 
"say" or influence managers (also called store directors) and depart 
ment heads have, is another indicator of store participativeness (see 
figures 6.1 and 6.2). O&O managers did not answer this question 
about themselves; they rated the influence of department heads as 
very high (a score of 5 on a scale of 1 to 5). Managers at both QWL 
and non-QWL stores rated both themselves and department heads as 
influential in decisionmaking (scores of approximately 4.6 out of 5). 
Shop stewards at the O&O stores rated the amount of influence 
managers have as high (4.5) and that of department heads as some 
what lower (3.5). These ratings probably reflect the fact that the 
managers at both of the O&O stores are also owners and have a very 
influential position as a result. Shop stewards at the Super Fresh 
stores gave high ratings to the amount of influence managers have at 
both QWL and non-QWL stores. As would be expected if QWL 
were effective, department heads at QWL stores were rated as sig 
nificantly more influential than department heads at non-QWL
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stores. This is because QWL gives a large, formal role to department 
heads, as part of the store planning board, in influencing decisions.
Store Functioning
Under store functioning, we examined the strategies stores adopt 
in training and deploying workers, as well as the nature of informal 
store processes. Our hypothesis, tested later in this chapter, is that 
store participativeness influences both of these aspects of store func 
tioning. More participative stores are expected to do better in meet 
ing worker requirements for hours of work, to provide more training 
and to be more innovative. They are also expected to encourage peer 
training. In addition, participation is expected to have a positive ef 
fect on what we have termed interpersonal processes—the quality of 
decisionmaking and the willingness of people to accept decisions, 
the degree of trust between manager and workers, the discussion and 
resolution of disagreements or conflicts, as well as how much people 
know about what is going on. More worker participation may, how 
ever, slow down the decisionmaking process. It is via these changes 
in store functioning that greater store participativeness is expected to 
translate into higher productivity and profit.
Labor Strategies
The effects of participation and the QWL program at Super Fresh 
have been distorted by a labor contract that works at cross purposes 
to some of the goals of participation as discussed in chapters 4 and 
5. The contract established a two-tier wage system paying new em 
ployees substantially less than former A&P workers, and it devel 
oped a bonus plan in which workers in stores that hold down unit 
labor costs receive a share of the store's profits, distributed among 
workers according to the number of hours worked.
The result is that managers at some of the QWL stores, with the 
participation and support of the department heads who make up 
most of the full-time workers, have adopted a labor strategy that 
penalizes the rest of the store's labor force. They have attempted to
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keep unit labor costs low by holding down the number of full-time 
workers and by encouraging turnover so that more workers will be at 
the bottom of the pay scale. The large number of part-time employ 
ees in these stores are disenfranchised from effective participation in 
the QWL program and in decisionmaking. This labor strategy is 
even harsher in its treatment of new employees than the strategy 
adopted at many of the non-QWL stores, though former A&P work 
ers, who are prominent among full-time workers in these stores, may 
have benefited from QWL.
These approaches to labor strategy show up clearly in table 7.1. 
The O&O stores, as noted above, have a higher percentage of full- 
time workers and a higher percentage at the top of the pay scale. 
Non-QWL stores have, on average, a slightly larger percentage of 
full-time workers and a larger percentage of workers at the top of the 
pay scale than QWL stores. Part-time workers at the O&O stores 
average more weekly hours (20 compared with 18 and 17 at QWL 
and non-QWL stores), and a smaller percentage of O&O workers are 
at the bottom of the pay scale (13 percent compared with 21 and 25 
percent respectively). Turnover and absenteeism are also highest, on 
average, for the QWL stores and lowest for the O&Os. Averages can 
be misleading, however. There was wide variation in the perfor 
mance of QWL stores on all aspects of labor strategy, and mean 
differences by store type, while large, were usually not significant.
Non-QWL stores had more workers who could be assigned to 
more than one job and had introduced more innovations in job de 
sign and ways of doing things, according to the managers, than other 
stores. These questions were not asked of the shop stewards. Again, 
the very positive responses of managers at non-QWL stores to these 
and other questions appear to reflect their overly optimistic view of 
events in their stores.
Informal Store Processes
Managers at non-QWL stores rated the positive effects of partici 
pation on the quality of decisionmaking, trust, conflict resolution
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and other interpersonal processes nearly twice as high as did shop 
stewards at those same stores. They also gave higher ratings to the 
amount of peer training than did shop stewards and reported signif 
icantly more slowing down of the speed of decisionmaking as a re 
sult of QWL. Managers at O&O stores gave significantly higher 
ratings to the positive effects of participation on interpersonal inter 
actions and reported that participation slowed down decisionmaking 
to a lesser extent than Super Fresh managers at either QWL or non- 
QWL stores. The O&O shop stewards' rating of the effect on inter 
personal interactions, while not significantly different from the 
managers' perceptions, were somewhat lower. This may account for 
the fact that the QWL stores scored significantly higher than the 
other two store types, and the non-QWL stores scored significantly 
lower in the shop stewards' ratings of effect of participation on in 
terpersonal interactions. O&O shop stewards also reported the great 
est slow down of decisionmaking, and non-QWL shop stewards the 
least, as a result of participation.
Both managers and shop stewards reported fewer training pro 
grams at the O&O stores since reopening. This is because these 
stores (and some of the QWL stores as well) had many training pro 
grams prior to reopening and, unfortunately, we did not ask ques 
tions on the survey that allowed this training to be captured. We do 
know from the personal interviews that workers remember little from 
the programs and claim to have learned most of what they know 
about operations and governance after the stores opened.
The shop stewards were also asked about the effects of participa 
tion on worker motivation. There were no significant differences 
among the stores in perceptions that extra effort makes a difference, 
or in the perception that participation in decisionmaking makes extra 
effort and hard work effective in increasing productivity. Our mea 
sure of extra effort is based on two items: how often it is true that 
working hard leads to high productivity or to doing the job well. Our 
measure of perceived effectiveness comes from the two items: extent 
to which the opportunity to contribute to decisionmaking influences 
extra effort or extra effectiveness on the job.
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Store Characteristics
The O&O stores, on average, are somewhat smaller, have more 
competitors, and obtain credit more easily than the Super Fresh 
stores, though none of these differences are significant. As A&P 
stores in 1981, the O&O stores had had the poorest economic per 
formance while the QWL stores had, on average, the best.
Testing the Model
The model developed in chapter 2 hypothesizes that worker par 
ticipation in decisionmaking within stores depends on worker char 
acteristics, type of formal store structure (i.e., worker-owned, 
conventional ownership with QWL, conventional ownership without 
full implementation of QWL) and union and consultant support in 
implementing participation. Store functioning—both the informal 
processes that go on within stores and the strategies which stores 
adopt with respect to the training and deployment of workers—is 
hypothesized to depend on store participativeness and the business 
environment. Finally, the model hypothesizes that store economic 
outcomes are affected by store functioning and store characteristics.
The model to be tested is described by the following system of 
equations:
(Eq. 7.1) participativeness = f(Worker Characteristics, Store Type, 
Union Support, Consultant Help).
(Eq. 7.2) store functioning = f(Participativeness, Business Environ 
ment).
(Eq. 7.3) store economic outcomes = f(Store Functioning, Store 
Characteristics).
Participation is measured by overall extent of worker control or, 
alternatively, by degree of involvement in a range of decisions. In 
the latter case, two participation equations are estimated, one for 
participation in daily decisions and one for participation in long- 
term decisions.
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A large number of store functioning variables are available in our 
data set. They include labor strategy variables such as percent offull- 
time workers, average weekly hours of part-time workers, percent at 
the bottom of the pay scale and amount of peer training. They also 
include variables that measure informal store processes—whether 
workers are making a greater effort, whether they believe that work 
ing harder gets results, whether interpersonal interactions have im 
proved, whether participation has slowed decisionmaking, whether 
workers are satisfied with participation.
Store economic outcomes are measured by profit, productivity, 
and unit labor costs. A separate version of the model is estimated for 
each of these outcomes.
Methodological Issues
The theoretical model underlying this study is essentially recur 
sive, however we have estimated the system of equations using 
Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) to allow for the possibility of un 
specified interactions among the dependent variables.
The small size of our sample—data for 25 stores—affected the 
way we tested the model. As table 7.1 shows, there are many possi 
ble measures in our data set for each of the variables in the model. 
The small sample size precludes use of more than a few of these in 
any particular test of the model. We have, therefore, tested alterna 
tive versions of the theoretical model using different measures of 
participation and of store functioning. One version used involvement 
in a range of decisions—decisions about daily tasks and long-term 
decisions—as the measure of participation. A second version of the 
model used the overall degree of worker control as the measure of 
participation.
In the case of store functioning, fidelity to the theoretical model 
led us to include one measure of informal store processes and one 
measure of labor strategy in each variant of the model. The results 
for 10 such pairs of store functioning variables are reported in tables 
7.3 through 7.12. These variants of the model are tested first using
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degree of involvement in a range of decisions in which workers par 
ticipate as the measure of participation and then using overall degree 
of worker control. We report results, in all, for 20 variants of the 
model, each run three times with profit, productivity and unit labor 
costs entered separately as the dependent variable in the store eco 
nomic outcome equation.
Each of the structural equations in the model is identified. Thus, 
using Three-Stage Least Squares to estimate the coefficients yields 
estimates that are both consistent and asymptotically efficient. That 
is, we have used the available data as efficiently as possible and 
have obtained consistent estimates of the coefficients. The signs of 
the coefficients are, in general, as hypothesized in the theoretical 
model. The small size of the sample suggests the importance of ex 
ercising caution in interpreting tests of hypotheses, however. While 
the test statistics are distributed asymptotically normal (0,1), very 
little is known about their actual distribution when the sample size is 
small and the number of observations, as in this study, is in the 
range of 10 to 25. We think that the large t-statistics on many of the 
key model variables, frequently greater than 3 and sometimes even 
greater than 4, create a strong presumption that the true coefficients 
of these variables are not zero and that these variables do have the 
effects hypothesized in the model.
Even recognizing the limitations of the small sample size, it seems 
reasonable to conclude, as we do in the next section of this chapter, 
that the data provide support for the hypotheses regarding the influ 
ence of ownership and participation on the economic performance of 
stores. Certainly, the model warrants further and more conclusive 
testing with a larger number of firms.
Results of the Model Testing
The participation equations were estimated as part of the system 
of equations in each of the 20 versions of the model reported here. 
Half of the model variants employ two equations for range of deci- 
sionmaking—participation in decisions about daily tasks, participa-
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tion in long-term decisions—as the participation variables; half 
employ a single equation for overall degree of worker control. On 
the basis of a preliminary regression analysis that included such vari 
ables as race, sex and seniority, we selected the percentage of high 
school graduates in a store as the most appropriate measure of 
worker characteristics for inclusion in the participation equations. 
Store type is measured in these equations by two dummy variables, 
one for QWL and one for worker-owned, with non-QWL as the 
omitted category. Consultant help counts the number of different 
kinds and different sources of consulting the store received. Union 
support had to be omitted from the analysis because several shop 
stewards did not answer this question.
Participation Equations
As described above, we estimated many variations of the basic 
model and each of the participation equations appears in 20 model 
runs. The results of the model testing for the version using involve 
ment in a range of decisions (daily and long-term decisions) as the 
measures of participativeness are reported in the two left-hand col 
umns of each table (7.2 to 7.12); results for the alternative version, 
which uses degree of overall worker control, are reported in the two 
right-hand columns of each table.
Table 7.2 reports typical coefficient estimators and t-statistics for 
the variables in the participation equations (Eq. 7.1). They are re 
ported for the version of the model in which store functioning is 
measured by percent full time and increased effort (N of stores = 
23), and in which profit is the dependent variable in the economic 
outcome equation. Estimates of the coefficients may vary in other 
model specifications, but variables with large t-statistics had such 
t-values in all model runs. The small number of observations makes 
us cautious about drawing inferences.
The high t-value for the education variable in each of the partici 
pation equations suggests that the proportion of high school gradu 
ates in a store increases worker participation in decisions about daily 
tasks and in decisions with long-term implications and also increases
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the perceived overall degree of worker control. That is, the worker 
characteristic variable of education has a positive effect on all mea 
sures of participation.
Worker ownership appears to increase worker involvement in 
long-term decisions compared with traditionally-owned and 
managed-stores, but, surprisingly, it does not increase participation 
in decisions about daily tasks nor does it increase the degree of over 
all worker control. Workers in stores with formal QWL programs 
may participate more in decisions about daily tasks and may have a 
greater degree of overall worker control than those in stores without 
such QWL programs, but the evidence is inconclusive. This finding 
is probably an artifact of the small number of O&O stores and the 
wide variation in participativeness for the QWL stores.
Another explanation for the unexpected finding about the effect of 
worker ownership is that the structures of formal decisionmaking in 
the worker-owned stores tend to be reserved for long-term decisions. 
Worker/owners may be very autonomous in their daily tasks, as the 
discussion in chapter 5 indicates. They may not report high degrees 
of worker control because they make their decisions informally and 
not in structured meetings.
Store Functioning Equations
Tables 7.3 through 7.12 report the effects of participation in deci 
sionmaking on store functioning (top half of each table) and the ef 
fects of store functioning on each of the store economic outcomes 
(bottom half of each table). The hypothesis that worker participation 
in decisionmaking affects store functioning receives some support in 
this analysis.
With respect to measures of labor strategy, greater participation in 
long-term decisionmaking increases the percentage of full-time 
workers in a store (tables 7.3 to 7.9), but it does not affect the av 
erage number of hours worked by part-time employees (tables 7.10 
to 7.12) or the percent of workers at the bottom of the pay scale 
(table 7.12). Regardless of store type, greater involvement in daily-
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decisions does lead to higher average work hours for part-time work 
ers (tables 7.10 to 7.12), but does not affect the proportion of full- 
time workers (tables 7.3 to 7.9). Contrary to our hypothesis, 
however, greater worker participation in daily decisions is associated 
with a higher percentage of workers at the bottom of the pay scale 
(table 7.12). This apparent paradox may result from the fact that in 
those Super Fresh stores where former A&P workers are favored in 
their hours, managers have attempted to hold down costs by hiring a 
larger number of low-paid new workers in part-time jobs. The older 
workers, with longer or full-time hours, who participate in daily de 
cisions may not object to this management strategy.
The third measure of participativeness, perceived degree of overall 
worker control, affects store labor strategy as well, regardless of 
store type. Greater perceived overall worker control in a store leads 
to a larger proportion of full-time workers (tables 7.3 to 7.9) and 
leads to a higher average number of hours worked by part-timers 
(tables 7.10 to 7.12). It also appears to increase the proportion of 
employees at the bottom of the pay scale (table 7.12).
While many of these results tend to confirm the model, one can 
not rule out reverse causation. In other words, the presence of 
former A&P workers who have more full-time positions or part-time 
positions with more hours may itself lead to greater perceived overall 
worker control.
With respect to other aspects of store functioning, those having to 
do with internal store processes, the hypothesis that greater partici 
pation in long-term decisions would be a positive influence was not 
confirmed in the analyses (tables 7.3 to 7.12). Other measures of 
participativeness did act in accordance with our hypotheses, how 
ever. Both involvement in daily decisions and perceived overall 
worker control appear to improve the quality of interpersonal inter 
actions (tables 7.3 and 7.11), to lead to greater effort (tables 7.4 and 
7.10), to strengthen the perception that participation makes working 
hard more effective (table 7.5), to lead to more innovation (table 
7.8), and to increase the amount of peer training (table 7.9). Partic 
ipativeness also appears to slow decisionmaking (table 7.6). In addi-
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tion, greater perceived overall worker control increases satisfaction 
with participation (table 7.7).
Measures of the business environment, such as the availability of 
credit, did not appear from our preliminary statistical work to affect 
store functioning. Thus, these measures are not included in the final 
analysis.
Store Economic Outcomes
There appears to be support for the hypothesis that participative- 
ness—particularly as measured by involvement in decisions about 
daily tasks and by overall worker control—improves store function 
ing, which in turn improves the economic performance of stores.
Each of the store economic outcomes is estimated in each variant 
of the model as a function of two store functioning variables and the 
number of competitors (Eq. 7.3). Other measures of store character 
istics and the business environment, including availability of credit, 
floor area of store in square feet, and 1981 sales volume, were in 
cluded in other analyses of the model. None had high t-values in any 
of the versions of the model, however, and the analyses are not re 
ported here. The results from (Eq. 7.3) are found in the bottom 
halves of tables 7.3 to 7.12.
Unit labor costs are measured in the usual way as payroll per dol 
lar of sales, but productivity is measured in this analysis by value 
added per dollar of payroll rather than per hour of work. As a result, 
increases in productivity as measured here need not reduce unit labor 
costs. It is still true for our measures of profit, productivity, and unit 
labor costs that an increase in productivity, other things equal, in 
creases profit while an increase in unit labor costs reduces profit. 
Thus developments within supermarkets that have the effect of in 
creasing unit labor costs may nevertheless increase profit if they have 
a sufficiently positive effect on productivity. Conversely, store poli 
cies designed to reduce unit labor costs may actually reduce profit if 
they have a sufficiently negative effect on productivity.
The effects of store functioning—labor strategies and informal 
store processes—on productivity, labor costs and profit are possibly 
the most important of our results. Table 7.3 examines the joint ef-
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fects of the proportion of full-time workers and interpersonal inter 
actions. We find that a larger proportion of full-time workers neither 
increases unit labor costs nor raises productivity, and hence it has no 
effect on profit. Improved interpersonal interactions raises unit labor 
costs, but it also increases productivity. The net effect on profit, if 
any, is probably positive.
Table 7.4 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time 
workers and productivity-enhancing effort. Again, the percent of 
full-time workers does not affect labor costs, productivity or profit. 
An environment in which increased effort pays off does appear to 
increase costs, but it also increases productivity. As a result, profit is 
neither increased nor reduced.
Table 7.5 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time 
workers and of effective effort through worker participation in deci- 
sionmaking. Again, percent full time has no effect on labor costs, 
productivity and profit, while increased effort and effectiveness 
raised both labor costs and productivity. The joint effect leaves profit 
unaffected.
Table 7.6 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time 
workers and any slowdown in decisionmaking that occurs. The ef 
fects of full-time work are the same as before. Slower decisionmak 
ing raises labor costs, but the decisions are apparently better 
decisions. Productivity is higher where decisionmaking is slower and 
the net effect on profit, if any, is positive.
Table 7.7 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time 
workers and satisfaction with participation. Again, proportion full 
time has no effect. Unit labor costs are higher in stores in which 
workers are perceived as more satisfied with participation. Produc 
tivity in such stores is, if anything, higher and profit is not affected.
Proportion full time is combined with innovativeness of the store 
in table 7.8. Again proportion full time has no effect while greater 
innovativeness increases both labor costs and productivity and has no 
effect on profit.
Table 7.9 examines the joint effect of the proportion of full-time 
workers and the amount of peer training. As with the other store 
process variables, peer training increases both labor costs and pro-
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ductivity but has no effect on profit. Proportion full time, as usual, 
has no effect on labor costs and profit though it may have a positive 
effect on productivity. This suggests the possibility of an interaction 
between the proportion of full-time workers and the amount of peer 
training, which affects productivity.
Table 7.10 examines the joint effect of average hours for part-time 
workers and of productivity-enhancing effort. Consistent with the re 
sults reported in table 7.4, increasing the hours of part-time workers 
does not increase labor costs or productivity and has no effect on 
profit. It is surprising that increased effort in this analysis also has 
no effect on labor costs, productivity or profit.
Table 7.11 examines the joint effect of average hours of part-time 
workers and interpersonal interactions. Consistent with table 7.3, the 
result of improved interpersonal interactions is to raise productivity 
and profit. However, the result of increasing the hours of part-time 
workers obtained here is somewhat anomalous in light of the find 
ings in model runs reported in earlier tables. Unit labor costs are 
increased, productivity is unaffected and profit, if anything, may be 
reduced.
Discussion
Though small sample size requires that caution be exercised in 
drawing conclusions, we interpret these results as providing strong 
support for several of our central hypotheses. We cannot confirm an 
independent role for the influence of worker ownership on store 
functioning, however. This may well be a statistical artifact due to 
the fact that only two of the stores are worker-owned.
The unique effect of worker ownership on the operation of super 
markets occurs mainly through its effects on the goals of worker- 
owned firms. In addition to high profits, these include full-time 
hours at high wages for worker/owners. Our analysis indicates that 
these latter goals have been accomplished without increasing unit la 
bor costs or reducing profit in comparison with firms with a higher 
proportion of part-time workers or a higher proportion of workers at 
the bottom of the pay scale.
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Greater participation in decisions about daily tasks and a higher 
overall degree of worker control, whether as a result of worker own 
ership or a QWL program, improves the effectiveness of informal 
store processes. More effective store processes—improved interper 
sonal interactions, increased effort, increased effectiveness, more 
peer training, more innovativeness, greater satisfaction with partici 
pation and even the slowing down of decisionmaking as workers par 
ticipate—all appear to contribute to greater productivity. Thus, 
despite the higher labor costs associated with more effective store 
processes, profit does not appear to be reduced. If anything, im 
proved interpersonal interactions and slower decisionmaking as a re 
sult of participation may increase profit.
Findings with respect to labor strategies are somewhat surprising. 
A higher percentage of full-time workers and, with the possible ex 
ception of one of the model runs, increasing the hours of part-time 
workers do not appear to increase labor costs. A higher proportion at 
the bottom of the pay scale does not appear to reduce them. Further, 
having more full-time workers or fewer workers at the bottom of 
the pay scale does not appear to raise productivity, while the pro 
ductivity effect of more hours for part-time workers is ambiguous. 
The effects of these variables on profit are weaker but in the same 
direction as their effects on productivity. That is, increasing the 
hours of work of part-timers does not reduce, and may even in 
crease, profit; while having many low-paid workers does not in 
crease, and may reduce, profit.
An important implication of this finding is that if Super Fresh bo 
nuses were tied to increases in productivity or profit, rather than to 
reductions in unit labor costs, then: impacts might be very different. 
Stores have been rewarded for reducing labor costs without taking 
into consideration the strategies employed to achieve this end and 
the effect of such strategies on productivity. It is likely that bonuses 
have gone to some stores which would not have received them if 
profit, rather than unit labor costs, had been the criterion of eco 
nomic performance. The bonus provision of the contract distorted 
the incentives for both managers and full-time workers, and resulted 
in incorrect decisions in some stores regarding how the store should 
function.
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Nevertheless, punitive labor strategies engaged in by some man 
agers—reducing the percentage of full-time workers, reducing the 
hours of part-timers, encouraging high turnover so that many work 
ers earn entry level wages—are not particularly successful strategies 
for reducing unit labor costs. They are even less effective in raising 
profit. Yet these are the usual justifications for such strategies.
The profit of firms that provide a greater proportion of full-time 
jobs, more hours for part-timers, fewer jobs at the bottom of the pay 
scale, greater participation for workers in decisions about daily 
tasks, and higher overall worker control does not suffer in compari 
son with the profit of firms that adopt more punitive labor strategies 
and more authoritarian management techniques.
In general, improvements in the quality of jobs do appear to raise 
unit labor costs. However, these improvements in the quality of work 
also make it possible for workers to do their jobs better and have a 
positive effect on productivity. As a result, profit is not jeopardized 
when better jobs and working conditions are provided, despite the 
increase in unit labor costs. Profit does not appear to be lower in 
stores in which the quality of jobs is better. Improving interpersonal 
interactions and slowing down decisions through participation in de- 
cisionmaking may actually increase profit.
These conclusions challenge the conventional wisdom among 
managers about strategies for increasing profit. In our sample of 
stores, so-called cost-cutting labor strategies did not reduce unit la 
bor costs or raise profit. And participative management and more 
effective store processes raised unit labor costs but, because of their 
positive effect on productivity, did not reduce profit. These results of 
our analysis, which must be viewed as tentative until they are repli 
cated in other studies in which the sample of firms is larger, raise 
serious questions about the wisdom of managerial decisions adopted 
by many service sector firms today as they attempt to become more 
competitive and to increase profitability.
To see these store outcomes in a broader perspective, we need to 
integrate them with the results reported in previous chapters. The 
following final chapter presents this integration and the policy impli 
cations which we draw from this experience.
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NOTE
1. Payroll, or the wage bill, is the product of the average wage (w) and total employee hours 
(N). It can be written wN while output can be written Q. Then unit labor costs can be ex 
pressed as ULC = wN/Q. Q/N is output per employee hour or average product. It follows that 
unit labor costs equal the average wage divided by the average product of labor.
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Table 7.2 
Participation in Decisionmaking
Involvement
(N = 23)
Overall control
(N=24)
Equation Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Participation1 (Eq. 7.1)
Involvement in decisions— 
daily tasks*
% high school graduates 7.226 6.799 
QWL store type2 2.810 2.583 
O&O store type2 2.360 1.043 
Consultants -0.033 -0.193
Involvement in decisions— 
long term
% high school graduates 3.024 7.203 
QWL store type 0.227 0.536 
O&O store type 6.682 7.258 
Consultants 0.043 0.655
Degree of overall 
worker control
% high school graduates 6.028 
QWL store type2 1.728 
O&O store type2 1.486 
Consultants 0.051
7.658
2.314
0.958
0.407
*In reading this and subsequent tables, note that the dependent variable in a 
particular model equation is printed flush with the left hand margin while 
the independent variables for the equation are indented under it. Thus, in 
the first equation reported here, "Involvement in decisions, daily tasks" is 
the dependent variable and the "percent of high school graduates" em 
ployed in the store has a positive effect on this measure of participativeness.
1. All measures of participation reported in this and subsequent tables 
were derived from shop stewards' responses.
2. Both measures of store type are dummy coded against the omitted type, 
non-QWL.
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Table 7.3
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and 
Interpersonal Interactions as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N = 21)
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 22)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Percent full time
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Interpersonal interactions 
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Coefficient
0.009 
0.041
2.090 
0.594
t-value
1.363 
3.046
5.175 
0.701
Coefficient
0.030
2.839
t-value
8.374
16.154
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity 
Percent full time
Interpersonal interactions 
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Percent full time
Interpersonal interactions 
# of competitors
Profit
Percent full time
Interpersonal interactions 
# of competitors
1.730
0.076 
0.026
0.109
0.005 
0.003
-0.000
0.003 
0.001
0.800
3.519 
0.363
0.789
3.125 
0.671
-0.001
2.358 
0.146
0.473
0.081 
0.051
-0.001
0.005 
0.004
-0.062
0.004 
0.002
0.210
4.264 
0.664
-0.009
4.391 
1.283
-0.376
2.828 
0.304
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.4
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time 
and Increased Effort as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N=22)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7
Percent full time
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
Increased effort
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq.
Productivity
Percent full time
Increased effort
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Percent full time
Increased effort
# of competitors
Profit
Percent full time
Increased effort
# of competitors
Coefficient
.2)
0.008
0.041
0.880
-0.053
7.3)
1.754
0.207
0.009
-0.045
0.018
-0.001
0.098
0.006
0.001
t-value
1.301
3.620
5.724
-0.179
0.924
3.084
0.108
-0.390
4.481
-0.127
0.772
1. 417
0.159
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 24)
Coefficient
0.032
1.061
0.514
0.232
0.027
-0.199
0.021
0.003
0.068
0.007
0.001
t-value
9.217
13.972
0.292
3.904
0.339
-1.872
5.881
0.639
0.563
1.762
0.165
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.5
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and 
Perceived Effort and Effectiveness as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N = 22)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7,
Percent full time
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Perceived effort and
effectiveness
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq.
Productivity 
Percent full time
Effort and effectiveness
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Percent full time
Effort and effectiveness
# of competitors
Profit
Percent full time
Effort and effectiveness
# of competitors
Coefficient
.2)
0.008 
0.040
1.024 
-0.061
7.3)
1.851
0.180
0.001
-0.052
0.016
-0.000
0.108
0.006
-0.000
t-value
1.412 
3.560
5.204 
-0.162
1.177
4.037
0.021
-0.520
5.458
0.095
0.896
1.696
-0.051
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 23)
Coefficient
0.032
1.190
0.843
0.215
-0.006
-0.213
0.019
0.002
0.106
0.007
-0.002
t-value
8.960
17.455
0.531
4.763
-0.090
-2.116
6.705
0.638
0.873
-1.993
-0.341
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
244 Economic Performance
Table 7.6
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and Slowness 
of Decisionmaking as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N = 21)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Percent full time
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Slowness of decisionmaking 
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity 
Percent full time
Slow decisionmaking 
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Percent full time
Slow decisionmaking 
# of competitors
Profit
Percent full time
Slow decisionmaking 
# of competitors
Coefficient
0.008 
0.040
1.299 
0.195
-1.110
0.608 
0.042
-0.041
0.036 
0.002
-0.104
0.027 
0.002
t-value
1.280 
3.424
3.747 
1.298
-0.407
3.592 
0.579
-0.232
3.235 
0.553
-0.596
2.527 
0.301
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 22)
Coefficient
0.032
0.478
-2.518
0.653 
0.074
-0.256
0.044 
0.006
-0.144
0.029 
0.002
t-value
8.628
13.946
-1.163
4.773 
1.025
-1.898
5.091 
1.688
-0.943
3.060 
0.418
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.7
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and 
Satisfaction With Participation as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N = 18)
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 20)
Equation Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
8.002
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Percent full time
Daily decisions 0.006 1.263 
Long-term decisions 0.040 4.608 
Overall worker control 0.030
Satisfaction with 
participation
Daily decisions 0.324 2.403 
Long-term decisions —0.202 0.738 
Overall worker control 0.512
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
Percent full time 2.091 0.831 3.202 
Satisfaction with 
participation 0.397 2.175 0.329
# of competitors 0.020 0.201 0.034
Unit labor costs
Percent full time -0.162 -1.114 -0.160 
Satisfaction with 
participation 0.051 4.914 0.049
# of competitors -0.003 -0.584 - 0.001
Profit
Percent full time 0.153 0.853 0.272 
Satisfaction with 
participation 0.007 0.534 -0.001
# of competitors 0.002 0.319 0.004
7.003
1.574
2.277
0.380
-1.536
6.290
-0.221
1.660
-0.099 
0.506
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.8
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and 
Innovations as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N=23)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7
Percent full time
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Innovations
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq.
Productivity 
Percent full time
Innovations
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Percent full time
Innovations
# of competitors
Profit
Percent full time
Innovations
# of competitors
Coefficient
.2)
0.009 
0.039
1.171 
0.152
7.3)
1.908
0.118
0.046
-0.150
0.014
0.002
0.161
0.002
0.003
t-value
1.527 
3.484
3.458 
0.234
1.204
3.492
0.712
-1.549
6.904
0.572
1.271
0.631
0.548
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 24)
Coefficient
0.033
1.480
3.451
0.090
0.041
-0.169
0.014
0.004
0.297
-0.000
0.002
t-value
9.359
1.001
2.321
2.766
0.633
-1.991
7.451
1.312
2.442
-0.181
0.279
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.9
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and 
Amount of Peer Training as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N = 23)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7
Percent full time
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Peer training 
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq.
Productivity 
Percent full time
Peer training 
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Percent full time
Peer training 
# of competitors
Profit
Percent full time
Peer training 
# of competitors
Coefficient
.2)
0.008 
0.041
0.543 
-0.304
7.3)
3.623
0.302 
0.019
0.090
0.028 
0.002
0.170
0.009 
0.001
t-value
1.359 
3.618
7.246 
-2.121
2.497
3.864 
0.278
1.169
6.421 
0.502
1.555
1.496 
0.150
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 23)
Coefficient
0.032
0.500
3.558
0.285 
0.033
0.058
0.027 
0.003
0.175
0.008 
0.001
t-value
8.854
13.111
2.458
3.769 
0.468
0.781
6.744 
1.164
1.560
1.398 
0.172
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.10
System of Equations* that Includes Average Hours Worked 
Part Time and Increased Effort as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N = 22)
Equation Coefficient
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2) 
Avg. hours PT 
Daily decisions 2.331 
Long-term decisions 0. 124 
Overall worker control
Increased effort
Daily decisions 
Long-term decisions 
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq.
Productivity 
Avg. hours PT 
Increased effort
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Avg. hours PT 
Increased effort
# of competitors
Profit
Avg. hours PT 
Increased effort
# of competitors
0.891 
-0.086
7.3)
0.153 
-0.189
0.045
0.004 
0.002
0.001
-0.006 
-0.009
0.003
t-value
6.349 
0.177
5.813 
-0.292
1.611 
-0.643
0.514
1.099 
0.149
0.236
-0.818 
-0.395
0.437
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 22)
Coefficient
2.954
1.059
0.146 
-0.193
0.083
0.001 
0.015
-0.002
0.007 
-0.013
0.005
t-value
13.336
13.943
1.809 
-0.762
1.063
0.167 
0.808
-0.398
1.052 
-0.602
0.731
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.11
System of Equations* that Includes Average Hours Worked Part 
Time and Interpersonal Interactions as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N = 21)
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 22)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Avg. hours PT
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
Interpersonal interactions
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
Coefficient
2.310
0.443
2.069
0.638
t-value
6.097
0.565
5.220
0.770
Coefficient
2.983
2.837
t-value
12.230
16.149
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
Avg. hours PT
Interpersonal interactions
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Avg. hours PT
Interpersonal interactions
# of competitors
Profit
Avg. hours PT
Interpersonal interactions
# of competitors
-0.010
0.102
0.037
0.007
-0.001
0.001
-0.006
0.010
0.002
-0.298
2.841
0.661
4.745
-0.913
0.606
-2.125
3.292
0.329
-0.023
0.106
0.074
0.006
-0.000
0.003
-0.006
0.009
0.003
-0.637
2.949
1.362
3.625
-0.101
1.544
-2.100
3.196
0.730
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.12
System of Equations* that Includes Average Hours Worked
Part Time and Percent at the Bottom of the Pay Scale as Measures
of Store Functioning
Including degree 
of involvement
(N=22)
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7
Avg. hours PT
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
Percent at bottom pay
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq.
Productivity
Avg. hours PT
Percent at bottom pay
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
Avg. hours PT
Percent at bottom pay
# of competitors
Profit
Avg. hours PT
Percent at bottom pay
# of competitors
Coefficient
.2)
2.299
0.115
3.039
-0.742
7.3)
1.153
-0.054
0.026
0.004
0.002
0.000
0.009
-0.005
0.002
t-value
6.592
0.172
3.652
-0.478
3.712
-1.779
0.513
1.682
1.220
0.053
2.546
-1.912
0.402
Including overall 
worker control
(N = 23)
Coefficient
2.885
3.133
0.152
-0.063
0.059
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.010
-0.006
0.002
t-value
13.496
5.809
4.972
-2.795
1.185
1.361
2.219
0.877
3.810
-3.260
0.589
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Conclusions and Implications
The preceding three chapters presented data from semistructured 
interviews with former A&P workers who took jobs in the O&O 
worker buyouts and in the Super Fresh supermarkets, from a survey 
questionnaire filled out by those workers, and from surveys of shop 
stewards and managers in their stores. These data provided material 
for analyses of individual and store processes and outcomes utilizing 
the theoretical model presented in chapter 2. In this final chapter, we 
summarize and discuss the findings and draw some conclusions with 
respect to both that model and policies that might be considered by 
those interested in job-saving efforts, quality of worklife programs, 
employee ownership, and related subjects.
The Philadelphia A&P shutdowns and subsequent openings of two 
job-saving efforts provided a unique opportunity for research. Be 
cause the industry, geographic location, previous economic environ 
ment, and labor force were common to all stores, we could focus 
specifically on the relationships among ownership, participation, 
store functioning, and outcomes. In addition, our use of different 
methods—surveys and interviews—to look at some of the same 
phenomena helped to interpret the findings. The consistency of re 
sults from these methods gave us confidence in the findings, despite 
the small sample size.
Though the setting was favorable for research, it had limitations 
as well. First, with workers in only six stores studied intensively, an 
overall total of 25 stores for which data on store-level processes and 
outcomes were collected, and only two of this total being worker 
buyouts, the sample size requires caution about statistical inferences.
Second, the sample of workers focused on those in the new set 
tings who had formerly been A&P employees and whose jobs were
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in some way saved. We cannot say much about the effectiveness of 
the job-saving efforts for those employees who had not experienced 
the shutdown.
While the Super Fresh supermarket chain or the unions can claim 
that thousands of jobs were saved which otherwise might have been 
lost, they cannot claim that thousands of former A&P workers had 
their working lives and economic fortunes fully restored from the 
brink of deprivation. Many of those now working for Super Fresh, 
even at the time of our interviews and surveys, were new to the 
stores. In an abstract sense, many jobs were saved, but in a real 
sense most former A&P workers experienced sacrifices. We concen 
trated on those who had gone through the shutdown so that we could 
see what happened to the people in these stores, not just what hap 
pened to change the stores' functioning.
Third, the study is limited by the very setting that enabled it. That 
is, the uniqueness of some of the circumstances may reduce the 
chances that lessons from such bold workplace experiments could be 
applied elsewhere. Similarly, the controls afforded by the setting 
over several aspects of potential variation, such as geography, prod 
uct market, workforce characteristics, and most particularly the fo 
cus on one industry, supermarkets, also create potential limits to the 
generalizability of the findings to other industries, locales, work 
forces, etc.
With these limits in mind, however, we see much of general inter 
est and importance here. Some of the findings were as hypothesized 
and some were unexpected. Before we go on to summarize the find 
ings of chapters 5,6, and 7, we should briefly discuss the hypothe 
ses tested.
Summary of the Theoretical Framework
To understand the potentially wide variation in outcomes in 
employee-owned and participatory organizations, we developed a 
multivariate framework. In this framework, we did not assume that 
outcomes are the direct results of employee ownership and worker
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participation. Instead, we posited that outcomes are largely func 
tions of organizational processes, which are in turn largely functions 
of basic input features.
For a graphic representation of the theoretical model, see chapter 
2. The framework is also summarized in equation form in chapter 2.
Basic input features are the basic raw ingredients needed to begin 
employee-owned and participative organizations. They include 
worker characteristics, organization type, the role of consultants and 
unions, the business environment, and organizational characteristics.
Organizational processes start to play a role once operations be 
gin. These include the governance of organizational decisionmaking 
(participativeness) and specific managerial decisions made concern 
ing the deployment of resources (organizational functioning and la 
bor strategy). We hypothesized that these processes play a vital role 
in translating plans into actions. Participative processes should make 
employee-owned and participative organizations do things differently 
from conventional firms.
According to our hypotheses, organizational outcomes, such as vi 
ability, productivity, and profitability are influenced by organiza 
tional functioning and labor strategy, as well as by the business 
environment and organizational characteristics. Furthermore, organi 
zational outcomes should directly influence worker outcomes, such 
as worker income, job security, job and life satisfaction, and family 
well-being. Worker outcomes should also be independently affected 
by labor strategy and resource deployment, by the degree of partici 
pativeness and by workers' characteristics.
Summary of Findings
To understand the data, we used two statistical methods. First, we 
looked at the simple mean differences among the three store types— 
worker-owned, conventional with QWL, and conventional without 
QWL. These differences told a great deal about the functioning of 
the stores and their success or failure. Second, we also tried to look 
at the causal relationships using complex simultaneous-equation
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modeling. Although we can develop a certain number of conclusions 
and assertions based on the mean differences among the store types, 
we felt the need to be more careful in asserting causality; hence the 
model testing. To a great degree, the mean differences confirm the 
model hypotheses, but the model testing sometimes confirmed and 
sometimes contradicted our expectations.
Mean Differences
Store Economic Outcomes
Overall, according to the mean differences, the worker buyouts 
were successful and effective at saving some jobs. In chapter 7, we 
found that, compared to the Super Fresh stores, the worker-owned 
O&O stores had a higher proportion of full-time workers and of 
workers at the top of the pay scale, better sales growth, and more 
improvement in labor productivity and unit labor costs when com 
pared with the old A&P performance. The worker-owned stores, 
which had been among the poorest performing A&P stores, had sig 
nificantly lower unit labor costs in 1983 than either the QWL or non- 
QWL Super Fresh stores, despite the fact that they employed a larger 
proportion of full-time, highly-paid workers. Productivity was also 
significantly higher in the O&O stores. Moreover, O&O profit mar 
gins had improved from lower to higher than those at Super Fresh 
stores, though that result was not statistically significant.
Worker Characteristics
How did the worker-owned stores achieve these results? To some 
degree, their success was a function of the special group of former 
A&P workers that made up their labor forces. In addition, as chapter 
5 revealed, staffing patterns of both the O&O and Super Fresh stores 
affected the implementation of the new systems of worker participa 
tion in decisionmaking.
Store Type
The importance of the formal store governance structure was man 
ifested by the rights worker/owners had under their company by-laws
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compared to rights Super Fresh workers had under the labor agree 
ment. Worker/owners got several things that Super Fresh workers did 
not—potential returns on their investments in ownership shares, au 
tonomy on the job, self-determination in training, and democratic 
participation in the entire range of decisionmaking.
In those Super Fresh stores in which QWL programs were fully 
implemented (more than half in our sample), workers acquired some 
involvement in decisions through departmental, store, and regional 
meetings, but their involvement was constrained and limited to 
short-term decisions. In the other half of Super Fresh stores in the 
sample, QWL had hardly been implemented. Perhaps some aspects 
of the QWL program had been put in place in these stores, but few 
workers were involved.
Participativeness
There was considerable variation in worker involvement among 
the store types. O&O worker/owners perceived their stores higher 
than did Super Fresh workers in almost all aspects of participative- 
ness, except, oddly, for the perceived degree of overall worker con 
trol. These differences were significant when we compared all the 
workers in the stores, but full-time workers at Super Fresh tended to 
be quite similar to the worker/owners in participation in daily deci 
sions and most intermediate ones. Of course, comparatively fewer 
Super Fresh workers had full-time jobs. And part-time workers, who 
made up a larger proportion of the workforce at Super Fresh (both in 
QWL and non-QWL stores), were lower in perceived overall worker 
control and involvement in daily decisions compared to full-time 
workers.
All Super Fresh workers, however, reported significantly less 
worker involvement in long-term decisions than O&O worker/own 
ers. At the non-QWL Super Fresh stores, part-time workers rated 
worker involvement in long-term decisions even lower than full- 
timers.
Workers at the QWL stores reported more worker involvement in 
daily decisions than their counterparts in the non-QWL stores. In
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long-term decisions and most intermediate decisions, however, both 
QWL and non-QWL workers reported low worker involvement.
Store Functioning and Labor Strategy
The worker-owned O&Os and the Super Fresh stores also differed 
in their deployment of labor and other resources. The O&O stores 
adopted a labor strategy that relied on full-time employment, while 
the Super Fresh chain relied heavily on part-time workers. The O&O 
stores had more full-time workers, higher average hours for part- 
timers, and a smaller percentage of low-paid workers. Turnover and 
absenteeism were highest for the QWL Super Fresh stores and lowest 
for the O&Os; however, these differences were usually not statisti 
cally significant. The O&O stores emphasized job training for work 
ers significantly more than did Super Fresh. In general, Super Fresh 
reduced the number of full-time positions, gave part-time jobs with 
continual reductions in hours per week to most of the former A&P 
workers, and supplemented these former A&P workers with inexpe 
rienced young workers, who were given low wages and part-time 
jobs.
With respect to other aspects of store functioning, there were 
fewer differences among the store types. A few findings did, how 
ever, point to impacts of worker participation on store operations. In 
fact, perceptions by workers and shop stewards showed that partici 
pation at the QWL Super Fresh stores had significantly more impact 
on operational practices than in either the O&O stores or the non- 
QWL stores, though the O&Os were a not-too-distant second. Par 
ticipation had the effect of slowing down decisionmaking more in the 
O&Os than the other stores, however.
Worker Outcomes
The main advantage of the O&Os seemed to be that worker/own 
ers worked more hours per week on average. The average annual 
supermarket income reported by individual worker/owners equalled 
that reported by QWL workers, but full-time QWL workers reported 
earning more money from their supermarket jobs in 1983 than full- 
time O&O worker/owners. Part-time workers at Super Fresh lost out
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economically, with lower incomes arising from shorter hours and 
lower-paying positions. An indication that QWL and the labor con 
tract at Super Fresh did indeed work is that QWL workers earned 
higher bonuses than non-QWL workers. Worker/owners gave them 
selves bonuses of a size we could not determine and also gained the 
potential accumulated return (unmeasured here) on the share values 
of their investments in the stores. Neither the bonuses nor the share 
appreciation was reflected in their reported annual income.
Worker/owners tended to be satisfied or dissatisfied with different 
aspects of their jobs compared to QWL and non-QWL workers. For 
instance, worker/owners were less satisfied with supervision and 
with co-workers than both QWL and non-QWL Super Fresh work 
ers, but they were more satisfied than non-QWL workers with their 
job security and their system of decisionmaking. On overall job sat 
isfaction, all three groups tended to score equally. QWL and non- 
QWL workers tended to be equally satisfied with most aspects of 
their jobs and lives off the job, however workers/owners were con 
siderably less satisfied with aspects of their lives off the job, partic 
ularly with their health, leisure, and family lives.
Simultaneous-Equation Model Testing
In order to go beyond the simple comparisons of mean scores for 
the different store types, we sought a more precise test of the theo 
retical framework, through simultaneous-equation modeling, as pre 
sented in chapters 6 and 7. First, we looked at which basic input 
features affected participation. The results indicate that worker char 
acteristics influenced several aspects of participativeness, with 
workers' educational level, skills, experience, and level of responsi 
bility having the most impact.
Store type was also a significant influence. Worker ownership was 
a key input to workers' involvement in long-term decisions. Compar 
ing all former A&P workers, worker ownership was associated with 
perceptions of greater worker involvement in daily decisions, as 
well. Among full-time workers, however, neither worker ownership
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nor QWL programs seemed associated with perceptions of higher 
daily decision involvement.
Comparing shop stewards' perceptions of worker participation in 
their stores, both worker ownership and QWL seem to increase 
workers' involvement in daily decisions, but the effect does not ap 
pear to be significant. This is probably due to the small number of 
O&Os in the sample and the wide variation in participativeness 
among the QWL stores.
Second, with respect to store functioning and labor strategies, the 
results of the simultaneous equations confirmed what the mean dif 
ferences and the more qualitative interview data indicated. That is, 
more worker involvement changes the way labor and time are used, 
favoring processes that make the organization more cooperative and 
efficient through the use of more experienced and loyal full-time 
workers with higher hourly wage rates. Stores that had more worker 
involvement in long-term decisions (characteristic of worker-owned 
stores) also had more full-time workers. Stores with more worker 
involvement in daily decisions had higher average hours for part- 
timers, more low-paid workers, better interpersonal processes as a 
result of either QWL or worker ownership, slower decisionmaking, 
more peer training, higher levels of worker motivation, and more 
innovations in work processes. Stores with more perceived overall 
worker control (characteristic of stores with better-educated labor 
forces) were similar to those with daily decision involvement.
Third, what really accounted for the economic results stores 
achieved? The labor and resource deployment strategy employed in 
the O&O and Super Fresh stores had interesting and, to conventional 
wisdom, unexpected effects. The strategies favoring more full-time 
workers and more hours for part-timers tended not to increase labor 
costs and they may have even increased productivity. However, hir 
ing more low-paid workers did not reduce labor costs and did reduce 
productivity. In general, the common strategy many managers adopt 
of trying to slash labor costs to increase profits, tended not to work 
here. Investing in human resources did not endanger profitability.
Furthermore, while improvements in store functioning which re 
sulted from worker participation tended to increase labor costs as a
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proportion of sales revenue, they also increased productivity. As a 
result, these changes usually did not reduce profits. In other words, 
increases in unit labor costs may have been offset by increases in 
productivity. The bottom line for the store was the same, though of 
course for workers it makes a big difference to have full-time work, 
more part-time hours, or more involvement.
Fourth, worker outcomes—including economic outcomes, job sat 
isfaction, and life satisfaction—tended to be influenced most 
strongly by worker characteristics, participativeness, and store prof 
itability. In general, the more skilled and harmonious the group that 
was assembled to staff the store, the more overall worker control and 
involvement in long-term decisions they had, and the more profitable 
the stores, the better the workers' life satisfaction. On the other 
hand, higher store profits in 1983 meant less job income and lower 
satisfaction with pay and benefits. Why? Perhaps this occurred be 
cause the worker-owned stores tended to have higher profits, but did 
not pay the worker/owners as well as full-time workers at QWL Su 
per Fresh stores. Another likely reason might be the rather high ex 
pectation some workers, probably worker/owners, seemed to have of 
rapid riches.
Discussion
A great number of the findings were in line with the hypotheses 
and the model, particularly on the economic performance of the 
worker-owned stores, their degree of worker participation, some as 
pects of their internal functioning, and their labor strategy. Simi 
larly, the QWL Super Fresh stores scored better than the non-QWL 
stores on workers' involvement in daily decisions and on a few areas 
of store functioning, but these differences were not reflected in store 
outcomes.
Many of the results of the model testing also tended to confirm 
the hypotheses. Worker ownership tended to increase worker in 
volvement in daily and long-term decisions; higher levels of partici 
pativeness predicted some improvement in aspects of store
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functioning and also led to a labor strategy relying on full-time 
workers; finally, improved store functioning tended to predict im 
proved productivity, even while it increased labor costs.
Some of the findings were not as expected in the theoretical 
framework, however. The worker-owned stores were not superior to 
QWL stores in profits or productivity. According to shop steward 
perceptions, the O&O stores did not differ from QWL stores in 
worker involvement in daily decisions. In job income, O&O workers 
were equal to Super Fresh workers, but full-time O&O workers were 
actually worse off in job income even though they worked longer 
weekly hours than full-time Super Fresh workers. O&O workers 
were also equal or lower on most measures of satisfaction, especially 
satisfaction with leisure and health.
Similarly, unexpected findings cropped up in the model testing. 
At the store level of analysis, while long-term decision involvement 
led to a full-tune labor strategy, it did not affect measures of store 
functioning. Surprisingly, improved store functioning led to in 
creased labor costs and did not help profits. Labor strategy did not 
affect profit, productivity, or labor costs. At the worker level of anal 
ysis, measures of participation had surprising effects on job income 
and work hours per week, while more worker involvement in long- 
term decisions led to lower satisfaction with leisure.
Despite Ae surprises, there was considerable support for the the 
oretical model, particularly in looking at the store level results. That 
different labor strategies adopted by the stores did not ultimately af 
fect store outcomes is certainly noteworthy. It means that perhaps 
several ways exist to make stores profitable. Choosing a way that 
maximizes worker input, relies on full-time workers, and improves 
intragroup relationships in the store does not reduce the emphasis on 
viability and success.
Certainly, the multiple objectives of worker-owned enterprises— 
including steady, high-paying employment as well as profit—did not 
of necessity sacrifice conventional objectives of efficiency and effec 
tiveness. On the contrary, the ability to raise productivity and effi 
ciency allowed them to meet several goals simultaneously.
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Individual worker/owners did benefit from the job-saving efforts, 
but not in as clear a fashion as the theoretical framework suggested. 
Yet even though worker/owners were not earning as much as full- 
time Super Fresh workers, they were much more likely to be full 
time, and they had other unmeasured financial benefits. We were not 
able to measure the increase in value of their ownership shares. 
Also, worker/owners mostly did not reveal to us their bonuses and 
many even would not reveal their job incomes.
The seemingly surprising finding on worker/owners' lack of psy 
chological benefits in their new situation is very much in line with 
the mixed findings in the literature reported in chapter 2. Quite pos 
sibly, the increased time demands (reflected in work hours) and the 
entrepreneurial responsibilities they were feeling for the first time 
are part of the price they pay—the "sweat equity" investment—for 
becoming owners. Apparently, the strain of becoming a worker/ 
owner was considerable. Perhaps this strain derived in part from 
higher initial expectations, from self-comparisons with friends and 
relatives who had full-time jobs at Super Fresh, and from the unex 
pected burdens of worker ownership.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that O&O worker/owners were not 
attracted to worker ownership for ideological reasons, and despite 
the fact that many social and power relationships established in the 
old A&P system persisted, the O&O workers established effective 
mechanisms for collective decisionmaking. On the other hand, the 
QWL program at Super Fresh had limited effects on participation, 
store functioning, labor strategy, and outcomes, both for workers and 
for stores. Where QWL did improve store functioning, it improved 
productivity, increased labor costs, and did not endanger profits.
As discussed in chapter 5 the primary problems at Super Fresh in 
increasing worker involvement stem from the limits placed by the 
labor contract and by the autonomy of the management in staffing 
and operational decisions. In the worker-owned stores, these deci 
sions are made by the worker/owners. The Super Fresh union con 
tract created pressures for management to hire few full-time workers, 
reduce part-timer hours, and encourage turnover. Workers' resent-
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ment over management's unilateral rights, combined with bad feel 
ings about wage and benefit concessions, made QWL unpopular, 
while increases in the number of part-timers not only made their 
involvement in QWL impossible, but also led to hostility between 
full-timers and part-timers.
Where QWL seemed to work best was in providing gripe sessions. 
Attendance at QWL meetings dropped off, however, when they were 
held on workers' own time, not paid time. In non-QWL stores, the 
system did not spread beyond the planning board members, who are 
department heads, often the only full-time workers. Apparently store 
managers did not see QWL as a human resource investment for all 
workers.
Improvements in the quality of work—more full-time jobs, more 
hours of work for part-timers, more peer training, improved interper 
sonal interactions, more worker satisfaction with participation, and a 
better atmosphere for increased effort and effectiveness—tended to 
raise labor costs as a proportion of sales. These improvements also 
made it possible for workers to do their jobs better and to have a 
positive effect on productivity, however. As a result, profit was not 
jeopardized when better jobs and working condition were provided, 
despite higher labor costs.
We may conclude that, at least for individual workers, worker 
ownership was not only a viable way to save jobs, but also gave the 
average worker a chance at a full-time job with a future. Joint labor- 
management concessions also worked to save jobs, but at Super 
Fresh resulted in benefits for a minority of workers, those who got 
full-time jobs. Both worker ownership and worker participation were 
effective in making firms profitable and saving jobs, but it may be 
necessary to combine them to ensure their full benefits to workers 
and firms.
Broader Issues in Worker Ownership and Participation
To the degree that the O&O stores are representative of worker 
buyouts—in the initial feasibility of their survival, in the use of an
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experienced and motivated workforce, in the establishment of egali 
tarian structures of ownership and participation, in the key involve 
ment of the workers' union—then worker buyouts are indeed a good 
and effective method of saving jobs. The O&O example shows, 
moreover, that it was possible even in a competitive environment to 
save jobs in a way that simultaneously ensured the quality of work 
and the effectiveness of the firm.
Ownership brought the incentive to increase profits, while partic 
ipation provided the means to deploy labor and other resources to 
accomplish workers' goals. Rather than cut their own earnings, 
worker/owners opted to enhance organizational functioning through 
means which increase revenues and labor productivity. Such choices 
may lead to some burdens typical of entrepreneurship: harder work, 
worrisome responsibilities, and less time with family. Worker/own 
ers hoped that along with these hardships went the rewards they 
would share.
The establishment of worker participation and bonuses for cutting 
costs saved jobs at Super Fresh and enhanced the firms' effective 
ness. Thousands of jobs (mostly part-time) were saved, labor costs 
declined, and store profitability increased. Furthermore, as the find 
ings indicate, QWL has been a positive factor where implemented, 
even despite worker unhappiness over wage, benefit, and work-rule 
concessions.
Some observers, like Bernstein (1976), argue that participation is 
most important, not ownership. Worker ownership, they say, may 
not even be needed. What they advocate is setting up worker partic 
ipation programs that assure workers a return on their involvement, 
not on their capital. Ellerman (1982) argues that ownership is simply 
a bundle of rights that can be arranged in different ways. Thus, the 
active (to control the business) and passive (to receive the profits) 
ownership rights can be, and are, split up in various ways in various 
business forms (Perry and Davis 1985). In employee-owned firms, 
participation may not accompany ownership or may even be aban 
doned as worker-owned firms "degenerate" (Russell 1985). It is the 
right to participate in control that assumes theoretical and practical 
importance.
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On the other hand, participative structures may be incomplete and 
may degenerate without worker ownership. Workers may have nei 
ther the incentive nor the means to control key decisions. Fully im 
plemented QWL at Super Fresh has not been more profitable than 
either worker ownership at the O&Os or non-QWL at other Super 
Fresh stores. Furthermore, the incentive to continue it seems dimin 
ished. At Super Fresh, worker participation through QWL has been 
imperfectly implemented. Perhaps QWL and financial incentives 
could be combined to better advantage, if the bonus were tied to 
profits or productivity and not to labor costs. Still, it is doubtful that 
control over long-term decisionmaking would be ceded to workers 
without some substantial degree of employee ownership.
Employee ownership as a structure, however, even combined with 
substantial worker participation as in the O&Os, is no guarantee of 
success. Workers' characteristics and the social composition of the 
stores, i.e., the processes of recruitment, self-selection, and staffing, 
were major ingredients that contributed both to participativeness in 
the stores and to their outcomes. Similarly, at Super Fresh, the abil 
ity of store directors to pick their workforce contributed greatly to 
the success or failure to implement QWL. Participative structures 
seem to require workers who are experienced, committed, and loyal 
to co-workers and to store goals.
Besides worker characteristics, however, other factors which we 
did not observe but only heard about may have affected the way 
worker ownership came to be practiced. For instance, in the O&O 
stores, the need to operate and compete in a business environment 
influenced worker/owners' choices and behavior. The new worker/ 
owners may have been experienced and largely elite workers in their 
former lives with A&P, but they were novices at running businesses, 
and especially in running democratic workplaces, which A&P had 
never been. The stores became very dependent on the IGA, the sup 
ply, warehousing, and advertising group to which they and other 
nonchain stores belonged. IGA gave them financial help and busi 
ness advice, which they readily adopted. IGA's conventional ap 
proach to supermarket operations made sense, but it often drove the 
notion of running a different, democratic cooperative from conscious 
awareness.
Conclusions and Implications 265
Such ideological hegemony may be an important contributing fac 
tor to so-called degeneration, which is of such great concern to theo 
rists. To develop worker-owned businesses with the inherent goal 
structure the O&Os have demonstrated, worker/owners and potential 
worker/owners need more training in dealing with the business envi 
ronment. They need to be prepared for potential contradictions be 
tween economic democracy in the firm and the need for approval 
from conventional firms who supply them, support them, or com 
pete with them.
In Philadelphia, the development of a critical mass of successful 
worker-owned supermarkets may give the O&Os the ability to co-opt 
and influence the business environment. A third store, not named 
O&O, was opened by one of the groups of worker/owners (see chap 
ter 4). A fourth store, also an O&O, was opened in 1985 in an inner- 
city neighborhood of Philadelphia with support from the city, UFCW 
local 1357, and community organizations. PACE, the main consult 
ant to the original O&Os, was a prime mover in the development of 
the fourth store. In addition, PACE oversaw the conversion of two 
more supermarkets in the suburbs from private ownership to reopen 
ing as O&O stores. The main supplier to IGA has taken increased 
interest in the O&O model and worked closely with PACE to de 
velop these suburban stores. Soon, PACE hopes, the increased pen 
etration of O&Os in the grocery market will encourage closer ties 
among the O&Os, which could lead not only to increased market 
clout, but also to mutual reinforcement of their internal cooperative 
structures. Besides, with a number of O&Os operating, a training 
ground for new worker/owners will be available. With these develop 
ments, perhaps the worker-owned stores can have a more general 
acceptance in the business environment as well as impact on the con 
sciousness of other managers and workers.
Implications
Before drawing out lessons from these findings for other job- 
saving situations, there are some questions to answer. Was the set 
ting unique and not replicable elsewhere? One of the favorable
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conditions here was the unusual flexibility of the union leadership in 
accepting unconventional and innovative solutions. Similarly, trying 
two job-saving strategies at once may have spurred both the worker/ 
owners and the Super Fresh management to greater efforts or to 
adopt new ideas. While two simultaneous methods might be unusual, 
the level of local union support was not unlike that found elsewhere, 
e.g., at the Rath Packing or Hyatt-Clark worker buyouts and at many 
plants trying QWL programs in the early 1980s.
Were the conditions faced in the A&P shutdown typical of shut 
downs? Many of the Philadelphia-area A&P stores threatened with 
shutdown in 1982 would, in fact, have been viable with few changes 
in any case. Nevertheless, A&P's corporate strategy, which shut 
down entire regions, was not an overreaction to the 1981-82 reces 
sion; it was a long-term response to chronic decline in A&P's posi 
tion in the national supermarket industry. Besides, current economic 
restructuring has closed many potentially profitable plants in many 
industries.
Perhaps the most atypical feature of the A&P shutdown is its in 
dustry. Supermarkets are small, have localized customer bases, and 
are not interdependent. Many shutdowns, especially the well- 
publicized ones, in which worker buyouts have been considered have 
been in large, complex firms involved in national markets. Perhaps 
buyouts are more appropriate in industries more similar to supermar 
kets and less appropriate to so-called typical industrial shutdown sit 
uations.
To what degree are our results skewed by self-selection of a group 
of about 40 workers into the worker-owned stores? Without question, 
this was a special group. It seems that without the Super Fresh op 
tion for many workers, there would likely have been more worker 
buyouts, given the 600 workers who initially made pledges to be 
come worker/owners. Perhaps many of these might-have-been worker 
buyouts would have had less success than the O&Os.
We have to remember several facts, however. First, A&P stores 
converted into O&Os were among the lower performers before the 
shutdown, so the odds were against them, even with a special group 
to run them. Second, worker/owners generally did not differ demo- 
graphically from other former A&P workers.
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Third, the Super Fresh workers and stores in the samples were 
largely picked by Super Fresh management. Presumably we were 
comparing the O&O workers and stores to the best of Super Fresh. 
At the least, the four Super Fresh stores studied intensively were to 
some extent showcases. While self-selection operated at the O&O 
stores, the entire research situation was somewhat skewed, and there 
is little reason to believe it to be worse for the O&Os.
Fourth, and most important, the simultaneous-equation modeling 
took into account worker characteristics. They were, in statistical 
terms, held constant when we looked at the impacts of other factors. 
In fact, the theoretical framework considers self-selection and staff 
ing as key contributors to the success or failure of employee owner 
ship and worker participation programs.
In the final analysis, we must be cautious, particularly about the 
small size of our sample, both of workers and of stores. Twenty-two 
worker/owner respondents and two worker-owned stores limit our 
ability to make strong generalizations, regardless of our high degree 
of confidence that the findings accurately describe these job-saving 
experiments in the Philadelphia area.
Similarly, the observations cover primarily the 1982-84 period. 
Changes may have taken place since then or may take place in the 
future which would call the framework and findings into question. 
We hope that it will be possible to check out these possibilities em 
pirically. Perhaps even more important, however, would be for the 
hypotheses to be tested elsewhere, under other circumstances.
Theoretical Implications
The findings have a number of implications for employee owner 
ship and worker participation. First, the importance of worker char 
acteristics leads us to conclude that successful and effective buyouts 
and participation programs do not occur in a vacuum. That is, the 
effectiveness of employee ownership and involvement depend to a 
great degree on the education and previous work experience of the 
workers who use them.
Second, to be truly effective, forms of worker participation, such
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as QWL programs, should involve genuine redistribution of power. 
The constraints under which worker involvement is placed in many 
organizations may become self-defeating and may lead researchers, 
managers, and workers to the conclusion that it does not work or is 
not worth the effort. Worker participation programs apparently need 
to be consistent with other human resource programs in regard to 
practices such as staffing, scheduling, and economic incentives.
Third, labor strategies and ways of operating, such as investing in 
workers, hiring higher quality labor, and combining incentives to 
motivate greater efforts, need more attention. They may be the key 
link from employee ownership and worker participation to outcomes.
Fourth, the attempt by worker-owned and participatory firms 
to achieve multiple objectives may explain why these firms some 
times do not appear as profitable as might be hoped for them. Per 
haps they are focused on other objectives, such as high pay or secure 
employment.
Fifth, multiple measures and multiple methods may be necessary 
to give a comprehensive and consistent picture of organization effec 
tiveness.
Finally, we have to take account of the entrepreneurial headaches 
involved in worker buyouts and to take into account worker/owners' 
expectations of reward. It may be more difficult and frustrating to 
own and manage within a group. These constraints may be felt by 
workers on a daily basis, while the rewards may be less frequent.
Pragmatic Implications
How does the O&O case compare to other examples, particularly 
the well-publicized failures? Specifically, why did worker buyouts at 
firms such as Rath Packing and Hyatt Clark Industries (HCI) fail 
while the O&Os succeeded?
At least three factors may be involved. One factor may be man 
agement style and structure. The larger the firm, the more important 
is a competent and cooperative management staff, something work 
ers at both Rath and HCI feel was lacking (Redmon, Mueller, and
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Daniels 1985; May 1985). At the O&Os, though worker/owners 
tended to lack direct management experience, the managers hired 
from outside were easier to monitor because of the smallness and 
flat hierarchy of supermarkets.
Second, a good part of the answer might lie in factors outside the 
scope of this single-industry study, in the nature of the industries and 
product markets in which these firms operate. As Clarke (1984, p. 
124) points out, "the producer co-operative form seems uniquely 
suited for small-scale, service-based, labour-intensive industries such 
as agriculture, crafts, retailing, printing, construction, media and the 
arts." To become successful worker buyouts, supermarkets, with a 
local selling area and a relatively inelastic demand for their products, 
would have an advantage over companies in more capital-intensive 
industries with national product markets dominated by huge corpo 
rations, such as meatpacking (Rath) and engine bearings (HCI). An 
interesting exception to this rule, however, is Weirton Steel, which 
was bought out in 1983 and has since become one of the few profit 
able major steel companies in the United States.
Third, the other opportunities laid off A&P workers had, both in 
Super Fresh and in the large metropolitan economy, afforded both 
job-saving experiments the leeway for selective staffing. The O&Os 
and Super Fresh might not function as well if staffed with workers 
inexperienced in performing the basic job functions of workers in the 
industry. In fact, a study of the new O&O store started from the 
ground up in Philadelphia indicates some of the difficulties (Gran- 
rose, Simon, and Coker 1986). Not only does an inexperienced 
workforce complicate the start-up process, but it may also threaten 
the viability of the firm in its initial operations.
Nevertheless, saving the jobs of experienced workers has potential 
drawbacks for some groups of workers, particularly women and mi 
norities. In these supermarkets, staffing new, participative ventures 
meant excluding those who were traditionally excluded from the 
elite. In industries with strong, white-male-dominated internal labor 
markets, this could perpetuate discriminatory practices in what are 
supposed to be democratic structures.
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Union Involvement
O&O and Super Fresh might not exist were it not for the union's 
extraordinary initiative. UFCW local 1357 took swift action to put 
forth a plan for worker buyouts. Still, it took from February until 
October for the first O&O store to open. It seems imperative for 
union leadership to consider the buyout option well before the real 
threat of a plant shutdown is announced. Local 1357 had already 
done some feasibility studies when A&P announced the closing. The 
union put forth its buyout proposal with some confidence that it 
would be accepted by workers and could succeed.
The union may have been better prepared for worker buyouts than 
for the concessionary agreement which set up Super Fresh. The 
union leadership may have been prepared for wage, benefit, and 
work-rule givebacks, but did not accurately predict how the bonus 
fund would affect workers.
Tying worker bonuses to reductions in labor costs tended to under 
mine some of the positive effects of QWL. Cost-cutting led manage 
ment to emphasize part-time work. Worker solidarity, always fragile 
in an industry in which part-time workers were historically a large 
part of the workforce, was further undermined. Besides, saving part- 
time jobs did not effectively meet the long-term needs of the major 
ity of former A&P workers. Those who received part-time jobs at 
Super Fresh were, in effect, displaced from their jobs anyway.
To counter these effects, perhaps bonuses should be directly tied 
to productivity improvements or to profits. Similarly, saving fewer 
full-time jobs may be preferable to saving more part-time jobs for 
making worker participation work better.
Management Strategy
Management, in order to save jobs and restore or improve profit 
ability, can consider several alternatives to plant shutdowns. Reduc 
ing unit labor cost may be an obvious choice, is directly under 
management's control, and is clearly calculable on a spreadsheet. 
This strategy may also reduce productivity and ultimately not im 
prove profits, however.
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Managers may want to reconsider labor's demand for guaranteed 
job security. Treating labor as a quasi-fixed cost instead of a totally 
variable cost may not put management in a straight jacket. Organi 
zations that innovate in the deployment of human resources can be 
come more effective, but it may take substantial amounts of 
employee ownership and worker participation to motivate managers 
to look at employees this way in the American context. Changing 
corporate strategy from its focus on restructuring and financial ma 
nipulation for improving balance sheet performance to a focus on 
human resources could prove very difficult.
Public Policy
The findings of this study may be useful in shaping aspects of 
public policy with respect to job-saving. First, keeping the workforce 
of threatened firms together may provide the skills needed to effect a 
turnaround or a worker buyout. How can that be done? Federal and 
local government can help by mandating advance notice by compa 
nies of impending shutdown. Six months advance notice seems mini 
mal to establish buyouts, and even innovative labor-management 
agreements take time to negotiate. Similarly, government-mandated 
or government-provided severance benefits would not only give laid 
off workers more time to establish a worker buyout but would also 
enable them to make the necessary personal investments that could 
leverage other sources of capital needed to run businesses.
Second, government officials trying to save jobs should consider 
the quality of the jobs saved. Can the jobs saved provide steady em 
ployment and income to support families?
Third, incentive for the establishment of worker participation as a 
way of meeting both workers' and firms' goals might be considered 
as part of federal and local government loan and technical assistance 
programs for reversing industrial decline, saving jobs, and promoting 
employee ownership. Current federal policies concerning employee 
ownership focus on tax treatment for ESOPs and stock distribution 
for employee/owners. Presumably, these policies reflect the assump 
tion that stock ownership is somehow by itself a motivator of greater 
performance in the organization and that employees need only be
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spurred to greater efforts and loyalty by a new form of compensa 
tion, namely the benefit program known as ESOP. Worker participa 
tion in decisions, particularly those crucial to the firm's long-term 
future and direction, may also enhance the effectiveness of employee 
ownership for meeting economic and social goals. Public policy can 
encourage employee-owned firms to give active as well as passive 
ownership rights to employees.
A Practical Caveat
As a by-product of this research, we found out something we had 
not explicitly set out to study. It seemed that the more success the 
worker/owners had with their O&O stores, the less willing they were 
to accept advice from outside the store. PACE, though it had been a 
prime mover in setting up the stores and training the worker/owners, 
found its advice less and less sought after. This insular tendency ex 
tended to this research project, in that there was less cooperation in 
giving out store financial information in one of the O&Os and a 
lower response rate to the interviews and survey questionnaires by 
worker/owners than by the groups of Super Fresh workers.
Very likely, part of this self-imposed seclusion stems from the 
new proprietary feelings stirring in the O&O worker/owners about 
what is now their own enterprise. In any case, it seems an indication 
of workers taking to heart an important implication of worker con 
trol. Researchers and technical assistance providers should take note 
of this phenomenon and be sensitive to attitudinal and class differ 
ences in their work with worker/owners.
Overall Implications
We started in chapter 1 discussing worker buyouts to save jobs in 
the context of experimentation to find new ways to work, and in an 
eqonomy undergoing rapid structural change. The 1982 Philadelphia- 
area A&P shutdown spawned a unique set of responses, which by 
their exceptional natures focus attention on crucial issues about sav 
ing jobs and restructuring workplaces.
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The O&O stores, while precious few in number, show that worker 
buyouts can be effective for job-saving. In fact, they may even have 
some advantages over other methods, at least to the extent that the 
Super Fresh stores, with their QWL programs, can represent other 
methods. That is, the O&O stores seem genuinely to have saved jobs 
of good quality which will likely last for the long term. Super Fresh 
saved a larger number of lower-quality jobs, but these jobs will not 
necessarily be filled by former A&P workers over the long term.
Both innovative responses to the shutdown opened up new sources 
of organizational effectiveness through worker participation and 
management flexibility. In both cases, this effectiveness came to 
some degree at the workers' expense. While the O&O worker/owners 
made sacrifices, they could consider them as investments or sweat 
equity. Nevertheless, they traded new responsibilities and worries 
for the opportunity to share greater control over their fates and for 
tunes.
Even in its newspaper display ads, Super Fresh used the theme of 
workers making an "investment" to create the new entity. (These 
ads successfully fooled many Philadelphians into believing that Su 
per Fresh is employee-owned, rather than an A&P subsidiary.) But 
the Super Fresh workers' "investment" of wage and benefit conces 
sions, along with reduced hours for part-time workers, earned profits 
for the stores, in which only a relative few workers shared indirectly. 
Super Fresh workers are still heard to grumble about recent improve 
ments to their stores as having been financed by the 20 percent wage 
cut they had to take in order to keep then- jobs.
Aside from workers' sacrifices, the key element in both job-saving 
innovations was increased worker involvement in decisions. Do these 
examples mean that in saving jobs there should be a restructuring of 
responsibilities in the workplace and a greater emphasis on human 
resources and the quality of working life? A report of a recent study 
of the economic performance of employee-owned firms stated, "Par 
ticipation is the key" (NCEO 1986). Compared to a matched sample 
of 164 conventional companies, a sample of 30 employee-owned 
firms not only performed better, but job-level worker participation 
was the explanatory factor most consistently significant. Similarly, a
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study of 43 General Motors plants found significant impacts on eco 
nomic performance from worker participation through QWL pro 
grams (Katz 1985). That is, all other things equal, improved plant 
economic performance was predicted by improved labor-management 
relations at the plant, which in turn resulted from greater levels of 
worker involvement in the QWL programs. Neither study focused on 
job-saving efforts, however.
Of course, the O&O and Super Fresh job-saving innovations 
emerged from a particular situation, so we cannot make too strong a 
case about their generalizability to other circumstances. But both 
O&O and Super Fresh have been successful and profitable concepts. 
It would seem to be a good idea to consider the sources of their 
success—particularly the contribution of employee ownership and 
worker participation—in other job-saving situations.
After all, the A&P shutdown was really neither peculiar nor un 
representative. The O&O buyouts and the establishment of Super 
Fresh with its QWL programs, though geographically circumscribed, 
are part of broader trends reshaping the economy and the place of 
workers in firms. The A&P shutdown came about from many of the 
common circumstances in which corporations and workers find 
themselves in this society. Rapid structural change and shifting cor 
porate strategies result in economic dislocation.
In this new economic context of the past decade, the rediscovery 
of employee ownership as a worker response to dislocation has not 
come about from nostalgic longing for a failed anticapitalist strategy. 
Nor has involvement of workers in workplace decisionmaking 
stemmed solely from modern personnel textbook prescriptions for 
maintaining or creating "union free" environments. Worker buyouts 
are not inherently inefficient, isolated, economically marginal, or 
anachronistic sidetracks for labor or management. In fact, the O&O 
worker/owners and, especially, their union and technical consultants 
took advantage of the accumulated knowledge of past failures and of 
theoretical controversies. Moreover, the union put itself in a position 
to demand management concessions in Super Fresh when it was 
called upon to concede cuts in wages and benefits.
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Both the O&O stores and Super Fresh are examples of forms of 
economic democracy, in that they involve workers in decisionmaking 
and, to some, extent, in control of their workplaces. This particular 
case illustrates the possibility of unions working innovatively with 
management in workplace restructuring and of unions taking initia 
tive rather than passively accepting management demands for con 
cessions or joint problemsolving. In general, however, such 
innovations require some significant changes in the behavior and 
thinking of both managers and unions.
Whether economic democracy is something workers themselves 
want will be determined by how attractive examples like the O&O 
stores are to them. Perhaps they will wait until a crisis, such as a 
plant shutdown, presents them with an opportunity. We have tried to 
present the facts clearly and fairly. It will be up to other victims of 
plant closings to build upon these lessons to improve their outcomes 
in their particular circumstances.

Appendix A
Excerpts From Agreement Between UFCW 1357 
and Roslyn O&O (1982-1985)
Article XXHI
The following is intended to explain the O and O concept of cooperative 
enterprise and is not subject to the arbitration provisions of this agreement 
for any reason whatsoever.
Employer is structured as a worker cooperative. Under this structure each 
shareholder must be a worker. Upon voluntary or involuntary termination of 
employment of a shareholder, his or her share is deemed transferred back to 
the corporation. Each shareholder is entitled to one, and only one, share.
Major decisions affecting large numbers of workers, large expenditures of 
money, or impacting on the corporation for a long period of time are made 
by the worker-owners on a one worker/one vote basis. Other corporate deci 
sions are made by the Board of Directors, a twelve member body, composed 
of nine workers-owners and three community representatives, all elected by 
the entire body of worker-owners on a one worker/one vote basis.
The fee for purchasing a share of the corporation's stock is $5,000 and re 
mains constant throughout the corporate existence. Profits and losses are 
allocated, in fixed percentages, to an unindividuated collective account, and 
to internal capital accounts provided for each shareholder. A portion of the 
profit distributed to the individual shareholder is based on a percentage of his 
or her capital investment. The remainder is based on his or her labor participa 
tion; that is, his or her hours worked as a percentage of total hours worked 
during the relevant period.
In order to meet outstanding debt obligations during the terms of this Agree 
ment, profit allocations to each worker-owner will equal approximately $1,000 
per year. As the profitability of the corporation increases, the profit alloca 
tion to each worker-owner increases accordingly.
Article XXVII 
Subsection 3
3. Employer agrees to encourage certain other supermarket entities with the 
characteristics listed below, created during the term of this Agreement, to join
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with it in coalition bargaining with the Union and to utilize this Agreement 
as a guidepost in its effort to reach agreement with the Union: 
a. A worker cooperative structure in which:
(1) All owners are workers;
(2) Each worker-owner has one and only one share;
(3) Upon voluntary or involuntary termination of employment, the 
share is deemed transferred back to the corporation;
(4) Corporate decision-making is on a one worker-owner/one vote 
basis;
(5) A portion of profit distribution is based on patronage defined as
labor participation.
b. Acceptance into membership of O&O Supermarket, Inc., a second-level 
cooperative which has supermarket worker cooperative members and 
which provides a variety of business and other support services to them 
and/or receipt of financial or other technical assistance from O and O 
Investment Fund, Inc., a non-profit Pennsylvania Corporation providing 
assistance to worker cooperatives in certain industries including the super 
market industry.
Appendix B
Excerpts from Roslyn O&O Supermarket, Inc. 
Cooperative Handbook & Cooperative Charter (1982)
We the Worker-Owners are a group of dedicated supermarket workers, in 
tent on altering the workplace to gain high productivity and profitability levels, 
and to provide better service to the consumer. At the same time, we will be 
operating within an organizational structure which serves to perpetuate a much 
more personally satisfying, fulfilling atmosphere in which to work.
We expect to achieve this by having all our members actively involved in 
all aspects of the business. This will include sharing in decision-making, helping 
to determine store policy, having an input in operations, and generally con 
tributing to all areas of our business. By following our cooperative philosophy, 
we will treat each other with more respect and trust, thereby assuring a 
workplace with less pressure and bringing out the full potential of all our 
members. We expect to expand on this ideal to include the consumer, no longer 
treating the customer only as a dollar sign but as an individual.
We will treat the customers fairly, with the courtesy and respect for which 
they are entitled. Since our establishment is part of the community, it will also 
become our goal to work within the communityin order to learn its needs and 
to do whatever is within our power to help meet these needs.
We ask all our members to contribute a membership fee in order to receive 
a voting share in the corporation. Upon achieving membership, all members 
will be entitled to work in our business, take active part in its operation, share 
in the profits or losses, and have access to all information, both financial and 
operational. The share received will be symbolic of their membership and can 
not be transferred or sold. This voting share will revert back to the cooperative 
upon a worker owner's termination of their job, for any reason.
To achieve a better working environment, we will have no outside supervi 
sion and the manager's duties and responsibilities will be outlined. There will 
be no breakdown of jobs into simple tasks, no narrow job classifications with 
restrictive detailed procedures, and finally no formal controls. We will rely 
strictly on the trust, experience, and knowledge of all members to perform 
their duties promptly, productively, and with the best interest of the cooperative. 
As one fares so does the other.
Philosophically, cooperative members want all major decisions made on the 
basis of consensus, which mandates general agreement by the group members. 
We want all profits and losses to be equally shared and the format for distribu 
tion to be self-determined as set up in the By-Laws. We would like to see trust 
among all members. TOGETHERNESS TO GET THE JOB DONE. Corn- 
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munications will be open among all members at all times in order to alleviate 
problems and reach better decisions. We demand that there be respect for all 
members and their opinions; that all members treat each other with appropriate 
courtesy at all times. There will be a sharing of knowledge and ideas in all 
job classifications in order to utilize the ability of all members to the fullest 
extent.
In order to attain greater knowledge, we want all members to be able to 
receive all information concerning the business. This includes ordering, func 
tions of other jobs, and information about all financial data (i.e., costs of goods, 
suppliers' costs, sales volume, and profits). We want all interested members 
to have the ability to train for any position in the operation of the store, and 
to have time allocated in which to gain this training.
To reach a higher degree of profitability in our enterprise, we will have 
store meetings as often as needed in order to keep all members properly in 
formed. We expect to have input by all members in the conservation of costs- 
bags, care of equipment, and promptness on the job—in order to minimize 
the cost of operations. We will also make retraining available whenever 
necessary in any position to make a member more productive and/or satisfied. 
Workers will have less restrictive job descriptions to alleviate boredom and 
make full use of individual skills.
As a group, we expect to conduct ourselves with courtesy, friendliness, and 
professionalism in order to gain confidence and respect from our customers 
and the business community. We understand the importance of good conduct 
in our enterprise, which will mean achieving a better working place and a 
stimulation of business.
Internally, it is the objective of our group to improve the marketplace con 
ditions in order to make our jobs more rewarding and have a more pleasant 
atmosphere in which to perform our duties.
Externally, the intent of this organization will be to achieve, for the first 
time, a truly community-oriented store. Lower and fair pricing, group dis 
counts, and hiring within the community when non-member positions become 
available will all help to benefit the economics of the community. We hope 
to respond to the needs of the community and to participate in efforts to upgrade 
conditions wherever possible, whatever form that takes. We intend to not just 
make the workplace, but also the community, a better place to live.
The Worker Cooperative Defined
A worker cooperative—the legal and organizational structure used for our 
supermarket—is a firm controlled and operated by the members who work 
in it. It is a self-governing corporation, characterized by a corporate legal struc 
ture with a cooperative set of by-laws. The by-laws assign certain rights to
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cooperative members, based on their functional work role within the store. 
To become a member of the cooperative a person is required to make a finan 
cial contribution—in this case $5,000.00 as a fee for cooperative membership. 
(The store manager is not a member of the cooperative and is not required 
to make any financial contribution.) 
In general, the rights attached to cooperative membership are as follows:
• One worker—one vote. This allows members an equal voice in the elec 
tion of the Board of Directors and in determination of major decisions 
affecting the cooperative.
• Profit-sharing. Members will receive patronage dividends, based on the 
number of hours worked, as specified by the by-laws.
Within the cooperative structure, all members share in the decision-making 
process, as well as share in the profits; decisions will be made in a democratic 
way, on the basis of consensus (general agreement by all group members), 
that is compatible with worker ownership functions.
The cooperative structure positively impacts on four areas of concern for 
a retail business: business operations, the worker, the consumer, and the com 
munity. First, the business itself benefits through the active participation and 
involvement, on all operational levels, of those maintaining the store on a dai 
ly basis. Through a sharing of information and expertise, worker-owners are 
able to respond quickly to problems which affect the ability of a store to be 
successful. The flexibility of members in terms of allocation of tasks and each 
member's knowledge of multiple jobs enable members to meet changing staff 
ing needs, thereby better meeting the business' need to adequately service the 
customer.
Second, by reopening a store, a primary consumer need is kept in the 
neighborhood. As a group who realizes the importance of neighborhood- 
oriented service, store personnel cater to a specific need by supplying pro 
ducts common to the consumer group(s). The consumer, by always being in 
contact with an owner at any level of store operations, benefits from more 
individualized service and a quick response to problems or criticisms. By vir 
tue of the increased interaction of owner and customer, the business can ad 
dress changing store requirements, customer requests, and be more on-target 
with respect to policy-making.
Third, the cooperative structure benefits the worker by giving people more 
control over their workplace. It allows a forum for an individual's expression 
of ideas, concerns, and/or problems and also provides for operational input 
regarding business planning. The cooperative structure serves the workers' 
interests as well as those of the business, through the understanding that the 
workers are the business; when people have control over their work environ 
ment personal productivity, quality of work life, and profits to be gained from 
the business increase.
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The fourth and final area to be served by the cooperative is that of the 
community-at-large. Cooperatives provide an alternative means of maintain 
ing an area's prosperity: the cooperative provides jobs and services, and in 
this way helps keep neighborhoods intact. Loss of business services negative 
ly affects an area's prosperity and its ability to attract new business and the 
subsequent influx of jobs, people, and money.
Responsibilities of a Worker in a Worker Cooperative
The responsibilities of the individual worker in a traditional workplace in 
clude job performance, neat appearance, and promptness. In a worker 
cooperative store these responsibilities remain the same, but are expanded to 
include the increased participation that the cooperative model demands. It is 
not just important for the individual to perform his duties well, but also to 
try and gain as much knowledge as possible of the entire operation so that 
better decisions can be made concerning the business as a whole. Neat ap 
pearance is necessary now, not just to please an employer, but also to please 
the customer. It becomes important to be prompt because (s)he now realizes 
that when someone has to cover for him/her, it costs the organization produc 
tivity and money; this now means that it costs him/her personally.
In order for our system to work, all workers, members and non-members 
alike, must cooperate with each other. Since the goals are the same, it becomes 
necessary to be as agreeable, courteous, and respectful as possible to one 
another.
It is the responsibility of an individual that if he/she 'sees something in the 
operation of the business which isn't right, it should be brought to the atten 
tion of the group in order to bring about change that will (a) make operations 
more profitable, or (b) improve working conditions.
Responsibilities of an Owner in a Worker Cooperative
In a worker cooperative grocery store a member has basically the same 
responsibilities of a conventional market owner; for instance, (s)he has to 
negotiate a contract with the union, deal with the suppliers, and work with 
other service agents. An owner must make up company policy, oversee the 
hiring, firing, and performance of workers, and protect the future of the 
business through intelligent business planning and formulation of long-range 
cash flow projections. Further, any decisions for renovations or major changes 
in the store are made by the owner.
In a worker cooperative these areas are dealt with collectively by all members 
in one of two ways. They can either decide to deal with every aspect of the
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business as a full group, or to form separate committees, each with a specific 
task. The committees would then present their recommendations to the entire 
group to be collectively approved; this cooperative will utilize the second pro 
cess, by committee, to conduct their business affairs.
An owner in a conventional business usually has total control over working 
conditions and personnel policies. In a worker cooperative, while a member 
will have input into all areas, no one person or body will have unilateral 
decision-making authority.
As a part-owner in the cooperative there will be times when ease and com 
fort of the working place might have to give way to the realities of business 
needs. It is important to remember that there will be times when a member's 
business nature will have to show precedent over his/her working nature.
The Worker Cooperative Function
The worker cooperative functions on a basis which relates closely to a cor 
porate structure, with the exception that cooperative members have input at 
all levels of the system. For example, the traditional corporate structure is 
illustrated by the following diagram:
SHAREHOLDERS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
MANAGEMENT
WORKERS
The above reflects an organization in which decision-making comes from the 
top and flows down through each level. The cooperative structure, illustrated
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by the diagram below, allows for information and decision-making authority 
to flow in both directions:
SHAREHOLDERS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
MANAGEMENT
WORKERS
While each level has designated areas of authority and tasks, members and 
non-members alike have the ability to make input into the system. This allows 
any group/person to address any other group/person, at designated times, on 
specific issues; mis promotes both the free exchange of ideas, concerns, or 
problems, and the democratic decision-making process. The primary princi 
ple underlying the cooperative model is that each member has the ability to 
participate, as fully as possible, within their workplace.
In a worker cooperative structure, shareholding is conducted on an equal 
basis; one member holds one share and is entitled to one vote. In this way, 
power is equally distributed throughout the membership. Upon termination, 
a member's share immediately reverts back to the cooperative; members are 
unable to sell or otherwise transfer their share to any other party.
Governance
The membership elects the Board of Directors as a representative govern 
ing body, with the primary function of setting and implementing short-term 
policies for the cooperative. The board is composed of nine (9) members and 
three (3) non-members. Within the board there are four offices; that of Presi 
dent, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer. Each officer, along with two 
other board members, is responsible for specific committee tasks: President—
285
Executive Committee; Vice-President—Governance Committee; Secretary- 
Education Committee; Treasurer—Financial Committee. The board president 
presides at all meetings concerning the cooperative including, but not limited 
to: the annual General Assembly, monthly board meetings, and special meetings 
called on an as-needed basis. The members, non-members, and management 
are directly accountable to the policies set by the Board of Directors, which 
is in turn accountable to the entire membership.
In a worker cooperative, decision-making authority is allocated among three 
governing bodies: (1) the General Assembly of Members, (2) the Board of 
Directors, and (3) the Manager.
Governance 
General Guidelines
Membership Decision-Making Authority
Membership review will be required before any of the following matters 
may be finalized:
(1) Amendments to the articles of incorporation (and initial ratification).
(2) Enlarging the Board of Directors.
(3) Merger or dissolution of the corporation.
(4) Election of directors.
(5) Changes in long or short term goals.
(6) The yearly business plan.
(7) Hiring and firing policies.
(8) Expansion or remodeling of physical plant.
(9) Initiation, modification, or termination of affiliation with suppliers.
(10) Purchase or sale of substantial assets.
(11) Further decision-making authority is established by the Time Line, Money 
Line, and Member Line.
Board Decision-Making Authority
(1) Set yearly goals and policies necessary for their implementation.
(2) Select manager, define duties, set salary.
(3) Evalute performance of manager.
(4) Control finances.
(5) Approve all personnel policies. (In the case of hiring, firing, and lay-off 
policies, membership approval is also necessary.)
(6) Further decision-making authority is established by the Time Line, Money 
Line, and Member Line.
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Management Decision-Making Authority
The Manager is responsible for day-to-day operational decisions for the 
cooperative, as defined by the Board of Directors. Further decision-making 
authority is established by the Time Line, Money Line, and Member Line.
Time Line
1 day
$1
Manager
Decides
Manager
Decides
Board 
1 year
Decides
Money Line
Board
$3,000.00
Decides
Members
Decide
Members
Decide
3 years
$10,000.00
Manager 
1 Member 7 Members
Member Line
Board Members
50% of Members
Decides Decides Decide
Articles of Incorporation
Article m 
The Treatment of Net Worth and Net Income
1. NET WORTH - There shall be an INDIVIDUAL INTERNAL CAPITAL 
ACCOUNT in the name of each member and one COLLECTIVE INTER 
NAL CAPITAL ACCOUNT that in unindividuated. The sum of the balances 
of the individual accounts plus the balance in the collective account shall equal 
the Net Worth (=Assets minus Liabilities) of the cooperative.
The membership fee, whether paid in cash or payroll deductions, shall be 
the initial balance in each member's account. Any gifts or grants to the 
cooperative shall be credited to the collective account.
The individual capital accounts shall accrue interest at the highest rate not 
to exceed 12 percent, as determined by the Board of Directors.
Appendix C
Excerpts From Agreement (1982)
between 
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. ("A&P")
and
The United Foods & Commercial Workers Union 
Locals No. 56 & 1357 ("UNION")
WHEREAS, A&P found it necessary to close its Philadelphia and Scranton 
Divisions due to business and economic reasons, and
WHEREAS, A&P closed or otherwise disposed of its stores and warehouses 
in these divisions, and
WHEREAS, those employees in the Union were terminated when the stores 
closed by the rules of seniority, and
WHEREAS, those stores transferred to other divisions could be closed due 
to the resulting detrimental impact of those stores closed, and
WHEREAS, the employees in these stores who are members of the Union 
face termination.
NOW, THEREFORE, the company and the Union agree to:
1. Through their joint efforts strive to reopen as many closed stores as possi 
ble, on a guaranteed profitable basis offering eventual re-employment to former 
A&P employees presently on layoff of December, 1981.
2. Apply this understanding to the employees of all existing operating stores 
within the jurisdiction of the Union so as to preserve the jobs of such employees 
which it is agreed are seriously jeopardized by economic circumstances affect 
ing A&P.
3. A&P will establish a new subsidiary which will have separate and in 
dependent management and which will be charged only for its own manage 
ment services (not for the management services generally charged to divisions 
of A&P). However, non-management overhead, such as overhead related to 
accounting and MIS services, will be charged to the new subsidiary.
4. The new subsidiary referred to in "3" above will in turn establish sub 
sidiaries or other separate entities, for each store to be reopened, or for each 
operating store to be operated, all pursuant to the terms of this understanding. 
Each such store will be a separate enterprise.
12. Create a mechanism providing for the purchase of the New Entity Store 
in the following instances:
A. A store owned by the new Entity is to be closed and transferred to 
a third party.
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B. The A&P employees of a store located within the jurisdiction of the 
Union do not elect to affiliate with the New Entity; and as a result thereof, 
the store is to be closed and transferred to a third party.
C. The New Entity elects to franchise the store or to enter into a joint 
venture.
If an event set forth in item 1 above occurs, then the employees of the store 
to be closed (the "Affected Employees") or the Employee Association 
("Pace") shall have the right to purchase said store at a fair price (the "Fair 
Price"). The mechanism for determination of the Fair Price shall be the sub 
ject to further negotiations between the parties. The option to purchase may 
be exercised only within the ninety (90) day period commencing upon the date 
that the Fair Price shall have been determined.
ADDENDUM 
Employees Incentive and Investment Fund
4. The amount of Employer contribution for each store shall be one percent 
(1 %) of the store's total sales for the contract year, subject to adjustments as 
follows: If the store's labor rate for the corresponding period is below nine 
percent (9%), the contribution rate shall be adjusted upward by one-twentieth 
of a percentage point (.05 %) for each full one-tenth of a percentage point (0.1%) 
reduction below nine percent (9%). If the store's labor rate for the correspond 
ing period is above ten percent (10%), the contribution rate shall be adjusted 
downward by one-twentieth of a percentage point (0.05%) for each full one- 
tenth of a percentage point (0.1 %) increase above ten percent (10%). For ex 
ample, if the labor rate is 8.3%, the contribution rate is 1.35%; if the labor 
rate is 11.1%, the contribution rate is 0.45%. Under no circumstances shall 
the Fund be required to reimburse the Employer based on the store's labor rate.
Appendix D
Excerpts From Agreement Between Super Fresh and UFCW 1357 and 56
(1982-1985)
ARTICLE VI
Union Activities
6.1 It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Union shall have 
the opportunity to investigate and resolve problems, to discuss problems with 
the Employer in an effort to reach a resolution, and to communicate with its 
members during the term of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VIII 
Seniority
8.2 Seniority for all employees shall be based upon continuous service from 
the last employment date with Employer within the store location. All new 
employees shall be on probation for a trial period of sixty (60) days, except 
as provided in Article XXII, Section 22.2, after which they shall be placed 
on the seniority roster and their seniority shall date from date of hire.
ARTICLE IX 
Employees Incentive and Investment Fund
9.1 The Employer shall contribute to an Employee Incentive and Invest 
ment Fund, which shall be established in accordance with the specifications 
set forth on the Addendum hereto.
9.2 The establishment and maintenance of the Employee Incentive and In 
vestment Fund shall be conditional upon the approval of the Internal Revenue 
Service or a court of competent jurisdiction, if applicable, that the plan and 
any accompanying trust are exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue 
Code, and the Employer's obligation to contribute shall be conditional upon 
the deducibility of such contributions for income tax purposes.
9.3 In the event that, for any reason, the Fund cannot receive the continu 
ing approval of the IRS with respect to the deductibility as an item of business 
expense of the employer contribution thereunder, the amount of the employer 
contribution for the period of which such contribution is required under this
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Agreement shall be paid directly to the employees in cash, as an employee 
benefit, by a formula to be mutually determined by the Employer and the Union.
ARTICLE XHI 
Quality of Work Life
13.1 The Union and the Employer agree to utilize a Quality of Work Life 
(QWL) structure to provide a mutual basis for problem solving. It is further 
agreed to utilize outside (neutral) sources to provide guidance and advice to 
increase the effectiveness of this program. Such QWL program shall be im 
plemented with the opening of the store.
The resulting QWL program will not become involved in disputes covered 
under the Grievance & Arbitration Procedure and will not conflict with any 
terms or conditions of this collective bargaining agreement and will not reduce 
any rights or privileges of the employee or Employer.
Appendix £
Excerpts from Quality of Work Life for United Food
& Commercial Workers Local 56 and Local 1357
with Super Fresh Food Markets (1982)
III. Organizational Design
6. Overview
Super Fresh will be organized as a two/three level structure. The first 
level will be that of the corporation itself, which will incorporate five 
different dimensions:
- Output Units (stores)
- Input Units (service functions)
- Environmental Unit (marketing/advocacy)
- Planning Boards (policy making bodies)
- Management Support System (control)
The second level will be the internal structure of the store itself, which 
will be organized along the same concept as the corporation, having the 
five dimensions as does the larger system.
- Output Units (departments)
- Input Units (front end; receiving)
- Environmental Unit (local business development and advocacy)
- Planning Boards (policy making bodies)
- Management Support System (control)
As Super Fresh increases the number of stores it operates, a three level 
structure will be created that groups the stores into regional units.
6.1 Output Units. Achievement of the organizational ends and objectives 
(outputs) will be the responsibility of the output units (stores) of the 
system. The other units are created in order to facilitate the operation 
of these units. These units will be self-sufficient and autonomous to the 
degree that the integrity of the whole system is not compromised.
6.2 Input Units. Inputs are the services required to support the output units. 
Because of economies of scale, technology and geographic dispersion 
inputs can best be realized at the corporate level. These units will also 
be semi-autonomous.
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6.3 Environmental Units. The interaction of the system with its environ 
ment is facilitated by the environmental units. The two main functions 
of these units are marketing and advocacy, that is, attracting the 
customers, making contact with the external stakeholders and advocating 
their point of view within the system.
6.4 Planning Board. Planning is a process that provides the overall coor 
dinating and integrating funtion for the input, output and environmental 
units. Planning boards are the main policy making body of the organiza 
tion and at all levels serve as the vehicle for the participative manage 
ment style of Super Fresh. This enables the information, judgments and 
concerns of subordinates to influence the decisions that affect them. One 
of the key functions of the planning boards is to constantly re-assess the 
progress the corporation, store, or department is making toward its goals 
(via feedback from the management support system) and to chart new 
objectives when necessary. Planning at the store level is directed to those 
matters affecting the store. Planning affecting more than one store is 
done at the corporate level.
6.5 Management Support System. The management support system is 
responsible for the comparison of the actual outcomes versus expected 
outcomes based on the plans and policies set by the planning boards. 
This provides the means for learning and adaptation.
7 Components of the System 
7.1 Stores (Output units)
7.1.1 The stores will produce the outputs of Super Fresh. Therefore, 
those activities which are directly compatible with the mission 
of the "whole," and are necessary for the production of out 
puts will be considered in this dimension.
7.1.2 Each store will be responsible for the management of its 
resources and will have an organizational structure very similar 
to the larger system of which it is a part.
7.1.3 Each store will operate as a semi-autonomous performance 
center. Financial contributions of each store to Super Fresh will 
reflect sales minus direct costs and will not have corporate in 
direct costs charged against it.
7.1.4 Each store will be allowed to retain a percentage of its con 
tributions above a minimum level determined by the corporate 
planning board. These funds will be used for internal develop 
ment and local business development by the store consistent with 
corporate board policies.
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7.1.5 Each store will be responsible for making those decisions which 
affect only its operations. Decisions which impact on the other 
stores and the corporation as a whole will be made at the cor 
porate level with participation from the Store Director.
7.1.6 Each Store Director will report directly to the Office of the 
President of Super Fresh.
7.1.7 Each store and department will have a planning board of its own.
7.1.8 At the store level each output department will be headed by a 
manager who reports directly to the Store Director. These out 
put departments will be as follows:
- Grocery
- Meat
- Produce
- Deli/Bakery
7.1.9 The Store Director will be responsible for general store orien 
tation for all new associates. This orientation will be assessed 
by the department managers.
7.1.10 The Store Directors in conjunction with department managers 
will develop departmental cross familiarization programs which 
will be assessed by the Store Director and those who participate 
in the program.
7.4 Planning Boards
7.4.1 There will be planning boards at all levels, including the cor 
poration as a whole, support service units, marketing units, and 
stores.
7.4.2 In general, each board will consist of (1) the manager of the 
unit whose board it is, (2) his/her immediate superior, 
(3) his/her immediate subordinates, and (4) representatives of 
the associates on higher level boards. The specific membership 
will be identified in sections 7.4.11 through 7.4.15.-
7.4.3 The planning boards will be engaged in continuous interactive 
planning and reserch to redesign the system as needed.
7.4.4 The planning boards will be policy making bodies and not mere 
ly advisory committees, however executive decisions will be 
left to the respective managers.
7.4.5 Organizational strategies, policies and procedure will be for 
mulated by the planning boards.
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7.4.6 The planning boards will explicitly specify the objective and 
consequences of the plans and policies designed by the board. 
These objectives and their attainment will be assessed on a 
regular basis by the management support system.
7.4.7 The planning boards will utilize the information generated by 
all the units.
7.4.8 Decisions will be made by a consensus of the board members. 
If consensus cannot be reached as to a course of action, the board 
will resolve the differences by research and experimentation 
done by special project committees.
7.4.9 Those holding management positions will be appointed by their 
immediate higher level manager, however they will have to 
maintain the confidence of their respective planning boards.
7.4.10 The corporate planning board will make available through 
Human Resources information and sources on internal and ex 
ternal training on the operation of the food retailing business 
and its environment. This information will be available to all 
associates.
7.4.11 At the corporate level the board will meet on a regular basis 
and will have the following members:
- The President of Super Fresh
- The Director of each store
- Representatives of associates-at-large selected by store plan 
ning boards
- The Support Service and the Marketing Unit Directors
- The Presidents of the two Unions
- The responsible manager of A&P or his/her representative
- External stakeholders, if the issue warrants it.
7.4.12 When the number of stores increases the corporate board will 
be divided into sub-corporate boards, meeting regionally. No 
more than fifteen stores will be included in a sub-corporate 
board. The sub-corporate board will have the following 
members:
- The Vice-President of Retail Operations (representing the 
President) and his/her assistants (who may function as regional 
managers)
- The Director of each store (maximum 15)
- An associate from each of the stores to be chosen by each 
store planning board on a rotational basis.
- The Support Services and the Marketing Unit Directors
- The representatives of the two Unions' management
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7.4.13 Coordination of the sub-corporate boards will be done in a 
special meeting of the corporate planning board at which time 
an overall corporate plan will be formulated. The following will 
attend:
- The President
- The Vice-President of Retail Operations and his/her regional 
assistants
- One Store Director and one associate from each region se 
lected by the sub-corporate planning board on a rotational 
basis
- Support Services and Marketing Directors
- The Presidents of each of the two Unions or their repre 
sentatives
- A responsible manager of A&P or his/her representatives
7.4.14 At a store level the board will meet on a regular basis and will 
have the following members:
- The Store Director and his/her assistants
- The Manager of each department and an associate to be 
chosen by the department planning board
- Grocery
- Meat
- Produce
- Deli/Bakery
- The Front End Manager and a cashier
- The representatives of the two Unions
- A representative of the President of Super Fresh
7.4.15 At the department level the board will meet on a regular basis 
and will include all the associates of that department.
8.2 Incentive Systems
8.2.1 Each store will contribute a percentage of its sales depending 
upon total labor cost percentage to an associate investment/in 
centive fund. The decisions regarding allocation, investment and 
disbursement of this fund are the right of the associates. The 
Unions will facilitate the forming of an advisory committee to 
make these decisions (outside the Super Fresh QWL effort).
8.2.2 Super Fresh will establish a management incentive fund in which 
each Store Director will participate. The incentive will be paid 
based on performance in the following areas: 
- Sales
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- Employee satisfaction
- Store contribution
8.3 Hiring
8.3.1 Former A&P employees will be given preference in hiring at 
the store level. Placement of these individuals will be done by 
a hiring committee made up of:
- Director of Human Resources
- The Vice-Presidents of the two Unions
- The store Director will be consulted on the list of Depart 
ment Managers being considered for his store. This procedure 
will operate as long as there is a list of former A&P or Super 
Fresh employees.
Appendix F
[Worker Survey]
Social Innovations at Work Project of Temple University 
Study of Philadelphia Supermarkets in Transition
Please answer the following questions either by circling the number most 
closely corresponding to your personal opinion or situation or by filling in 
any blanks. Remember, the answers you give will be kept completely con 
fidential. No individual responses will be given to anyone in the store, the 
union, or anywhere else. A summary of the combined responses of everyone 
who returns a questionnaire will be available after the study is completed but 
these will be average answers of the group as a whole, NOT your personal
response.
DO NOT WRITE
IN THIS
COLUMN
CARD #1
COLUMN #1
ID 1-10
I. JOB EXPERIENCE
1. What is your current position?
1. ASSISTANT MANAGER 11. FROZEN FOOD CLERK
2. FROZEN FOOD DEPARTMENT MANAGER 12. DELI CLERK
3. DELI DEPARTMENT MANAGER 13. PRODUCE CLERK
4. PRODUCE DEPARTMENT MANAGER 14. DAIRY CLERK
5. DAIRY DEPARTMENT MANAGER 15. GROCERY CLERK
6. GROCERY DEPARTMENT MANAGER 16. MEAT CUTTER
7. OFFICER PERSONNEL 17. MEAT WRAPPER
8. HEAD CASHIER 18. RECEIVER
9. CASHIER 19. OTHER:
10. NIGHT CREW ____________ 11
(please identify)
2. On average, how many hours per week do you work in this store?
___________ HOURS PER WEEK 12-13
3. How long have you worked at this job in this store? 14-15 
_____ YEARS and _____ MONTHS 16-17
4. How many years have you worked in any kind of supermarket, 
not counting interruptions like child bearing or military service 
but counting your current job? 
________ YEARS IN ALL 18-19
H. TRAINING
5. How many years of schooling have you had? (High school 
graduation =12; college graduation=16) 
_______ YEARS 20-21
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6. How much job-related training have you received since you 
started working here?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 22
7. Please circle a "YES" response beside every job you know how to perform.
NO YES
a. Assistant Manager................................... 1 2
b. Frozen Food Department Manager...................... 1 2
c. Deli Department Manager............................. 1 2
d. Produce Department Manager.......................... 1 2
e. Dairy Department Manager............................ 1 2
f. Grocery Department Manager.......................... 1 2
g. Office Personnel..................................... 1 2
h. Head Cashier....................................... 1 2
i. Cashier............................................ 1 2
j. Night Crew......................................... 1 2
k. Frozen Food Clerk................................... 1 2
1. Deli Clerk.......................................... 1 2
m. Produce Clerk....................................... 1 2
n. Dairy Clerk......................................... 1 2
o. Grocery Clerk....................................... 1 2
p. Meat Cutter......................................... 1 2
q. Meat Wrapper...................................... 1 2
r. Receiver........................................... 1 2
s. Other___________________________ 1 2
(Please Identify) 23
8. How many new jobs have you learned since coming to work here? 
________# NEW JOBS LEARNED 24
9. Other than whole new jobs, how many new skills have you learned since 
coming to work here? (For example: pricing, advertising, display, 
scheduling, buying, bookkeeping, supervising, staffing, etc.) 
______# NEW SKILLS 25-26
10. How much have you learned about each of the following things since 
coming to work here?
NOTHING A GREAT DEAL 
a. Confidence in handling problems
that arise in the store 12345 27 
b. Willingness to speak up in
meetings 12345 28 
c. How to work on a team -12345 29 
d. How to influence others 12345 30 
e. Feeling responsible for your work 1 2 3 4 5 31 
f. How to supervise others 12345 32 
g. How to listen to others' opinions 12345 33
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HI. PARTICIPATION
11. How much are workers' opinions taken into account when decisions are 
made in your store?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 34
12. How mucy "say" or influence do each of the following have on what 
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE VERY MUCH
'SAY" "SAY"
a. Workers as a group 12345 35 
b. Department heads 12345 36 
c. Store Director
(for O&O—Store Manager) 12345 37 
d. Corporate Planning Board
(for O&O—Board of Directors) 12345 38
13. How much "say" or influence SHOULD each of the following have on what 
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE VERY MUCH
"SAY" "SAY"
a. Worker as a group 12345 39 
b. Department heads 12345 40 
c. Store Director
(for O&O—Store Manager) 12345 41 
d. Corporate Planning Board
(for O&O—Board of Directors) 12345 42
14. How much involvement do you have in each of the following kinds 
of decisions?
MY
OPINION
I AM IN- IS I SHARE I CAN 
I AM FORMED I CAN TAKEN EQUALLY DECIDE 
NOT IN- BEFORE- GIVE MY INTO IN DE- ON MY 
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT CISIONS OWN 
a. Improvement in 
working
conditions 1 2 3 4 5 6 43 
b. Appointment of a 
new department
head 1 2 3 4 5 6 44 
c. Hiring new
employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 45 
d. Making a major
capital investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 46 
e. Having more 
training programs 
during work time 1 2 3 4 5 6 47
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f.
g-
h.
i.
Assigning tasks
that have to
be done
Changing the
vendors or
displays
Their working
hours
Shutting down
the store
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
15. How much involvement DO YOU WANT in
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6 48
6 49
6 50
6 51
each of the following
kinds of decisions?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g-
h.
i.
Improvement in
working
conditions
Appointment of
a new department
head
Hiring new
employees
Making a major
capital investment
Having more
training programs
during work time
Assigning tasks
that have to
be done
Changing the
vendors or
displays
Their working
hours
Shutting down
the store
I DON'T
WANT TO
BE IN 
VOLVED
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I WANT
TO BE
IN 
FORMED
BEFORE 
HAND
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
I WANT
TO GIVE
MY
OPINION
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
I WANT
MY
OPINION
TO BE
TAKEN
INTO
I WANT
TO SHARE
EQUALLY
IN
ACCOUNT DECISIONS
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
I WANT
TO DE 
CIDE
ON MY
OWN
6 52
6 53
6 54
6 55
6 56
6 57
6 58
6 59
6 60
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16. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making 
influence the amount of extra effort you put into your job?
12345 
NONE AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 61
17. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making 
influence how effectively you are able to do your job?
12345 
NONE AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 62
18. How much extra effort do you actually put into doing a good job?
12345 
NONE AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 63
19. How often is it true for you personally that working hard leads 
to high productivity?
12345 
NEVER ALMOST ALWAYS 64
20. How often is it true for you personally that working hard leads 
to doing your job well?
12345 
NEVER ALMOST ALWAYS 65
IV. STORE FUNCTIONING
21. Which of these consequences have occurred because of your 
QWL (for O&O—O&O) system of decision making?
DEFINITELY NOT DEFINITELY YES 
a. People know more 
about what goes
on here 1 2 3 4 5 66 
b. People are more 
willing to accept
decisions 1 2 3 4 5 67 
c. The quality of 
decisions has
increased 1 2 3 4 5 68 
d. It takes longer to
make decisions 1 2 3 4 5 69 
e. There is more trust 
between the manager
and the employees 1 2 3 4 5 70 
f. Disagreements are 
talked about more
openly 1 2 3 4 5 71 
g. Disagreements are
more easily resolved 1 2 3 4 5 72
Card #77-78-79
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V. VALUES AND SATISFACTION
23. Here is a list of things a person could have on his or her 
job. How important is each of the following to you? 
MODERATELY 
IMPORTANT
CARD #2
COLUMN #
ID 1-10
EXTREMELY 
IMPORTANT
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g-
h.
i.
A feeling of
accomplishment 1
Personal growth
and development 1
Having a good
relationship
with co-workers 1
Pay and fringe
benefits 1
QWL (For O&O-
Worker Ownership 1
Job security 1
Independence 1
Getting a promotion
or a better job 1
Having a good
relationship with
your boss 1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
24. How satisfied are you with each of the following aspects of your job?
VERY 
SATISFIED
VERY 
DISSATISFIED
a. The feeling of
accomplishment it
gives you 
b. The amount of
personal growth
it offers 
c. Your relationship
with co-workers 
d. Your pay and
fringe benefits 
e. QWL (For O&O-
Worker Ownership) 
f. Your job security 
g. Your independence 
h. Your change to get
promoted or a
better job 
i. Your relationship
with your boss
20
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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25. How satisfied are you with each of the following aspects of your life?
a. Your family life 
b. Your leisure life 
c. Your job, overall 
d. Your career 
e. Your feelings about
yourself 
f. Your economic
situation 
g. Your life, ii 
h. Your health
VERY
SATISFIED
lif
ara
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
VERY
DISSATISFIED
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
5
5
5
5
29
30
31
32
pers<
i
gene
on 1
1
ral 1
1
2
2
2
2
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
5
5
5
5
33
34
35
36
JATION 
tal status?
3
ED SEPARATED
4
DIVORCED
5
WIDOWED
YFARS
? 1
1.
ion?
2
3TE
. WHITE
FEMALE
STANT
2. BLACK
2. MALE
3
JEWISH
3. OTHER
4
OTHER
37
38-39
40
41
42
VI. HOUSEHOLD SITU
26. What is your marii
1 2
SINGLE MARRI
27. What is your age?
30. What is your relig
1 
CATHOLIC
31. Do you:
1. OWN YOUR OWN HOUSE FREE AND CLEAR?
2. OWN YOUR OWN HOUSE, MORTGAGED?
3. RENT?
4. LIVE WITH RELATIVES/PAY SOME ROOM AND BOARD?
5. LIVE WITH RELATIVES/PAY NOTHING?
32. What is the total number of people living in your household? 
______ PEOPLE
33. How many of these people are under 18? ______
34. How many people are economically dependent upon you for at least 
some of their support? (Count both those living in your household 
and those living elsewhere.)
______ TOTAL DEPENDENTS
35. What is your usual hourly wage for this job?
______ DOLLARS PER HOUR
36. What is your total annual income from this job? (Not counting 
your bonus.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR
43
44-45 
46-47
48-49 
50-51
52-56
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37. What was the amount of your most recent bonus?
_______ DOLLARS 57-61
38. What is the total annual income for everyone in your household 
combined? (Include any other income you have.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR 62-67
39. What was your total personal income on your A&P (or previous) job?
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR 68-72
40. How many months were you laid off altogether since A&P 
announced its shutdown in March of 1982?
______ MONTHS 73-74
41. As far as savings are concerned, how are your savings now 
compared to before the shutdown?
12345 
MUCH WORSE THE SAME MUCH BETTER 75
42. As far as debt is concerned, how much do you owe now compared 
to before the shutdown?
12345
MUCH MORE MUCH LESS 76
Card #77-78-79
CARD#3
COLUMN #
ID 1-10
43. During the past two years, did changes in your financial situation make 
it harder or easier for your family to do any of the following things?
HARDER SAME EASIER
a. Buying a house 1 2 3 4 5 11 
b. Having a wedding, etc. 12345 12 
c. Buying a car 12345 13 
d. Paying school tuition 12345 14 
e. Having a baby 1 2 3 4 5 15 
f. Retiring 1 2 3 4 5 16 
g. Buying a stereo, boat or
other leisure purchase 1 2 3 4 5 17 
h. Keeping something you
were making payments on 1 2 3 4 5 18 
i. Having a vacation 1 2 3 4 5 19 
j. Moving out on own 1 2 3 4 5 20
44. How have any changes in your income affected your day to day budget?
a. For food........
b. For clothing.....
c. For transportation,
d. For leisure......
e. For housing......
LESS IN MORE IN
BUDGET
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
SAME
3
3
3
3
3
BUDGET
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
21
22
23
24
25
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45. Have changes in your income led you to seek extra income in any new 
ways such as the following:
NO YES 
a. Working another job........................... 1 2 26
b. Having someone else in your family work........ 1 2 27
c. Getting money from friends/relatives.............. 1 2 28
d. Doing services (i.e., fixing things)................ 1 2 29
e. Bartering or trading for things.................. 1 2 30
f. Selling things................................. 1 2 31
g. Other_________________________ 1 2 32 
(Please Specify)
[Questions 46-51 appeared only on the Super Fresh Survey]
46. At Super Fresh, how much are you getting out of work compared to A&P?
12345 
MUCH LESS THE SAME MUCH MORE 33
47. At Super Fresh, how much control do you have over your life 
compared to A&P?
12345 
MUCH LESS THE SAME MUCH MORE 34
48. Did you ever go to the following meetings?
NO YES
a. Store (operation or QWL) 1 2 35 
b. QWL Training 1 2 36 
c. Corporate Planning Board 1 2 37 
d. Regional Planning Board 1 2 38
49. What is QWL?
50. Are there separate QWL & operations meetings? 1 2
NO YES 50
Card #77-78-79
51. How are QWL issues different from operations issues?
Thank you for your participation. Please seal your questionnaire in the envelope provided and 
return it as directed. If you have a question, call Dr. Judith Goode, 787-7773.

Appendix G
Social Innovations at Work Project of Temple University
Study of Philadelphia Supermarket Transition
Shop Steward Information
Please answer the following questions either by circling the number most 
closely corresponding to your situation or by filling in any blanks. Remember, 
the answers you give will be kept completely confidential. No individual 
responses will be given to anyone in the store, the union, or anywhere else. 
A summary of the combined responses will be available after the study is com 
pleted but these will be average answers of the group as a whole, NOT your 
personal response.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1. What is your current position?
1. ASSISTANT MANAGER
2. FROZEN FOOD DEPARTMENT MANAGER
3. DELI DEPARTMENT MANAGER
4. PRODUCE DEPARTMENT MANAGER
5. DAIRY DEPARTMENT MANAGER
6. GROCERY DEPARTMENT MANAGER
7. OFFICER PERSONNEL
8. HEAD CASHIER
9. CASHIER
10. NIGHT CREW
DO NOT WRITE
IN THIS
COLUMN
CARD #1
COLUMN #1
ID 1-10
11. FROZEN FOOD CLERK
12. DELI CLERK
13. PRODUCE CLERK
14. DAIRY CLERK
15. GROCERY CLERK
16. MEAT CUTTER
17. MEAT WRAPPER
18. RECEIVER
19. OTHER:
(please identify)
2. On average, how many hours per week do you work in this store? 
__________ HOURS PER WEEK
3. How long have you worked at this job in this store? 
_____ YEARS and _____ MONTHS
4. How many years have you worked in any kind of supermarket, 
not counting interruptions like child bearing or military service 
but counting your current job? 
________ YEARS IN ALL
5. How many years of schooling have you had? (High school 
graduation =12; college graduation =16) 
________YEARS
11-12
13-14 
15-19
20-21
22-23
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6. What is your marital status?
123 45 
SINGLE MARRIED SEPARATED DIVORCED WIDOWED 24
7. What is your age? ______ YEARS 25-26
8. What is your race? 1. WHITE 2. BLACK 3. OTHER 27
9. What is your sex? 1. FEMALE 2. MALE 28
10. What is your religion?
1 234 
CATHOLIC PROTESTANT JEWISH OTHER 29
11. How many months were you laid off altogether since A&P announced 
its shut down in March of 1982?
______ MONTHS 30-31
12. What is your total annual income from this job? (Not counting 
your bonus.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR 32-36
13. What was the amount of your most recent bonus?
______ DOLLARS 37-41
14. What is the total annual income for everyone in your household 
combined? (Include any other income you have.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR 42-47
15. How many people are economically dependent upon you for at 
least some of their support? (Count both those living in your 
household and those living elsewhere.)
______ TOTAL DEPENDENTS 48-49
H. PARTICIPATION
16. How much are workers' opinions taken into account when decisions are 
made in your store?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 50
17. How much "say" or influence do each of the following have on what 
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE VERY MUCH
"SAY" "SAY"
a. Workers as a group 12345 52 
b. Department heads 12345 53 
c. Store Director
(For O&O—Store Manager) 12345 54 
d. Corporate Planning Board
(For O&O-Board of Directors) 12345 55
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18. How much "say" or influence SHOULD each of the following have on what 
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE VERY MUCH
"SAY" "SAY"
a. Worker as a group 12345 56 
b. Department heads 12345 57 
c. Store Director
(For O&O—Store Manager) 12345 58 
d. Corporate Planning Board
(For O&O-Board of Directors) 12345 59
19. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making
influence the amount of extra effort workers in this store put into their jobs?
12345 
NONE AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 60
20. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making
influence how effectively workers in this store are able to do their jobs?
12345 
NONE AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 61
21. How much extra effort do workers in this store actually put into 
doing a good job?
12345 
NONE AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 62
22. How often is it true for workers in this store that working hard leads 
to high productivity?
12345 
NEVER ALMOST ALWAYS 63
23. How often is it true for workers in this store that working hard leads 
to high productivity?
12345 
NEVER ALMOST ALWAYS 64
24. How often is it true for workers in this store that working hard leads 
to doing their job well?
12345 
NEVER ALMOST ALWAYS 65
25. Which of these consequences have occurred because of your 
QWL (For O&O—O&O) system of decision making?
DEFINITELY NOT DEFINITELY YES 
a. People know more about
what goes on here 1 2 3 4 5 66 
b. People are more willing
to accept decisions 1 2 3 4 5 67 
c. The quality of decisions
has increased 1 2 3 4 5 68 
d. It takes longer to make
decisions 1 2 3 4 5 69
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e. There is more trust between
the manager and the
employees 1 2 3 4 5 70 
f. Disagreements are talked
about more openly 1 2 3 4 5 71 
g. Disagreements are more
easily resolved 1 2 3 4 5 72
CODE #77-80
CARD #2
COLUMN #
ID # 1-10
26. How much involvement do workers have in each of the following 
kinds of decisions?
THEIR
THEY THEY OPINIONS THEY THEY 
ARE ARE IN- THEY ARE SHARE DECIDE 
NOT FORMED GIVE TAKEN EQUALLY ON 
IN- BEFORE- THEIR INTO IN THEIR 
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN 
a. Improvement in
working conditions 1 2 3 4 5 611 
b. Appointment of a
new department head 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 
c. Hiring new
employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 13 
d. Making a major
capital investment 1 2 3 4 5 614 
e. Having more training 
programs during
work time 1 2 3 4 5 6 15 
f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done 1 2 3 4 5 6 16 
g. Changing the ven 
dors or displays 1 2 3 4 5 6 17 
h. Their working hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 18 
i. Shutting down the
store 1 2 3 4 5 6 19
27. What percent of workers actually participate in decision making in the store?
VERY OFTEN PARTICIPATE _____% 20-21 
OCCASIONALLY PARTICIPATE _____% 22-23 
RARELY PARTICIPATE _____% 24-25 
NEVER PARTICIPATE _____% 26-27
100%
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28. How much involvement do department heads have in each of the following 
kinds of decisions?
THEIR
THEY THEY OPINIONS THEY THEY 
ARE ARE IN- THEY ARE SHARE DECIDE 
NOT FORMED OWE TAKEN EQUALLY ON 
IN- BEFORE- THEIR INTO IN THEIR 
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN 
a. Improvement in
working conditions 1 2 3 4 5 6 28 
b. Appointment of a
new department head 1 2 3 4 5 6 29 
c. Hiring new
employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 30 
d. Making a major
capital investment 1 2 3 4 5 631 
e. Having more training 
programs during
work time 1 2 3 4 5 6 32 
f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done 1 2 3 4 5 6 33 
g. Changing the ven 
dors or displays 1 2 3 4 5 6 34 
h. Their working hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 35 
i. Shutting down the
store 1 2 3 4 5 6 36
29. How much involvement do store directors have in each of the following 
kinds of decisions?
THEIR
THEY THEY OPINIONS THEY THEY 
ARE ARE IN- THEY ARE SHARE DECIDE 
NOT FORMED GIVE TAKEN EQUALLY ON 
IN- BEFORE- THEIR INTO IN THEIR 
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN 
a. Improvement in
working conditions 1 2 3 4 5 6 37 
b. Appointment of a
new department head 1 2 3 4 5 638 
c. Hiring new
employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 39 
d. Making a major
capital investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 40 
e. Having more training 
programs during
work time 1 2 3 4 5 6 41 
f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done 1 2 3 4 5 6 42 
g. Changing the ven 
dors or displays 1 2 3 4 5 6 43
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h. Their working hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 44 
i. Shutting down the
store 1 2 3 4 5 6 45
HI. TRAINING
30. How many job-related training programs have occurred here since the A&P shutdown?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 46
31. To what extent are workers encouraged to train each other on the job?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 47
32. How much have workers been trained in each of the following things 
since the A&P shutdown?
NONE A GREAT DEAL 
a. Confidence in handling problems
that arise in the store 1 2 3 4 5 48 
b. Willingness to speak up in meetings 1 2 3 4 5 49 
c. How to work on a team 1 2 3 4 5 50 
d. How to influence others 1 2 3 4 5 51 
e. Feeling responsible for their work 1 2 3 4 5 52 
f. How to supervise others 1 2 3 4 5 53 
g. How to listen to others' opinions 1 2 3 4 5 54 
h. How to perform a new job 1 2 3 4 5 55 
i. How to perform new skills for their
same job (advertising, pricing,
scheduling, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 56 
j. How QWL (for O&O-Worker
Ownership) works 1 2 3 4 5 57
33. To what extent has the union been supportive of QWL? (For O&O— 
Worker Ownership)
12345 
NOT AT ALL A GREAT DEAL
34. (#34-39—Not asked at O&O) To what extent have workers been encouraged 
to go to each of the following kinds of meetings?
NEVER ALWAYS
a. Store operational meetings 1 2 3 4 5 59 
b. Store QWL meetings 1 2 3 4 5 60 
c. QWL training meetings 1 2 3 4 5 61 
d. Corporate Planning Board 1 2 3 4 5 62 
e. Regional Planning Board 1 2 3 4 5 63
35. In your estimation, to what extent has QWL been implemented in your store?
12345 
NONE AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 64
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36. How satisfied are the workers with QWL as it is practices in your store?
12345 
VERY SATISFIED VERY DISSATISFIED 65
37. What is QWL?
38. How is QWL different from operations?
39. Are there separate QWL and Operations meetings?
1 2 
NO YES 
If so, what goes on at each?
Thank you for your participation. Please seal your questionnaire in the envelope provided and 
return it as directed. If you have a question, call Dr. Judith Goode, 787-7773.

Appendix H
Social Innovations at Work Project of Temple University 
Study of Philadelphia Supermarkets in Transition 
Store Director (For O&O Manager) Information
Please answer the following questions either by circling the number most 
closely corresponding to your situation or by filling in any blanks. Remember, 
the answers you give will be kept completely confidential. No individual 
responses will be given to anyone in the store, the union, or anywhere else. 
A summary of the combined responses will be available after the study is com 
pleted but these will be average answers of the group as a whole, NOT your 
personal response.
DO NOT WRITE
IN THIS
COLUMN
CARD #1
COLUMN #1
ID 1-10
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYEES IN YOUR STORE
1. What is the total number of people employed in this store?
______ TOTAL # OF EMPLOYEES 11-12
2. How many of these employees are Full Time?
______ FULL TIMERS 13-14
3. How many are Part Time?
_______ PART TIMERS 15-16
4. On average, how many hours per week do your Full Timers work?
______ HOURS/WEEK FT 17-18
5. On average, how many hours per week do your Part Timers work?
______ HOURS/WEEK PT 19-20
6. How many employees quit, were fired, retired or died during the past year?
______ # TURNED OVER 21-22
7. In an average week, how many employees are absent?
______ # ABSENT 23-24
8. How many of your employees have supervisory responsibilities?
______ # SUPERVISORS 25-26
9. How many of your employees (Full and Part Time) are female?
______ # FEMALES 27-28
10. How many of your employees are non-white?
______ # NON-WHITE 29-30
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11. How many of your employees have at least a high school diploma or GED?
_____ # H.S. GRADUATES 31-32
12. What percent of your workers are at the top of the pay scale?
______ % 33-34
13. How much are they paid per hour?
$______ HOUR 35-39
14. What percent of your workers are at the bottom of the pay scale?
______ % 40-41
15. How much are they paid per hour?
$______ HOUR 42-46
16. How many employees can you schedule for more than one job?
______ EMPLOYEES 47-48
17. How many training programs have been run for your employees 
during the past year?
______ # TRAINING PROGRAMS 49-50
18. To what extent are workers encouraged to train each other on the job?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 51
19. What is the average seniority of workers in your store?
______ YEARS SENIORITY 52-53
H. CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR STORE
20. How many square feet of selling area do you have?
______ THOUSAND SQUARE FEET 54-56
21. How many other food stores compete with you in the neighborhood 
you serve?
_____ # COMPETITORS 57-58
22. How easy is it for you to obtain credit for the store?
12345 
VERY DIFFICULT VERY EASY 59
m. PARTICIPATION
23. How much are workers' opinions taken into account when decisions 
are made in your store?
12345 
NOT AT ALL A GREAT DEAL 60
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24. How much "say" or influence DO each of the following have on 
what goes on in the store?
a. Workers as a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director (For O&O—
Store Manager) 
d. Corporate Planning Board (For
O&O—Board of Directors)
15. How much "say" or influence S 
what goes on in the store?
a. Workers are a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director (For O&O—
Store Manager) 
d. Corporate Planning Board (For
O&O—Board of Directors)
VERY LITTLE
"SAY"
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
3
3
3
3
VERY MUCH
"SAY"
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
61
62
63
64
f/LD each of the following have on
VERY LITTLE
"SAY"
1 2
1 2
3
3
VERY MUCH
"SAY"
4 5
4 5
65
66
1
26. How much involvement do you have in each of the following kinds 
of decisions?
MY
OPINION
I AM I AM IN- IS I SHARE I CAN 
NOT FORMED I CAN TAKEN EQUALLY DECIDE 
IN- BEFORE- GIVE MY 
VOLVED HAND OPINION 
a. Improvement in
working conditions 
b. Appoint of a new 
department head 
c. Hiring new 
employees 
d. Making a major
capital investment
e. Having more training
programs during
work time
f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done 
g. Changing the ven 
dors or displays 
h. Their working hours 
i. Shutting down the 
store
67
68
I  
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 
1
1
BEF RE 
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3 
3
3
INTO
ACCOUNT
4
4
4
4
4
4
4 
4
4
IN 
DECISIONS
5
5
5
5
5
5
5 
5
5
ON MY 
OWN
6
6
6
6
6
6
6 
6
69
70
71
72
73
74
75 
76
6 77 
CODE #78-80
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27. How much involvement do department heads have 
following kinds of decisions?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g-
h.
i.
Improvement in
working conditions
Appointment of a
new department head
Hiring new
employees
Making a major
capital investment
Having more training
programs during
work time
Assigning tasks that
have to be done
Changing the ven 
dors or displays
Their working hours
Shutting down the
store
THEY
ARE
NOT
IN 
VOLVED
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
THEY
ARE IN 
FORMED
BEFORE 
HAND
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
28. How much involvement do workers have
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
of decisions?
Improvement in
working conditions
Appointment of a
new department head
Hiring new
employees
Making a major
capital investment
Having more training
programs during
work time
THEY
ARE
NOT
IN 
VOLVED
1
1
1
1
1
THEY
ARE IN 
FORMED
BEFORE 
HAND
2
2
2
2
2
THEY
GIVE
THEIR
OPINION
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
in each of the 
THEIR
OPINIONS
ARE
TAKEN
INTO
ACCOUNT
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
THEY
SHARE
EQUALLY
IN
DECISIONS
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
CARD #2 
COLUMN # 
ID# 1-10
THEY
DECIDE
ON
THEIR
OWN
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
in each of the following kinds
THEY
GIVE
THEIR
OPINION
3
3
3
3
3
THEIR
OPINIONS
ARE
TAKEN
INTO
ACCOUNT
4
4
4
4
4
THEY
SHARE
EQUALLY
IN
DECISIONS
5
5
5
5
5
THEY
DECIDE
ON
THEIR
OWN
6
6
6
6
6
20
21
22
23
24
319
f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done 1 2 3 4 5 6 25
g. Changing the ven 
dors or displays 1 2 3 4 5 6 26
h. Their working hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 27
i. Shutting down the
store 1 2 3 4 5 6 28
29. What percent of your workers ACTUALLY participate in decision making 
in the store?
VERY OFTEN PARTICIPATE _____% 29-30
OCCASIONALLY PARTICIPATE _____% 31-32
RARELY PARTICIPATE _____% 33-34
NEVER PARTICIPATE _____% 35-36
100%
30. Which of these consequences have occurred because of your QWL 
(For O&O—O&O) system of decision making?
DEFINITELY NOT DEFINITELY YES 
a. People know more about
what goes on here 1 2 3 4 5 37 
b. People are more willing to
accept decisions 1 2 3 4 5 38 
c. The quality of decisions has
increased 1 2 3 4 5 39 
d. It takes longer to make
decisions 1 2 3 4 5 40 
e. There is more trust between
the manager and the
employees 1 2 3 4 5 41 
f. Disagreements are talked
about more openly 1 2 3 4 5 42 
g. Disagreements are more
easily resolved 1 2 3 4 5 43
IV. INNOVATIONS
31. To what extent have jobs or duties that people perform changed since 1982?
12345 
NO CHANGE A GREAT DEAL
OF CHANGE 44
32. To what extent have new methods for doing things in a supermarket 
been used in this store since 1982?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 45
33. To what extent have new kinds of supermarket equipment been used 
in this store since 1982?
12345 
NONE A GREAT DEAL 46
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V. STORE FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Please base the first four answers to each question on figures from the most recent four quarters. 
That is, the data should include October 1, 1983 to September 31, 1984. Remember all of this 
data will be kept confidential and is intended to help you.
Oct. 1, Jan. 1, Aprill, July 1,
1983 to 1984 to 1984 to 1984 to
Dec. 31, March 31, June 30, Sept. 31,
1983 1984 1984 1984
34. What was your sales
volume? $ _____ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
35. What was the total cost of
goods sold? $ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
36. What was your store's net
income? $ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ _______
37. What were your operating
expenses? $______$______$______$______
38. What was your total payroll
expenditure? $ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
39. What was your total cash
flow? $ _____ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
40. What was the total value of
your assets? $ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______ 
41 How much did you spend
on capital improvements? $ ______ $ _______ $ ______ $ ______
42. What was the average
TOTAL # of employee
hours worker per week? $ ______ $ ______ $ _____ $ ______
44. If your business should slump temporarily, how likely is it that you would do each of the 
following things? Please circle 1 number for each statement then go back and rank order 
the top 10 things you would do: l=the first and 10=the last.
RANK EXTREMELY EXTREMELY 
ORDER UNLIKELY LIKELY 
______ a. Reduce hours of full time
workers 1 2 3 4 5 11 
_____ b. Reduce hours of part time
workers 1 2 3 4 5 12 
_____ c. Reduce the # of full time
workers 1 2 3 4 5 13 
_____ d. Reduce the # of part time
workers 1 2 3 4 5 14 
_____ e. Bargain to reduce wages 12345 15
_____ f. Change product mix 1 2 3 4 5 16 
_____ g. Reduce advertising/specials 12345 17 
_____ h. Increase advertising/specials 1 2 3 4 5 18
_____ i. Reduce coupons 12345 19 
_____ j. Draw from savings/checking 1 2 3 4 5 20
_____ k. Sell liquid assets 1 2 3 4 5 21
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_____ 1. Borrow from the bank 1 2 3 4 5 22 
_____ m. Reduce wages of owners 1 2 3 4 5 23 
_____ n. Other ____________ 1 2 3 4 5 24
identify 
_____ o. Other ___________ 1 2 3 4 5 25
identify
DID YOU REMEMBER TO RANK YOUR TOP 10? 28-47
VI. CONSULTING
45. Since March 1982, have you ever had a consultant assist you or your employees in im 
proving your store operations?
1 2 
NO YES
If so, how many hours of consulting time did you receive from each of the following sources 
in each topic area?
JOB STORE 
OR GROUP OPERAT- 
SKILL- QWL PROCESS ING 
TRAIN- TRAIN- TRAIN- PRAC- FINAN-
ING ING ING TICES CIAL LEGAL OTHER 
a. A&P _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
b. PACE
(Sherman Kreiner
Andy Lamas) _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
c. GREY AREAS
(Jay Guben &
Merry Guben) _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
d. IGA _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
e. PALM
(John Good) _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
f. UFCW 1357 _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
g. UFCW 56 _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
h. OTHER _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
i. OTHER _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
j. OTHER _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
(Please specify)
46. How much have workers learned about each of the following things 
since the A&P shutdown?
NOTHING A GREAT DEAL 
a. Confidence in handling problems
that arise in the store 12345 
b. Willingness to speak up in
meetings 12345 
c. How to work on a team 12345 
d. How to influence others 12345 
e. Feeling responsible for their work 12345 
f. How to supervise others 12345
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g. How to listen to others' opinions 1234
h. How to perform a new job 12345
i. How to perform new skills for 
their same job (advertising, pric 
ing, scheduling, etc.) 12345
j. How QWL (For O&O—Worker
Ownership) works 12345
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. PLEASE SEAL YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE IN 
THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AND MAIL. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, CALL DR. 
JUDITH GOODE, 787-7773.
Appendix I
Mean Differences on Major Study Variables Among Store
Managers, Shop Stewards, Full-Time Workers, and Part-Time Workers
In the Six Stores Studied Intensively
Study variables
Mean responses of 
___________1__________ Significant
Store Shop Full-time Part-time differences 
managers stewards workers workers (p <.05)
Workers' Opinions Considered1 4.04 3.23 3.53 2.32 a,b,c,d,f
Perceived Degree of Influence:2
Workers as a Group 3.54 2.76 3.09 2.24 a,b,d,e 
Department Heads 4.42 3.60 4.17 3.50 a,b 
Store Managers 4.65 4.54 4.69 4.3 d 
Board 4.46 4.24 4.38 4.09 -
Worker Involvement in: 3
Improving Work Conditions 3.72 3.04 4.09 2.19 a,b,d,e,f
Appointing Department Head 1.92 1.96 3.10 1.26 b,c,d,e,f
Hiring Workers 1.84 1.65 3.22 1.30 b,c,e
Making Major Capital Investment 1.28 1.54 2.47 1.25 b,c,e
Having More Work Training 1.14 1.25 1.67 1.19 b,d,e
Assigning Daily Tasks 2.40 1.92 5.14 3.02 b,c,e,f
Changing Vendors or Display 2.36 3.00 3.57 1.75 b,c,e
Setting Working Hours 2.40 2.15 4.21 1.77 b,c,e
Shutting Down the Store 1.48 1.79 2.64 1.30 b,c,e
Consequences of QWL (Worker Ownership): 4
People Know More
People Are More Willing to
Accept Decisions
Quality of Decision Increased
Takes Longer to Make Decisions
More Trust Between Manager
and Worker
Disagreements Are Talked About
More Openly
Disagreements Are More Easily
Resolved
Workers Encouraged to Attend
Store QWL Meetings5
4.24
3.80
4.08
3.00
4.44
4.28
4.12
3.76
3.40
3.28
3.12
2.88
3.32
3.48
3.52
3.76
3.75
3.60
3.56
3.22
3.65
4.07
3.60
3.55
2.51
2.55
2.45
2.64
2.61
2.75
2.48
2.57
a,d,e,f
b,d,f
a,b,d,f
b
a,b,c,d,f
a,b,d,f
b,d,f
b,d,f
LEGEND: a=Store Managers vs. Shop Stewards. b=Full-Time vs. Part-Time 
Workers. c=Store Managers vs. Full-Time Workers. d=Store Managers vs. Part-Time 
Workers. e=Shop Stewards vs. Full-Time Workers. f=Shop Stewards vs. Part-Time Workers.
NOTES:
1. Responses range from 1 Not At All to 5 A Great Deal.
2. Responses range from 1 Very Little Say to 5 Very Much Say.
3. Responses range from 1 Not Involved to 5 Own Decision.
4. Responses range from 1 Definitely Not to 5 Definitely Yes.
5. Responses range from 1 Never to 5 Always.
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Appendix J
Comparison of Mean Responses Between Stores Where Interviews 
Were Held and Stores Where No Interviews Were Held
Store managers responses in QWL stores
Interviewed Non-interviewed
Actual Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Ideal Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Stores 
(n=2)
4.50
5.00
4.50
5.00
4.50
5.00
4.00
4.00
Stores 
(n=ll)
2.73
4.00
4.64
4.27
3.45
4.27
4.82
4.27
Union stewards responses
f-value 2-tail P
2.81
5.24
0.26
3.07
1.82
3.07
1.49
0.27
in QWL stores
0.11
0.00
0.84
0.01
0.21
0.01
0.17
0.83
Interviewed Non-interviewed
Actual Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Ideal Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Stores
(n=2)
3.50
4.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
4.50
Stores
(n=ll) f-value 2-tail P
3.09
3.91
4.64
4.18
3.91
4.45
4.82
4.00
0.27
1.00
1.79
0.55
0.09
0.08
1.00
0.83
0.84
0.42
0.10
0.64
0.94
0.94
0.34
0.49
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Appendix J (continued)
Store managers responses in non-QWL stores
Actual Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Ideal Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Interviewed
Stores
(n=2)
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50
Non-interviewed
Stores
(n=8)
4.00
4.63
4.64
4.38
4.38
4.63
4.63
3.75
Union stewards responses
Actual Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Ideal Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Interviewed
(n=2)
2.50
3.00
4.00
5.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
Non-interviewed
(n=7)
1.86
2.86
4.38
3.86
4.29
4.43
4.50
4.14
f-value
0.73
0.22
0.22
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.23
1.03
2-tail P
0.52
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.36
in non-QWL stores
l-value
1.06
0.13
0.37
1.80
0.79
1.44
1.87
0.35
2-tail P
0.34
0.92
0.78
0.12
0.46
0.20
0.10
0.74
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